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Aug. 28, 2026

Maximize Your Returns: The Critical Need for Red-Team Capabilities at All Echelons of Command

Lex Oren Jr.
©2026 Lex Oren Jr.

ABSTRACT: This article argues that the US Army’s underuse of red teaming at echelons below flag-officer levels hinders effective decision making and operational adaptability. Unlike existing literature that primarily focuses on red teaming at higher command levels, this article emphasizes the need to integrate red-team capabilities at the division, brigade, and battalion levels. The methodology includes a comprehensive analysis of current Army doctrine, historical case studies, and interviews with military experts to assess the impact of red teaming on operational outcomes. The findings suggest that embedding professionally trained red-team members at lower echelons enhances critical thinking, identifies potential vulnerabilities, and improves overall mission success. This article offers actionable recommendations for policymakers and military practitioners to restructure training programs and resource allocation, strengthening the Army’s strategic and tactical effectiveness.

Keywords: red team, US Army, Joint planning, critical thinking, future wars

 

In his article, “Seven Reflections of a ‘Red Commander,’​” Ian M. Sullivan, a member of the Senior Executive Service, stated: “This world of wargaming is becoming an increasingly essential tool for the Army and joint force as they grapple with what it means to conduct large-scale combat operations against peer competitors in areas far removed from the continental United States.” Yet, Sullivan’s article concentrates on red teaming as an “analytical, intelligence function that can operationalize the adversary’s approach to warfare within the construct of wargames.”1

Sullivan’s concept is one method of employing red teams, but this article does not pursue Sullivan’s methodology. This article argues that trained red teams should serve as dedicated planners throughout major planning efforts because this approach leads to better outcomes for all commands. The US Army’s investment in red-team training and education (though commendable) has not fully addressed the issue of regurgitated, inadequate plans and problem-solving competencies. Across Army formations, a significant gap is present: The Army lacks professionally trained red-team members at all levels of command, particularly at the division, brigade, and battalion echelons. As modern warfare becomes increasingly complex and the threat of multidomain warfare rises, the Army must incorporate red-teaming capabilities below the division level. This approach promises significant benefits, including improved military decision making and enhanced operational and tactical effectiveness. Before continuing, it is important to note that while red teams often portray the enemy during war games—with the intelligence community often enacting this role—the principles red-team members employ can extend to all aspects of planning at any level of command. Red-teaming principles are best applied by encompassing a diverse section of the organization’s manpower. Limiting the participation of trained red teams to a few brief moments of planning diminishes their overall potential to enhance plans, directives, and problem-solving in military operations at all echelons.

To develop adaptive ground forces with improved decision-making capabilities, the Army chief of staff must integrate red teams at echelon, from the battalion level through the division and corps levels. Red teams that are structured, resourced, and trained within tactical organizations will offer valuable insights into potential vulnerabilities, foster a more agile and adaptable military force by enhancing decision-making processes, and boost tactical and operational efficiency through formal education. Commanders who use red teams to apply various means of problem-solving will take capable products and refine them to be world-class. As commanders gain a clearer understanding of the problem, subordinate commanders at each level can receive and issue more informed orders with greater confidence. Ensuring the successful integration of red teams is a task for the Army chief of staff and the collective responsibility of all military leaders.

The Army should implement red teaming at every level involving deliberate tactical and operational planning. This article argues that division, brigade, garrison, and battalion commands will benefit from inculcating red teams in their organizations. This change would involve adding an extra duty position that supports all planning activities within the organization. The difference is, when the organization reaches the stage at which it normally conducts planning, the organization will have trained red-team members available to supplement the process. Successful organizations will train a wide range of individuals in red-team methodologies to create a powerful planning tool. The individuals selected for the red teams should come from across the enterprise, not strictly from within the intelligence war-fighting function. Red teams should consist of active-duty officers, reserve officers, noncommissioned officers, and US Department of War civilian experts within any organization. When faced with a challenging mission or a critical decision, commanders should use a red team to generate courses of action and identify pitfalls and shortcomings they may not have otherwise recognized.2

