Middle East & North Africa

 
  •  Examining Military Governance as a Part of Professional Military Education

    Examining Military Governance as a Part of Professional Military Education

    Examining Military Governance as a Part of Professional Military Education Mr Brent C Bankus, Ms Lorelei E W Coplen, Prof James O Kievit Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "After the capture of Baghdad in 2003, the expectation was that an Iraqi entity would quickly step forward to begin to fill the role of government in the territory formerly ruled by Saddam Hussein. Instead, there was a power vacuum which the United States – and in particular the United States military – had to fill. Similarly, in Afghanistan, despite the relatively quick identification of Hamid Karzai as the “designated” national leader, it also became clear that the new national government lacked many of the essential capabilities required to actually implement good governance. Again, despite the clear preference of many of today’s military officers to have some other entity (whether of the U.S. government, the United Nations, or even non-government private contractors) be responsible for doing so, that responsibility initially fell largely, if not exclusively, on U.S. military commanders. Even though the U.S. military, especially the U.S. Army, has had a long history of military governance activities, many of those commanders felt unprepared and/or that it was 'not really my job.'"
    • Published On: 6/15/2011
  •  The Russian Military and the Georgia War: Lessons and Implications

    The Russian Military and the Georgia War: Lessons and Implications

    The Russian Military and the Georgia War: Lessons and Implications Dr Ariel Cohen, COL Robert E Hamilton Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Russia launched the war against Georgia in August 2008 for highly valued strategic and geopolitical objectives, which included de facto annexation of Abkhazia, weakening or toppling the Mikheil Saakashvili regime, and preventing North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) enlargement. The Russian politico-military elites had focused on Georgia since the days of the presidency of Eduard Shevardnadze, whom they blamed, together with Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev and Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR) Communist Party Central Committee Secretary Alexander Yakovlev, for the dissolution of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe and the dismantlement of the Soviet Union itself."
    • Published On: 6/1/2011
  •  Rebuilding Armed Forces: Learning from Iraq and Lebanon

    Rebuilding Armed Forces: Learning from Iraq and Lebanon

    Rebuilding Armed Forces: Learning from Iraq and Lebanon Dr Florence Gaub Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Since U.S. operations began in Iraq in 2003, the Iraqi armed forces have embarked on a huge transformation. In this groundbreaking monograph, Dr. Florence Gaub focuses on the structural and sociological aspects of rebuilding the Iraqi armed forces, which she observes and comments on through the lens of lessons learned from Lebanon’s experience of rebuilding its own armed forces in the late 20th century following civil war."
    • Published On: 5/1/2011
  •  Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq, 2003-09: A Case of Operational Surprise and Institutional Response

    Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq, 2003-09: A Case of Operational Surprise and Institutional Response

    Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq, 2003-09: A Case of Operational Surprise and Institutional Response Brigadier Andrew Smith Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that has emerged in conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003 is a contemporary example of conventional militaries being confronted with a tactical surprise with operational—if not strategic—implications. Those implications can necessitate “institutional” responses to avoid strategic defeat in what, for many countries, are “wars of discretion.” Operational surprise, as defined in this examination, differs from strategic shocks as described by Nathan Freier, and the necessary responses are distinct from the military adaptations considered by John Nagl. The paper contends that the 6-year evolution of the IED experience from 2003 until 2009 constitutes a complete cycle of surprise and response, of which the most significant part is the institutional response."
    • Published On: 4/1/2011
  •  The Conflicts in Yemen and U.S. National Security

    The Conflicts in Yemen and U.S. National Security

    The Conflicts in Yemen and U.S. National Security Dr W Andrew Terrill Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Yemen is not currently a failed state, but it is experiencing huge political and economic problems that can have a direct impact on U.S. interests in the region. It has a rapidly expanding population with a resource base that is limited and already leaves much of the current population in poverty. The government obtains around a third of its budget revenue from sales of its limited and declining oil stocks, which most economists state will be exhausted by 2017. Yemen has critical water shortages aggravated by the use of extensive amounts of water and agricultural land for production of the shrub qat, which is chewed for stimulant and other effects but has no nutritional value. All of these problems are especially difficult to address because the central government has only limited capacity to extend its influence into tribal areas beyond the capital and major cities..."
    • Published On: 1/1/2011
  •  Transitions: Issues, Challenges and Solutions in International Assistance

    Transitions: Issues, Challenges and Solutions in International Assistance

    Transitions: Issues, Challenges and Solutions in International Assistance Doctor Harry R Yarger Reports and Misc. Publications by the US Army War College, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute "In this text, papers prepared for the Transitions: Issues, Challenges and Solutions Conference,” conducted at Carlisle Barracks in November 2010, examine transitions from theoretical and practical perspectives. In sharing their research and experience, the authors collectively cultivate in the reader a necessary strategic perspective; one that is holistic and systemic in outlook. However, each essay focuses on some specific aspect of transitions and develops it in some detail. Readers will find each essay and its argument stands on its own merit, offering an independent assessment and making a valuable and enduring contribution to the body of knowledge on transitions and state-building."
    • Published On: 11/18/2010
  •  America's Most Committed Muslim Ally

    America's Most Committed Muslim Ally

    America's Most Committed Muslim Ally Dr W Andrew Terrill Op-ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Somehow in the rage over the New York Mosque and Cultural Center, many of America’s Muslim allies have been forgotten. Jordan is an especially important case. This country is both a victim of terrorism and one of America’s most committed allies in the struggle against al Qaeda. As with the United States, al Qaeda has struck Jordanian targets without mercy..."
    • Published On: 11/1/2010
  •  Somalia: Line in the Sand--Identification of MYM Vulnerabilities

    Somalia: Line in the Sand--Identification of MYM Vulnerabilities

    Somalia: Line in the Sand--Identification of MYM Vulnerabilities LTC Eloy E Cuevas, Ms Madeleine Wells Letort Paper by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Continuing instability in Somalia has increased concern that terrorists who seek to establish a foothold in Africa may use such insecure places as a safe haven and launching pad. Several attempts have been made to establish lawful governments in Somalia; however, warlord and clan interests have managed to take center stage among the population. The Somali-based al-Shabaab (also known as the Mujahidin Youth Movement [MYM]) is a militant organization born out of both successive regional turmoil and international salafi-jihadi ideology, which continues to actively undermine the United Nations (UN)-supported African Union (AU) peacekeeping force, the fledging Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG), and all UN efforts to support Somalis in creating a stable state. "
    • Published On: 9/1/2010
  •  America's Flawed Afghanistan Strategy

    America's Flawed Afghanistan Strategy

    America's Flawed Afghanistan Strategy Dr Steven Metz Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Despite the lavish time and attention that the Obama administration devoted to reviewing its Afghanistan strategy, the result was more continuity than change. The administration adjusted U.S. troops levels and shifted some operational methods but accepted the most basic—and questionable—assumptions of the Bush strategy. Unfortunately, these do not hold up under close scrutiny. The new strategy, like the old one, totters on a dangerously flawed foundation."
    • Published On: 8/1/2010
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