Issue Papers

 
  •  Sixth Annual Reserve Component Symposium Workshop #3

    Sixth Annual Reserve Component Symposium Workshop #3

    Sixth Annual Reserve Component Symposium Workshop #3 Prof John F Troxell Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "In response to hurricanes Katrina and Rita the military mounted a massive response that saved many lives and greatly assisted recovery efforts. The military took proactive steps and responded with about 50,000 National Guard and 20,000 active federal personnel. Based on its June 2005 civil support strategy, the Department of Defense (DOD) relied heavily on the Guard during the initial response. In addition, active duty forces were alerted prior to landfall and key capabilities such as aviation, medical, and engineering forces were initially deployed. Growing concerns about the magnitude of the disaster prompted DOD to deploy large, active ground units to supplement the Guard beginning about 5 days after landfall..."
    • Published On: 8/15/2007
  •  Sixth Annual Reserve Component Symposium Workshop #4

    Sixth Annual Reserve Component Symposium Workshop #4

    Sixth Annual Reserve Component Symposium Workshop #4 Mr John Elliot, Prof James O Kievit Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "The frequently strained interaction between the active component and the National Guard during the military’s response to Hurricane’s Katrina and Rita in the summer of 2005 has led some to argue for a cultural migration away from strict “command and control” concepts toward a broader concept of “command, control, cooperation and coordination.” Meanwhile, many experts believe that pandemic influenza or terrorist attacks employing nuclear or biological devices likely will result in death and economic or physical disruption that would vastly exceed the destruction wreaked along the Gulf Coast, that the destructive potential of hurricanes like Katrina and Rita actually represent the “lower end” of catastrophic events. "
    • Published On: 8/15/2007
  •  Beyond Iraq: The Lessons of a Hard Place

    Beyond Iraq: The Lessons of a Hard Place

    Beyond Iraq: The Lessons of a Hard Place Mr Anton K Smith Student issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "Our “adventure” in Iraq is doing little to enhance the post 9/11 security of the American public. The idea that a Middle East-altering democracy could be militarily introduced into a country as riven and as historically different from the U.S. as Iraq is now understood to have been naïve. As a series of early failures drove wedge after wedge into the fragile Iraqi society, the policy objective of a 'united, stable and democratic Iraq' at peace with its neighbors fell victim to shortsighted decisions and poor preparation. The prolonged engagement in Iraq is distracting us from an even greater threat of a stateless insurgency arrayed against the current world order. A mechanism for constraining U.S. prerogatives has been established, and a formula for our defeat is under development."
    • Published On: 7/15/2007
  •  Making Riflemen from Mud: Restoring the Army's Culture of Irregular Warfare

    Making Riflemen from Mud: Restoring the Army's Culture of Irregular Warfare

    Making Riflemen from Mud: Restoring the Army's Culture of Irregular Warfare LTC James D Campbell Student Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "In the summer of 1899, Lieutenant Matthew Batson was commanding L Troop, 4th U.S. Cavalry, during operations in the Philippines. Already recognized as an energetic and courageous officer during the war in Cuba, Batson gained further notoriety after being awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for actions in combat with his troop in July. At the request of his superiors, in late summer Batson submitted a formal proposal for raising a scout company for the First Division’s Provisional Cavalry Brigade. The plan called for this company to be recruited from the Macabebes, an ethnic tribal group in Southern Luzon who had long opposed domination by the majority Tagalogs. The Tagalogs formed the backbone and provided most of the leadership for the Army of the Philippine Republic, fighting against U.S. rule in the archipelago..."
    • Published On: 7/15/2007
  •  A View of Command, Control, Communications and Computer Architectures at the Dawn of Network Centric Warfare

    A View of Command, Control, Communications and Computer Architectures at the Dawn of Network Centric Warfare

