Recent Articles

 
  •  Learning the Lessons of Lethality: The Army's Cycle of Basic Combat Training, 1918-2019

    Learning the Lessons of Lethality: The Army's Cycle of Basic Combat Training, 1918-2019

    Learning the Lessons of Lethality: The Army's Cycle of Basic Combat Training, 1918-2019 Dr Conrad C Crane, Dr Michael E Lynch, Shane P. Reilly, Jessica J. Sheets Historical Research Review by US Army War College, Army Heritage and Education Center "This study analyzes the initial entry training programs for Army inductees for the last 100 years, to identify the patterns that have shaped that training. Technology has changed over the years, and training has adapted, but technological change has been a less important factor than the oscillation between wartime and peacetime methodologies. Changes in technology have not changed the core functions in which the Army trains its new Soldiers: lethality and survivability. The unvarying trend for the last century shows an increase in lethality and survivability skills after the nation enters combat, often learning harsh lessons. As soon as the conflict ends, however, the training emphasis reflexively moves back toward garrison-type activities..."
    • Published On: 2/22/2019
  •  A History of the Army's Future: 1990-2018 v 2.0

    A History of the Army's Future: 1990-2018 v 2.0

    A History of the Army's Future: 1990-2018 v 2.0 Dr Conrad C Crane, Dr Michael E Lynch, Shane P. Reilly Historical Research Review by US Army War College, Army Heritage and Education Center "The establishment of Army Futures Command (AFC) in August 2018 was the most significant change to the Institutional Army in a generation, and it signaled the value the Army placed on studying the future. While the establishment of a new four star headquarters might be seen as a bold move, it was in reality the culmination of 30 years of future development in the Army. Those three decades saw the development of numerous structures designed to examine the potential for future concepts and technology, with uneven success. The processes were good, but technological overreach, and over 20 years of war in the Middle East, doomed most efforts to put useful concepts into practice..."
    • Published On: 2/22/2019
  •  Riding the Hydra: How the Army Enterprise Went to War 2001-2007

    Riding the Hydra: How the Army Enterprise Went to War 2001-2007

    Riding the Hydra: How the Army Enterprise Went to War 2001-2007 Dr Conrad C Crane, Dr Michael E Lynch, Shane P. Reilly Historical Research Review by US Army War College, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center "The history of the U.S. Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom is replete with tactical and operational studies, and the shifts in strategy are well documented. The Chief of Staff of the Army’s (CSA) official study, The U.S. Army in the Iraq War, provides an excellent analysis of the operational level of war. “Riding the Hydra,” however, examines the institutional Army, specifically the Army staff, and its efforts to prepare the Army for war."
    • Published On: 2/22/2019
  •  What Next for Russia’s Front-Line States?

    What Next for Russia’s Front-Line States?

    What Next for Russia’s Front-Line States? Mr Keir Giles Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) considers that this Letort Paper provides a useful assessment of the continuities and changes in the foreign policy posture of Russia’s front-line states following Russia’s intervention in Ukraine in 2014. As a British scholar on Russia, Keir Giles explains that Moscow already voiced its opposition when the Baltic States accessed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2004, and the color revolutions presented a democratization model on Russia’s doorstep. However, at that time, Russia did not possess the confidence or the capability to counter what it perceived as Western expansionism by using direct military action."
    • Published On: 2/22/2019
  •  Implications of Service Cyberspace Component Commands for Army Cyberspace Operations

    Implications of Service Cyberspace Component Commands for Army Cyberspace Operations

    Implications of Service Cyberspace Component Commands for Army Cyberspace Operations Mr Jeffrey L Caton Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "The 2018 National Defense Strategy admonishes the Department of Defense (DoD) to invest in the continued development and integration of cyber capabilities into joint military operations. In this monograph, Mr. Jeffrey Caton examines the current paradigm of how the service cyberspace component commands operate as a mixture of common joint practices and service-unique means and methods. His research was completed in September 2017; thus, it does not address the May 2018 elevation of U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) to a unified command, or that all Air Force Cyber Command’s (AFCYBER’s) Cyber Mission Force (CMF) teams achieved full operational capability in 2018."
    • Published On: 2/15/2019
  •  Contemporary Chemical Weapons Use in Syria and Iraq by the Assad Regime and the Islamic State

