Operating in the Gray Zone: An Alternative Paradigm for U.S. Military Strategy Dr Antulio J Echevarria II Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "Recent events in Ukraine, Syria, Iraq, and the South China Sea continue to take interesting, if not surprising, turns. As a result, many security experts are calling for revolutionary measures to address what they wrongly perceive to be a new form of warfare, called “hybrid” or “gray zone” wars, but which is, in fact, an application of classic coercive strategies. These strategies, enhanced by evolving technologies, have exploited a number of weaknesses in the West’s security structures. To remedy one of those weaknesses, namely, the lack of an appropriate planning framework, this monograph suggests a way to re-center the current U.S. campaign-planning paradigm to make it more relevant to contemporary uses of coercive strategies. "

Strategic Insights: Mexico—New Directions, Continuity, and Obstacles in the Fight Against Transnational Organized Crime Dr R Evan Ellis Article by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press

The East Mediterranean Triangle at Crossroads Dr Jean-Loup Samaan Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "For years, the Israel-Turkey partnership was believed to be an anchor of stability in the troubled Middle East. For the United States the two regional players were supposed to pave the way to a regional system, but the collapse of their bilateral relation over the last years has put an end to these expectations. As a result of this crisis between Ankara and Jerusalem, the competition in the East Mediterranean region evolved significantly. Whereas Turkey increased its inflammatory rhetoric against Israel, the latter counterbalanced Turkey‘s position by strengthening ties with two rivals of Ankara: Greece and Cyprus."

Old and New Insurgency Forms Dr Robert J Bunker Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "While the study of insurgency extends well over 100 years and has its origins in the guerrilla and small wars of the 19th century and beyond, almost no cross modal analysis—that is, dedicated insurgency form typology identification—has been conducted. Until the end of the Cold War, the study of insurgency focused primarily on separatist and Marxist derived forms with an emphasis on counterinsurgency practice aimed at those forms rather than on identifying what differences and interrelationships existed. The reason for this is that the decades-long Cold War struggle subsumed many diverse national struggles and tensions into a larger paradigm of conflict—a free, democratic, and capitalist West versus a totalitarian, communist, and centrally planned East. "

Strategic Insights: Whiskey over Books, Again? Anti-Intellectualism and the Future Effectiveness of Army 2025 Dr Don M Snider Article by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press

Strategic Insights: The Sinister Shadow of Escalating Middle Eastern Sectarianism Dr. W. Andrew Terrill Article by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press

Military Engagement and Forward Presence: Down but Not Out as Tools to Shape and Win Dr John R Deni Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "Reliance on precision strike stand-off capabilities and a strategy of surging American military might from the continental United States (CONUS) after a crisis has already started have become particularly attractive approaches for managing insecurity in a more resource-constrained environment. However, the security challenges facing the United States and its vital interests over the coming years require more than a retreat to “Fortress America.” Relying on stand-off capabilities and surge readiness cannot provide adequate deterrence or reassurance, promote effective regional security, or build the capability and interoperability necessary to succeed in combined military operations at reasonable cost, and will have the effect of reducing, not expanding, options available to any President. Mitigating the security challenges of tomorrow necessitates investment in a more effective and more efficient set of tools."

Strategic Insights: Guyana-Venezuela: The Essequibo Region Dispute Dr. Jose de Arimateia da Cruz Article by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press

Strategic Insights: Thinking About Catastrophe: The Army in a Nuclear Armed World Dr Steven Metz Article by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press