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May 14, 2026

How Is Going to War Like Buying a Car?: The Bargaining Model of War

Richard R. Johnson
©2026 Richard R. Johnson

ABSTRACT: The bargaining model of war, a popular, yet complex international relations theory, emphasizes how nations communicate signals regarding military strength, resolve to fight, and foreign policy goals. Since the military plays a major role in communicating these signals, its leaders should understand this theory, despite its complexities. This article explains the model and its components through the used car sale bargaining process and supplements the analogy with real-world examples of international events. This article will help military and foreign policy professionals easily grasp the concepts of the model.

Keywords: bargaining, conflict, uncertainty, signaling, commitment

 

How is avoiding war like bargaining for a used car? The field of security studies encompasses several theoretical models explaining how wars occur. The bargaining model of war is one such model that continues to influence leaders and which many scholars and foreign policy analysts embrace. It views international conflict as a bargaining interaction between two nations, as each party looks for signs regarding the opponent’s intentions (goals), capabilities, and resolve.

While not unanimously embraced in international relations literature, the bargaining model is popular enough that military professionals should understand it. As will be revealed in this article, the model has relevance throughout the war-fighting process. Military and policy leaders continue to reassess whether to keep fighting to achieve their original goals or accept a less desirable outcome. Military professionals engaged in recommending policy or operational planning must understand the model. Misunderstandings can lead to poor policy decisions or the inability to translate policy into coherent operational planning. As the model is somewhat complicated and based in the language of economics, military professionals sometimes fail to understand or properly engage it. Although not a perfect analogy, this article proposes a better way to understand the model by comparing it to the process of negotiating for a used car.1

In bargaining with a used car salesperson, it would appear the purpose of the negotiation is to determine the car’s fair value, but the real situation is far different. The buyer and seller have competing goals. The buyer’s goal is to obtain the vehicle for the lowest cost possible while avoiding paying more than the vehicle is worth. The salesperson’s goal is the opposite—to sell the vehicle at the highest price possible, knowing the vehicle’s true condition and the absolute lowest price the company will accept. As they pursue their respective goals, the buyer and the salesperson use arguments to support their offers and counteroffers and can even threaten to walk away from the deal. The worst outcome for both parties, however, is a failed sale. The worst outcome for competing nations is war—then both sides have lost the peace.

In the realm of international relations, nations pursue self-interested goals that sometimes place them at risk of war with other nations. When diplomatic efforts fail to make progress toward achieving the nation’s goals, a nation can modify its goals or go to war. War, however, can prove costly for both parties in terms of lives and money. For the loser, war may cost that nation everything. When pursuing a foreign policy agenda against another nation while trying to avoid war, the initiating nation must consider its capabilities, preferences (goals), and resolve. Is the nation militarily capable of defeating its opponent if war results? Are the nation’s goals important enough to go to war over? Does the nation have sufficient political resolve to stick it out all the way to victory? These questions are like the used car buyer asking: How much can I afford to spend? Can I talk the salesperson down to the price I want? How committed am I to that price? Am I willing to bargain as long as it takes?

Nevertheless, uncertainty exists in this bargaining process as both sides try to conceal their true capabilities, preferences, and resolve. Just as the buyer cannot know for sure the lowest price the salesperson is willing to accept, it is rarely clear whether the attacking nation can truly defeat its opponent. Afghanistan for NATO and the Soviet Union and Vietnam for France and the United States are reminders that winning is rarely assured. A buyer is never sure how long the salesperson is willing to haggle before giving in, and a buyer does not know if the salesperson is willing to compromise in other ways, such as accepting a smaller down payment or throwing in free oil changes and car washes for a year. Likewise, nations considering war never know how long the opponent will stand its ground or its willingness to make concessions to avoid war.2

The buyer and car dealer look for signals, such as nonverbal cues, online reviews of the dealership, the Kelley Blue Book value of the car, the buyer’s current employment, and the buyer’s credit score as clues to reduce their uncertainty, just as nations look at various signals (especially intelligence information) to size up their opponent’s capabilities, preferences, and resolve. Ultimately, the final agreed-upon price reveals the truth about what price the salesperson and buyer were both willing to accept. In the same way, the outcome of the negotiations (or the war if war results) reveals the truth about the opposing nations’ military capabilities, political preferences, and resolve.

