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May 14, 2026

A New Security Framework for NATO’s Eastern Flank

Matthew J. Kukla and Anna Batta
©2026 Matthew J. Kukla and Anna Batta

ABSTRACT: This article argues for a NATO-EU–led security strategy to achieve long-term deterrence in Ukraine after the end of the Russia-Ukraine War. Unlike existing analyses, this article straddles the strategic level of deterrence, outlining an operational road map. Its historical example of the Iraq War shows that long-term security requires the development of plans before a conflict ends, long-term commitments, and multilateral—not unilateral—security efforts. The proposed solution provides strategic planners and policymakers with a low-risk, high-reward approach that leverages burden sharing through a multinational framework.

Keywords: Ukraine, security, deterrence, NATO, training

 

Using the Iraq War as a contemporary example, this article illustrates the significance of a post-conflict security strategy designed to ensure Ukraine’s long-term stability and ability to deter future acts of aggression. Today, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) have an opportunity to establish a strategy that will ensure Ukraine’s security tomorrow. A well-engineered strategy that protects Ukraine from threats after the conclusion of the Russia-Ukraine War is tantamount to success. Such security would provide Ukrainian civil authorities with vital support and room to maneuver, allowing them to rebuild infrastructure, reestablish industries, reconstitute military forces, and restore critical academic, legal, and other institutions.

Drawing on historical examples, this article provides lessons for a collective-security approach to training in Ukraine and advances a training model tailored to Ukraine. The security shortfalls in the Iraq War point to the following key lessons learned: (1) long-term security plans should be established prior to the end of conventional conflict, (2) long-term security requires a commitment that spans generations, and (3) multilateral security efforts are more likely to succeed than unilateral efforts. These takeaways from Iraq directly support the proposed solution developed in this article—the Ukrainian Defense Training Initiative (UDTI).

The proposed solution would begin when the Russia-Ukraine War ends and does not provide any suggestions on how to end the war. The solution assumes a peace treaty, an armistice, or some type of agreed-upon halt to hostilities has already been established and respected by Russia and Ukraine. This article also assumes part of the agreement to cease hostilities involves Ukraine not being admitted into NATO, thus requiring security solutions outside NATO’s Article 5 protections.

Ukraine’s long-term protection requires a future-oriented security commitment by NATO and EU members, which would provide personnel to serve as the primary trainers of Ukrainian defense forces. This long-term commitment would be modeled after the post–World War II actions of the United States, whereby America’s enduring presence in and support for countries such as Germany, Italy, and Japan provided persistent and adaptable security, stabilizing these war-torn countries while they rebuilt. Such US presence also deterred any existential threats that may have arisen from exploiting these countries in their fragile state.

Using this post–World War II example, this article suggests personnel from NATO and EU member countries would serve as the primary trainers in Ukraine, providing stability and protection while assuring Ukraine (and the world) of NATO’s and the EU’s adherence to security writ large. These trainers would serve as the primary command-and-control training cadre stationed in Ukraine, coordinating and conducting individual, crew, and collective training events. In parallel, homogeneous Ukrainian forces would be responsible for defending the country’s borders and lines of communication, supporting civil authorities while new recruits and units at various levels cycled through.

The practice of rotating a cadre in theater to train non-NATO members at multiple levels already exists in various forms, with the US State Partnership Program—which has been operating for more than 30 years—serving as a prime example.1 Under this program, the California National Guard was paired with Ukraine in 1993 and has provided long-standing training on small-unit tactics and other defense assistance.2 After “Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea. . . . Guardsmen and women . . . continuously [trained] with Ukrainian counterparts, rotating through . . . the Yavoriv Combat Training Center in western Ukraine.”3 The purpose of rotating a smaller cohort of NATO-EU trainers through the training center in Ukraine is to make on-site force training a cost-effective option, while providing a limited NATO-EU presence to help deter Russia and assure Ukraine. Additionally, the training center itself serves as a central launch site for a type of “fire ant strategy,” allowing quick mobilization against a threat by using simple, rapid, and collective response measures.4 This training-center concept goes beyond standard war-fighting functions, expands overall institutional capacity, and improves intra-theater interoperability across all domains, making the concept a critical component of a broader, long-term security strategy throughout Europe.5

