Strategic Issues

Strategic Competition and Resistance in the 21st Century: Irregular, Catastrophic, Traditional, and Hybrid Challenges in Context Mr Nathan P Freier Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The 2005 National Defense Strategy (NDS 05) introduced the concept of the four challenges—traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive. However, since the strategy’s publication in March 2005, little has emerged in the way of specific amplification of these concepts. Reference to the challenges is prolific in both formal and informal defense deliberations. Yet, there has always been some need for greater richness and granularity in their description and application in defense strategy and policymaking. For three of the four challenges, the wait is over. This monograph describes the foundational substance of the traditional, irregular, and catastrophic challenges as they were conceived at the working-level during development of NDS 05."

Collins Center Update Vol 9, Issue 2 Colonel Phil Evans, Mr. Ritchie Dion, Mr. Bill Waddell, Mr. Bob Barnes, Mr. John Auge, Mr. Kevin Cogan, Collins Center Update by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership

A View of Command, Control, Communications and Computer Architectures at the Dawn of Network Centric Warfare Mr Kevin J Cogan Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "In March 2004, the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) in cooperation with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Office of Force Transformation (OFT) initiated a study focusing on the U.S. Army V Corps’ and 3rd Infantry Division’s major combat operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). This study, entitled “Network Centric Warfare Case Study: U.S. V Corps and 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) during Operation Iraqi Freedom Combat Operations (March-April 2003)” is one of several case studies commissioned by OFT to determine the military’s ability to conduct operations in accordance with network centric warfare (NCW) concepts."

Georgia After the Rose Revolution: Geopolitical Predicament and Implications for U.S. Policy Dr Svante E Cornell Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Since its independence, Georgia has been the most vocally independent-minded country in the former Soviet Union. Russia countered Georgia’s independence by strong support for secessionist minorities such as those in Abkhazia and south Ossetia. Since President Vladimir Putin’s coming to power, Russian pressure on Georgia to reverse its pro-Western course has grown measurably. Following the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia, relations with Russia turned sour as the new government proved both democratic and single-mindedly focused on rebuilding the Georgian state, resolving the secessionist conflicts, and seeking NATO membership—all anathema to Moscow."

Information as Power Ms Cindy E Ayers, Dr Jeffrey L Groh, Dennis M Murphy, Prof David John Smith Anthology by the US Army War College, The Information in Warfare Working Group, Center for Strategic Leadership "The Information in Warfare Working Group (I2WG) of the United States Army War College is pleased to present this anthology of selected student work from Academic Year 2006 representing examples of well-written and in-depth analyses on the vital subject of Information in Warfare. The charter of the working group calls for it to coordinate and recommend the design, development and integration of content and courses related to the information element of power into the curriculum to prepare students for senior leadership positions. This publication is an important component of that effort."

Belize 2021 National Security Framework: Strengthening the Links between Policy, Resource Allocation and Execution COL Dale C Eikmeier, Prof Bernard F Griffard Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "The absence of an institutionalized process for long-range national security planning is a strategic disadvantage. To reduce risk and achieve Vision 2021, Belize requires an integrated national security architecture that develops policy, coordinates action plans, monitors execution, reviews progress and maintains a long-term perspective. Currently, the government does not possess an adequate national security planning structure with the requisit capability. Redesigning the current national security architecture so that it provides long-range planning, coordination between cabinet ministers and their agencies, and monitoring of security programs can be the difference between success and failure of a national security strategy. "

The Collins Center Update Volume 9, Issue 1: October - December 2006 B.F. Griffard, Colonel Dale C. Eikmeier, Captain Raymond G. De Lucio, Mr. Ritchie Dion, COL Scott McConnell, Colonel Robert Hume Collins Center Update by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership

Proteus: New Insights for a New Age; Proteus Futures Academic Workshop Report Mister William O Waddell, COL William L Wimbish III Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "The Proteus Management Group (PMG) hosted the first annual Proteus Futures Academic Workshop 22-24 August 06 at the Center for Strategic Leadership, United States Army War College at Carlisle Barracks. This workshop was focused on providing scholars from various organizations the opportunity to present papers on topics and issues related to the Proteus Insights that addressed future strategic national security challenges. Workshop participants were from a variety of nations, disciplines, and backgrounds, and included: students and faculty from universities, colleges and military service schools; government civilian and military senior leaders, planners and analysts from joint agencies, the uniformed services and the national intelligence community; former political appointees, and international representatives from Canada and Israel."

Network Centric Warfare Case Study Volume I: Operations U.S. V Corps and 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) during Operation Iraqi Freedom (March-April 2003) Mr David W Cammons, Douglas Lindsay, LTC Alan Seise, John B Tisserand III, Duane E Williams Study by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "This report highlights the results of a study of Network Centric Operations (NCO) as executed by V Corps and the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized), (3 ID (M)), during the major offensive combat operations of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) from March 2003 through April 2003. The U.S. V Corps was the senior U.S. Army tactical headquarters responsible for operations conducted primarily along and to the west of the Euphrates River, to include the seizure of Baghdad. At the onset of the campaign (crossing the Kuwait-Iraq border) 3 ID (M) was the only ground maneuver force available to V Corps and continued as the corps’ main effort through the seizure of Baghdad."