Background

One definition of red teaming is a “structured process that seeks to better understand the interests, intentions, and capabilities of an institution—or a potential competitor—through simulations, vulnerability probes, and alternative analysis.” Red teaming involves applying unique approaches to examining complicated problems. When planners challenge assumptions and identify blind spots, red teams help organizations develop more robust strategies and enhance their decision making in uncertain environments.3

Army doctrine directs commanders and planners to incorporate red-team functions in the military decision-making process (MDMP). Red teams are an additional resource that can complement the Army’s MDMP and joint planning process, resulting in detailed plans and problem-solving. Planning and Orders Production, Field Manual (FM) 5-0, is the primary document in which orders for Army operations are planned and published, and the manual has more than 400 pages of text. Yet, Planning and Orders Production mentions red teaming only 10 times, stating red-team-qualified individuals are typically “part of the commander’s staff at higher echelon headquarters,” and the red team is required to perform operational design as part of the planning team. Planning and Orders Production further describes the deliberate role red teams play in the war-game portion of the MDMP.4

The Marine Corps leads all US services by mentioning red teaming 61 times in Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 5-10, including in appendix G. In contrast, the US Air Force only mentions red teams in two paragraphs in Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-0, with such teams representing the enemy during the planning process. Notwithstanding the US Marine Corps, the lack of discussion of red teams across the services demonstrates either a perceived lack of value or the impression red teaming is irrelevant to tactical, operational, and strategic planning. The Army’s seemingly deliberate omission of red-teaming implementation across the entire planning process should raise concerns among senior leaders and planners.5

Red teams must not remain strictly an intelligence function. At the combatant command level, “red teams are directed to support the joint intelligence of the operational environment (JIPOE) by providing expertise, promoting critical thought and encouraging alternative perspectives, and by enhancing understanding of the operational environment (OE) and adversary’s perspective.” Currently, red teams predominantly reside within the intelligence sections and consist of trained intelligence officers, civilians, and noncommissioned officers. Those individuals typically are not trained in red-teaming curriculum and methodologies during traditional professional military education, though.6

Red-team members can stand apart from intelligence analysts in several ways. The MDMP framework does not restrict red teams and is not constrained by narrow, specific questions; rather, the framework affords latitude for innovative thinking. Servicemembers at all levels can help solve problems based on their unique life experiences. Commanders limit themselves if they do not take full advantage of their resources. A single individual can address many problems, but in doing so, often restricts solutions to those based exclusively on their past experiences and biases. Like all humans, staff officers have cognitive biases they may not recognize or consider, which can impede decision making. For example, hindsight and anchoring biases, illusions of control, or self-censoring may stall imaginative thinking. In the right environment, red teams can challenge assumptions and consider alternative perspectives while reducing groupthink.7

Few commanders are currently exercising appropriate red-team techniques across military formations. A query of the Army’s Force Management System on September 5, 2024, listed 235 individual positions across the active Army, National Guard, and Army Reserve. Force-development officers have found discouraging results when reviewing the current requirements and authorizations for red-team members in the total Army force structure. The Army instructs planners to include red teams at specific points in the MDMP. Regardless, because of a lack of trained red-team members across the force structure, planners cannot credibly impact published plans and orders.8

Identifying Potential Vulnerabilities

The lack of red-teaming language in Planning and Orders Production is an oversight that should be corrected. The Army must integrate red teams throughout every phase of the MDMP in an updated version of Planning and Orders Production. Red teams can positively impact planning within the defense enterprise by providing greater oversight of enemy analysis and reducing missed opportunities. Red teams can also create more realistic scenarios, adding greater value to the planning process. Imagine the potential of accurately depicting offensive space and cyberoperations in battalion orders, forcing planners to include defensive cyberoperations in battlespace scenarios. Due to artificial intelligence’s (AI) rapid advancement and the imminence of quantum computing, employing multidomain capabilities is a step forward in modernizing the planning process. As scenarios become more congested, with operations occurring across all five domains, the balance of kinetic and nonkinetic effects will challenge the validity of plans. As stated by Susan Craig: “Red teams have been recommended and legislated as a way to prevent the kinds of failures of imagination and critical thinking that were apparent in the wake of 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq.” When red teams turn assumptions into facts by applying critical analysis and unique methodologies, they remove operational ambiguity and clarify alternative assumptions, requiring branch plans.9

