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Aug. 28, 2026

Innovation and Adaptation: Lessons from the Russia-Ukraine War, 2024

Stephan Bolton and John A. Nagl

ABSTRACT: The third year of the Russia-Ukraine War was marked by inconclusive counterattacks and minimal territorial gains despite a loss of life and materiel, mostly on the Russian side, greater than any witnessed in Europe since World War II. The most important lessons for US forces from this year of the war are the impact and promise of emerging, multi-use technology on war-fighting functions and domains. Perhaps most notably, each year of this war has further reinforced principles of mission command, either by their observance or omission.

Keywords: Russia, Ukraine, mission command, military innovation, adaptation

 

Military forces in peacetime face a unique challenge. Armies are obligated to adapt and innovate for a conflict that may or may not occur at an unknown time and place, against anticipated or unsuspected enemies, in unknowable policy contexts, and that requires a degree of armed violence that cannot be fully replicated in peacetime.1

Armies solve this conundrum through observation of other armies at war, either directly or from afar. The American experience includes many examples. In 1855, then–Secretary of War Jefferson Davis sent three Army officers, including Captain George McClellan, to capture operational-level lessons from the Crimean War (1853–56) that informed both the North and the South during the American Civil War.2 American officers, diplomats, and third parties gained battlefield insights from the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5) and the Spanish Civil War (1936–39) that informed how US forces prepared for the world wars that followed each.3 In 1973, Major General Donn Starry learned lessons from the 1973 Yom Kippur War, which informed the development of AirLand Battle doctrine and the creation of the Training and Doctrine Command.4

Attempts to learn from the wars of others continue today. The Army Training and Doctrine Command chartered the US Army War College to derive lessons for the Joint Force following the second Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.5 That ongoing study has gathered key war-fighting observations to help the Army and the Joint Force with its transformation at all levels of war—from tactical to strategic to institutional.6 They point to the value of well-executed multidomain operations and decentralized mission command; to the effects of friction caused by domain parity and an increasingly transparent battlefield on fire and maneuver; and to the opportunities and costs of partnering, whether with other allies in the interest of extended security or with industry in pursuit of emerging capabilities.7

The third year of the war was not decisive, as many hoped and some anticipated, though Ukraine continued to outperform any reasonable expectations, given Russia’s advantages in size and strength. Since the start of the war, Ukraine has reclaimed half the territory seized by Russia in 2022 and now boasts the largest army in Europe, with 1 million people in uniform.8 Its August counteroffensive into Kursk, Russia, though greatly reduced since, produced strategic effects.9 Russia clawed back roughly 4,100 square kilometers in 2024, recapturing Avdiivka, Ukraine, and other midsized cities and establishing a modest buffer for its Kharkiv, Ukraine, position.10 But its estimated casualties at the end of 2024 exceeded 430,000, with losses of more than 5,000 main battle tanks and infantry vehicles in 2024.11 Russian mobilization and recruiting have ensured a steady supply of manpower and postured them for at least another year of operations.12 It appears the United States and its allies will continue to have lessons to draw from this long and grinding war for some time to come.

Observations from the Third Year of the War

One dominant theme emerged across the research from 2024: the impact and promise of emerging, multiuse technologies on war-fighting functions and domains. Artificial intelligence and the latest drone models are among the most alluring and useful pre-doctrinal technologies to be introduced in warfare. Before reviewing these developments in the tactical fight, it is worth considering how Russia, Ukraine, and other stakeholder nations arrived at this moment. What are the catalyzing factors that brought these nations to war, and what are the prospects for bringing the war to a just end?

It is fair to argue that Ukraine and Russia were in conflict since the latter’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, based on irredentist claims and its support to pro-Russian belligerents in the Donbas, followed by de facto occupation of territory there. Despite a relatively static 420-kilometer line of contact in eastern Ukraine, from 2014–22, there was persistent armed violence between regular and irregular forces on both sides.13 Casualty rates among combatants and civilians during this period of frozen conflict clearly meet objective standards for what constitutes war.14 Throughout this period, NATO and other Western states maintained a state of adversarial competition with Russia and sustained consistent, if subsistent, levels of support to Ukraine. Western security assistance during this period enabled Ukrainian defense, resistance, and institutional reform. It posed dilemmas for Russia and provided a unifying objective for the West. It did not stop Russia from pursuing the biggest escalation of violence in Europe this century.