Some people, such as retired Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, argue NATO forces should learn from Ukrainian military personnel who have developed skills during the war. The potential solution offered in this article suggests a hybrid training system—one that provides cross-pollination training for interoperability. This approach enables temporary Ukrainian tactics and techniques to merge with NATO skill sets and, possibly, doctrine.6

What Not to Do: Lessons Learned from the Iraq War for Post-Conflict Security

In a 2004 article examining why military occupations succeed or fail, David M. Edelstein observed the following: “Given the vast quantitative and qualitative superiority of the U.S. military, it is increasingly evident that winning the peace will continue to be much more difficult for the United States than winning the war.”7 Only 20 days elapsed between the start of the US-led invasion and the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime.8 Whereas the rapid defeat of Iraq’s conventional forces in 2003 was a textbook military victory, that quick victory is forever tainted by the long-term security-strategy failure that held the United States captive in Iraq for more than 20 years. The plan did not fail because the United States had too few boots on the ground or insufficient resources; it failed due to the absence of a coherent plan for long-term security and a lack of the unity of command necessary to shepherd any plan to success.

At various levels, across multiple organizations, US leadership scrambled to develop a plan for an ever-changing environment in real time, but it could not keep pace with the fluid political, social, and military pressures in Iraq. The product that emerged from this effort was an incongruent, ever-changing security plan that resembled a type of “adhocracy.”9 This on-the-fly strategy inserted unnecessary internal contention among multiple agencies, putting them only “partly in charge,” which meant no one agency was truly in charge.10 The failure to appoint an overarching agency to run Iraq’s reconstruction efforts violated a critical principle of war—unity of command.11 Simply put, planning for long-term security after victory must occur long before the victory itself occurs.

Tethering the security failures in Iraq to a lack of planning or the absence of unity of command would be unfair. Other factors, such as a lack of time and multilateral support, also hindered success. The United States expended many resources securing Iraq, but time proved to be the resource the United States could not gain through procurement, contracts, or coalitions. Reality quickly suggested “[p]erhaps no challenge is greater for state- and nation-building programs than time.”12 Whereas a period of 20-plus years may seem like enough time to cultivate a secure environment, history continues to prove otherwise. Successful nation building—and the security required to achieve it—is measured over the course of generations rather than in years or decades.13 The building of states and nations “is an ever-continuing process that requires constant adjustments to meet the demands of the people,” calling for adaptations to the natural political and economic fact-of-life changes that occur over time.14

What to Do: Europe, Asia, and the 100-Year Commitment

The foregoing discussion suggests the commitment required to secure Ukraine should be acknowledged by NATO, the EU, and Ukraine as a commitment spanning 100 years. The idea of a 100-year commitment may seem absurd, but history validates that long-term, deliberate security plans are more likely to succeed than fail.15 Germany, Japan, and South Korea are three success stories of postwar recovery driven by the security and early reconstruction support provided by other nations. As noted by Hal Brands, the “long-term nation-building program, underpinned by U.S. troops, helped produce the South Korean miracle.”16 In many cases, the US security presence has continued for 80 years postconflict, and the United States is likely to continue to be present into the foreseeable future. Consequently, in the context of history, a 100-year commitment is not illogical.

The role of US forces in host countries has certainly changed over time. Today, these forces are not an occupying presence aiming to maintain peace or govern. Instead, they serve to reassure host countries of long-term US security commitments. Additionally, the 100-year commitment proposed in this article avoids counterproductive narratives that tend to accompany self-imposed deadlines.17 Simultaneously, the mere presence of US forces helps deter external threats. Therefore, a 100-year commitment to Ukraine by NATO and the EU should not be perceived as an occupation; rather, this commitment should be viewed as a multilateral security guarantee that benefits all parties.

