Strategic Issues

  •  Dissent and Strategic Leadership of the Military Professions

    Dissent and Strategic Leadership of the Military Professions

    Dissent and Strategic Leadership of the Military Professions Dr Don M Snider Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Vice Admiral James Stockdale, Vietnam prisoner of war and Medal of Honor recipient, once said, 'Even in the most detached duty, we warriors must keep foremost in our minds that there are boundaries to the prerogatives of leadership, moral boundaries.' In this monograph, the author delineates a segment of these boundaries as they are understood from the study of military professions and as derived from the roles and responsibilities of those seniors privileged to be the profession’s temporary stewards—the colonels/captains and Flag Officers who comprise the strategic leadership. Such boundaries mean that the decision to dissent can never be a purely personal matter. Rather it will reverberate outward impinging at a minimum the three critical trust relationships of the military profession—those with the American people, those with civilian and military leaders at the highest levels of decisionmaking, and those with the junior corps of officers and noncommissioned officers of our armed forces."
    • Published On: 2/1/2008
  •  Using Sustainability to Build Stability in Africa: Strategic Policy Issues for the Army

    Using Sustainability to Build Stability in Africa: Strategic Policy Issues for the Army

    Using Sustainability to Build Stability in Africa: Strategic Policy Issues for the Army Arthur L Bradshaw, Dr Kent H Butts, Mr Brian D Smith Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "Sustainability means meeting the demands placed on the system today without compromising the needs of future generations. Thus, the over consumption, abuse, or pollution of a country’s natural resource base today will cause the country to fail when it cannot meet the demands placed upon the political system by future generations. The workshop series aims at to examine how the Army can leverage sustainability as an approach to engaging African nations. Working within the context of U.S. Africa Command’s (USAFRICOM) strategic vision, sustainability provides an approach to engagement that will support the capacity of African militaries so that they may help civilian governments address sustainability issues and maintain the legitimacy necessary to prevent state failure and instability. "
    • Published On: 1/15/2008
  •  The Trouble With Strategic Communication(s)

    The Trouble With Strategic Communication(s)

    The Trouble With Strategic Communication(s) Dennis M Murphy Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "Recently the U.S. Southern Command’s Admiral James Stavridis paraphrased World War II’s great naval commander and strategist Ernest King: 'I don’t know what the hell this [strategic communication] is that Marshall is always talking about, but I want some of it.' This past summer over 200 strategic communication practitioners and academics met at the National War College for the first annual Worldwide Strategic Communication Seminar. Senior government officials urged attendees to get on with the business of strategic communication, noting that 'we will be flying the plane while we’re building it'..."
    • Published On: 1/15/2008
  •  Creative Strategic Intelligence Analysis and Decision Making Within the Elements of National Power; Proteus Futures Workshop Report 2007

    Creative Strategic Intelligence Analysis and Decision Making Within the Elements of National Power; Proteus Futures Workshop Report 2007

    Creative Strategic Intelligence Analysis and Decision Making Within the Elements of National Power; Proteus Futures Workshop Report 2007 Workshop Report by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "From 14 to 16 August 2007 the Proteus Management Group USA hosted an Academic Workshop to bring together specialists from academia, the defense community, and civilian organizations to share information and insights on analyzing future complex national security challenges. "
    • Published On: 12/15/2007
  •  Toward a Mathematical Theory of Counterterrorism; Proteus Monograph Series 1, Volume 2

    Toward a Mathematical Theory of Counterterrorism; Proteus Monograph Series 1, Volume 2

    Toward a Mathematical Theory of Counterterrorism; Proteus Monograph Series 1, Volume 2 Jonathan David Farley Monograph by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership, The Proteus Management Group 'In March 2006, The New York Times Magazine published an article entitled, 'Can Network Theory Thwart Terrorists?' When terrorist cells are depicted schematically, they are often shown as structures called graphs. These are not the graphs readers may have plotted in high school algebra, but collections of dots (called nodes), representing individuals, and lines (called edges) between nodes, representing any sort of relationship between the two corresponding individuals, such as a direct communications link."
    • Published On: 12/15/2007
  •  Truth, Perception and Consequences Proteus Monograph Series 1, Volume 1

    Truth, Perception and Consequences Proteus Monograph Series 1, Volume 1

    Truth, Perception and Consequences Proteus Monograph Series 1, Volume 1 Christine A R MacNulty Monograph by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership, The Proteus Management Group "Today we, in the United States, tend to regard Sun Tzu’s maxim 'If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles' as being about the physical capabilities, C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance), weapons, and warfighting capability of our own forces and those of the adversary. Given the rest of The Art of War, and its focus on preventing such actions, it is likely that Sun Tzu was referring much more to the understanding of the psyche than to the material aspects of warfare."
    • Published On: 11/15/2007
  •  Force and Restraint in Strategic Deterrence: A Game-Theorist's Perspective

    Force and Restraint in Strategic Deterrence: A Game-Theorist's Perspective

    Force and Restraint in Strategic Deterrence: A Game-Theorist's Perspective Dr Roger B Myerson Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "This monograph is a short nontechnical introduction to the use of game theory in the study of international relations. The focus is on the problem of deterrence against potential adversaries and aggressors. The author, Professor Roger Myerson, uses game models to provide a simple context where we can see more clearly the essential logic of strategic deterrence. We should look to such theoretical analysis for basic insights that may have practical importance in policymaking. The main conclusion is that a great power’s use of its military forces may be rendered ineffective or even counterproductive when there are no clear internationally recognizable limits on this use of force."
    • Published On: 11/1/2007
  •  On the Uses of Cultural Knowledge

