Middle East & North Africa

 
  •  In Defense of Rational Risk Assessment

    In Defense of Rational Risk Assessment

    In Defense of Rational Risk Assessment Mr Nathan P Freier Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Risk in Webster’s is “the possibility of suffering harm or loss.”1 Risk accompanies both action and inaction. To strategists, it is accounted for and mitigated, but not always or even commonly avoided. To the national security strategist, risk—to paraphrase the current defense strategy—is the likelihood of failure or prohibitive cost in pursuit of key objectives. In this view, some goals are beyond reach. Others are within reach, but the cost of achieving them puts more important ambitions in some jeopardy. Unfortunately, those familiar with contemporary strategic-level military decisionmaking know that rational consideration of even the prospect of failure is absent. In high-level policy discussions, success is assumed."
    • Published On: 2/1/2007
  •  Negotiating with Iran and Syria over Iraq

    Negotiating with Iran and Syria over Iraq

    Negotiating with Iran and Syria over Iraq Dr W Andrew Terrill Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The United States has been struggling for decades to establish effective ways to deal with Iran and Syria, with no easy answer coming to the fore. In recent years, the question sometimes was framed as to whether we should seek regime change for these nations or accept the existence of the current regimes and attempt to change their behavior through political pressure and negotiations. Recently, the possibility of coercive regime change seems to have been ruled out under all but the most exceptional circumstances by a key administration official."
    • Published On: 1/1/2007
  •  Learning from Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy

    Learning from Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy

    Learning from Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy Dr Steven Metz Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "During the past 5 years, American strategy has undergone a sea change, shifting from a focus on the conventional military forces of rogue or rising states to irregular challenges associated with the “long war” against transnational jihadism. Much of the new thinking has resulted from the conflict in Iraq. One result of this has been an attempt to relearn counterinsurgency by the U.S. military. While the involvement of the United States in counterinsurgency has a long history, it had faded in importance in the years following the end of the Cold War. When American forces first confronted it in Iraq, they were not fully prepared. Since then, the U.S. military and other government agencies have expended much effort to refine their counterinsurgency capabilities. But have they done enough?"
    • Published On: 1/1/2007
  •  Regional Fears of Western Primacy and the Future of U.S. Middle Eastern Basing Policy

    Regional Fears of Western Primacy and the Future of U.S. Middle Eastern Basing Policy

    Regional Fears of Western Primacy and the Future of U.S. Middle Eastern Basing Policy Dr W Andrew Terrill Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The United States has a core national interest in maintaining peace and stability in the Middle East as well as containing or eliminating threats emanating from that region. Yet, if most American strategic analysts can agree on this assumption and these goals, there is often disagreement on the ways to best achieve them. In this monograph, Dr. W. Andrew Terrill presents his analysis of how the United States and other Western states might best address their military cooperation and basing needs within the Middle East, while still respecting and working with an understanding of regional and especially Arab history and concerns. He also provides the reader with policy recommendations based upon his analysis."
    • Published On: 12/1/2006
  •  Iraqi Security Forces and Lessons from Korea

    Iraqi Security Forces and Lessons from Korea

    Iraqi Security Forces and Lessons from Korea Dr Sheila Miyoshi Jager Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The creation of a viable Iraqi security force has been the sine qua non of our success in Iraq (and the withdrawal of our military). The key question is, is this still feasible? This is not the first time we have undertaken such a task. Some succeeded (the Balkans and El Salvador), some failed (Vietnam), and some are ongoing (Afghanistan). But it was in South Korea, after its liberation at the end of World War II, where we first attempted to build a national security force from the ground up..."
    • Published On: 12/1/2006
  •  Iraq, Women's Empowerment and Public Policy