Red teaming is a function that enhances commanders’ ability to evaluate different options thoroughly in plans, operations, concepts, organizations, and capabilities. Planners consider the operational environment and the viewpoints of partners, adversaries, and other relevant actors. The factors of time, space, and force are considered. At the same time, tactical objectives are aligned through the operational, theater-strategic, and strategic objectives to ensure the commander applies sound logic.10

By removing errors in logic, trained red teams can reduce the fog and friction of war, identifying vulnerabilities in friendly plans through expert analysis and applying planning techniques to supplement group work. The red team can review the facts and assumptions underlying a plan to determine whether its foundations are solid. Red teams also use an argumentative practice from Roman Catholicism, assigning the position of advocatus diaboli—more commonly known as devil’s advocate—to present counterarguments during war-gaming phases. Devil’s advocacy empowers red-team members to uncover flawed reasoning, particularly when beliefs or assertions lead to rushed or invalid conclusions. These red-teaming advantages translate into positive operational outcomes.11

During an in-person interview, retired Brigadier General Philip Y. Browning stated the 7th Infantry Division’s expert red-team analysis of enemy intelligence, understanding of cultural differences, and grasp of the operational environment enabled the division to plan and execute combat maneuvers for Operation Just Cause in Panama. The 7th Infantry Division achieved its assigned objective of toppling Manuel Noriega, Panama’s de facto ruler, while using minimal US resources. Ultimately, the benefits gained by implementing red teams into the planning process will ensure plans account for various enemy actions, reduce missed friendly opportunities, and eliminate tactical and operational gaps in execution.12

Improving Military Decision Making

Commanders often rely on their staff members to analyze an operation deliberately and gain a clearer picture of a specific battlefield element. That picture may clarify something complex, such as the operating environment, or may accomplish a seemingly simple task, such as articulating a clear problem statement. In the simplest terms, the greater the commander’s understanding of the mission or battlefield, the greater the potential for the unit’s success and the smaller the risk to the United States, its allies, and partner forces.

The MDMP is a tested framework for planning. Nevertheless, not all problems fit nicely into the MDMP model. Instead of using a universal method to solve all problems, military commanders must first understand the situation and recognize some solutions require a unique or creative approach. The most important initial task “is framing a problem and then reframing it when conditions change.” The Army red-team curriculum provided specific training in framing problems and defining the operational environment: actions that help develop and maintain a common operational picture. Contrary to the current Army doctrine, red-team techniques can be inserted into every step of the decision-making process, not just during the course of action (COA) comparison, to enrich the quality of the orders. Trained red-team members have developed multiple techniques to augment the MDMP, as seen in figure 1.13

The ideal group process and red-teaming methods
Figure 1. The ideal group process and red-teaming methods
(Source: The United States Army Training and Doctrine Command [TRADOC], The Applied Critical Thinking Handbook, Version 8.1 [TRADOC, September 2016], 150)

Diversity must be considered when establishing a red team. Diversity in rank, age, culture, gender, service, and service components adds value. Servicemembers bring multiple perspectives, experiences, skills, and backgrounds to an organization. Diverse teams focused on a shared problem may generate multiple ways to evaluate and understand the problem, then use various tools and mental models to frame possible solutions.14

One example of effective diversity is in the US Army Reserve forces. Reserve and National Guard servicemembers have careers outside the military, in which they can leverage their exclusive experiences supporting current military operations. Such servicemembers may provide different perspectives on problem-solving than the regular Army. Red-team members bring diverse skill sets, applying tools and varied approaches to augment decision making. Red-team members frequently help solve complex problems and are also fully capable of producing COAs that help the commander determine the direction of the command. Red-team members can insert value-added data during multiple check-ins with the command team throughout the seven steps of the MDMP.

