Recent Articles

Closer Than you Think - The Implications of the Third Offset Strategy for the US Army Samuel R. White, Jr. Report by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "In support of the Army’s examination of the Third Offset, the U.S. Army War College conducted a 6-month project employing faculty and student researchers to study the potential impact of the DoD’s Third Offset Strategy on the Army. The study team examined the Third Offset Strategy from a strategic perspective. Ultimately, the study is designed to help the Army understand the influence of the Third Offset capabilities on the character of warfare and the implications of these capabilities for the Army and Landpower. This understanding may then help inform decisions in research and development, as well as leader development, training, and organizations."

Toward a NATO of the Gulf? The Challenges of Collective Defense Within the GCC Dr Jean-Loup Samaan Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "The stability of the Gulf remains a priority of U.S. national security interests. Because of its importance both politically and economically, the region is and should likely remain a critical area for U.S. Armed Forces in the near future. But if for a long time, the Gulf Arab kingdoms seemed to be passive actors of their own region―leaving either Iran, Iraq, or Western powers to shape the power plays―they now reached an unprecedented level of strategic ambition. As evidenced by their active diplomatic agendas in the Middle East and their increased military involvement in regional crises, the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are now players that matter."

Strategic Landscape, 2050: Preparing the U.S. Military for New Era Dynamics Mr Roman Muzalevsky Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "Assessing longer term trends may seem like a manageable task. But in the world of rapid technological innovations and growing complexity, it turns into a more difficult enterprise. Yet this is what Mr. Roman Muzalevsky, a strategic affairs analyst, achieves in his visionary assessment of a strategic landscape and operational threat environment likely to emerge by 2050."

The Clash of the Trinities: A New Theoretical Analysis of the General Nature of War MAJ Daniel D. Maurer Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "Major Daniel Maurer begins assembling his framework by respectfully questioning the received wisdom that Clausewitz was the last and most comprehensive word on the subject of war’s underlying nature. First, despite some common ground regarding the relevance of war’s political basis, he finds no consensus (no “unified field theory”) among practitioners, presidents, political scientists, sociologists, or historians—from Clausewitz to Wylie to Keegan—that satisfactorily accounts for all of war’s varying shades, and which legitimately recognizes its basic elemental components, its evolving character, and the “Why?” that animates or inspires parties to engage in conflict."

Building Partner Capacity in Africa: Keys to Success Prof Frank L Jones Book by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "U.S. interests in Africa have expanded in the past decade beyond such traditional areas as economic development through trade and investment, democratic governance and the rule of law, and conflict prevention with an emphasis on peacekeeping and rapid response capacities. The continent is now at the center of a number of critical security issues."

Strategic Insights: Lost in Translation Dr M Chris Mason Article by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press The type of wars being fought since the end of World War II has changed dramatically from those fought in the first half of the 20th century and before. Wars fought between countries have dropped in number to nearly zero, while the number of wars fought inside individual countries has risen dramatically.

What Should the U.S. Army Learn From History? Recovery From a Strategy Deficit Dr Colin S Gray Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "This monograph examines the potential utility of history as a source of education and possible guidance for the U.S. Army. The author considers the worth in the claim that since history (more accurately termed the past) is all done and gone, it can have no value for today as we try to look forward. This point of view did not find much favor here. The monograph argues that although history does not repeat itself in detail, it certainly does so roughly in parallel circumstances. Of course, much detail differs from one historical case to another, but nonetheless, there are commonly broad and possibly instructive parallels that can be drawn from virtually every period of history, concerning most circumstances."

Strategic Insights: U.S.-China Relations: Avoiding the Traps Prof John F Troxell Article by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press

Ends, Means, Ideology, and Pride: Why the Axis Lost and What We Can Learn from Its Defeat Dr Jeffrey Record Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "Why did the Axis Powers lose World War II, and what can we learn from its defeat? The Axis seemed on top of the world until 1941, when it added to its list of enemies the United States and the Soviet Union. The entry of Russia and America into the war decisively tipped the balance against Germany, Italy, and Japan. Resource-rich Russia and the United States were prepared for protracted conflict, whereas the Axis was not. From Pearl Harbor onward, it is difficult to imagine how the Axis could have avoided the fate that befell it, short of Stalin’s defection from the Allied side."