Recent Articles

Two Case Studies of Successful Strategic Communication Campaigns Dr Thomas P. Galvin Report by the US Army War College, School of Strategic Landpower, US Army War College Press, Strategic Studies Institute "Strategic communication has historically been cited as a weakness in U.S. military operations, both at the operational and strategic levels. Numerous studies have highlighted problems with U.S. abilities to promote a coherent message and influence the environment to be favorable to its strategic interests. Failures are easy to identify. The effects of poor communication can manifest themselves quickly; however, what about successes? Rarely are they discussed, perhaps because it is difficult to know when a campaign achieved enough of the desired effects such that leaders can claim success."

Riding the Hydra: How the Army Enterprise Went to War 2001-2007 Dr Conrad C Crane, Dr Michael E Lynch, Shane P. Reilly Historical Research Review by US Army War College, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center "The history of the U.S. Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom is replete with tactical and operational studies, and the shifts in strategy are well documented. The Chief of Staff of the Army’s (CSA) official study, The U.S. Army in the Iraq War, provides an excellent analysis of the operational level of war. “Riding the Hydra,” however, examines the institutional Army, specifically the Army staff, and its efforts to prepare the Army for war."

Learning the Lessons of Lethality: The Army's Cycle of Basic Combat Training, 1918-2019 Dr Conrad C Crane, Dr Michael E Lynch, Shane P. Reilly, Jessica J. Sheets Historical Research Review by US Army War College, Army Heritage and Education Center "This study analyzes the initial entry training programs for Army inductees for the last 100 years, to identify the patterns that have shaped that training. Technology has changed over the years, and training has adapted, but technological change has been a less important factor than the oscillation between wartime and peacetime methodologies. Changes in technology have not changed the core functions in which the Army trains its new Soldiers: lethality and survivability. The unvarying trend for the last century shows an increase in lethality and survivability skills after the nation enters combat, often learning harsh lessons. As soon as the conflict ends, however, the training emphasis reflexively moves back toward garrison-type activities..."

A History of the Army's Future: 1990-2018 v 2.0 Dr Conrad C Crane, Dr Michael E Lynch, Shane P. Reilly Historical Research Review by US Army War College, Army Heritage and Education Center "The establishment of Army Futures Command (AFC) in August 2018 was the most significant change to the Institutional Army in a generation, and it signaled the value the Army placed on studying the future. While the establishment of a new four star headquarters might be seen as a bold move, it was in reality the culmination of 30 years of future development in the Army. Those three decades saw the development of numerous structures designed to examine the potential for future concepts and technology, with uneven success. The processes were good, but technological overreach, and over 20 years of war in the Middle East, doomed most efforts to put useful concepts into practice..."

What Next for Russia’s Front-Line States? Mr Keir Giles Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) considers that this Letort Paper provides a useful assessment of the continuities and changes in the foreign policy posture of Russia’s front-line states following Russia’s intervention in Ukraine in 2014. As a British scholar on Russia, Keir Giles explains that Moscow already voiced its opposition when the Baltic States accessed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2004, and the color revolutions presented a democratization model on Russia’s doorstep. However, at that time, Russia did not possess the confidence or the capability to counter what it perceived as Western expansionism by using direct military action."

Implications of Service Cyberspace Component Commands for Army Cyberspace Operations Mr Jeffrey L Caton Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "The 2018 National Defense Strategy admonishes the Department of Defense (DoD) to invest in the continued development and integration of cyber capabilities into joint military operations. In this monograph, Mr. Jeffrey Caton examines the current paradigm of how the service cyberspace component commands operate as a mixture of common joint practices and service-unique means and methods. His research was completed in September 2017; thus, it does not address the May 2018 elevation of U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) to a unified command, or that all Air Force Cyber Command’s (AFCYBER’s) Cyber Mission Force (CMF) teams achieved full operational capability in 2018."

Contemporary Chemical Weapons Use in Syria and Iraq by the Assad Regime and the Islamic State Dr Robert J Bunker Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "Chemical weapons remain a component of the 21st-century battlefield even though the international community has attempted to ban them from the arsenals of both state and nonstate actors. They have been referred to as the poor man’s atomic bomb, as have biological weapons, another form of nonnuclear weapons of mass destruction. While chemical weapons do not have the destructive power of strategic—or even tactical—nuclear warheads, they are far easier to acquire or produce and are able to generate a terror factor even when their use is merely threatened."

“Come As You Are” War: U.S. Readiness for the Korean Conflict Dr Conrad C Crane, Dr Michael E Lynch, Shane P. Reilly, Jessica J. Sheets Historical Research Review by US Army War College, Army Heritage and Education Center "Task Force Smith at the beginning of the Korean War has often been used as a metaphor for military unreadiness. While the story of that first US action of the war provides a timeless cautionary tale for commanders, the story of unreadiness for war in June 1950 went much further than the tactical failures of one infantry battalion. The lack of readiness was caused by a very disruptive interwar period that saw drastic and often chaotic changes to Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P)."

Communication Campaigning: Primer for Senior Leaders Dr Thomas P. Galvin Publication by the US Army War College, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, School of Strategic Landpower, US Army War College Press, Strategic Studies Institute "Strategic communication is both an art and a science, a malleable hybrid process that makes achieving consensus on the best organizational approach to a communications campaign difficult to achieve. Too often, national and military leaders favor the science, and deliver messages that are rational in their construction but uninspiring to stakeholders and members of the organization alike. But too much artistry is also a problem. If the message is not grounded in the identity of the organization, it fails to be authentic or motivating..."