    On the Uses of Cultural Knowledge

    On the Uses of Cultural Knowledge Dr Sheila Miyoshi Jager Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "This monograph, by Dr. Sheila Miyoshi Jager, explores the role that cultural knowledge must play in thinking about a new strategy for counterinsurgency. Although the importance of cultural awareness and understanding of adversary societies has been widely recognized as essential to operations and tactics on the battlefield, Dr. Jager argues its significance has been largely ignored in formulating the broader strategic goals of counterinsurgency. This monograph highlights the importance of culture, and cultural awareness, in formulating a broad strategy for counterinsurgency which also has wide-ranging implications for U.S. foreign policy."
    • Published On: 11/1/2007
  •  Regional Threats and Security Strategy: The Troubling Case of Today's Middle East

    Regional Threats and Security Strategy: The Troubling Case of Today's Middle East

    Regional Threats and Security Strategy: The Troubling Case of Today's Middle East Mr James A Russell Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "This monograph attempts to peel back the layers of complexity surrounding the regional threat environment as a first step in the process of constructing a security strategy that can effectively mitigate the threats to U.S. and global interests. The United States has relied on a remarkably effective Cold War template to protect and preserve its regional interests that includes such elements as access to host nation facilities, prepositioned military equipment, foreign military sales, and joint training and exercises. The question facing strategists is whether this template remains relevant to the regional environment. The author argues that changing internal political dynamics throughout the region will make it increasingly difficult for regional elites to continue to allow the United States to apply its tried and true Cold War template."
    • Published On: 11/1/2007
  •  The 2nd Annual Proteus Academic Workshop and the Way Ahead

    The 2nd Annual Proteus Academic Workshop and the Way Ahead

    The 2nd Annual Proteus Academic Workshop and the Way Ahead Mister William O Waddell, COL William L Wimbish III Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "The Proteus Management Group (PMG) hosted the second annual Proteus Futures Academic Workshop 14-16 August 07 at the Center for Strategic Leadership, United States Army War College (USAWC) at Carlisle Barracks, PA. This year’s workshop provided international scholars from various organizations and institutions across government, academia and the private sector the opportunity to present papers on topics that explore complex issues within the future global security environment, as well as to examine Proteus related new and innovative concepts, strategies and processes to meet 21st century security challenges. Over 70 workshop participants from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds participated in this year’s event. "
    • Published On: 10/15/2007
  •  Collins Center Update Volume 9, Issue 4 (Fall 2007)

    Collins Center Update Volume 9, Issue 4 (Fall 2007)

    Collins Center Update Volume 9, Issue 4 (Fall 2007) Professor Bert B. Tussing, Major Kyle Burley, Professor B.F. Griffard Collins Center Update by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership
    • Published On: 10/15/2007
  •  American Grand Strategy for Latin America in the Age of Resentment

    American Grand Strategy for Latin America in the Age of Resentment

    American Grand Strategy for Latin America in the Age of Resentment Dr Gabriel Marcella Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The fear that extra-hemispheric powers would strategically deny Latin America as a friend of the United States has animated American statesmen since the 19th century. Such fear certainly pervaded the Cold war competition. Today the challenge to the security and well-being of Latin America is neither ideological, nor military, nor external. Strategic denial is more likely to come about from a highly combustible blend of poverty, crime, despair, corruption, resentment, and antidemocratic sentiments that promise a vague 21st century socialism under new authoritarian clothing. The sentiments are sinking deep roots in the socio-political landscape, and they are profoundly anti-American. "
    • Published On: 9/1/2007
  •  Sixth Annual Reserve Component Symposium Workshop #4

    Sixth Annual Reserve Component Symposium Workshop #4

    Sixth Annual Reserve Component Symposium Workshop #4 Mr John Elliot, Prof James O Kievit Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "The frequently strained interaction between the active component and the National Guard during the military’s response to Hurricane’s Katrina and Rita in the summer of 2005 has led some to argue for a cultural migration away from strict “command and control” concepts toward a broader concept of “command, control, cooperation and coordination.” Meanwhile, many experts believe that pandemic influenza or terrorist attacks employing nuclear or biological devices likely will result in death and economic or physical disruption that would vastly exceed the destruction wreaked along the Gulf Coast, that the destructive potential of hurricanes like Katrina and Rita actually represent the “lower end” of catastrophic events. "
    • Published On: 8/15/2007
  •  Sixth Annual Reserve Component Symposium Workshop #3

    Sixth Annual Reserve Component Symposium Workshop #3

    Sixth Annual Reserve Component Symposium Workshop #3 Prof John F Troxell Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "In response to hurricanes Katrina and Rita the military mounted a massive response that saved many lives and greatly assisted recovery efforts. The military took proactive steps and responded with about 50,000 National Guard and 20,000 active federal personnel. Based on its June 2005 civil support strategy, the Department of Defense (DOD) relied heavily on the Guard during the initial response. In addition, active duty forces were alerted prior to landfall and key capabilities such as aviation, medical, and engineering forces were initially deployed. Growing concerns about the magnitude of the disaster prompted DOD to deploy large, active ground units to supplement the Guard beginning about 5 days after landfall..."
    • Published On: 8/15/2007
  •  Sixth Annual Reserve Component Symposium Workshop #2

    Sixth Annual Reserve Component Symposium Workshop #2

    Sixth Annual Reserve Component Symposium Workshop #2 Prof Bert B Tussing Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "Among the many challenges encountered in the military’s response to hurricane’s Katrina and Rita in the summer of 2005 were difficulties surrounding Command and Control (C2). Given the frequently strained interaction between the active component and the National Guard, it became clear that our traditional notions of C2 required a cultural migration away from “command and control” toward a broader concept of “command, control, cooperation and coordination.” At the same time, in spite of their devastation, many experts are labeling Katrina and Rita as representative of the “lower end” of potentially catastrophic events which could occur..."
    • Published On: 8/15/2007
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