Recent Articles

Scenario Planning and Strategy in the Pentagon Dr Michael Fitzsimmons Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "Students and practitioners of national security policy have long understood that uncertainty about the future is a central challenge of strategy. Scenario planning should be one of the Department of Defense’s (DoD) most important tools for developing strategy under uncertainty. Since 2002, the DoD has employed a formalized, joint scenario planning process to support strategy and force development, but that process has proven less influential than intended for strategic decision-making."

Executive Summary: The U.S. Army in the Iraq War, Vol. 1 Colonel Joel D. Rayburn, Colonel Frank K. Sobchak with Lieutenant Colonel Jeanne F. Godfroy, Colonel Matthew D. Morton, Colonel James S. Powell, Lieutenant Colonel Matthew M. Zai Document by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "The U.S. Army in the Iraq War was commissioned by Chief of Staff of the Army General Raymond Odierno in 2013 to serve as the initial Army’s operational level history of the conflict. While he instructed that the review should be held to the same academic and evidentiary requirements of previous historical studies, other aspects would be fundamentally different. Believing that a classified review of the war would not be circulated sufficiently to engender organizational learning and change, General Odierno directed that the final product should be a readable, unclassified narrative."

The U.S. Army in the Iraq War — Volume 2: Surge and Withdrawal, 2007-2011 COL Joel D. Rayburn, COL Frank K. Sobchak Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "In September 2013, then Army Chief of Staff General Raymond T. Odierno directed the Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Study Group to research and write an operational history of the U.S. Army’s experience in the Iraq War from 2003 to 2011. This volume of The U.S. Army in the Iraq War is the second of two fulfilling that task. It tells how the surge counteroffensive in 2007-2008 neutralized both the Sunni insurgency and Shi’a militias, bringing Iraq to its most peaceful and stable state since the invasion. It then describes how, with political support for the war waning, consecutive Presidential administrations began to reduce the number of troops in Iraq while Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and later United States Forces-Iraq (USF-I) worked hurriedly to prepare the Iraqi military to take responsibility for their nation’s security. The speed of the drawdown accelerated significantly after the election of President Barack Obama, culminating in an unexpected complete withdrawal in 2011..."

The U.S. Army in the Iraq War – Volume 1: Invasion – Insurgency – Civil War, 2003-2006 COL Joel D. Rayburn, COL Frank K. Sobchak Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "In September 2013, Chief of Staff of the Army General Raymond T. Odierno directed the Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Study Group to research and write an operational history of the U.S. Army’s experience in the Iraq War from 2003 to 2011. This volume, The United States Army in the Iraq War, 2003-2006, is the first of two fulfilling that task. It tells the story of the U.S.-led campaigns to remove Saddam Hussein and his Iraqi Ba’athist regime from power in 2003 and to stabilize the country following those operations. It details the course of the campaigns up to a point in late 2006 when President George W. Bush and other U.S. leaders changed the strategy in Iraq to one that resulted in the “surge” counteroffensive by American troops in 2007–2008. That counteroffensive and the subsequent withdrawal of the coalition forces from Iraq are the subjects of the second volume of this series."

Executive Summary: The U.S. Army in the Iraq War, Vol. 2 Colonel Joel D. Rayburn, Colonel Frank K. Sobchak, with Lieutenant Colonel Jeanne F. Godfroy, Colonel Matthew D. Morton, Colonel James S. Powell, Lieutenant Colonel Matthew M. Zais Document by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "The U.S. Army in the Iraq War was commissioned by Chief of Staff of the Army General Raymond Odierno in 2013 to serve as the initial Army’s operational level history of the conflict. While he instructed that the review should be held to the same academic and evidentiary requirements of previous historical studies, other aspects would be fundamentally different. Believing that a classified review of the war would not be circulated sufficiently to engender organizational learning and change, General Odierno directed that the final product should be a readable, unclassified narrative."

Peace & Stability Journal, Special 25th Anniversary Edition Peace and Stability Journal by the US Army War College, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute

Maneuvering the Saudi-Iranian Rivalry in the Middle East: How the United States Can Preserve and Protect Its Long-Term Interests in the Region Mr Gregory Aftandilian Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press "This monograph examines how the United States should preserve and protect its long-term interests in the Middle East region by maneuvering carefully and strategically in the Saudi-Iranian conflict. The monograph first analyzes the history of the conflict between these two countries and shows that, while these two regional powers were rivals, they were not necessarily enemies and cooperated at times. It then traces their recent conflict back to the Iranian revolution and brings it up-to-date with their support for opposing sides in proxy wars in the region, taking part in sectarian diatribes, and the breaking of diplomatic relations."

Creating Great Expectations: Strategic Communications and American Airpower Dr Conrad C Crane Letort Paper by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Of all the American military services, the two most active and adept in strategic communications in the last century have been the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Air Force (USAF). As the smallest service, the Marines have pursued a very successful public relations campaign to trumpet their accomplishments and ensure their survival. It is a standing joke that a Marine rifle squad consists of eight riflemen and two cameramen.,,"

Strategic Insights: Better Late Than Never Dr M. Chris Mason Article by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press