There and Back Again: Failures of Deterrence and Termination

Gideon Rose’s assertion earlier this year that “extended deterrence was a sham” may have merit in the context of a nuclear umbrella tacitly assumed to cover NATO partners beyond Alliance borders.15 Yet, even conventional forms of extended deterrence were called into question when comprehensive Alliance measures failed to deter the 2022 Russian invasion. Despite eight years of security assistance from key partners of Ukraine, the presence of a modest boots-on-the-ground training force, and a combination of elements of “smart” power, Russia still seized additional Ukrainian territory in 2022. Just as in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014, Russia anticipated no meaningful opposition to its fait accompli, forcing Western states into strategies of compellence that Russia has been able to withstand.16

Three main factors led the Kremlin to initiate its 2022 invasion—an incorrect assessment of Ukrainian capabilities, a perception of Western weaknesses, and Putin’s long-standing desire to claim eastern Ukraine. Western failures of capability, credibility, and communication led Russian leaders to believe their invasion of Ukraine would produce political outcomes far outweighing the potential costs.17 Western leaders failed to communicate sufficient will or intent to defend Ukrainian sovereignty with force in the event of increased hostilities. In fact, when the war started, the United States deliberately excluded the use of force to defend Ukraine, promising only indirect assistance.18 Russian leaders perceived Ukrainian armed forces as lacking the capability to defeat an invasion, or at least incapable of sustaining a protracted defense. The limited NATO forces in Ukraine to train and advise were never intended to be a credible deterrent, or even a trip wire.19 These factors, combined with the lack of any formal defense agreements or security guarantees, erode in the minds of Russian leaders any credible deterrent based on punishment.20 The lesson is clear: States and alliances need effective military capabilities and credible force structures to achieve meaningful deterrence. Forward-postured forces, security guarantees, and clear signaling are essential for extending that deterrence to partner nations.21 The state that would extend its protection to another must build and demonstrate the resolve to do so.

Just as poor signaling and miscalculation contributed to a deterrence failure in 2022, so too has misunderstanding given rise to unrealistic hopes that war could be terminated in 2024. The belligerents’ strategic and policy objectives have no common ground, and neither has suffered sufficiently on the ground to seek an end to fighting. For Russia’s part, despite significant losses in manpower and materiel, it continues to gain more ground than it loses, and it has not paid a high enough price to quit the field.22 Russia has weathered diplomatic and economic pressure from the West, secured direct and indirect support from China and North Korea, and does not appear to suffer a deficit of political or public will.

Ukraine has also suffered extensive losses to its armed forces and to the homefront. Its will has at times wavered as prospects for decisive victory recede. Ukrainian reliance on external support, and recent uncertainties about the future of that support, put Ukraine’s resolve under further pressure. Yet, Ukraine is likely to continue fighting as long as Russia pursues the political and physical subjugation of the Ukrainian state, and Russia is likely to continue fighting as long as Ukraine seeks alignment with NATO—or a sort of Finlandized neutrality assured by robust security guarantees.23

Drawing on theories of bargaining and ripeness, suffering to date has not yet imposed conditions necessary for termination. Bargaining describes how parties in conflict achieve their objectives through negotiation and mutual accommodation. Ripeness, in contrast, argues that negotiations will not bear fruit until all parties perceive the conflict to have reached a mutually hurting stalemate, making bargaining a more attractive path. Barring significant changes during the war or in the parties’ objectives, fighting is likely to continue, not for weeks or months, but for years.24

Decision and Decisive Action

Each year of this war has further reinforced the principles of mission command, whether through observance or omission. Demonstrations of competence, disciplined and decentralized initiative, and prudent risk acceptance have played out in several battles. Russian and Ukrainian forces regularly augment these principles with demonstrations of adaptation in contact, notably by integrating emerging technologies into operations. During the Battle of Bakhmut, which bracketed the war’s first two years, Ukrainian forces improved their distributed command and initiative through artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled tools, creating tactical autonomy and initiative.25 In contrast, Russian forces employing AI tools and unmanned systems remained comparatively hampered by their centralized command structures. Differing approaches to risk emerged in the Battle of Avdiivka, where Russian forces prevailed in early 2024, based on a willingness to mass significantly greater forces and accept significantly higher casualty rates. Ukrainian forces, facing long odds, practiced an adaptive defense that preserved combat power to the greatest degree possible.26 Ukrainian forces further elevated their competence with unmanned systems and predictive AI during the critical defense of Chasiv Yar, which began in spring 2024 and continues today. The defenders have effectively employed these new tools for reconnaissance and targeting, resulting in increased lethality, especially against Russian artillery.27 Comprehensive integration of sensors via the Delta situational awareness system has further enabled a faster decision cycle. Useful observations for the US Army emphasize the value of new technology training and increased situational awareness at the lowest possible echelon to empower junior leaders.28