The Model’s Origins

In the 1960s, RAND economist Thomas Schelling posited the bargaining model of war when he suggested that the marketplace bargaining process is a better way of understanding the competition of war. Schelling proposed that states go to war when negotiations fail, partly because the states disagreed about the true capabilities of their opponents, just as buyers and sellers disagree about the price of wares. The nation initiating the war believes it can achieve its political goals using force, which may or may not be correct. Uncertainty exists until actual combat takes place, and even then, the uncertainty may not be fully resolved. Actual battle reduces uncertainty by revealing each nation’s actual combat capabilities and resolve. Once nations reveal their actual fighting capabilities, they can better assess how likely they are to achieve their original political goals, often causing the nations to reassess these political goals and make compromises.3

Later scholars emphasized how the balance of power between nations (and how nations signal that power) influenced the likelihood of war. Nations with clear superiority in military might and resolve are those more likely to experience cooperation and compromise from their militarily weaker opponents. Political scientist James D. Fearon formalized the bargaining model of war in the 1990s. He expanded Schelling’s ideas and formally identified three important elements of the bargaining process: uncertainty, the commitment problem, and an indivisible goal. Fearon also highlighted the importance of signaling and how each nation tries to communicate to potential opponents through signaling activities.4

Explaining the Bargaining Model of War

The bargaining model of war posits that entities (usually nations, but also non-state actors such as guerrillas or terrorists) threaten organized violence to maximize their political gains and minimize losses. The model views warfare as an alternative bargaining process when diplomacy fails between the two opponents over political issues, such as control of the government, a change in a government’s policy, or the control of a piece of geography. The model attempts to explain why nations might select war over other foreign policy options (such as economic leverage, sanctions, or diplomatic negotiation), realizing that war is often the most costly option for both parties. The consequences of war include psychological trauma, physical injuries, and the deaths of soldiers and civilians. War incurs economic costs including paying for troops, weapons, and munitions, as well as seized or destroyed resources. Many wars contribute to the spread of disease, the displacement of populations, and starvation due to food chain disruptions. Damage to the natural environment and industrial infrastructure can also lead to ecological damage.5

According to the bargaining model, war ultimately results from a high level of uncertainty between the actors. The process of fighting the war is the means of removing uncertainty about who might win and allowing the actors to readjust their goals in light of the reality. For example, a nation may believe it will easily defeat its opponent, but actually engaging in combat may reveal this was incorrect. The first of the three elements in Fearon’s bargaining model, uncertainty, deals with the opposing nation’s capabilities, preferences, and resolve to stand its ground. A car buyer’s uncertainty may lead to demanding a price lower than the car salesperson will accept, leading to a failure to obtain that car. Likewise, uncertainty may lead to a nation pursuing an aggressive foreign policy against a rival on the mistaken assumption that the targeted nation is much weaker than the threatening nation. Russia’s President Vladimir Putin made this miscalculation when invading Ukraine in 2022.6

The second element is the commitment problem. National leaders may commit to peace with an opposing nation at one point, but when conditions change—such as the military power balance shifts in the leader’s favor, a new leader takes office, or a new dispute arises—the peace agreement may crumble. Both sides realize this fact, making it difficult to trust each other and incentivizing both sides to get all the concessions they can from the other side. In this regard, there is no direct comparison with the auto purchase analogy because of consumer protection laws and civil courts that prevent the salesperson or the buyer from failing to uphold their end of the agreement once a sales contract is signed. There is no international authority equivalent to a state civil court that can adjudicate disputes between nations with the same level of enforceable legal power, though the United Nations tries.7

The third element is whether the issue at stake is indivisible. If the salesperson is unwilling to accept a price the buyer can afford, and the buyer cannot come up in price, then this is an indivisible problem. The sale will fall through because the buyer’s and seller’s demands are incompatible. Most auto sales are divisible problems, however, and the buyer and seller will compromise until they reach an acceptable price. Likewise, since war is a rare event, most international issues are also divisible problems. In the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel, for example, the negotiations revealed that the Sinai was a divisible issue. Egypt cared most about ownership of the Sinai as its sovereign territory and its command of the approaches to the Suez Canal. Israel cared less about the desolate land of the Sinai but wanted it as a buffer zone against any future Egyptian invasions. The accords satisfied Egypt’s goal by returning possession of the Sinai to Egypt and Israel’s security goal by deploying multinational peacekeeping troops in the Sinai as a buffer zone. In contrast, for Israelis and Palestinians who rejected a two-state solution, the control of Palestine is an indivisible issue. Neither side is willing to give up on its goal of complete control of all of Palestine.8