Iraq and the Absence of a Multilateral Security Solution

To secure Iraq, the United States should have aggressively sought a truly multilateral solution between coalition partners and the United Nations. A multilateral approach would have reestablished the legitimacy of the US presence in Iraq—legitimacy lost after no weapons of mass destruction were found in the country (the premise for starting the war in the first place).18

Then–Secretary of State Colin Powell, as well as the rest of the world, recognized that “the United States must act multilaterally in the Iraqi occupation to reclaim legitimacy.”19 Nevertheless, the multilateral approach to Iraqi security was never pursued in a meaningful way and became part of the masquerade of success. Ironically, according to a 2005 National Security Council document titled National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, the chosen course of action involved a multilateral strategy for security by “pursuing a comprehensive approach that involves the integrated efforts” of other countries.20 This claim was untrue, and, in the end, the US experience in Iraq was a “taxing, long-mismanaged intervention [that] undermined domestic confidence in U.S. power and leadership.”21 The iconic photos of a decisive victory that punctuated the start of the Iraq War could not overcome the story’s epilogue.

In the end, neither the United States nor Iraq were completely defeated or redeemed, instead finding themselves as hapless partners in a counterinsurgency purgatory. This outcome explains why the United States has soured on nation building. The US experience in Iraq conditioned Americans to be skeptical of new security endeavors far from America’s borders. Today, this skepticism manifests itself in the United States remaining “unwilling to offer Ukraine the security guarantees it seeks . . . [such as] NATO membership [or] deployment of U.S. troops in Ukraine.”22

The key takeaway from Iraq is the United States—and the Iraqi people—could have benefited from a true, multilateral security effort. A multilateral approach to security benefits all parties involved. Such an approach disperses risks, requires deliberation and consensus about objectives, lowers monetary burdens through cost sharing, provides legitimacy, and eases a host nation’s concerns about possible exploitation.23 As noted by Edelstein, “[p]resumably, the international community is not interested in forming an empire.”24 Whereas a multilateral approach would not guarantee success in Ukraine, such an approach would provide a unified front, affirming the EU and NATO’s determination to achieve long-term security—for Ukraine and for the whole of Europe.25

How Can the Iraq War Inform Ukrainian Security?

The key lessons learned from the security shortfalls in Iraq are as follows: (1) long-term security plans should be established prior to the end of conventional conflict, (2) long-term security requires a commitment that spans generations, and (3) multilateral security efforts are more likely to succeed than unilateral efforts. Drawing on these lessons, this article proposes the UDTI as a solution to the Ukrainian case. Under the UDTI, NATO and the EU would support the initiative not by providing large formations of war fighters to Ukraine; instead, members would establish a small cohort of cadres from different member states in support of training initiatives at various levels. Ukraine’s actual border security and overall defense would be the sole responsibility of Ukrainian forces. Each member country’s cadre team would be tasked with training Ukrainian forces at the individual, crew, and collective levels. The UDTI is divided into the following four tiers.

Tier Four – In the Queue

Requirements. Member countries in tier four are in the reset, identification, planning, and preparation phases before they move into Ukraine to support the UDTI. Countries must spend a minimum of five years in tier four.

Tier Three – Individual, Crew, Collective, and Combat-Support Training

Requirements. Tier three involves the most cadre-to-trainee contact time and requires 10 member-country teams to support the UDTI. The commitment to providing this support is two years in Ukraine, after which a member country moves either to tier four for reset or to tier two for service at the next level. Of the 10 member-country teams, only two graduate to the next level.

Tier Two – Deputies

Requirements. Member countries in tier two support tier three, ensuring the proper resources are available to meet training metrics and serving as the primary validating officials for all tier-three training activities. Additionally, tier two coordinates with the next-highest level and serves as the connective tissue between tiers one and three. The deputy level has two member-country positions, both of which require prior service at the tier-three level. Tier-two member countries incur an additional three-year commitment, after which they either move to tier four for reset or graduate to tier one.

