Middle East & North Africa

 
  •  Kuwaiti National Security and the U.S.-Kuwaiti Strategic Relationship after Saddam

    Kuwaiti National Security and the U.S.-Kuwaiti Strategic Relationship after Saddam

    Kuwaiti National Security and the U.S.-Kuwaiti Strategic Relationship after Saddam Dr W Andrew Terrill Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The U.S.-Kuwait military relationship has been of considerable value to both countries since at least 1990. This alliance was formed in the aftermath of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein’s brutal invasion of Kuwait and the U.S. decision to free Kuwait with military force in 1991. Saddam’s later defeat and removal from power in 2003 eliminated an important rationale for the alliance, but a close look at current strategic realities in the Gulf suggests that Kuwait remains an important U.S. ally. It is also an ally that faces a number of serious national security concerns in the turbulent post-Saddam era, some of which will require both Kuwaitis and Americans to rethink and revise previous security approaches, particularly to meet the shared goals of reducing terrorism and regional instability."
    • Published On: 9/1/2007
  •  The Reserve Policies of Nations: A Comparative Analysis

    The Reserve Policies of Nations: A Comparative Analysis

    The Reserve Policies of Nations: A Comparative Analysis Dr Richard Weitz Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "While the American defense community has naturally been preoccupied with the extensive transformation of the U.S. reserve components in recent years, equally critical developments in the reserve policies of the world’s other major military powers have received less attention. The inevitability of continued American engagement with these countries means that their changing policies are highly relevant to the United States. American defense planners should therefore keep abreast of ongoing alterations in these countries’ reserve components and, in certain cases, might wish to adjust their own forces and policies in response."
    • Published On: 9/1/2007
  •  Egypt: Security, Political, and Islamist Challenges

    Egypt: Security, Political, and Islamist Challenges

    Egypt: Security, Political, and Islamist Challenges Dr Sherifa D Zuhur Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In this monograph, Dr. Sherifa Zuhur argues that the Egyptian government’s efforts to retain tight control over the political landscape is impeding the democratization process. In the name of antiterrorism, these efforts may not put an end to sporadic outbreaks of militant violence which reemerged after the 1999 truce with the larger of these radical groups. The long-protested official state of emergency which grants the Egyptian government extraordinary powers has been extended, and that action required constitutional amendments which were recently approved by referendum. "
    • Published On: 9/1/2007
  •  Can Tony Blair Make a Difference in the Middle East?

    Can Tony Blair Make a Difference in the Middle East?

    Can Tony Blair Make a Difference in the Middle East? Dr W Andrew Terrill Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "As the entire world now knows, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair has decided not to slip into comfortable retirement. Instead, after 10 years of service as the leader of the United Kingdom, he has sought out one the world’s most thankless jobs at one of the worst possible times to accept it. He has arranged to be appointed special envoy of the Middle East Peace Quartet. The Quartet includes the European Union, Russia, the United Nations, and the United States..."
    • Published On: 8/1/2007
  •  Negotiation in the New Strategic Environment: Lessons from Iraq

    Negotiation in the New Strategic Environment: Lessons from Iraq

    Negotiation in the New Strategic Environment: Lessons from Iraq Mr David M Tressler Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "U.S. soldiers in Iraq—from junior to senior leaders—conduct thousands of negotiations with Iraqi leaders while pursuing tactical and operational objectives that affect the strategic import of the U.S. mission in that country. As long as U.S. troops operate under conditions like the ones they currently face while at the same time conducting a counterinsurgency and stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operation in Iraq, negotiation will be a common activity and an important part of achieving mission objectives. Lessons from experience negotiating in Iraq can be helpful in future operations."
    • Published On: 8/1/2007
  •  Beyond Iraq: The Lessons of a Hard Place

    Beyond Iraq: The Lessons of a Hard Place

    Beyond Iraq: The Lessons of a Hard Place Mr Anton K Smith Student issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "Our “adventure” in Iraq is doing little to enhance the post 9/11 security of the American public. The idea that a Middle East-altering democracy could be militarily introduced into a country as riven and as historically different from the U.S. as Iraq is now understood to have been naïve. As a series of early failures drove wedge after wedge into the fragile Iraqi society, the policy objective of a 'united, stable and democratic Iraq' at peace with its neighbors fell victim to shortsighted decisions and poor preparation. The prolonged engagement in Iraq is distracting us from an even greater threat of a stateless insurgency arrayed against the current world order. A mechanism for constraining U.S. prerogatives has been established, and a formula for our defeat is under development."
    • Published On: 7/15/2007
  •  Treating Allies as Allies in the Arab World

    Treating Allies as Allies in the Arab World

    Treating Allies as Allies in the Arab World Dr W Andrew Terrill Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "At this crucial junction in time, there are serious, evolving, and seemingly nonstop challenges involving the potential spread of violent upheaval and terrorism in the Middle East and particularly the Gulf region. To address these difficulties, the United States will need to work with friendly Arab nations that can help us meet those challenges with united strength. Unfortunately, the importance of our alliances with regional Arab powers is not always fully appreciated by our own strategic thinkers. Questions correspondingly emerge as to whether we are doing enough to understand allied concerns and find ways in which we can work together to address the terrorism threat."
    • Published On: 6/1/2007
  •  A View of Command, Control, Communications and Computer Architectures at the Dawn of Network Centric Warfare

    A View of Command, Control, Communications and Computer Architectures at the Dawn of Network Centric Warfare

    A View of Command, Control, Communications and Computer Architectures at the Dawn of Network Centric Warfare Mr Kevin J Cogan Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "In March 2004, the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) in cooperation with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Office of Force Transformation (OFT) initiated a study focusing on the U.S. Army V Corps’ and 3rd Infantry Division’s major combat operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). This study, entitled “Network Centric Warfare Case Study: U.S. V Corps and 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) during Operation Iraqi Freedom Combat Operations (March-April 2003)” is one of several case studies commissioned by OFT to determine the military’s ability to conduct operations in accordance with network centric warfare (NCW) concepts."
    • Published On: 3/15/2007
  •  The Missing Debate

    The Missing Debate

    The Missing Debate Prof John R Martin, Dr Gordon Rudd Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "While the surge of 21,500 additional troops to Iraq is consuming national headlines, another important debate is being marginalized. With little public attention, Congress recently authorized an increase of 92,000 uniformed personnel for the Army and Marines. Although significant operationally, the Iraq augmentation is temporary; the larger increase will be permanent, with long-term strategic implications for national security capabilities. Without a thoughtful debate on how to structure the permanent plus-up, the additional 92,000 Soldiers and Marines may have only limited utility."
    • Published On: 3/1/2007
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