The first weeks of the Kursk offensive stand in contrast to the attritional warfare that had become the norm since 2023 and provide a useful lens on the application of multidomain operations. The Ukrainian Army had studied its 2023 counteroffensive that fell short in the face of a well-prepared Russian defense-in-depth and was further hindered by Ukrainian command-and-control challenges, inexperienced brigades, and structural problems, including insufficient mine clearing and air support.29 Seeking a remedy to the stalemate of positional warfare, Ukraine applied tenets and imperatives of multidomain operations to achieve operational surprise.30 Ukrainian forces synchronized lethal and nonlethal assets across domains and functions. Effective use of cyber and electronic warfare, along with massed unmanned systems, aided deception. A range of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets enabled more efficient fires. Together, these improved agility as Ukrainian mechanized forces maneuvered to exploit weaknesses in Russian troop dispositions and dislocated command and control.31 Ukraine established and sustained the Kursk salient to create multiple dilemmas for Russia and prompted strategic-level manpower and force posture decisions.32 The ultimate failure of the Kursk offensive to hold ground, even as it delayed Russian offensive operations and provided critical evidence that Ukraine was not defeated, demonstrates multidomain operations enable operational surprise—even on a transparent battlefield.33

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance and Fires in the Transparent Battlefield

Decisions are only as good as the information that enables them. In the short course of this war, Ukraine has elevated data mastery and information dominance over Russia through the transformative use of cloud computing.34 This approach to information synthesis integrates a broad constellation of sensors, whether military, commercial, or civilian, and processes data through algorithmic logic to produce actionable intelligence. Platforms like the Delta situational awareness system, Sky Fortress acoustic detection system, and Diia digital ecosystem have proven effective in targeting enemy systems, defending against air-domain threats, and integrating crowdsource reporting.35 Many aspects of Ukraine’s approach should inform US and NATO modernization toward their information-advantage targets. Key among these approaches is Ukraine’s partnership with the private sector, its ability to store data offshore and avoid the risks of information isolation, and its use of open, interoperable architecture.36

If the first two years of the war highlighted the potential for unmanned aerial systems (UAS) in the close fight, the third year emerged as a period of acceleration, with lessons and indicators for US and allied forces. Ukraine initially turned to repurposed civilian UAVs to overcome shortfalls in reconnaissance, strike, logistics, and protection.37 In just a few years, Ukraine has increased its drone production tenfold, producing more Class 1 drones than any NATO state.38 Armed UAVs have become Ukraine’s greatest attritional tool in the absence of sufficient artillery.39 Unmanned aerial systems employment was so effective in 2024 that it helped extend the effective range of the close-range fire from the line of contact, pushing Russian artillery support and logistics stockpiles ever farther from the front line, though Russia has since copied and, in some cases, even outpaced Ukrainian UAV innovations.40 Ukraine has also advanced its use of Class III drones for strategic strikes deep inside Russian territory, with notable materiel and informational effects.41 United States and allied study of UAV employment should anticipate rapid improvements to drone navigation, communication, and resilience against electronic warfare. Artificial intelligence and targeting algorithms will continue to improve autonomy and the eventual coordination of swarms.42 The US Army should continue to streamline acquisition processes and foster UAS and counter-UAS innovation and experimentation across tactical echelons with associated doctrinal, organizational, and training changes.43

Mass-produced drones will increasingly fill capability and capacity gaps in artillery and aviation in future conflicts. The Russia-Ukraine War also shows their value in meeting reconnaissance and security (R&S) needs.44 Even as R&S turns to automated and unmanned methods, it remains an essential capability in large-scale combat operations. Ukraine’s lack of R&S forces below operational commands and Special Operations Forces makes drones the tool of choice at the tactical level. Drone employment has been so effective that it has driven organizational change, leading to the creation of the Unmanned Systems Force and rapid acquisition methods for procuring UAVs. Ukrainian forces have also made significant use of crowdsourced situational awareness, incorporating civilian reporting into the R&S picture.45 Smartphone reporting and other forms of open-source and human intelligence have helped Ukrainian forces develop awareness and actionable intelligence in the absence of task-organized R&S units.46 These R&S approaches deserve consideration in US Army concepts and experimentation, especially as it divests and transforms units previously assigned the R&S mission.

