Strategic Issues

Making Riflemen from Mud: Restoring the Army's Culture of Irregular Warfare LTC James D Campbell Student Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "In the summer of 1899, Lieutenant Matthew Batson was commanding L Troop, 4th U.S. Cavalry, during operations in the Philippines. Already recognized as an energetic and courageous officer during the war in Cuba, Batson gained further notoriety after being awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for actions in combat with his troop in July. At the request of his superiors, in late summer Batson submitted a formal proposal for raising a scout company for the First Division’s Provisional Cavalry Brigade. The plan called for this company to be recruited from the Macabebes, an ethnic tribal group in Southern Luzon who had long opposed domination by the majority Tagalogs. The Tagalogs formed the backbone and provided most of the leadership for the Army of the Philippine Republic, fighting against U.S. rule in the archipelago..."

The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration Dr Colin S Gray Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In this monograph, Dr. Colin S. Gray draws a sharp distinction between preemption and prevention, and explains that the political, military, moral, and strategic arguments have really all been about the latter, not the former. Dr. Gray provides definitions, reviews the history of the preventive war option, and considers the merit, or lack thereof, in the principal charges laid against the concept when it is proclaimed to be policy."

Collins Center Update Volume 9, Issue 3 (Summer 2007) Professor B.F. Griffard, Professor Dennis M. Murphy, Mr. John Auger, Professor Jim Kievit, Colonel Michael Gould, MAJ Kyle Collins Center Update by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership

Strategic Competition and Resistance in the 21st Century: Irregular, Catastrophic, Traditional, and Hybrid Challenges in Context Mr Nathan P Freier Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The 2005 National Defense Strategy (NDS 05) introduced the concept of the four challenges—traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive. However, since the strategy’s publication in March 2005, little has emerged in the way of specific amplification of these concepts. Reference to the challenges is prolific in both formal and informal defense deliberations. Yet, there has always been some need for greater richness and granularity in their description and application in defense strategy and policymaking. For three of the four challenges, the wait is over. This monograph describes the foundational substance of the traditional, irregular, and catastrophic challenges as they were conceived at the working-level during development of NDS 05."

Collins Center Update Vol 9, Issue 2 Colonel Phil Evans, Mr. Ritchie Dion, Mr. Bill Waddell, Mr. Bob Barnes, Mr. John Auge, Mr. Kevin Cogan, Collins Center Update by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership

A View of Command, Control, Communications and Computer Architectures at the Dawn of Network Centric Warfare Mr Kevin J Cogan Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "In March 2004, the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) in cooperation with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Office of Force Transformation (OFT) initiated a study focusing on the U.S. Army V Corps’ and 3rd Infantry Division’s major combat operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). This study, entitled “Network Centric Warfare Case Study: U.S. V Corps and 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) during Operation Iraqi Freedom Combat Operations (March-April 2003)” is one of several case studies commissioned by OFT to determine the military’s ability to conduct operations in accordance with network centric warfare (NCW) concepts."

Georgia After the Rose Revolution: Geopolitical Predicament and Implications for U.S. Policy Dr Svante E Cornell Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Since its independence, Georgia has been the most vocally independent-minded country in the former Soviet Union. Russia countered Georgia’s independence by strong support for secessionist minorities such as those in Abkhazia and south Ossetia. Since President Vladimir Putin’s coming to power, Russian pressure on Georgia to reverse its pro-Western course has grown measurably. Following the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia, relations with Russia turned sour as the new government proved both democratic and single-mindedly focused on rebuilding the Georgian state, resolving the secessionist conflicts, and seeking NATO membership—all anathema to Moscow."

Information as Power Ms Cindy E Ayers, Dr Jeffrey L Groh, Dennis M Murphy, Prof David John Smith Anthology by the US Army War College, The Information in Warfare Working Group, Center for Strategic Leadership "The Information in Warfare Working Group (I2WG) of the United States Army War College is pleased to present this anthology of selected student work from Academic Year 2006 representing examples of well-written and in-depth analyses on the vital subject of Information in Warfare. The charter of the working group calls for it to coordinate and recommend the design, development and integration of content and courses related to the information element of power into the curriculum to prepare students for senior leadership positions. This publication is an important component of that effort."

Belize 2021 National Security Framework: Strengthening the Links between Policy, Resource Allocation and Execution COL Dale C Eikmeier, Prof Bernard F Griffard Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "The absence of an institutionalized process for long-range national security planning is a strategic disadvantage. To reduce risk and achieve Vision 2021, Belize requires an integrated national security architecture that develops policy, coordinates action plans, monitors execution, reviews progress and maintains a long-term perspective. Currently, the government does not possess an adequate national security planning structure with the requisit capability. Redesigning the current national security architecture so that it provides long-range planning, coordination between cabinet ministers and their agencies, and monitoring of security programs can be the difference between success and failure of a national security strategy. "