Middle East & North Africa

Negotiation in the New Strategic Environment: Lessons from Iraq Mr David M Tressler Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "U.S. soldiers in Iraq—from junior to senior leaders—conduct thousands of negotiations with Iraqi leaders while pursuing tactical and operational objectives that affect the strategic import of the U.S. mission in that country. As long as U.S. troops operate under conditions like the ones they currently face while at the same time conducting a counterinsurgency and stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operation in Iraq, negotiation will be a common activity and an important part of achieving mission objectives. Lessons from experience negotiating in Iraq can be helpful in future operations."

Beyond Iraq: The Lessons of a Hard Place Mr Anton K Smith Student issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "Our “adventure” in Iraq is doing little to enhance the post 9/11 security of the American public. The idea that a Middle East-altering democracy could be militarily introduced into a country as riven and as historically different from the U.S. as Iraq is now understood to have been naïve. As a series of early failures drove wedge after wedge into the fragile Iraqi society, the policy objective of a 'united, stable and democratic Iraq' at peace with its neighbors fell victim to shortsighted decisions and poor preparation. The prolonged engagement in Iraq is distracting us from an even greater threat of a stateless insurgency arrayed against the current world order. A mechanism for constraining U.S. prerogatives has been established, and a formula for our defeat is under development."

Treating Allies as Allies in the Arab World Dr W Andrew Terrill Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "At this crucial junction in time, there are serious, evolving, and seemingly nonstop challenges involving the potential spread of violent upheaval and terrorism in the Middle East and particularly the Gulf region. To address these difficulties, the United States will need to work with friendly Arab nations that can help us meet those challenges with united strength. Unfortunately, the importance of our alliances with regional Arab powers is not always fully appreciated by our own strategic thinkers. Questions correspondingly emerge as to whether we are doing enough to understand allied concerns and find ways in which we can work together to address the terrorism threat."

A View of Command, Control, Communications and Computer Architectures at the Dawn of Network Centric Warfare Mr Kevin J Cogan Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "In March 2004, the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) in cooperation with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Office of Force Transformation (OFT) initiated a study focusing on the U.S. Army V Corps’ and 3rd Infantry Division’s major combat operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). This study, entitled “Network Centric Warfare Case Study: U.S. V Corps and 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) during Operation Iraqi Freedom Combat Operations (March-April 2003)” is one of several case studies commissioned by OFT to determine the military’s ability to conduct operations in accordance with network centric warfare (NCW) concepts."

The Missing Debate Prof John R Martin, Dr Gordon Rudd Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "While the surge of 21,500 additional troops to Iraq is consuming national headlines, another important debate is being marginalized. With little public attention, Congress recently authorized an increase of 92,000 uniformed personnel for the Army and Marines. Although significant operationally, the Iraq augmentation is temporary; the larger increase will be permanent, with long-term strategic implications for national security capabilities. Without a thoughtful debate on how to structure the permanent plus-up, the additional 92,000 Soldiers and Marines may have only limited utility."

U.S. Interests in Central Asia and the Challenges to Them Dr Stephen J Blank Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "For the United States, Central Asia is a region of both growing importance and of growing challenge. Its proximity to Russia, China, Iran, India, and Pakistan;, location as the center of the Global War on Terrorism; and its large energy holdings make it a strategic region where the United States has important, some might even say vital, interests. Those interests pertain, first of all, to geostrategic realities of security, particularly in the war on terrorism. But they also pertain to energy and to the effort to support liberalizing and democratizing reforms."

Political Warfare in Sub-Saharan Africa: U.S. Capabilities and Chinese Operations in Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa Dr Donovan C Chau Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "In this monograph, Dr. Donovan Chau considers one nonviolent instrument of grand strategy in particular, political warfare. Retracing the origins and mischaracterizations of political warfare, Dr. Chau suggests that the PRC has used political warfare as its leading grand strategic instrument in Africa. The monograph offers a concise, detailed overview of U.S. capabilities to conduct political warfare in Africa. It then examines PRC political warfare operations in four regional “anchor” states—Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa."

In Defense of Rational Risk Assessment Mr Nathan P Freier Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Risk in Webster’s is “the possibility of suffering harm or loss.”1 Risk accompanies both action and inaction. To strategists, it is accounted for and mitigated, but not always or even commonly avoided. To the national security strategist, risk—to paraphrase the current defense strategy—is the likelihood of failure or prohibitive cost in pursuit of key objectives. In this view, some goals are beyond reach. Others are within reach, but the cost of achieving them puts more important ambitions in some jeopardy. Unfortunately, those familiar with contemporary strategic-level military decisionmaking know that rational consideration of even the prospect of failure is absent. In high-level policy discussions, success is assumed."

The Iraq War: Learning from the Past, Adapting to the Present, and Planning for the Future Dr Thomas R Mockaitis Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Iraq confronts the U.S. military with one of the most complex internal security operations in history. It must occupy, pacify, secure, and rebuild a country of 26 million people with fewer than 150,000 troops organized and trained as a conventional force in predominantly heavy armored divisions. They occupy a land divided into two broad ethnic and three religious groups crisscrossed by hundreds of regional, local, and family loyalties. For the past 3 years, Iraq has been wracked by a Sunni insurgency augmented by foreign mujahedeen terrorists and complicated by general lawlessness. Growing intercommunal violence between Sunni and Shiite militias has taken the country to the brink of civil war."