Tier One – Lead

Requirements. Overseeing the entire UDTI is the responsibility of a tier-one member country, which must have previously served in a tier-two position. The tier-one lead is responsible for the command and control of the UDTI, serving as the liaison for planning and coordinating with Ukraine, NATO, and EU supporting members. Tier one has only one member country, and that member incurs an additional five-year commitment. Upon completion of tenure, the member would move to tier four for reset.

The UDTI’s tiered process is best illustrated as a sports-team bracket, as shown in figure 1.

Flowchart of graduated responsibility in the UDTI
Figure 1. Flowchart of graduated responsibility in the UDTI
(Source: Created by authors)

Importantly, member countries’ commitments do not require the same cadre to remain for the full duration of its tiered time. Controlled by their country, individual cadre members can be replaced at any time to avoid disrupting their professional development cycles. A designated member-country team could serve for as little as two years or as many as 10 years, depending on the team’s decision to graduate to the next tiered level or move to the queue.

To make participation in the UDTI palatable to member-country teams, the initiative must be funded out of a centralized account to which all members contribute, minimizing the burden on any single country. Member-country teams should be compensated on a progressive pay scale that increases as they move up in their respective tiers. This compensation scheme encourages competition among participants, incentivizing them to move from tier four to tier one.

Members of NATO and non-NATO EU countries can establish this multilateral approach as an equitable solution that spreads risks, responsibilities, and costs across the many to avoid overburdening the few. Additionally, this solution would allow NATO and the EU to build relationships, capacity, capability, and system interoperability in a real-world scenario.26 Undoubtedly, deterrence and peacekeeping offer their own return on investment and are cheaper than a kinetic war or mandatory peace enforcement.

Conclusion

The security shortfalls in the Iraq War serve as a contemporary warning about the unintended consequences of a military victory achieved in the absence of a well-thought-out, post-victory security plan. The security solution proposed in this article is underpinned by the UDTI—a novel proposition that requires a long-term, multilateral commitment by NATO and EU members to train Ukrainian forces in Ukraine. In the near term, the presence of these members in the country—a potential deterrent to outside aggression—would allow the Ukrainian civil authorities to focus on rebuilding and reestablishing social, economic, and governing institutions without intrusion or interruption by external threats.27 In the long term, such presence may deter future aggression.

Ending hostilities between Ukraine and Russia is vitally important. Without judicious, long-term security plans—and bold commitments by NATO and EU members to actualize those plans—what mechanisms guarantee an enduring peace, vice a momentary pause in conflict? According to Robert Muggah, “ common perception among . . . policy makers is that when armed conflicts come to an end, safety and security are likely to ‘return.’ ”28 The US involvement in Iraq epitomizes Muggah’s statement, continuing to serve as a 20-year case study on why long-term security planning and deliberate execution matter. Juxtaposing Iraq with Germany, Japan, and South Korea clearly shows a long-term, coalitional presence yields long-term stability and the possibility of deterrence.

 
 

Matthew J. Kukla
Colonel Matthew J. Kukla has served more than 30 years in the US Army as an enlisted servicemember and as an officer, serving on active duty and in the National Guard. His deployments include Europe, Iraq, and South Korea. His experience includes serving as a commander from the company to the brigade level and holding multiple primary staff positions. Kukla currently serves as a traditional guardsman in the state of Georgia. He holds a master of business administration and two master of arts degrees in national security and strategy.

Anna Batta
Dr. Anna Batta is an associate professor and the Benjamin Foulois Research Chair in the Department of National Security Studies at the Air War College, where she has served for the past 10 years. Batta’s teaching interests include Russian foreign policy and domestic affairs. She has published in academic journals such as Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Ethnopolitics, and Civil Wars. Batta’s most recent book is The Russian Minorities in the Former Soviet Republics: Secession, Integration, and Homeland (Routledge, 2022).