    Iraq, Women's Empowerment and Public Policy

    Iraq, Women's Empowerment and Public Policy Dr Sherifa D Zuhur Monograph by US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The role and experience of women is not always considered in wartime or during stabilization and reconstruction operations. In Iraq, where an entirely new political order can only flourish with the spirit of democratization, it is essential to consider women’s needs and the obstacles they now face."
    • Published On: 12/1/2006
  •  Network Centric Warfare Case Study Volume II: A View of Command, Control, Communications and Computer Architectures at the Dawn of Network Centric Warfare

    Network Centric Warfare Case Study Volume II: A View of Command, Control, Communications and Computer Architectures at the Dawn of Network Centric Warfare

    Network Centric Warfare Case Study Volume II: A View of Command, Control, Communications and Computer Architectures at the Dawn of Network Centric Warfare Mr David W Cammons, Mr Kevin J Cogan, CPT Raymond G Delucio Study by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "...The study hypothesis postulates that “improved sensors, connectivity systems, and networked information technologies enhanced the combat effectiveness of U.S. V Corps and its subordinate units during OIF major offensive combat operations.” The results largely validated the study hypothesis. This study argues that the introduction of extended reach communications and networked information technologies significantly enhanced the ability of U.S. Army commanders to make faster decisions, more easily exploit tactical opportunities, conduct coordinated maneuver while advancing further and faster than at any previous time and more fully integrate and synchronize joint fires; all of which resulted in the rapid defeat of Iraqi military forces and the fall of the Ba’athist Regime in Baghdad..."
    • Published On: 11/6/2006
  •  Iran, Iraq, and the United States: The New Triangle's Impact on Sectarianism and the Nuclear Threat

    Iran, Iraq, and the United States: The New Triangle's Impact on Sectarianism and the Nuclear Threat

    Iran, Iraq, and the United States: The New Triangle's Impact on Sectarianism and the Nuclear Threat Dr Sherifa D Zuhur Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Many observers are concerned about the best means of discouraging sectarian conflict in Iraq while still waging counterinsurgency efforts. Another tension between regional policy goals concerns American and Iraqi desires to constrain growing Iranian influence in Iraq, and in the region as a whole, and advocating more scrutiny over transnational dealings and control over weapons proliferation, while also promoting peaceful co-existence and stricter observance of sovereignty in the Middle East. One pole around which these tensions circumambulate is the tensions between Sunni and Shi`a political and religious entities. Bilateral state relations are one level of consideration, to which must be added American concerns and those of other nations of the region. This monograph explores the various doctrinal, historical, and political facets of these issues."
    • Published On: 11/1/2006
  •  Russia, Iran, and the Nuclear Question: The Putin Record

    Russia, Iran, and the Nuclear Question: The Putin Record

    Russia, Iran, and the Nuclear Question: The Putin Record Dr Robert O Freedman Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "Vladimir Putin inherited a strong Russian-Iranian relationship from his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin. Russia made major arms agreements with Iran under Yeltsin, selling Tehran jet planes, tanks, and submarines, and also began building a nuclear reactor for Iran at Bushehr. The two countries also cooperated on regional issues such as Tajikistan and Afghanistan, and Yeltsin valued the low Iranian profile during the first Chechen war (1994-96)."
    • Published On: 11/1/2006
  •  Proteus Insights and the Protean Media Critical Thinking Game

    Proteus Insights and the Protean Media Critical Thinking Game

    Proteus Insights and the Protean Media Critical Thinking Game COL William L Wimbish III Issue Paper by the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership "As our Nation continues to deal with the aftermath of 9/11, the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), and subsequent supporting operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, it has become harshly apparent that we have entered a new age of complexity. Leaders are going back to the drawing board to rethink how we deal and cope with future challenges spawned by the age of knowledge. Technology has enabled our foes to adapt and attack the fabric of our fundamental values, beliefs and foundations which have made our nation the global power it is today. These new-age threats have and will continue to be aimed at our vulnerabilities and seams. Using idiosyncratic methods and asymmetric techniques, super empowered groups and individuals are able to hide, adapt, and strike quickly, with precision."
    • Published On: 6/15/2006
  •  Is Eurasia's Security Order at Risk?