When under duress during combat operations, US Army commanders must make rapid decisions. Red-team members and leaders have received training that helps them understand the cognitive processes involved in critical thinking. For example, red-team members and leaders understand fast, intuitive responses (also known as system one responses) are the first solutions that arise when an individual is presented with a problem. These thoughts, known as heuristics, are mental shortcuts that allow people to solve problems and make judgments quickly and efficiently. All commanders and staff officers can generate a fast, intuitive response to a problem based on personal experience. These colloquial strategies shorten decision-making timelines and allow people to function without formally considering their next courses of action. Sometimes, the first instinct (or gut intuition) is the correct answer, but red-team members are trained to view challenges from multiple perspectives, enabling them to generate new approaches and seize opportunities. Red-team members can frame obstacles in novel ways and create potential solutions that would otherwise go unnoticed. Red teams can leverage the devil’s advocate, who pushes planners to “look for evidence outside their bounds of awareness.” When used properly, the devil’s advocate may dispute elements of a plan to flush out potential gaps.15

Red teams benefit the decision-making process in many ways beyond participating in war games, by exploring and reconsidering alternative approaches; mitigating surprise by considering various possible outcomes; and generating insights to refine strategy, doctrine, operational concepts, and plans. One historical example of a red team supporting a successful operation is when the United States effectively red teamed the plan to invade Europe during World War II. The success of the Allied deception operation against the Germans in June 1944, before the Normandy Invasion, was due to a thorough and accurate assessment of Germany’s intentions. American intelligence planners could infer the impact a fictitious Allied army would have on Nazi leaders by understanding how the United States saw the Nazis and itself, and how the Nazis saw the United States and themselves. Prior to the Normandy Invasion, Operation Fortitude—the US deception operation centered around the fictitious First US Army Group, known as the ghost army—was commanded by US General George Patton. This fabricated force used a headquarters deception unit to generate false radio traffic, visual displays, and media stories. The ruse of the phony army positioned near the Pas-de-Calais successfully misled German defenders on the Western Front, keeping them in place even as the Normandy Invasion began. This example of “[f ]our ways of seeing” is a red-team technique for viewing situations through multiple lenses, thus changing the problem-solving framework and creating more opportunities for distinctive solutions.16

Boost Operational Efficiency Through the Power of Formal Education

Red-team instruction is provided for specific cyberoperations and within United States Special Operations Command. Yet conventional Army officers, civilians, and noncommissioned officers do not receive red-team training in professional military education curricula, and the training is not regularly provided within the Army intelligence community at formal institutions. Red-team professionals require education and training to develop the skills to think unconventionally. When a need arises, and command teams at any echelon recognize the value a red team can provide, leaders may direct the formation of a red team and provide it with a problem to solve or define. Red teaming during the planning process may take longer because of the use of various methodologies, the division of group work into smaller teams, and the use of unfamiliar exercises that rarely, if ever, appear in typical planning environments. To achieve integration, leaders must also support irregular practices that do not fit the mold of traditional planning processes.17

Red teaming is for operations and intelligence planners, and commanders at all echelons. As commanders develop their commander’s estimate of the situation, they can apply red-team techniques to build a more accurate battlefield operating picture, define a problem set, or generate new opportunities for global integration. Commanders can create competent, creative solutions if the military can fully use its people—its most valuable resource. Commanders must support their planning teams, requiring trust in their people and in the process. Commanders must practice methods of gaining trust and allowing red teams to frame problems through approaches that diverge from the familiar MDMP. Commanders who fail to trust their staff members can stifle creative thinking. The commander must give clear and precise guidance and then step back and allow team members to execute their roles.18

Red teams may create command-directed products that support specific aspects of planning. Peter Pellegrino, one of the world’s leading experts in war gaming, is currently serving at the US Naval War College. Pellegrino’s provision of real-world examples to current geographic and functional combatant commanders is driving alternative ways to enhance operational effectiveness. His approach is also creating new ways to direct red teams during the planning stage, allowing for the identification of measures of performance and measures of effectiveness. Linking measures of performance effectiveness to operational objectives and subordinate tactical tasks enables staff members to prioritize their resources to support the main effort and supporting efforts, thus ensuring an economy of force. Along with the commands, trained red teams also participate in the war gaming portion of the MDMP to give commanders the opportunity to practice making decisions for multiple COAs. In combat, a commander can respond quickly if he or she has been exposed to an unanticipated problem featuring a scenario similar to one the commander has faced in the past. Failing to analyze the issue during the COA comparison may stall momentum, or worse, lead to a wrong decision or a lack of decision. Both outcomes will result in the unnecessary loss of the military’s most valuable assets.19

