Center for Strategic Leadership

Civil-Security Forces Environmental Cooperation in Central America and the Caribbean Arthur L Bradshaw, Doctor Kent H Butts, Earl Green, John B Wheatley Study by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "This conference is the fourth in a series of conferences sponsored by the U.S. Southern Command in Central America. As such, it built upon the relationships and programs initiated in earlier conferences. The purpose of these conferences is to support three growing realizations: that the protection of the environment is critical to the sustainable development of the entire region, which is, in turn, critical to regional stability; that environmental issues are best dealt with on a regional basis; and that military and security forces have a vital role in the process of resolving environmental issues."

Effectiveness of Stability Operations During the Initial Implementation of the Transition Phase for Operation Iraqi Freedom COL Paul F Dicker Student Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "The United States’ strategic goal at the onset of the armed conflict in Iraq was to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime and to create a free, unified, and democratic Iraq. The necessity of having a unified Iraq derives from its strategic location in the Middle East and from U.S. commitments to other Middle East countries supporting the war effort, including Saudi Arabia and Jordan. In order to achieve this strategic goal, the coalition, led by the U.S. military, would need to first insure a secure and stable environment."

Incorporation of Indigenous Forces in Major Theater War: Advantages, Risks and Considerations Ms Priscilla Sellers Student Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "The planning of nearly all military campaigns has included, at least in part, the consideration of the participation of friendly indigenous forces or assets. From the North African Campaign (Operation Torch) to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the number and specific tactical responsibilities of the indigenous assets in theater have varied but generally have continued to increase. Just as the responsibilities of the indigenous force have continued to change over time, so have the responsibilities incumbent upon the U.S. military establishment in determining the appropriate integration and handling of this local asset, based upon respective inherent factors. "

Leveraging the Media: The Embedded Media Program in Operation Iraqi Freedom Col Glenn Starnes Student Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "Margaret Belknap writing in Parameters in 2002 commented, “The fourth estate [the media] offers a superb mechanism for strategic leaders and warfighters to transmit operational objectives and goals, as well as to reinforce policy objectives.” Ms Belknap stated that strategic leaders must be proactive in leveraging the media in order to inform audiences concerning objectives and end-states. She warned that if the military failed to leverage the media, they risked having the graphic images of war shown to the world and the American people in a distorted manner. Inaccurate or deceitful reporting of military actions could drastically affect the will and support of the American people, which is the strategic center of gravity for the United States (US). Loss of public support for a war could also affect the decision-making process at the strategic level. Essentially, Ms Belknap echoed the sentiment of many others who recommend the military cease holding the press at arm’s length. Instead, the military should embrace the press and leverage the media’s technology and worldwide reach to further strategic goals."

Observing al Qaeda Through the Lens of Complexity Theory: Recommendations for the National Strategy to Defeat Terrorism LTC Michael F Beech Student Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "The defeat of al Qaeda and the global network of Islamic terrorist organizations often appear no more certain today than it did two years ago. Since 9/11 the world has witnessed terrorist attacks against US interests and its allies in seven different countries. Al Qaeda may have lost Afghanistan as a safe haven, but it has gained a new front by conducting operations against US and coalition forces in Iraq. Despite US military successes, al Qaeda retains a demonstrated ability to recruit and conduct operations globally as Osama bin Laden and many of his most experienced inner circle and associates are still at large. Although there has yet to be another devastating attack on the US homeland, it is important to remember that the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon took over three years of planning and preparation. The lack of a subsequent catastrophic attack in the US since 9/11 is not in itself proof of a successful strategy against terrorism. Despite the efforts of two years of military operations against al Qaeda, the CIA pronounced that al Qaeda still represents the single greatest risk to US national security. This paradox calls into question the very frameworks, models and tools that US strategic leaders use to develop counter terrorism policy and strategy."

Swiftly Defeat The Efforts: Then What? The "New American Way Of War" And Transitioning Decisive Combat To Post Conflict Stabilization LTC John D Nelson Student Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "Since the end of the first Gulf War in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm the United States has fought in three decisive operations: Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, and Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq. The principles of Rapid Decisive Operations influenced the pattern and conduct of operations in all three conflicts. The success in the major combat operations of Operation Iraqi Freedom, led Max Boot, to call this a New American Way of War."

Transformational Leadership in Wartime LTC Steven J Eden Student Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "Few men are vouchsafed the command of armies; fewer still face the task of rebuilding defeated armies in wartime, and of these only a handful have been successful. Three who assumed command in the midst of defeat were George McClellan, arriving in Washington, D.C., to take over the Army of the Potomac as it licked its wounds after Bull Run; William Slim, coming to Burma as the Japanese drove the British out of Rangoon; and Matthew Ridgway, appointed to lead an Eighth Army reeling back before the Chinese pouring over the Yalu River. "

The Collins Center Update Volume 6, Issue 3: April - June 2004 Collins Center Update by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership

Planning Considerations for International Involvement in an Israeli Withdrawal from Palestinian Territory Amjad Atallah, Jarat Chorpa, Yaser Dajani, Orit Gal, PROF Joel Peters, Mark R Walsh Study by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "On 6-7 May 2004—in the wake of Likud’s rejection of Sharon’s disengagement plan from the Gaza Strip and parts of the northern West Bank—a group of Israelis, Palestinians and international officials and experts convened to address operational aspects of third party involvement in a withdrawal process. Chaired by Jarat Chopra and Mark Walsh, the meeting was hosted in Noordwijk aan Zee by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, sponsored by the Programme for Security in International Society at the University of Cambridge Centre of International Studies and organized with Strategic Assessments Initiative. The aim of the discussions was to consider what can and cannot work from a functional perspective, within the context of social and political realities"