    Is Eurasia's Security Order at Risk?

    Is Eurasia's Security Order at Risk? Dr Stephen J Blank Op-Ed by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "The foundation stones of European and Eurasian security are the series of treaties beginning with the Helsinki treaty of 1975 and its extension at Moscow in 1991; the 1987 Washington Treaty on Intermediate Nuclear forces in Europe (INF); the 1990 Paris Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), extended in 1999; and the Paris and Rome treaties between NATO and Russia in 1997 and 2002. However, some, if not all, of these treaties are apparently at risk. In 2005 Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivano, told U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that Russia was thinking of withdrawing from the INF Treaty. Although nothing came of this gambit, a lower-ranking Russian general restated this interest in early, 2006, obviously at his superiors’ instigation."
    • Published On: 5/8/2006
  •  U.S. Military Operations in Iraq: Planning, Combat and Occupation

    U.S. Military Operations in Iraq: Planning, Combat and Occupation

    U.S. Military Operations in Iraq: Planning, Combat and Occupation Mr Shane Lauth, Ms Kate Phillips, Ms Erin Schenck, Dr W Andrew Terrill Colloquium Report by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies "Even before Operation IRAQI FREEDOM began, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) published a monograph about planning for transition to Phase IV operations. Now that we are 3 years beyond the start of that transition, the debate continues about the adequacy of planning for and proficiency of execution of Phase IV operations in Iraq and elsewhere. The debate most often surrounds three issues concerning this final operational phase: the relationship to preceding operational phases; responsibility for planning; and responsibility for execution. Inevitably, the interagency process becomes central to addressing each of these issues."
    • Published On: 4/1/2006
  •  Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two Insurgencies

    Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two Insurgencies

    Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two Insurgencies Dr James S Corum Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "This monograph examines the British experience in building and training indigenous police and military forces during the Malaya and Cyprus insurgencies. The two insurgencies provide a dramatic contrast to the issue of training local security forces. In Malaya, the British developed a very successful strategy for training the Malayan police and army. In Cyprus, the British strategy for building and training local security forces generally was ineffective. The author argues that some important lessons can be drawn from these case studies that apply directly to current U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine."
    • Published On: 3/1/2006
  •  CU @ The FOB: How the Forward Operating Base is Changing the Life of Combat Soldiers

    CU @ The FOB: How the Forward Operating Base is Changing the Life of Combat Soldiers

    CU @ The FOB: How the Forward Operating Base is Changing the Life of Combat Soldiers Dr Stephen J Gerras, Dr Leonard Wong Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "This inquiry has been conducted in the midst of increasing questioning by policymakers and scholars concerning the importance and role of alliances and other multilateral arrangements and legal norms affecting the use of force by the United States. Provoked in part by the transatlantic altercations surrounding Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the questioning is driven by systemic developments—changes in the structure of world politics and changes in the shape of war—of which the Iraq-focused disputes were a symptom."
    • Published On: 3/1/2006
  •  Revisions in Need of Revising: What Went Wrong in the Iraq War

    Revisions in Need of Revising: What Went Wrong in the Iraq War

    Revisions in Need of Revising: What Went Wrong in the Iraq War Dr David C Hendrickson, Dr Robert W Tucker Monograph by the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute "David C. Hendrickson and Robert W. Tucker examine the contentious debate over the Iraq war and occupation, focusing on the critique that the Bush administration squandered an historic opportunity to reconstruct the Iraqi state because of various critical blunders in planning. Though they conclude that critics have made a number of telling points against the Bush administration’s conduct of the Iraq war, they argue that the most serious problems facing Iraq and its American occupiers—criminal anarchy and lawlessness, a raging insurgency, and a society divided into rival and antagonistic groups—were virtually inevitable consequences that flowed from the act of war itself."
    • Published On: 12/1/2005
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