Ukrainian forces have also proven adaptive with their long-range fires and influence on the deep fight. Ukraine must economize its use of high-cost and precision-fires systems sourced from the United States and other allies, such as the Army Tactical Missile System, due to quantity and operational constraints. Yet, their forces have imposed unexpected costs on Russia through the use of Class II and III drones against operational and strategic targets, including industrial and logistics capabilities deep within Russia.47 Three key observations emerge for US consideration

  1. munition density and magazine depth are key limiters on traditional fires, which may be mitigated through diversity in one’s arsenal;

  2. low-cost massed fires may augment higher-cost options; and

  3. a unified multinational approach is useful in developing a diverse arsenal.48

Preserving Combat Power

Robust and adaptive logistics practices remain a vital element of war. Both combatants face sustainment and logistics readiness challenges across every level of this fight. Some challenges are not new. The great wars of the last century validate that protracted, high-intensity warfare places great demands on national stockpiles and industrial bases to meet battlefield demands. The lesser proxy conflicts of the Cold War also demonstrate that great powers regularly find themselves sustaining weaker partners through wars that endure longer than expected. Some current challenges are functions of modern gray-zone warfare, as supply chains and deployment and distribution systems are at risk to adversaries’ cyber- and space-domain activities.49 Tactical challenges may seem like novel impositions of the transparent battlefield, as sustainment operations are habitually contested by pervasive sensors and an increasing range of deep-strike capabilities. Modern fighting forces must train and exercise the projection and protection of redundant supply methods. These same capabilities that pose threats may also be turned into good use—AI tools will improve logistics efficiency, and unmanned systems will be a boon to sustainment operations in multiple domains.50

The ubiquity and potency of drones in this war is also a demand signal for protection modernization. Drones have created transparency through in-depth reconnaissance, and their direct-action use is also responsible for significant levels of attrition. Drone strikes are responsible for more than 60 percent of frontline systems casualties and are particularly effective against dismounted forces.51 Current counter-UAS systems and battle position methods appear insufficient to protect against first-person view and Lancet-style drones, as events in Operation Epic Fury demonstrate.52 The demand for materiel, training, organization, and doctrinal change becomes more urgent as drone warfare evolves into attacking swarms of increasingly autonomous weapons.53 In the near term, the US Army should pursue major programs, like improvements to maneuver short-range air defense and soldier- and-unit-level systems along the lines of the Sandhills Project, to develop effective UAS counters.54 Concurrently, some basics deserve rethinking. Drone threats demand adaptation of cover and concealment practices from assembly areas to battle positions. Decoys and deception should be a part of standard operating procedures in all units. Counter-UAS training may become relevant across a range of combat units—but particularly for those formations responsible for protection across all three Army components.55

The effective reach of sensors and fires on a static, transparent battlefield also creates novel challenges for military medicine. Forward-echelon treatment facilities and evacuation pathways are particularly vulnerable.56 Safeguarding initial and follow-on casualty care requires reducing medical units’ signatures and risks of exposure by improving their mobility, agility, and dispersal. Casualty evacuation times have more than doubled, creating a series of associated challenges for forward echelons of care. Medical planners and frontline practitioners must account for higher rates of wound infections, combat stresses, and higher demands for forward use of whole-blood products. Fundamentals like preventive medicines and infection controls remain as important as in past conflicts. This war also illuminates the value of new practices, like telemedicine, forward-embedded mental health professionals, the use of unmanned systems in battlefield evacuations and medical resupplies, and the utility of trauma registries to analyze trends and improve readiness.57

Russian Irregular Warfare

Irregular warfare remains the most regular form of warfare.58 It is most prevalent in the peaceful, steady state between nations involved in adversarial competition. Irregular warfare is also useful in creating or deescalating crises and creating opportunities for regular forces during combat operations. This war provides two contrasting examples. In 2014, Russia employed a range of irregular warfare methods to disrupt and subvert Ukrainian governance over portions of its territory, population, and regional leadership. Russia employed state and state-sponsored irregular forces supported by cyber and information operations to effect a fait accompli coup in Ukraine’s Crimea oblast.59 Russia exploited weaknesses in Ukrainian political cohesion and military readiness, as well as a lack of organized international resolve. Yet, during Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, its irregular approaches were ineffective in support of combat operations. Ukraine proved more resilient, better prepared to resist, and received more coherent external support.