    A View of Command, Control, Communications and Computer Architectures at the Dawn of Network Centric Warfare Mr Kevin J Cogan Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "In March 2004, the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) in cooperation with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Office of Force Transformation (OFT) initiated a study focusing on the U.S. Army V Corps’ and 3rd Infantry Division’s major combat operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). This study, entitled “Network Centric Warfare Case Study: U.S. V Corps and 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) during Operation Iraqi Freedom Combat Operations (March-April 2003)” is one of several case studies commissioned by OFT to determine the military’s ability to conduct operations in accordance with network centric warfare (NCW) concepts."
    • Published On: 3/15/2007
  •  Belize 2021 National Security Framework: Strengthening the Links between Policy, Resource Allocation and Execution

    Belize 2021 National Security Framework: Strengthening the Links between Policy, Resource Allocation and Execution

    Belize 2021 National Security Framework: Strengthening the Links between Policy, Resource Allocation and Execution COL Dale C Eikmeier, Prof Bernard F Griffard Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "The absence of an institutionalized process for long-range national security planning is a strategic disadvantage. To reduce risk and achieve Vision 2021, Belize requires an integrated national security architecture that develops policy, coordinates action plans, monitors execution, reviews progress and maintains a long-term perspective. Currently, the government does not possess an adequate national security planning structure with the requisit capability. Redesigning the current national security architecture so that it provides long-range planning, coordination between cabinet ministers and their agencies, and monitoring of security programs can be the difference between success and failure of a national security strategy. "
    • Published On: 12/15/2006
  •  Proteus: New Insights for a New Age; Proteus Futures Academic Workshop Report

    Proteus: New Insights for a New Age; Proteus Futures Academic Workshop Report

    Proteus: New Insights for a New Age; Proteus Futures Academic Workshop Report Mister William O Waddell, COL William L Wimbish III Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "The Proteus Management Group (PMG) hosted the first annual Proteus Futures Academic Workshop 22-24 August 06 at the Center for Strategic Leadership, United States Army War College at Carlisle Barracks. This workshop was focused on providing scholars from various organizations the opportunity to present papers on topics and issues related to the Proteus Insights that addressed future strategic national security challenges. Workshop participants were from a variety of nations, disciplines, and backgrounds, and included: students and faculty from universities, colleges and military service schools; government civilian and military senior leaders, planners and analysts from joint agencies, the uniformed services and the national intelligence community; former political appointees, and international representatives from Canada and Israel."
    • Published On: 11/15/2006
  •  Belize 2021: Ends, Ways, Means and Risk Management: Belize National Security Strategy Formulation Process Workshop #2

    Belize 2021: Ends, Ways, Means and Risk Management: Belize National Security Strategy Formulation Process Workshop #2

    Belize 2021: Ends, Ways, Means and Risk Management: Belize National Security Strategy Formulation Process Workshop #2 COL Dale C Eikmeier, Prof Bernard F Griffard Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "On August 22, 2006 planners representing Belize’s security organizations and other government agencies reconvened to continue their national security strategy formulation process. Their initial efforts in June 2006, reported in CSL Issue Paper, Belize 2021: Developing a National Security Strategy for the Future, July 2006, Volume 06-06, produced the Belize 2021 Vision, its national goals, and identified tiered threats to success that required counter-strategies. This paper looks at the continuing process to develop Belize’s roadmap to 2021 exercised during this second strategy formulation workshop."
    • Published On: 9/15/2006
  •  Improving the Military's Domestic Crisis Response

    Improving the Military's Domestic Crisis Response

    Improving the Military's Domestic Crisis Response COL Richard W Dillon, COL James F Roth, Prof Bert B Tussing Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "On 11 and 12 July 2006, the U.S. Army War College’s Center for Strategic Leadership convened a symposium to examine the evolving, and potential role of the military’s reserve components in responding to catastrophic incidents in the United States. The fifth of an annual series dedicated to issues surrounding the service reserves and the National Guard, this forum drew heavily from the lessons learned throughout the country’s recent history of defense support to civil authorities (DSCA), and particularly from the lessons of Hurricane Katrina."
    • Published On: 8/15/2006
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