 
 

Endnotes

  1. 1. “State Partnership Program: Partner Focused, Strategically Aligned,” National Guard, n.d., accessed April 15, 2025, https://www.nationalguard.mil/Leadership/Joint-Staff/J-5/International-Affairs-Division/State-Partnership-Program/.
  2. 2. Jim Greenhill and Zach Sheely, “State Partnership Program Turns 30: A Crucial Arrow in Ukraine’s Quiver,” U.S. Department of War, July 17, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3460799/state-partnership-program-turns-30-a-crucial-arrow-in-ukraines-quiver/; and Doug G. Ware, “California Guard Troops Have Helped Ukraine Beat Russia on Battlefield, Army Official Says,” Stars and Stripes, July 13, 2023, https://www.stripes.com/theaters/us/2023-07-13/national-guard-training-california-ukraine-russia-10731519.html.
  3. 3. Greenhill and Sheely, “State Partnership Program.”
  4. 4. Matthew J. Kukla, “The Fire Ant Strategy: A Cost-Effective Approach to Taiwan’s Defense” (regional security strategy paper–East Asia, Air War College, Montgomery, AL, 2025), 1.
  5. 5. Jahara Matisek and Alexander Noyes, “How to Reform Military Advising,” Lawfare, June 29, 2025, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/how-to-reform-military-advising.
  6. 6. “Gen. Hodges: Ukraine’s Deep Strike Hits Russia’s War Core,” Kyiv Post, 2025, YouTube video, link.
  7. 7. David M. Edelstein, “Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail,” International Security 29, no. 1 (Summer 2004): 49–91, 83.
  8. 8. Joel D. Rayburn and Frank K. Sobchak, eds., The U.S. Army in the Iraq War, vol. 1, Invasion/ Insurgency/Civil War 2003–2006 (Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press, 2019), 81, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/386/.
  9. 9. Stuart W. Bowen Jr., “No More Adhocracies: Reforming the Management of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations,” PRISM 3, no. 2 (2012): 3–18, 4.
  10. 10. Bowen, “No More Adhocracies,” 15.
  11. 11. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfighting, Joint Publication 1, vol. 1 (Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 2023), II-14.
  12. 12. Heather Selma Gregg, Building the Nation: Missed Opportunities in Iraq and Afghanistan (Potomac Books, 2018), 230.
  13. 13. Gregg, Building the Nation, 236.
  14. 14. Gregg, Building the Nation, 236.
  15. 15. Gregg, Building the Nation, 236.
  16. 16. Hal Brands, “Blundering into Baghdad: The Right—and Wrong—Lessons of the Iraq War,” Foreign Affairs, February 28, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/iraq-war-lessons-blundering-into-baghdad-hal-brands.
  17. 17. Edelstein, “Occupational Hazards,” 66.
  18. 18. Jay S. Bybee, Authority of the President Under Domestic and International Law to Use Military Force Against Iraq (U.S. Department of Justice, October 2002), 152.
  19. 19. Edelstein, “Occupational Hazards,” 70–71.
  20. 20. National Security Council, National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (National Security Council, November 2005), 7–8, 38.
  21. 21. Brands, “Blundering into Baghdad.”
  22. 22. International Crisis Group, Ukraine’s Most Plausible Security Guarantee Will Not Come from the U.S. (International Crisis Group, March 2025), 2.
  23. 23. Edelstein, “Occupational Hazards,” 71–72.
  24. 24. Edelstein, “Occupational Hazards,” 72.
  25. 25. Edelstein, “Occupational Hazards,” 73.
  26. 26. Matisek and Noyes, “Military Advising.”
  27. 27. Gregg, Building the Nation, 66.
  28. 28. Robert Muggah, “No Magic Bullet: A Critical Perspective on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Weapons Reduction in Post-Conflict Contexts,” The Round Table 94, no. 379 (April 2005): 239–52, 240.
 
 

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