Significant changes between the two events were observed. Ukrainian political leadership and popular will were stronger following elections, government and military reform, and eight years of Russian occupation and belligerence. Western states supported these reforms with cyber and information security and intelligence sharing. While this deliberate shift toward comprehensive defense in anticipation of further Russian aggression did not deter invasion, it effectively negated Russian activities aimed at subverting the regime in Kyiv.60

The End Is the Beginning Is the End

Many experts are examining this war for hints about the future of conflict.61 Many began 2024 expecting some form of decision as the combatants rebuilt their capabilities in hopes of gaining an advantage, but by year’s end, both sides were continuing the fighting, with neither willing to negotiate seriously.62 Meanwhile, the absence of common bargaining interests between the combatants, a shifting locus of external support from the West, an increase in external support to Russia, and Ukraine’s remarkable resilience (paired with its sustained capacity to strike deeply and spectacularly within Russia) all conspire to push war termination beyond the visible horizon.

There is broad concurrence that this war should provoke the armies of developed nations to focus on modernization, but not all voices agree. The extent to which AI, unmanned systems, and other emerging technologies will become the arbiters of success on the battlefield remains a contentious issue.63 Similarly contentious is the extent to which dominant technologies of the past may become obsolete. The cries from some corners that tanks are now irrelevant or that drones are the new decisive capability often do not reconcile well with objective reporting from the field.64

The war’s third year was an intense period of innovation, adaptation, and improvisation, driven by both sides’ searches for solutions to positional and attritional warfare in the absence of any domain dominance. The year bears similarity in many ways to the third and fourth years of World War I, during which technological innovations like the coordinated employment of tanks in the attack, the introduction of mass aerial bombing, and improvements to machine guns, artillery, and chemical weapons all showed promise on the battlefield as solutions to endless trench warfare. Those developments required experimentation, time, and context to contribute substantially to the end of that war, but they were not the deciding factors. Armor and airpower would not show their fully integrated potential until World War II.

Today, autonomous or remotely operated systems, paired with AI, show promise for achieving effects with economies of force. They have dominated the attrition of frontline forces and enabled spectacular deep-strike attacks, but these new capabilities have not yet reliably enabled offensive maneuver or massed effects to defeat a well-prepared defense in depth.65 Instead, local parity between Ukrainian and Russian forces in almost all domains and technologies has led to positional, trench-style warfare over much of the line of contact.66 The lack of movement and the static nature of defenses facilitates target identification and acquisition at scale, aided by AI, and shortfalls in artillery have increased the relative importance of armed drones. But this observation does not mean that armed drones are more effective than artillery nor that armed drones would be as effective in maneuver warfare. If Ukrainian commanders in the field had sufficient artillery systems and magazine depth, drones would not be the leading cause of attritional damage to Russian forces.67

Bernard Brodie and others have cautioned against a “cult of innovation” because innovation is not inherently good, and there is assumed risk in adopting technologies with insufficient validation.68 That risk increases in times of reduced resources relative to a force’s commitments. This increase multiplies when a service divests some of its traditional capabilities before the expectations of new capabilities have been confirmed.69 New technologies often observe a “generational gap” between their first indications of military utility and their effective integration into war fighting.70 This 20-to-30-year lag may stem from institutional inertia, from groups of new technologies emerging (like complex variables all impacting each other’s evolution), or because meaningful innovation is best realized by a generation of leaders who grew up with the new technologies.71 A strong and counterintuitive argument posits that innovation in peacetime can be more effective than during war—if senior leaders create suitable advancement pathways to elevate the talents of junior leaders adept at new ways of warfare.72 Today’s so-called digital natives will surely accomplish things in 10 or 20 years that have yet to be imagined.

This statement is not to suggest that unmanned systems and AI are fads that will fade. Rather, it is a caution against the certainty some pundits or practitioners may express that emerging capabilities are akin to a revolution in military affairs or the elusive “third offset.”73 It is recognition that the current rate of change is so fast that the US Army does not have a generation (or even a decade) in which to innovate, adapt, and acquire winning technologies.74 The Secretary of War has challenged the US Army to accelerate its transformation to develop and integrate essential new capabilities on an ambitious, necessity-driven timeline.75 This challenge demands that the practitioner apply critical and historical thinking with a jealous regard.

