Recent Articles

2025 Homeland Defense Symposium Compendium Editors: Prof. Bert Tussing, Dr. George Schwartz, Dr. John ‘Charles’ Anderson. Conference Papers by: Dr. Erik Dahl, Dr. John Comiskey, Amy Lay, Ashley Reichert, Cary Underwood, Julianne Ortman; The United States Army War College’s 2025 Homeland Defense Symposium presented a unique opportunity for a whole-of-nation discussion and for information sharing on extant and emerging threats to the United States homeland. The research, presentations, key points, and discussions are consolidated in a compendium in this inaugural issue of For the Common Defense. Approximately 125 security professionals from a wide variety of backgrounds including the Joint Force, all levels of government, and civilian academia, attended in-person or virtually for three days. They participated in the symposium because they recognize that our homeland is once again in danger. Our potential adversaries are already making preparations to conduct operations in the continental U.S. in the event of a future large- scale combat operation. They will strive to disrupt infrastructure and supply chains, generate civil unrest, and create multiple dilemmas for elected leaders with the goal of keeping our military forces out of the warfight overseas.

The Collins Center Update is a quarterly summary of programs and activities at the Center for Strategic Leader (CSL) at the U.S. Army War College (USAWC). This issue features articles on Gaming Homeland Defense Contingencies by Major Andrew Starkey and Professor Bert Tussing; The Homeland Defense Defender’s Elective by Master Sergeant Ronald Bittner; Army War College Fellows Focus by Ms. Patricia Hayes, the 2025 National Security Simulation Exercise of Competition, Crisis, and Conflict by Mr. Brian Foster; and The National Security Seminar Homeland Defense Workshop by Dr. George Schwartz.

By Colonel Larry A. Wyatt, Dr. Michele Devlin, Dr. José de Arimatéia da Cruz. Weather-induced instability, such as the 2023–24 dzud (a slow-onset Mongolian winter disaster characterized by large-scale livestock mortality), creates schisms adversaries use to expand their soft power, Mongolia’s movement toward US adversaries could indirectly threaten US national security by heightening instability, increasing competition, and disrupting global economic systems. Conversely, through increased environmental diplomacy, investment, and resilience building—and by promoting democratic partnerships to bolster regional stability and showcase US leadership while mitigating adversarial exploitation of vulnerable regions—the United States can mitigate the impacts of ecological challenges on its national security interests.

Antulio J. Echevarria II, Larry P. Goodson, and Brennan Deveraux – Project Directors; Integrated Research Project from the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press; The US government and the US Army are unprepared for a great-power war. This integrated research project (IRP), sponsored by Vice Chief of Staff of the Army General James J. Mingus, is a critical first step in helping senior US Army leaders increase their knowledge of, and preparations for, deterring or fighting a great-power war in the twenty-first century. No one knows how long the US government and the US Army have to prepare for a future conflict. Consequently, the US Department of Defense faces difficult decisions as it balances preparing for a future war with maintaining readiness to address current challenges. The student research in this IRP only scratches the surface of what the US Department of Defense and the US Army should do to understand, deter, and prepare more effectively for the possibility of a great-power war in the twenty-first century. While the steps outlined here are preliminary, they are not tentative. Readers will find that each chapter offers concrete, actionable recommendations based on duly considered analysis. But more work lies ahead.

Handbook by the School of Strategic Learning, US Army War College The purpose of this document is to assist United States Army War College students during the Military Strategy and Campaigning (MSC) course. It also serves to assist commanders, planners, and other staff officers in combatant commands (CCMD), joint task forces (JTF), and Service component commands. It supplements joint doctrine and contains elements of emerging doctrine as practiced globally by joint force commanders (JFCs). It portrays a way to apply draft doctrine awaiting signature, published doctrine, and emerging concepts, all at the higher levels of joint command, with a primary emphasis at the combatant command level.

