Schools for Strategy: Teaching Strategy for 21st Century Conflict Dr Colin S Gray Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Because strategic performance must involve the ability to decide, to command, and to lead, as well as the capacity to understand, there are practical limits to what is feasible and useful by way of formal education in strategy. The soldier who best comprehends what Sun-tzu, Clausewitz, and Thucydides intended to say, is not necessarily the soldier best fitted to strategic high command. It is important to distinguish between intellect and character/personality. The superior strategist is ever uniquely a product of nature/biology, personality/psychology, and experience/opportunity. Nonetheless, formal education has its place."

Talent: Implications for a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy LTC Michael J Colarusso, COL David S Lyle, COL Casey Wardynski Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In Towards a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success: A Proposed Human Capital Model Focused upon Talent, Colonel Casey Wardynski, Major David Lyle, and Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Michael J. Colarusso made their case for the importance of accessing, developing, retaining, and employing talented leaders. In this current monograph, they go deeper and explore the differences between competent and talented leaders as well as discussing what talents the U.S. Army should seek in its officers. More importantly, they examine the consequences of failing to create an officer talent management system."

YouTube War: Fighting in a World of Cameras in Every Cell Phone and Photoshop on Every Computer Dr Cori E Dauber Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "This monograph, by Dr. Cori E. Dauber, argues that terrorist attacks today are often media events in a second sense: information and communication technologies have developed to such a point that these groups can film, edit, and upload their own attacks within minutes of staging them, whether the Western media are present or not. In this radically new information environment, the enemy is no longer dependent upon the traditional media. This is, she argues, the 'YouTube War.' "

War's Second Grammar Dr Antulio J Echevarria II Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "With the publication of FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, the U.S. military officially embraced a second grammar of war. As an official statement of counterinsurgency doctrine, these manuals have received their share of criticism and praise, neither of which will be repeated here. Instead, the purpose of this opinion piece is to suggest that, no matter how different war’s second grammar is from its first, it is still a grammar. To be sure, holding true to good grammar contributes immensely to favorable outcomes in war. However, even an exquisite grammar cannot save a dubious logic; nor can it encompass all factors that contribute to military success."

The Army's Professional Military Ethic in an Era of Persistent Conflict Major Paul Oh, Dr Don M Snider, Major Kevin Toner Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In the series forward, General Casey challenges us to deeply study the richness of the Army professional Ethic formed over our 234 year history, the last 35 years of which comprised as an all-volunteer professional force. Dr. Snider and his fellow authors take on General Casey’s challenge and engage in vibrant and thoughtful dialog about our profession and our PME. They call us toward a deeper understanding of what it means to be a professional, to be part of a professional body, and our responsibilities to that body and to the nation it serves in continuing to advance our Ethic."

Guide to Rebuilding Public Sector Services in Stability Operations: A Role for the Military Mr Derick W Brinkerhoff, Mr Richard Hill, Mr Ronald W Johnson, Prof Susan Merrill Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "This paper provides guidance helpful to U.S. peacekeeping personnel in planning and executing stability operations tasks related to restoration of public sector services and infrastructure. It is designed to supplement existing and emerging guidance, and is specifically relevant to addressing the needs of public sector rebuilding in a post-conflict situation by peacekeeping forces. The material presented here draws both from theory and analytic frameworks and from on-the-ground experience of practitioners."

Congressional Gridlock, Town Hall Vitriol...and the Information Dennis M Murphy Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "Speed, access to news, connectivity…. The information age, as Thomas Friedman likes to remind us, has made the world flat. From many perspectives, that’s good news. You can access news from anywhere, at any time with a click of a mouse. You have the capability to watch literally hundreds of television channels, in multiple languages from the comfort of your couch. You can listen to rock, jazz, metal or classical music without interruption driving from coast to coast…or you can listen to talk radio a mind-numbing 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. And the future will only bring more capability, more options, and more information."

National Security Strategy Reform: Rebalancing the President's Agenda Dr Robert H Dorff Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The common wisdom about presidential success in achieving major goals is simple: Focus on only one or at most two major initiatives. Presidents who try to accomplish too much risk accomplishing nothing, and multiple agenda items distract the team from “staying on message” providing ample opportunity for opponents to undermine the efforts."

Mind-Sets and Missiles: a First Hand Account of the Cuban Missile Crisis Mr Kenneth Michael Absher Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "This Letort Paper provides a detailed chronology and analysis of the intelligence failures and successes of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The author, Mr. Kenneth Absher, contends that, when our national security is at stake, the United States should not hesitate to undertake risky intelligence collection operations, including espionage, to penetrate our adversary’s deceptions. At the same time, the United States must also understand that our adversary may not believe the gravity of our policy warnings or may not allow its own agenda to be influenced by U.S. diplomatic pressure."