Recent Articles

Joshua Arostegui, Editor; Conference papers from the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press; The US Army War College’s 2024 Carlisle Conference on the People’s Liberation Army was held on October 16 and 17 at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The conference featured keynote speakers from the US Department of Defense and the think-tank community, and panels focused on assessing the People’s Republic of China’s understanding of and capability to carry out a protracted war in the Indo-Pacific. The conference brought together over 100 participants from government, military, US Intelligence Community, academic, and think-tank organizations. The conference papers were authored by expert speakers and panelists and were designed to provide insight into key People’s Republic of China and People’s Liberation Army advances that could enable Chinese forces in a future protracted war against a US-led coalition. The papers were also crafted to enable in-depth seminar discussions following each panel, allowing the authors to garner feedback to improve their analyses.= The conference volume is organized into four sections based on the conference panels: understanding the People’s Republic of China’s views on historical and modern protracted wars; assessing the People’s Liberation Army’s operational endurance in the land, maritime, and air domains; analyzing China and the People’s Liberation Army’s ability to command and control a protracted war; and determining how Russia and North Korea could support the People’s Republic of China in a protracted war.

John A. Nagl, Project Director, and Michael T. Hackett, Chief of Staff; Integrated Research Project from the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, School of Strategic Landpower, US Army War College Press; Following the 2024 A Call to Action: Lessons from Ukraine for the Future Force, which explored military lessons learned from the first year of the Russia-Ukraine War, this book examines the changing character of war as the second year of the war unfolded. This year’s authors explore the conflict from four different angles: information advantage (intelligence, information operations, and cyber); landpower operations (fires, maneuver, force protection, mission command, and mercenaries); multi-domain operations (air and maritime); and crosscutting themes (diplomacy, sustainment, and innovation and adaptation). The second year witnessed the innovative approaches to combat of the first year—drones, unmanned aerial systems, and electronic-warfare offensive and defensive capabilities—combined with entrenched warfare not seen at the current scale in Europe since World War I. The use of mercenary private military companies like the Wagner Group generated moments of high suspense (with a failed mutiny in July 2023) and led to changes in Russian force structure and tactics. Delays in continued allied support tested the resolve and operational capabilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which nevertheless kept up the fight and held Russia back. Through it all, the conflict offers a compelling picture of the war of the future, along with lessons for the US Army Training and Doctrine Command to prepare the Joint Force to meet the challenges of the large-scale combat operations of tomorrow. ©2026 John A. Nagl. All rights reserved.

by Brennan Deveraux; Monograph from the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press; This monograph challenges the Department of War to reframe the conversation about humans’ involvement in lethal autonomous weapons systems by codifying a human-centric framework built on the employment pillars of certification, authority, restriction, and accountability. Although an ample body of literature discusses lethal autonomous weapon systems, this monograph takes a novel approach by proposing a theoretical framework and applying it to historical and hypothetical practical scenarios involving weapons with autonomous characteristics. In terms of methodology, the monograph relies heavily on primary sources, including UN documents and Department of War publications, which are augmented by secondary sources from experts in the field and creative speculation about the characteristics of future warfare. The study’s conclusions will help US military and policy practitioners manage and integrate lethal autonomous weapon systems. This study is designed to spark a necessary and likely uncomfortable conversation about when relying on lethal machines is appropriate. The monograph provides tangible recommendations to help shape future policy decisions about developing and employing lethal autonomous weapon systems.

2025 Homeland Defense Symposium Compendium Editors: Prof. Bert Tussing, Dr. George Schwartz, Dr. John ‘Charles’ Anderson. Conference Papers by: Dr. Erik Dahl, Dr. John Comiskey, Amy Lay, Ashley Reichert, Cary Underwood, Julianne Ortman; The United States Army War College’s 2025 Homeland Defense Symposium presented a unique opportunity for a whole-of-nation discussion and for information sharing on extant and emerging threats to the United States homeland. The research, presentations, key points, and discussions are consolidated in a compendium in this inaugural issue of For the Common Defense. Approximately 125 security professionals from a wide variety of backgrounds including the Joint Force, all levels of government, and civilian academia, attended in-person or virtually for three days. They participated in the symposium because they recognize that our homeland is once again in danger. Our potential adversaries are already making preparations to conduct operations in the continental U.S. in the event of a future large- scale combat operation. They will strive to disrupt infrastructure and supply chains, generate civil unrest, and create multiple dilemmas for elected leaders with the goal of keeping our military forces out of the warfight overseas.

