Recent Articles

2010 Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL) Antulio J. Echevarria II Document by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL) is published annually to make students and other researchers aware of strategic topics that are, or should be, of particular concern to the Department of Defense and the U.S. Army. The list is a compilation of input from the faculty at the U.S. Army War College as well as input from subject matter experts across the field of strategic studies. The topics reflect current as well as longer-term strategic issues, and are revised as the changing security environment warrants. This hard copy document is supplemented by a more expansive online research topic database which is updated in real time. Researchers are encouraged to contact any of the faculty members of the Strategic Studies Institute listed herein for further information regarding possible topics."

U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Vol II: National Security Policy and Strategy, 4th Edition Dr J Boone Bartholomees Jr Book by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute

Project on National Security Reform: Vision Working Group Report and Scenarios Dr Sheila R Ronis Book by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "On November 26, 2008, the Project on National Security Reform submitted its 2-year study of the national security system, Forging a New Shield, to the President, President-elect, and Congress. The study found that the national security system was at risk of failure and needed serious reform. Before the Project finalized the report’s recommendations, its Vision Working Group tested the findings against a diverse set of scenarios to determine if the recommendations were robust and effective. This testing revealed that each of the five major findings improved the performance of the current national security system. This volume documents the scenario-testing process used by the Vision Working Group. It includes the actual pre-reform and post-reform scenarios and details many other scenario techniques used in the overall study."

Organizing to Compete in the Political Terrain Dr Nadia Schadlow Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The degree to which military forces can and should shape the political landscape during war—that is, who rules contested territory—is at the root of several ongoing debates about how to restructure the U.S. Army. It is an issue that is central to striking the appropriate balance between civilian and military assets in stabilization and reconstruction operations, and it is key to determining how much to shift the Army toward so-called irregular war as opposed to so-called conventional capabilities. Decisions about the military’s appropriate role in shaping political outcomes in war are fundamental to resolving these debates and will determine the degree of organizational and educational changes that the United States Army must make to meet current and future security threats. "

Strategic Leadership Primer: 3rd Edition Dr Stephen J Gerras Publication by the US Army War College, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, School of Strategic Landpower, US Army War College Press, Strategic Studies Institute "General Marshall is alleged to have made this observation as he reflected upon his early years as Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) in the beginning months of World War II. Marshall apparently believed his previous education, training, and experience had not adequately prepared him for high-level leadership As the CSA, his success depended upon his ability to persuade influential people and organizations, both in and out of government, to employ their efforts on behalf of his vision of a winning wartime strategy and to mobilize the Army to make that strategy a reality..."

Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE) Colonel John F Agoglia, Michael Dziedzic, Barbara Sotirin Guides and Handbooks by the US Army War College, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, United States Institute of Peace, United States Institute of Peace Press "This document constitutes the Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE) Metrics Framework. The Framework is a hierarchical metrics system of outcome-based goals, indicators, and measures. Once collected, the measures can be aggregated to provide indications of trends toward the achievement of stabilization goals over time."

Wanted: A Strategy for the Black Sea Dr Stephen J Blank Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "There exists an extensive literature on the strategic importance of the Black Sea zone. Yet it is difficult to discern whether U.S. policymakers are pursuing a coherent strategy for this crucial region. Although Kyrgyzstan is in Central Asia, an adjoining region, events there are symptomatic of this strategic challenge. Not only did our embassy in Kyrgyzstan repeat the mistake the United States made in Iran by being excessively attached to the reigning government and insufficiently attuned to other opposing sociopolitical groups, its actions during the April 2009 upheaval were inadequate, even though it had forewarning of that event."

The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China's Military Mr Roy Kamphausen, Dr David Lai, Dr Andrew Scobell Book by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The final years of the 2000s turned out to be quite eventful for the People’s Republic of China (PRC and China interchangeably) and its armed forces, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). While there were exciting events for them to celebrate, there were disturbing ones for them to worry about as well."

Endgame for the West in Afghanistan? Explaining the Decline in Support for the War in Afghanistan in the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, France and Germany Mr Charles A Miller Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Domestic support for the war is often mentioned as one of the key battlegrounds of the Afghan conflict. A variety of explanations have been put forward in the media and in the political realm to explain why this war, which once commanded overwhelming popular support in almost all participating countries, is now opposed by a majority, even in the United States itself. Casualties, lack of equitable multilateral burden sharing, confused and shifting rationales on the part of the political leadership for the war and a “contagion” effect from the unpopularity of the Iraq war have all been cited at one time or another."