As the war in Ukraine enters its fifth year, it is wise to acknowledge that transitions and inflection points cannot be confirmed as endings or beginnings until time and history offer a more distant perspective. At best, at this moment, we may only speculate about how this war will resolve, and with even less confidence, when. Sir Winston Churchill captured this sense of hope in midst of uncertainty following the Allied victory in the second battle of El Alamein, fully two-and-a-half years before victory in Europe: “Now this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.”76 But, it is past time for lessons identified from the Russia-Ukraine War to be converted into lessons learned and institutionalized across the force as the next step in ensuring continued US operational excellence.

 
 

Stephan Bolton
Colonel Stephan Bolton is a US Army Special Forces officer and a distinguished graduate of the US Army War College class of 2025. He served as the chief of staff of the Russia-Ukraine War integrated research project during academic year 2025.

John A. Nagl
Dr. John A. Nagl is the General John J. Pershing Professor of Warfighting Studies in the Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations at the US Army War College. With Colonel Chase Metcalf, he directs the Russia-Ukraine War integrated research project.

 
 

Endnotes

  1. 1. Williamson Murray, “Innovation: Past and Future,” in Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, ed. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 300–328. See also David Barno and Nora Bensahel, Adaptation Under Fire: How Militaries Change in Wartime (Oxford University Press, 2020); and Francis G. Hoffman, Mars Adapting: Military Change During War (Naval Institute Press, 2021).
  2. 2. Zachary Griffiths, “U.S. Military Observers and Why They Are Needed in Ukraine,” War on the Rocks, May 12, 2023, https://warontherocks.com/2023/05/u-s-military-observers-and-why-they-are-needed-in-ukraine/.
  3. 3. Brent L. Sterling, Other People’s Wars: The US Military and the Challenge of Learning from Foreign Conflicts (Georgetown University Press, 2021).
  4. 4. Sterling, Other People’s Wars.
  5. 5. Katie Crombe and John A. Nagl,“A Call to Action: Lessons from Ukraine for the Future Force,” Parameters 53, no. 3 (Autumn 2023), https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss3/10/.
  6. 6. John A. Nagl and Katie Crombe, A Call to Action: Lessons from Ukraine for the Future Force (US Army War College Press, 2024), https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/968/; and John A. Nagl and Michael T. Hackett, A Long, Hard Year: Russia-Ukraine War Lessons Learned 2023 (US Army War College Press, 2026), https://press.armywarcollege.edu/irps/2/.
  7. 7. Crombe and Nagl, “Call to Action”; and Michael T. Hackett and John A. Nagl, “A Long, Hard Year: Russia-Ukraine War Lessons Learned 2023,” Parameters 54, no. 3 (Autumn 2024), https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/News/Display/Article/3890256/a-long-hard-year-russia-ukraine-war-lessons-learned-2023/.
  8. 8. Serhii Kuzan, “Ukraine’s Growing Military Strength Is an Underrated Factor in Peace Talks,” Ukraine Alert (blog), Atlantic Council, March 25, 2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraines-growing-military-strength-is-an-underrated-factor-in-peace-talks/.
  9. 9. David L. Klingensmith, Multidomain Operations in Practice: Lessons from Ukraine’s Kursk Offensive (strategic research paper, US Army War College, 2025).
  10. 10. Angelica Evans et al., “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 31, 2024,” Institute for the Study of War, December 31, 2024, https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2024.
  11. 11. Yurri Clavilier and Michael Gjerstad,“Combat Losses and Manpower Challenges Underscore the Importance of ‘Mass’ in Ukraine,” Military Balance Blog, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), February 10, 2025, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2025/02/combat-losses-and-manpower-challenges-underscore-the-importance-of-mass-in-ukraine/. Estimating combat losses in this work is an art and a science. For a discussion of the challenges, see “Estimating Russian Casualties on the Ukrainian Font,” Lviv Herald, June 1, 2025.
  12. 12. Clavilier and Gjerstad, “Combat Losses.”
  13. 13. “Visualising the Dynamics of Combat and Negotiations in Donbas,” International Crisis Group, August 3, 2021, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/eastern-europe/ukraine/visualising-dynamics-combat-and-negotiations-donbas.