    Contemporary Chemical Weapons Use in Syria and Iraq by the Assad Regime and the Islamic State

    Contemporary Chemical Weapons Use in Syria and Iraq by the Assad Regime and the Islamic State Dr Robert J Bunker Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "Chemical weapons remain a component of the 21st-century battlefield even though the international community has attempted to ban them from the arsenals of both state and nonstate actors. They have been referred to as the poor man’s atomic bomb, as have biological weapons, another form of nonnuclear weapons of mass destruction. While chemical weapons do not have the destructive power of strategic—or even tactical—nuclear warheads, they are far easier to acquire or produce and are able to generate a terror factor even when their use is merely threatened."
    • Published On: 2/7/2019
  •  “Come As You Are” War: U.S. Readiness for the Korean Conflict

    “Come As You Are” War: U.S. Readiness for the Korean Conflict

    “Come As You Are” War: U.S. Readiness for the Korean Conflict Dr Conrad C Crane, Dr Michael E Lynch, Shane P. Reilly, Jessica J. Sheets Historical Research Review by US Army War College, Army Heritage and Education Center "Task Force Smith at the beginning of the Korean War has often been used as a metaphor for military unreadiness. While the story of that first US action of the war provides a timeless cautionary tale for commanders, the story of unreadiness for war in June 1950 went much further than the tactical failures of one infantry battalion. The lack of readiness was caused by a very disruptive interwar period that saw drastic and often chaotic changes to Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P)."
    • Published On: 2/6/2019
  •  Communication Campaigning: Primer for Senior Leaders

    Communication Campaigning: Primer for Senior Leaders

    Communication Campaigning: Primer for Senior Leaders Dr Thomas P. Galvin Publication by the US Army War College, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, School of Strategic Landpower, US Army War College Press, Strategic Studies Institute "Strategic communication is both an art and a science, a malleable hybrid process that makes achieving consensus on the best organizational approach to a communications campaign difficult to achieve. Too often, national and military leaders favor the science, and deliver messages that are rational in their construction but uninspiring to stakeholders and members of the organization alike. But too much artistry is also a problem. If the message is not grounded in the identity of the organization, it fails to be authentic or motivating..."
    • Published On: 2/1/2019
  •  Operationalizing R2P: An Integrated Approach for the Responsibility to Protect

    Operationalizing R2P: An Integrated Approach for the Responsibility to Protect

    Operationalizing R2P: An Integrated Approach for the Responsibility to Protect Dwight Raymond, Annie Su PKSOI Paper by US Army War College, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute "This paper discusses the two prominent frameworks for the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which refers to the obligation of states toward their populations and toward all populations at risk of genocide and other mass atrocity crimes. The 2001 R2P report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty presented three phases for R2P (prevent, react, rebuild)..."
    • Published On: 2/1/2019
  •  Examining the Roles of Army Reserve Component Forces in Military Cyberspace Operations

    Examining the Roles of Army Reserve Component Forces in Military Cyberspace Operations

    Examining the Roles of Army Reserve Component Forces in Military Cyberspace Operations Mr Jeffrey L Caton Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "The legacy of the Citizen Soldier concept in the United States predates the U.S. Constitution. Today, those serving in the oldest form of service to our Nation are called upon to address one of the newest manifestations of warfare in the realm of military cyberspace operations. What capabilities can Reserve component forces bring to Department of Defense (DoD) cyberspace forces? What opportunities and challenges surround the integration of these forces into a still-evolving joint cyberspace force? What are the expectations for cyber forces that serve in a militia capacity?"
    • Published On: 1/31/2019
  •  Scenario Planning and Strategy in the Pentagon

    Scenario Planning and Strategy in the Pentagon

    Scenario Planning and Strategy in the Pentagon Dr Michael Fitzsimmons Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "Students and practitioners of national security policy have long understood that uncertainty about the future is a central challenge of strategy. Scenario planning should be one of the Department of Defense’s (DoD) most important tools for developing strategy under uncertainty. Since 2002, the DoD has employed a formalized, joint scenario planning process to support strategy and force development, but that process has proven less influential than intended for strategic decision-making."
    • Published On: 1/29/2019
  •  The U.S. Army in the Iraq War — Volume 2: Surge and Withdrawal, 2007-2011