By Dr. William J. Barry, PhD and Lieutenant Colonel Aaron “Blair" Wilcox; Issue paper from the U.S. Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership; In the frenzy to adopt newly accessible artificial intelligence (AI) tools for military purposes, little public discussion has addressed the potential pitfalls. Despite the energy invested in developing the ideal generative AI (GenAI) tool for military applications, a trusted capability remains elusive across the US Army and the Joint Force. In May 2025, the US Army War College, the Global Information Dominance Experiment, and the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office partnered to test Donovan, a GenAI system developed by Scale AI, in the first classified war game focused on war plans at the theater-Army level. This experiment demonstrated the industry-partnership model required to build the tools the Army needs to maintain the cognitive edge in landpower.

Antulio J. Echevarria II; Monograph from the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press; This monograph discusses how NATO might better leverage risk to strengthen the alliance’s extended deterrence. Such leverage would prove especially useful because Kyiv is unlikely to be permitted to join NATO and the United States may reduce its presence in Europe. Western analysts have not given Russian deterrence enough credit for the alliance’s deterrence failure on February 24, 2022. The alliance did not act fecklessly, nor did it self-deter. Rather, NATO’s deterrence measures were calibrated more for hybrid/gray-zone attacks of the sort it saw in 2014, not for the large-scale combat operations the alliance witnessed in 2022, which involved a nuclear-armed adversary with stronger interests in Ukraine than NATO had. To be sure, the alliance’s leaders acted responsibly in managing the risk of escalation. But in so doing, they also facilitated Russian deterrence efforts, which succeeded in keeping Washington and Brussels from intervening in the war. The alliance thus demonstrated its need for a strategy that would increase the risks and costs of war for Russia without unduly raising NATO’s. In short, the alliance needs a proxy strategy of “waging war without going to war,” whereby NATO can provide its full political, economic, and military support to Ukraine without running the risk of putting alliance troops in harm’s way.

Brennan Deveraux and Joshua Arostegui; Monograph from the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press; This monograph establishes a contextual baseline that serves as the framework for future comparisons of the US Army and the People’s Liberation Army Army. It examines differences in five key components of land warfare: the two nations’ landpower definitions, uses of land forces to build relationships, underlying warfare concepts, associated modernization efforts, and varying approaches to simulating land warfare in the region. In examining these components, the authors identify warfare intangibles that highlight analytical findings in a way that promotes future research. The existing scholarship comparing the two forces is often limited in scope, focusing on funding or comparing capabilities such as the number of specific weapons systems. This monograph differs from existing scholarship by providing a broad, in-depth comparison of critical landpower components. The analysis challenges long-held assumptions about US Army superiority and sets a foundation for future research. The authors rely heavily on primary sources and ample secondary documents translated directly from Chinese vernacular sources. This study’s conclusions challenge conventional thinking surrounding the People’s Liberation Army and will assist US military and policy practitioners in assessing the relative strengths and advantages the US military can grow or exploit.

C. Anthony Pfaff and Christopher John Hickey, Principal Investigators; ©2025 C. Anthony Pfaff. All rights reserved. Integrated Research Project from the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press; "Integrating Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning Technologies into Common Operating Picture and Course of Action Development" explores the potential of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning to revolutionize military planning processes by enhancing situational awareness and expediting course of action development within the Joint planning process. The study delves into technical, organizational, and resource considerations that are critical for AI integration. In addition, the study highlights the importance of clean, structured data in training AI systems, addresses challenges in data collection across varying formats and classifications, and emphasizes the need for AI-friendly infrastructure. By automating processes like common operational picture generation and leveraging AI for course of action analysis, military planners can achieve greater efficiency and decision-making speed. Furthermore, this publication underscores the challenges of ethical implementation, resource sustainability, and organizational adaptation, including upskilling personnel and integrating commercial vendors. Case studies, such as the Maven Smart System and STORMBREAKER, demonstrate AI’s ability to enhance data fusion, improve battlefield awareness, and streamline operational planning. This research provides a robust framework for overcoming barriers to AI adoption, enabling the US military to harness AI technologies for enhanced planning, decision making, and operational success.