  14. 14. Meredith Reid Sarkees, “The COW Typology of War: Defining and Categorizing Wars (Version 4 of the Data),” Correlates of War, 2010, https://correlatesofwar.org/wp-content/uploads/COW-Website-Typology-of-war.pdf.
  15. 15. Gideon Rose, “Get Ready for the Next Nuclear Age: How Trump Might Drive Proliferation,” Foreign Affairs, March 8, 2025, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/nuclear-age-proliferation-trump-nato-gideon-rose.
  16. 16. For further discussion of how deterrence fails, see Robert Art and Kelly Greenhill, “Coercion: An Analytical Overview,” in Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics, ed. Kelly Greenhill and Peter Krause (Oxford University Press, 2018), 1–32.
  17. 17. Vaughn D. Strong Jr., “The Difficulty of Extended Deterrence: How the United States and NATO’s Lack of an Extended Deterrence Strategy Enabled the Russian/Ukrainian Conflict” (strategic research paper, US Army War College, 2025).
  18. 18. Joseph R. Biden Jr., “President Biden: What America Will and Will Not Do in Ukraine,” Opinion Guest Essay, The New York Times, May 31, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/31/opinion/biden-ukraine-strategy.html.
  19. 19. Dan Reiter and Paul Poast, “The Truth About Tripwires: Why Small Force Deployments Do Not Deter Aggression,” Texas National Security Review 4, no. 3 (Summer 2021), https://tnsr.org/2021/06/the-truth-about-tripwires-why-small-force-deployments-do-not-deter-aggression/.
  20. 20. Strong, “Difficulty of Extended Deterrence.”
  21. 21. Strong, “Difficulty of Extended Deterrence.”
  22. 22. Todd Sunday, “Russia-Ukraine War Termination: Are They Ready?” (strategic research paper, US Army War College, 2025).
  23. 23. Sunday, “Russia-Ukraine War Termination.”
  24. 24. Sunday, “Russia-Ukraine War Termination.”
  25. 25. Sean Madden, “Mission Command in the Ukraine-Russia War: Lessons from 2024” (strategic research paper, US Army War College, 2025).
  26. 26. Madden, “Mission Command.”
  27. 27. Abigail Darwish, “Ukrainian Military Tech Timeline and Analysis (2022–2025),” Bloomsbury Intelligence & Security Institute, May 29, 2025, https://bisi.org.uk/reports/ukrainian-military-tech-timeline-and-analysis-20222025.
  28. 28. Madden, “Mission Command.”
  29. 29. David L. Klingensmith, “Multidomain Operations in Practice: Lessons from Ukraine’s Kursk Offensive” (strategic research paper, US Army War College, 2025).
  30. 30. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Operations, Field Manual 3-0 (HQDA, March 2025).
  31. 31. Klingensmith, “Multidomain Operations.”
  32. 32. Klingensmith, “Multidomain Operations.”
  33. 33. Klingensmith, “Multidomain Operations.”
  34. 34. Francis Lee, “Digital Supremacy: Algorithmic Warfare Lessons” (strategic research paper, US Army War College, 2025).
  35. 35. Lee, “Digital Supremacy.”
  36. 36. Lee, “Digital Supremacy.”
  37. 37. Oleksii Pinchuk, “Unmanned Aerial Systems in the Russian-Ukrainian War” (strategic research paper, US Army War College, 2025).
  38. 38. Pinchuk, “Unmanned Aerial Systems.”
  39. 39. Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, Tactical Developments During the Third Year of the Russo-Ukrainian War (Royal United Services Institute, February 2025), https://static.rusi.org/tactical-developments-third-year-russo-ukrainian-war-february-2205.pdf.
  40. 40. Yaroslav Trofimov, “Iran Is Applying the Lessons of Russia’s Drone Warfare Against America,” The Wall Street Journal, March 25, 2026, https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-drone-warfare-russia-ukraine-b7369cf6.
  41. 41. “Long-Range Ukrainian Strikes Halve Russian Artillery Use, Push Back Enemy Aircraft, and Destroy Missile Carriers,” Defense Express, April 9, 2025, https://en.defence-ua.com/analysis/long_range_ukrainian_strikes_halve_russian_artillery_use_push_back_enemy_aircraft_and_destroy_missile_carriers-14126.html.
  42. 42. Pinchuk, “Unmanned Aerial Systems.”
  43. 43. Pinchuk, “Unmanned Aerial Systems.”
  44. 44. Brennan Speakes, “Rethinking Cavalry: Modern Applications of Reconnaissance and Security in Multi-domain Operations in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict” (strategic research paper, US Army War College, 2025).
  45. 45. Speakes, “Rethinking Cavalry.”
  46. 46. Speakes, “Rethinking Cavalry.”
  47. 47. Jeremy Secrest, “Ukraine: Long-Range Fires Through Adaptation” (strategic research paper, US Army War College, 2025).
  48. 48. Secrest, “Ukraine.”
  49. 49. Philip Thomas, “Logistics Under Fire” (strategic research paper, US Army War College, 2025).
  50. 50. Thomas, “Logistics Under Fire.”