The amount of formal red-team instruction and training within the Joint Force is minimal. In 2004, the University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies began teaching red teaming at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, as part of the Command and General Staff College. Students were awarded the 7J additional skill identifier upon graduation. According to Forbes, the Army defunded the University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies in October 2021 and repurposed the $2.5 million for other priorities.20

Creating a red team does not constitute a significant structural change that would generate new growth in manning requirements. Restoring a formal red-team curriculum is a cost-effective approach to supplying trained red teams to the community of practice. As a cost-effective approach to practical implementation, the Army can apply a force design update or change management plans (for example, by creating a modified table of equipment or table of distribution or allowances) to add the 7J additional skill identifier to key developmental positions at the tactical level.

The Department of War is institutionalizing red teaming in the military. For example, the US Naval War College’s Office of Naval Intelligence Detachment is developing a new force structure, known as the Navy Red Enterprise: “The US Navy NRE represents the Naval Intelligences initiative, designed to refine, expand, and institutionalize the Navy’s use of red teaming, representing the naval intelligence’s long-standing commitment to the importance of this in supporting both Fleet requirements and the CNO’s responsibility to organize, train, and equip the force.”21

Counterargument and Rebuttal: Supplemental AI

Artificial intelligence (AI) and technological advancements have considerable effects on the battlefield. The Russia-Ukraine War and the US Navy’s fight against the Houthis in the Red Sea have demonstrated how technology shapes the nature of battles. Drone strikes, drone swarms, and directed-energy weapon systems are being battle proven. Eventually, the human-machine interface of unmanned submersibles and human-machine learning will dominate the future battlefield. Military formations can combat adversaries differently and move more rapidly by combining new technologies, organizational arrangements, and war-fighting ideas. Or, simply put, “the technological capabilities must be adequate to achieve the objectives of new operational concepts.” Author Mick Ryan wrote: “They could also mobilize more quickly, adopt standardized equipment and organizations, and be supported by strategic industries with a larger quantity and wider range of military supplies.” Promoting innovation through emerging technology will increase knowledge at the speed of relevance and reduce the cost of sustaining additional manpower. Technology is advancing at an unprecedented rate, and many suggest the demand for human planning and execution will decrease in times of war.22

An example of a US-led operation that failed to achieve the desired objective is the Iraq War. Lieutenant General William S. Wallace, commander of V Corps, stated, “this is not exactly the enemy we war-gamed against.” Army planners concluded (after the fact) that overthrowing Saddam Hussein and seizing Baghdad were not the centers of gravity that would lead to victory in Iraq. The US Army could have prevented its failure to identify the enemy centers of gravity accurately if it had used red teams to develop plans and provide in-depth analysis.23

Some argue AI can replace red teams: the human factor commanders rely on to provide expert analysis in support of decision making. The Iraq COG example of centers of gravity in Iraq shows the human factor, the irony of reality, and various intersubjective perspectives open up opportunities to make inaccurate assumptions. In this new era of warfare, opportunities exist to help leaders and policymakers by changing the operational framework to reduce anxiety levels and risks leaders face when considering strategic opportunities. The current scenario implies policymakers could increasingly depend on AI rather than human-driven recommendations provided to flag officers. Consequently, this dependence on AI could enable civilian leaders to make decisions faster when ordering military action as an element of national power.24

Although human-machine learning is the way of the future, the military is not ready for stand-alone AI platforms. The military is rapidly approaching a time when human input will be combined with AI. But using AI as a stand-alone planning tool has yet to yield the results necessary to eliminate human intervention in planning. The US Marine Corps Forces Reserve conducted a study to determine the effectiveness of using ChatGPT and its large language model AI program as the red team during a war-gaming exercise. In his article “AI Is Coming for Your Wargame,” Major Stephen Houghton stated: “lthough the output was impressive prima facie, it did not appear to be executing a cogent overall strategy. . . . [and] the recommendations did not appear to support each other in a broader way.” As Houghton’s findings suggest, AI provided sound recommendations early in the war-game scenario but failed to nest objectives from the strategic level to the tactical level.25

