A National Security Staff for the 21st Century Dr Jack A LeCuyer Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "America stands at a crossroads. Within the past 2 decades, national security and foreign policy organizations and experts have perceived serious deficiencies in the authorities, organizations, and personnel used to prepare for and conduct national security missions allowing the United States to exercise its power to fullest advantage in achieving the goals of our national security strategy. If the nation is to maintain its world leadership and influence, it must transform its obsolete national security system to enable better handling of the challenges and opportunities of the changed global ecosystem. This transformation must go beyond simple reform and doing the same things differently. It must involve doing new things that enable us to truly establish collaborative, networked, performance-based management of the national security system at the strategic level, management that cascades down to the departments, agencies, and elements in the field. "

Learning by Doing: The PLA Trains at Home and Abroad Mr. Roy Kamphausen, Dr David Lai, Mr. Travis Tanner Book by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, National Bureau of Asian Research, and United States Pacific Command The judgments in this volume provide unique and valuable insights on how the PLA is adapting its training to its perception of the security environment. This does not just include how it is resourcing, organizing, and training its forces, but also how the PLA thinks about warfare and the threats they currently face. Through participation in international military exercises, as well as peacekeeping operations (PKO) and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) missions abroad, the PLA is gaining greater experience in carrying out a broader spectrum of missions.

Beyond the Battlefield: Institutional Army Transformation Following Victory in Iraq LTC G Scott Taylor Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The U.S. Army goes to great lengths to capture lessons learned and preserve these lessons for current practitioners and future generations. Though the Army is one of the most self-critical organizations found in American society, a well-deserved reputation has also been earned for failing to inculcate those lessons by transforming the institutional Army. Change is achieved through a continuous cycle of adaptive innovation, experimentation, and experience. In Iraq, out of necessity while in contact with a dynamic enemy, the Army transformed on the battlefield with radical changes in doctrine, organization, training, and materiel, which significantly enabled battlefield success."

Jihadist Cells and "IED" Capabilities in Europe: Assessing the Present and Future Threat to the West Dr Jeffrey M Bale Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Western military forces and security and intelligence agencies are justifiably concerned about two phenomena that continue to affect their ongoing asymmetric conflicts with jihadist terrorist organizations: 1) the increasing diffusion and application of expertise acquired by jihadists in fabricating “improvised explosive devices” (IEDs), and 2) the extent to which local jihadist cells in the West may or may not be connected to veteran terrorist groups and networks in other countries and regions. This monograph by Dr. Jeffrey M. Bale argues that these two issues are, in fact, interrelated. Using the March 2004 Madrid train bombings and the two failed July 2006 train bombings near Cologne as contrasting case studies, Bale argues that jihadist cells whose members are linked organizationally, logistically, or operationally to wider terrorist networks, especially ones comprising well-trained and battle-tested operatives, are much more likely to be able to acquire the levels of technical expertise needed to manufacture effective IEDs, carry out devastatingly successful single IED attacks, and perhaps even sustain longer-term IED bombing campaigns."

A "Hollow Army" Reappraised: President Carter, Defense Budgets, and the Politics of Military Readiness Prof Frank L Jones Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The term “hollow army” became a part of the American political vocabulary more than 30 years ago, in another election year, 1980. Highlighted by a reporter in an article about the U.S. Army Chief of Staff’s congressional testimony concerning the fiscal year 1981 defense budget, the term became a metaphor for the Jimmy Carter administration’s alleged neglect of U.S. national security by political opponents as well as disapproving members of his own party in Congress, who believed him to be a liability..."

Russia's Homegrown Insurgency: Jihad in the North Caucasus Dr Stephen J Blank Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The United States has had a bitter set of experiences with insurgencies and counterinsurgency operations, but it is by no means alone in having to confront such threats and challenges. Indeed, according to Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, the greatest domestic threat to Russia’s security is the ongoing insurgency in the North Caucasus. This insurgency grew out of Russia’s wars in Chechnya and has gone on for several years, with no end in sight. Yet it is hardly known in the West and barely covered even by experts. In view of this insurgency’s strategic importance and the fact that the U.S. military can and must learn for other contemporary wars, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) felt the need to bring this war to our readers’ attention and shed more light upon both sides, the Islamist (and nationalist) rebels and Russia, as they wage either an insurgency or counterinsurgency campaign."

State-Building Challenges in a Post-Revolution Libya Dr Mohammed El-Katiri Monographs by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "A peaceful transition to a new form of government in Libya is of vital importance not only to the people of Libya, but to neighboring countries—and to security in the broad sense much farther afield. Yet, at the time of this writing, the new interim leadership remains fragile, with limited capacity and sovereignty, and the inability to enforce security is still a critical challenge. There is a risk of conditions being created that could lead to Libya becoming a fragile or indeed a failed state."

How Nation-States Craft National Security Strategy Documents Dr Alan G Stolberg Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In some manner, shape, or form, every nation state in the international system has a national security strategy or strategies. These strategies are intended to guide the state as it makes its way through the labyrinth of challenges that every nation state faces in the 21st century. The strategy could represent the nation’s overall grand strategy or it could be a national security-related strategy for one particular issue, like force structure development for the armed forces. Strategy making is an art; not a science. Sometimes these strategies work and sometimes they do not. Some are effective and efficient as desired and others are less so..."

The Future of American Landpower: Does Forward Presence Still Matter? The Case of the Army in Europe Dr John R Deni Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In this monograph, Dr. John R. Deni explores the utility of forward presence in Europe, placing the recent decisions—and, in particular, the arguments against forward presence—in the context of a decades-long tradition on the part of many political leaders, scholars, and others to mistakenly tie the forward-basing of U.S. forces to more equal defense burden sharing across the entire North Atlantic alliance. In assessing whether and how forward presence still matters in terms of protecting U.S. interests and achieving U.S. objectives, Dr. Deni bridges the gap between academics and practitioners by grounding his analysis in political science theory while illuminating how forward-basing yields direct, tangible benefits in terms of military operational interoperability..."