The Collins Center Update is a quarterly summary of programs and activities at the Center for Strategic Leader (CSL) at the U.S. Army War College (USAWC). This issue features articles on Gaming Homeland Defense Contingencies by Major Andrew Starkey and Professor Bert Tussing; The Homeland Defense Defender’s Elective by Master Sergeant Ronald Bittner; Army War College Fellows Focus by Ms. Patricia Hayes, the 2025 National Security Simulation Exercise of Competition, Crisis, and Conflict by Mr. Brian Foster; and The National Security Seminar Homeland Defense Workshop by Dr. George Schwartz.

By Colonel Larry A. Wyatt, Dr. Michele Devlin, Dr. José de Arimatéia da Cruz. Weather-induced instability, such as the 2023–24 dzud (a slow-onset Mongolian winter disaster characterized by large-scale livestock mortality), creates schisms adversaries use to expand their soft power, Mongolia’s movement toward US adversaries could indirectly threaten US national security by heightening instability, increasing competition, and disrupting global economic systems. Conversely, through increased environmental diplomacy, investment, and resilience building—and by promoting democratic partnerships to bolster regional stability and showcase US leadership while mitigating adversarial exploitation of vulnerable regions—the United States can mitigate the impacts of ecological challenges on its national security interests.

Antulio J. Echevarria II, Larry P. Goodson, and Brennan Deveraux – Project Directors; Integrated Research Project from the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press; The US government and the US Army are unprepared for a great-power war. This integrated research project (IRP), sponsored by Vice Chief of Staff of the Army General James J. Mingus, is a critical first step in helping senior US Army leaders increase their knowledge of, and preparations for, deterring or fighting a great-power war in the twenty-first century. No one knows how long the US government and the US Army have to prepare for a future conflict. Consequently, the US Department of Defense faces difficult decisions as it balances preparing for a future war with maintaining readiness to address current challenges. The student research in this IRP only scratches the surface of what the US Department of Defense and the US Army should do to understand, deter, and prepare more effectively for the possibility of a great-power war in the twenty-first century. While the steps outlined here are preliminary, they are not tentative. Readers will find that each chapter offers concrete, actionable recommendations based on duly considered analysis. But more work lies ahead.

Handbook by the School of Strategic Learning, US Army War College The purpose of this document is to assist United States Army War College students during the Military Strategy and Campaigning (MSC) course. It also serves to assist commanders, planners, and other staff officers in combatant commands (CCMD), joint task forces (JTF), and Service component commands. It supplements joint doctrine and contains elements of emerging doctrine as practiced globally by joint force commanders (JFCs). It portrays a way to apply draft doctrine awaiting signature, published doctrine, and emerging concepts, all at the higher levels of joint command, with a primary emphasis at the combatant command level.

By Dr. William J. Barry, PhD and Lieutenant Colonel Aaron “Blair" Wilcox; Issue paper from the U.S. Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership; In the frenzy to adopt newly accessible artificial intelligence (AI) tools for military purposes, little public discussion has addressed the potential pitfalls. Despite the energy invested in developing the ideal generative AI (GenAI) tool for military applications, a trusted capability remains elusive across the US Army and the Joint Force. In May 2025, the US Army War College, the Global Information Dominance Experiment, and the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office partnered to test Donovan, a GenAI system developed by Scale AI, in the first classified war game focused on war plans at the theater-Army level. This experiment demonstrated the industry-partnership model required to build the tools the Army needs to maintain the cognitive edge in landpower.