Currently, only the human element can understand the audacity of the attack, articulate the associated risk, and determine the risk parameters a commander is willing to assume. These risks carry the weight of operational decisions and are crucial to military planning. Generative AI can perform a statistical analysis of an operation today. Regardless, only an engaged command team and staff can apply the intangibles of human character. Ultimately, until human attributes pose a greater risk to planning than AI, military leaders must retain the current doctrine, which directs Army organizations to apply red teams during the COA-comparison portion of the MDMP. Considering the Army directs organizations to apply red teams, the Army should also provide the resources for training and education to address the US military’s challenges.

In contrast to Wallace’s example, if military planners had used red teams to develop a clearer picture of the operational environment during the Persian Gulf War, the planning in Iraq may have resulted in a different outcome. Many people viewed the George W. Bush administration’s choice to invade Iraq as a mistake, arguing the invasion stemmed from a flawed decision-making process in which leaders overlooked indications they had made incorrect conclusions about the supposed presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Red teams may have provided auxiliary substance by pursuing evidence that differed from the Bush administration’s grounds for a particular assumption.26

Conclusion

The Army chief of staff must train and employ red teams to help solve complex tactical, operational, and strategic problems. The US Army must maximize planning with deliberate, intellectual, and critical thinking to solve its most challenging problems. The current US Army doctrine provides leaders and planners with minimal information about where to use red teams. The doctrine fails to train members of the US Army on the application of red-team principles and methodologies. Additionally, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command must revise doctrine to incorporate red-team members into all stages of the MDMP.

The Army should emphasize red-team development, considering the potential for large-scale combat operations against the United States’ pacing adversaries. The Army chief of staff should direct the US Army Training and Doctrine Command to reestablish a formal red-team school of instruction. This action would result in the 7J additional skill identifier being added to critical positions—such as plans and operations officers and noncommissioned officers in all primary staff sections—through force design updates and change management plans. By adding the skill identifier to the table of distribution and allowances and modified tables of equipment, Army senior leaders will send a message indicating professional red teaming is vital to developing sound operational plans.

 
 

Lex Oren Jr.
Lieutenant Colonel Lex Oren Jr. is the 7th Battalion Army Reserve Careers Group, Commanding Officer. Oren’s experience includes serving as the chief of the Force Management Manpower and Requirements Division at the US Army Reserve Command Headquarters at Fort Bragg. He has a bachelor’s degree in exercise science and master’s degrees in secondary education from the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga and in national security and strategic studies from the US Naval War College. Oren is a graduate of the Joint and Combined Warfighter School, the Command and General Staff Officer Course, the Defense Strategy Course, and the US Naval War College.

 
 

