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Parameters | Spring 2026
March 6, 2026 — Welcome to the Spring 2026 issue of Parameters, which consists of an In Focus special commentary, three forums (Clausewitz and Modern Warfare, Operational Considerations, and Historical Studies), and the Strategic Competition Corner. ... MORE

Book Reviews
March 6, 2026 — Book reviews Spring 2026... MORE

Strategic Rivalries: How Are They Won?
March 6, 2026 — This article argues strategic rivalries—distinct from general strategic competition—are best understood as contests in which states prioritize weakening a specific opponent’s capacity to compete. It departs from existing work by critiquing the Joint Concept for Competing’s narrow definition and by emphasizing rivalry termination as a central but understudied dimension. Drawing on decades of international relations scholarship and historical datasets of interstate rivalries since 1815, the article analyzes how rivalries end and identifies strategic preclusion as a proactive approach for winning them. Its insights offer policy and military practitioners guidance for shaping competitive strategies short of war... MORE

Spezialpropaganda: The East German Military’s Covert Information-Warfare Program
March 6, 2026 — This article details the East German military’s extensive, innovative covert-propaganda program, which was designed to influence West German attitudes for almost two decades during the Cold War. Unlike existing scholarship that primarily addresses intelligence-led disinformation, this study uniquely analyzes military-led information warfare. The article uses previously classified East German military records to examine capabilities and tactics ranging from fake conscription notices to radio broadcasts. The findings offer contemporary US military planners and practitioners insight into the complexities of integrating information-warfare capabilities, measuring the effectiveness of propaganda, and understanding adversarial influence campaigns, with direct implications for current Joint Force planning and doctrine... MORE

Risk Decision Making and Intertemporal Choice: Lessons from the Taiwan Strait
March 6, 2026 — This article argues that domestic and political factors may incentivize US presidents to use risky military options to resolve crises quickly, though high costs or threats to long-term vital interests can overcome leaders’ natural tendencies to focus on the present. Recently declassified documents from President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s administration allow a detailed examination of how US leaders balanced risks over time during the First and Second Taiwan Strait Crises. The findings inform policy recommendations to enhance military planning and enable military advisers to communicate long-term risks more effectively to political leaders... MORE

Imitating US Doctrine Cost Europe Its Heavy Combat Power
March 6, 2026 — This article argues that Europe’s loss of heavy combat power is primarily the result of doctrinal shifts influenced by the United States, rather than underfunding alone. Unlike existing research that focuses on defense budgets or burden-sharing, this study isolates the opportunity costs of adopting US-based expeditionary and counterinsurgency doctrines. Using force structure data for Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom (1990–2022), it conducts a counterfactual analysis of lost tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and heavy artillery pieces. The article shows that Europe’s shortfalls are doctrinal as much as fiscal and highlights the relevance of maintaining balance in future doctrinal choices... MORE

Successful Large-Scale Combat Operations Require Artificially Intelligent Breaching Munitions
March 6, 2026 — The US Army must invest in artificial intelligence–enabled breaching munitions to succeed in large-scale combat operations. This article combines existing technologies to propose a new capability the Army does not currently possess. It lays out the current state of breaching materiel, identifies additional technology available, and proposes combining multiple pieces of existing technology to create improved breaching munitions for the Army’s use. This new capability will require practitioners and policymakers to enable the creation of artificial intelligence systems through acquisition and tactical experimentation... MORE

Strategic Theory and Clausewitz’s Trinitarian Test
March 6, 2026 — Carl von Clausewitz’s trinity represents a qualitative test for strategy in both theory and practice. With the trinity, Clausewitz transforms competing influences into a mark of mark of theoretical quality. Synthesizing several translations of Clausewitz’s On War and interpretations by experts such as Hew Strachan, Antulio J. Echevarria II, and Frank G. Hoffman, this article suggests that Clausewitz believed that good theory encompasses and accounts for all fundamental forces of war, whereas bad theory emphasizes the extremes of one force. The trinity compels mandatory considerations for students of theory, war planners, and practitioners... MORE

Approaching the Military as a Profession Through the Clausewitzian Trinity
March 6, 2026 — The Clausewitzian trinity (people, government, and military—or passion, reason, and chance) can enhance existing scholarship and discussions about military professionalism by emphasizing the fundamental purpose of military forces. Specifically, managing chance incorporates elements of reducing uncertainty and applying creativity as individuals develop coup d’oeil. Junior personnel manage chance by reducing cognitive load while enhancing cognitive skills needed to quickly assess battlefield conditions as they progress to becoming senior leaders. This article contrasts these ideas against the various roles assigned to civil-military forces in the Clausewitzian trinity to emphasize professionalism in developing military leaders... MORE

Legacies Worth Considering: (Re)examining the Assumptions behind Denial Strategies
March 6, 2026 — Contemporary analyses of denial strategies risk conceptual confusion because they neglect the legacies of two distinct traditions: coercion versus control. This article explores the two traditions’ legacies from a broader perspective. It shows how neglecting those legacies contributes to conceptual confusion concerning operational conduct and strategic affairs in the South China Sea. The article facilitates smoother communication between and among civilians and military members involved in operational planning, which is essential if the United States and its allies want to combine military and nonmilitary instruments in future operations... MORE