    The U.S. Army in the Iraq War — Volume 2: Surge and Withdrawal, 2007-2011

    The U.S. Army in the Iraq War — Volume 2: Surge and Withdrawal, 2007-2011 COL Joel D. Rayburn, COL Frank K. Sobchak Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "In September 2013, then Army Chief of Staff General Raymond T. Odierno directed the Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Study Group to research and write an operational history of the U.S. Army’s experience in the Iraq War from 2003 to 2011. This volume of The U.S. Army in the Iraq War is the second of two fulfilling that task. It tells how the surge counteroffensive in 2007-2008 neutralized both the Sunni insurgency and Shi’a militias, bringing Iraq to its most peaceful and stable state since the invasion. It then describes how, with political support for the war waning, consecutive Presidential administrations began to reduce the number of troops in Iraq while Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and later United States Forces-Iraq (USF-I) worked hurriedly to prepare the Iraqi military to take responsibility for their nation’s security. The speed of the drawdown accelerated significantly after the election of President Barack Obama, culminating in an unexpected complete withdrawal in 2011..."
    • Published On: 1/17/2019
  •  The U.S. Army in the Iraq War – Volume 1: Invasion – Insurgency – Civil War, 2003-2006

    The U.S. Army in the Iraq War – Volume 1: Invasion – Insurgency – Civil War, 2003-2006

    The U.S. Army in the Iraq War – Volume 1: Invasion – Insurgency – Civil War, 2003-2006 COL Joel D. Rayburn, COL Frank K. Sobchak Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "In September 2013, Chief of Staff of the Army General Raymond T. Odierno directed the Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Study Group to research and write an operational history of the U.S. Army’s experience in the Iraq War from 2003 to 2011. This volume, The United States Army in the Iraq War, 2003-2006, is the first of two fulfilling that task. It tells the story of the U.S.-led campaigns to remove Saddam Hussein and his Iraqi Ba’athist regime from power in 2003 and to stabilize the country following those operations. It details the course of the campaigns up to a point in late 2006 when President George W. Bush and other U.S. leaders changed the strategy in Iraq to one that resulted in the “surge” counteroffensive by American troops in 2007–2008. That counteroffensive and the subsequent withdrawal of the coalition forces from Iraq are the subjects of the second volume of this series."
    • Published On: 1/17/2019
  •  Executive Summary: The U.S. Army in the Iraq War, Vol. 1

    Executive Summary: The U.S. Army in the Iraq War, Vol. 1

    Executive Summary: The U.S. Army in the Iraq War, Vol. 1 Colonel Joel D. Rayburn, Colonel Frank K. Sobchak with Lieutenant Colonel Jeanne F. Godfroy, Colonel Matthew D. Morton, Colonel James S. Powell, Lieutenant Colonel Matthew M. Zai Document by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "The U.S. Army in the Iraq War was commissioned by Chief of Staff of the Army General Raymond Odierno in 2013 to serve as the initial Army’s operational level history of the conflict. While he instructed that the review should be held to the same academic and evidentiary requirements of previous historical studies, other aspects would be fundamentally different. Believing that a classified review of the war would not be circulated sufficiently to engender organizational learning and change, General Odierno directed that the final product should be a readable, unclassified narrative."
    • Published On: 1/17/2019
  •  Executive Summary: The U.S. Army in the Iraq War, Vol. 2

    Executive Summary: The U.S. Army in the Iraq War, Vol. 2

    Executive Summary: The U.S. Army in the Iraq War, Vol. 2 Colonel Joel D. Rayburn, Colonel Frank K. Sobchak, with Lieutenant Colonel Jeanne F. Godfroy, Colonel Matthew D. Morton, Colonel James S. Powell, Lieutenant Colonel Matthew M. Zais Document by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "The U.S. Army in the Iraq War was commissioned by Chief of Staff of the Army General Raymond Odierno in 2013 to serve as the initial Army’s operational level history of the conflict. While he instructed that the review should be held to the same academic and evidentiary requirements of previous historical studies, other aspects would be fundamentally different. Believing that a classified review of the war would not be circulated sufficiently to engender organizational learning and change, General Odierno directed that the final product should be a readable, unclassified narrative."
    • Published On: 1/17/2019
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