Endnotes

  1. 1. Ian M. Sullivan, “Seven Reflections of a ‘Red Commander’: What I’ve Learned from Playing the Adversary in Department of Defense Wargames,” Military Review (September 2024): 2.
  2. 2. The US Army division commands are typically at the O-8, major-general command level with about 20,000 servicemembers. Brigade and garrison commands are usually at the O-6, colonel level of command with an average of 5,000 servicemembers in a brigade and 300 authorizations for garrisons. The battalion is traditionally the first field-grade command, led by an O-5 (lieutenant colonel) who maintains a headquarters company and a field support company, in addition to four subordinate companies totaling around 600 servicemembers.
  3. 3. Micah Zenko, Red Team: How to Succeed by Thinking Like the Enemy (Basic Books, 2015), 1.
  4. 4. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Planning and Orders Production, Field Manual 5-0 (HQDA, 2022).
  5. 5. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 5-10 references red teams on pages 23 and 24; also Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-0, Appendix G, 99–104 and 204, references red team in two pages of its doctrine.
  6. 6. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Guide for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JCS, 2022), 4–7; and Susan Craig, “Reflections from a Red Team Leader,” Military Review (March-April 2007): 57–60.
  7. 7. Anchoring bias is a cognitive bias involving people relying too heavily on the first piece of information (the anchor) they receive when making decisions or judgments. Illusions-of-control bias is another type of cognitive bias that involves individuals overestimating their ability to control or influence outcomes determined by chance or external forces. Self-censoring bias occurs when individuals deliberately withhold their opinions, concerns, or ideas due to fear of judgment, rejection, conflict, or adverse consequences, often in group settings or hierarchical environments. See Jennifer M. Wood, “20 Cognitive Biases That Affect Your Decisions,” Mental Floss, September 17, 2015, https://www.mentalfloss.com/article/68705/20-cognitive-biases-affect-your-decisions.
  8. 8. The US Army force-structure management system assigns additional skill identifiers with alphanumeric codes to positions on the table of distribution and allowances and modified tables of equipment. In the query described here, the 7J additional skill identifier designated specific positions as those of certified red-team members.
  9. 9. Craig, “Red Team Leader,” 57–60.
  10. 10. US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) G-2, The Applied Critical Thinking Handbook, ver. 8.1 (TRADOC G-2, September 2016), 1.
  11. 11. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. J. Graham (Penguin Books, 2003), 66; Garri Benjamin Hendell, “​‘Loyal Opposition’ Stifled,” Army Magazine 72, no. 3 (March 2022): 12–13; and TRADOC G-2, Applied Critical Thinking Handbook, 47.
  12. 12. Philip Y. Browning, interview by the author, October 9, 2024; and Ronald H. Cole, Operation Just Cause: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama, February 1988–January 1990 (Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995), 6.
  13. 13. Blair S. Williams, “Heuristics and Biases in Military Decision Making,” Military Review (October 2010): 58–70; Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (Harvard University Press, 1974); and TRADOC G-2, Applied Critical Thinking Handbook, 150.
  14. 14. HQDA, The Operations Process, Army Doctrine Publication 5-0 (HQDA, March 2012), 1-10.
  15. 15. University of Wisconsin, Heuristics (University of Wisconsin, 2019); Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), 32; Kendra Cherry, “What Are Heuristics?: These Mental Shortcuts Lead to Fast Decisions—and Biased Thinking,” Verywell Mind, June 24, 2024, https://www.verywellmind.com/what-is-a-heuristic-2795235; and Max H. Bazerman and Dolly Chugh, “Decisions Without Blinders,” Harvard Business Review 84, no. 1 (January 2006): 88–97.
  16. 16. US Naval War College Office of Naval Intelligence Detachment, Navy Red Enterprise Overview/Update (US Naval War College, 2024); Gregory Fontenot, “Seeing Red: Creating a Red-Team Capability for the Blue Force,” Military Review 85, no. 5 (September 2005): 4–8; and Michael G. Anderson, “The Case for Deception in Operational Success,” Military Strategy Magazine 8, no. 2 (Fall 2022).
  17. 17. Red teams’ methodology is not limited to training received by the opposing force. Red teams may augment the opposing force to provide an analysis of tactical and operational planning. See HQDA, Operations Process, 1-10.
  18. 18. Milan Vego, “The Bureaucratization of the U.S. Military Decisionmaking Process,” Joint Force Quarterly 88 (1st Quarter 2018): 34–45.
  19. 19. Pete Pellegrino, interview by the author, August 27, 2024.
  20. 20. Bryce Hoffman, “U.S. Army Moves to Close Red Teaming University,” Forbes, updated October 26, 2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/brycehoffman/2020/10/26/us-army-moves-to-close-red-teaming-university/.
  21. 21. US Naval War College Office of Naval Intelligence Detachment, Navy Red Enterprise.
  22. 22. Mick Ryan, War Transformed: The Future of Twenty-First-Century Great Power Competition and Conflict (Naval Institute Press, 2022), 145.
  23. 23. Army Doctrine Publication 3-0 defines a center of gravity as: “The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act.” See Fontenot, “Seeing Red,” 4–8; and HQDA, Operations, Army Doctrine Publication 3-0 (HQDA, October 2022), 2–6.
  24. 24. Ryan, War Transformed, 87.
  25. 25. Stephen Houghton, “AI Is Coming for Your Wargame: Using ChatGPT as the Red Team,” Marine Corps Gazette (July 2023): 44–46.
  26. 26. Bazerman and Chugh, “Decisions Without Blinders,” 88–97.
 
 

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