  51. 51. Watling and Reynolds, “Tactical Developments.”
  52. 52. Patrick Anderson, “Protection: Survivability on the UAS Battlefield” (strategic research paper, US Army War College, 2025).
  53. 53. Useful fictions have been instrumental in visualizing the battlefield of tomorrow. A good recent example is Mick Ryan, White Sun War: The Campaign for Taiwan (Casemate, 2023). For the use of drones in Epic Fury, see Trofimov, “Iran Is Applying the Lessons.”
  54. 54. Anderson, “Protection: Survivability.”
  55. 55. Anderson, “Protection: Survivability.”
  56. 56. Michael Henry, “Preparing for the Next Battlefield: Medical Lessons from the Third Year in the Russia-Ukraine War” (strategic research paper, US Army War College, 2025).
  57. 57. Henry, “Preparing for the Next Battlefield.”
  58. 58. For Joint and US Army discussion of irregular warfare, see Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Campaign and Operations, Joint Publication 3-0 (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2017); and Headquarters, Department of the Army, Operations, Field Manual 3-0 (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2025).
  59. 59. Arthur Bennett, “Russian Disruptive and Subversive Approaches” (strategic research paper, US Army War College, 2025).
  60. 60. Bennett, “Russian Disruptive and Subversive Approaches.”
  61. 61. See also this year’s effort by US military fellows at “Conflict in Focus: Insights for Future Conflicts from the Russia-Ukraine War,” Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), May 9, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/conflict-focus-insights-future-conflicts-russia-ukraine-war.
  62. 62. Michael Kofman and Shashank Joshi, “The Ukrainian Battlefield in 2024,” (CSIS streamed live on Center for a New American Security, January 9, 2024) YouTube video, 52:47,
    .
  63. 63. Mick Ryan, “How Ukraine Has Changed the Character of War,” Futura Doctrina, February 21, 2025, https://mickryan.substack.com/p/how-ukraine-has-changed-the-character.
  64. 64. Griffiths, “U.S. Military Observers.”
  65. 65. Commentary by a visiting subject matter expert made under the Chatham House Rule during classroom discussion at the US Army War College, January 22, 2025.
  66. 66. Mick Ryan, “Why No One Is Winning in Ukraine: Technological Change Has Produced a Surprising Stalemate,” Foreign Affairs, February 21, 2025, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russia/why-no-one-winning-ukraine-ryan.
  67. 67. Commentary made under the Chatham House Rule at the Paris Defense and Security Forum, March 13, 2025.
  68. 68. Laura H. Schousboe, “All That Glitters Is Not Gold: Overcoming the US Military’s Pro-Innovation Bias,” War on the Rocks, April 1, 2020, https://mwi.westpoint.edu/glitters-not-gold-overcoming-us-militarys-pro-innovation-bias/.
  69. 69. Kendrick Kuo, “Dangerous Changes: When Military Innovation Harms Combat Effectiveness,” International Security 47, no. 2 (Fall 2022): 48–87, https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/47/2/48/113546/Dangerous-Changes-When-Military-Innovation-Harms.
  70. 70. Barry Watts and Williamson Murray, “Military Innovation in Peacetime,” in Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 369–416.
  71. 71. Stephen Peter Rosen, “Conclusion: Lessons Learned,” in Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Cornell University Press, 1991), 251–62.
  72. 72. Rosen, Winning the Next War.
  73. 73. For discussion of military revolutions and revolutions in military affairs, see MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, The Dynamics of Military Revolutions, 1300–2050 (Cambridge University Press, 2001); and for discussion of the concept of offset strategies, see Timothy A. Walton, “Securing the Third Offset Strategy: Priorities for the Next Secretary of Defense,” Joint Force Quarterly 82 (3rd Quarter, 2016): 6–15.
  74. 74. Lloyd J. Austin III, “Now We Know What a Modern War Looks Like,” Opinion Guest Essay, The New York Times, April 7, 2026, https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/07/opinion/iran-has-shown-us-what-modern-war-looks-like.html.
  75. 75. Pete Hegseth, memorandum, “Army Transformation and Acquisition Reform,” April 30, 2025, Washington, DC.
  76. 76. Winston S. Churchill, “The Bright Gleam of Victory” (speech, Lord Mayor’s Day Luncheon at the Mansion House, London, UK, November 10, 1942), https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches /1941-1945-war-leader/the-bright-gleam-of-victory/.
 
 

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