American Civil-Military Relations: New Issues, Enduring Problems Dr Douglas V Johnson II, Dr Steven Metz Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The debate over proper civil-military relationships began while America was still a collection of British colonies. The relationship was the subject of intense and acrimonious debate during the framing of the Constitution and periodically the debate reemerges. The author feel the relationship exists on two levels. The first is focused on specific issues and key individuals and is transitory in nature. The second level deals with the enduring questions with essential values. At the latter level individuals merely represent the issues. Two questions are addressed in this study: What is the appropriate level of involvement of the military in national security policymaking? and Within that context, with what or whom does an officer's ultimate loyalty lie?"

Strategic Implications of the U.S.-DPRK Framework Agreement Dr Thomas L Wilborn Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) signed an unprecedented framework agreement in October 1994 to halt the latter’s nuclear weapons program, establish low-level diplomatic contacts between Washington and Pyongyang, and reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula. In this study, the author argues that it also places the United States, South Korea’s historic ally and partner with South Korea in the Combined Forces Command, in a new and unfamiliar role as mediator of conflict on the peninsula."

The Army in the Information Age LTC Anthony M Coroalles, Gen Gordon R Sullivan Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Times of change, times of turbulence, and times of uncertainty are inherently "interesting" periods. The element that makes them so is unpredictability. Unpredictability also compels many people, including military professionals, to fear and to want to avoid such times. Certainty, stability, and calm are conditions that we find much easier to deal with in our daily lives. Given a choice, these are also the conditions that most nations and institutions would prefer as characteristic of their strategic environment. Yet neither the Army nor the nation seem to have a choice in the rapid pace of change that is swirling around us as the 20th century draws to a close. Indeed we live in interesting times."

Energy, Economics, and Security in Central Asia: Russia and Its Rivals Dr Stephen J Blank Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to the creation of five new states in Central Asia. These states: Kazkahstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan, have become both the object of international rivalries in Central Asia and the sources of new political forces as they act to enlarge their independence in world politics. This monograph attempts to trace the importance of the new forces unleashed by the advent of these states by focusing on the struggle around energy and security issues involving them."

Counterforce and Theater Missile Defense: Can the Army Use an ASW Approach to the SCUD Hunt? Dr James J Wirtz Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The Gulf War demonstrated that theater missile defense (TMD) will be an important mission for the U.S. Army and its Patriot defense system in the years ahead. The author suggests that Army planners should view TMD not just as a simple tactical problem, but as an exercise that has important political and strategic ramifications that cut to the core of U.S. efforts to create and maintain international coalitions."

Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability Dr Steven Metz Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In this study, Steven Metz argues that the way the Department of Defense and U.S. military spend the time when counterinsurgency support is not an important part of American national security strategy determines how quickly and easily they react when policymakers commit the nation to such activity. If analysis and debate continues, at least at a low level, the military is better prepared for the reconstitution of capabilities. If it ignores global developments in insurgency and counterinsurgency, the reconstitution of capabilities would be more difficult."

Total Force: Federal Reserves and State National Guards COL Charles E Heller Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Never before in peacetime has the United States placed so much emphasis and reliance on the Armed Forces' Reserve Components. Since the Total Force Policy was introduced by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird in 1970, this dependency has grown even more. The 1990 mobilization for OPERATION DESERT SHIELD and the follow-on offensive OPERATION DESERT STORM in 1991 validated the use of the Reserve Components for contingency operations and guaranteed the policy's extension for the foreseeable future"

Security Cooperation with China: Analysis and a Proposal Dr Thomas L Wilborn Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Relations between the United States and China reached their lowest point in almost 20 years when President Bush imposed sanctions on Beijing after the People's Liberation Army (PLA) indiscriminately fired at unarmed demonstrators and their supporters at Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989. In the intervening years, some U.S. contacts, particularly trade, quickly attained or exceeded their pre Tiananmen level. However, until recently, the U.S Government resisted reestablishing formal security links."

Hamas and Hizbollah: The Radical Challenge to Israel in the Occupied Territories Dr Stephen C Pelletiere Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "This study argues that Hamas and Hizbollah, the two main religious groups fighting Israel, probably are more threatening to U.S. interests than is generally believed. It discusses the various openings that the groups were able to exploit to advance themselves, and particularly how they profited from errors on the Israelis' part."