The Role of Signaling

The bargaining model suggests the primary cause of war is a high level of uncertainty between actors in a dispute over an indivisible issue. To reduce uncertainty, both sides seek clues—which the model calls signals—that can reveal the opposing side’s capabilities, preferences, and resolve. The car buyer may look up the Kelley Blue Book estimate of the car’s value, check the mileage, and look for condition issues on the vehicle to determine its appropriate price. The salesperson can point to the outward appearance and features of the car to support a higher price. The salesperson may also look for signals about the buyer’s ability to pay a higher price, such as verifying the buyer’s employment and credit score. Likewise, when the clouds of war are forming between two nations, these nations seek signals of their opponent’s military capability, preferences, and resolve through reconnaissance and espionage. How strong and ready is the opponent’s military? Are they trying to form defensive alliances or seeking military aid from other nations? Do the government and public appear united in their support for war, or are there strong debates and large protests against the possibility of war? Have diplomatic communiques been intercepted that reveal the government is secretly willing to compromise on its demands? These are some of the signals that nations use to reduce uncertainty about their potential opponents’ capabilities, preferences, and resolve.9

Nations also realize that potential opponents are also looking for such signals and, therefore, have an incentive to produce false signals. The car seller may try to hide known condition flaws on the vehicle, illegally roll back the odometer, or claim another buyer is interested in the car to establish a higher price. The buyer may intentionally dress in shabby clothes and arrive in a dilapidated vehicle to mask the buyer’s true income level. A nation may try to exaggerate its military capabilities by mobilizing its reserve troops, displaying its military equipment, or hinting that it has weapons systems it may not really possess, such as chemical or nuclear weapons, to deter a potential attacker or coerce an opponent into cooperating.10

During the 1950s, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev cut defense spending, diverting funds to housing, education, and agriculture. At the same time, he ramped up his aggressive rhetoric against the West. Khrushchev claimed the Soviet Union was producing strategic bombers and intercontinental missiles at a feverish pace to conceal the Soviet Union’s military weaknesses. Alternatively, a nation planning an invasion may try to conceal its military force buildup to launch a surprise attack, as Nazi Germany did when it invaded Poland in 1939 and Denmark and Norway in 1940. The Nazi regime maintained the appearance of diplomacy while secretly stockpiling munitions and marshaling invasion forces at night and under forest cover. The incentives to engage in false signaling to strengthen one’s position severely hamstrings nations when they attempt to present honest signals. Is a nation truly willing to negotiate in good faith? This dilemma complicated the decades of nuclear arms limitations talks between the United States and the Soviet Union.11

Fearon identified two costly types of signals that nations might employ. He called the first “tying hands,” which occurs when a state threatens military intervention if their opposition crosses a certain threshold. Once that line is crossed, they must follow through when challenged or lose face at home and abroad. Perhaps the car buyer has agreed to purchase a specific car for a loved one; when faced with the embarrassment of coming home empty-handed, the buyer may be motivated to pay a higher price than planned. One foreign policy example is when President Barack Obama stated in a 2012 speech about chemical weapons in the Syrian Civil War, “a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized.” On the one-year anniversary of that speech, Syrian forces conducted a chemical weapons attack on the village of Ghouta, killing hundreds of civilians. Despite his earlier “red line” comment being perceived by many as a threat of military action, Obama took no military action against Syria in response to the chemical weapons attack. Some claim this inaction caused the administration to appear weak to the American public and other nations, contributing to Syria using chemical weapons yet again against civilians in 2017. This time the United States responded with a large cruise missile attack on the airfield that launched the chemical attack. Once leaders transmit signals committing to a certain course of action, they lose credibility if they fail to follow through.12

The second type of costly signaling Fearon identified involved “sunk costs” that make it psychologically difficult for a leader to back down. The more time the buyer has spent dreaming about owning this vehicle or haggling over the price, the more difficult it may be for the potential buyer to walk away from the negotiation. For example, it is financially costly to activate reserve troops, and once activated, military and political leadership cannot recover that money, at which point said leaders may be reluctant to make major compromises to avoid war. The enormous US investment in lives and money in South Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan made it difficult for American leaders to justify withdrawing from these wars without a clear victory, thus dragging out the lengths of these conflicts. Fearon suggested that the negative political repercussions for leaders are greater when backing down from hand-tying circumstances than backing away from sunk-cost situations, but both hurt a nation’s ability to signal resolve.13

As if exchanging real and false signals were not complicated enough, people and organizations always interpret signals through the filter of their own biases. The car buyer, perhaps based on experience or incorrect beliefs about the car market, may think they can wear a salesperson down to a lower price than the seller can ever accept. Perhaps the salesperson the buyer encounters today has already exceeded the monthly profit quota and wants to go home on time. This salesperson is uninterested in a drawn-out negotiation and is willing to walk away from any unreasonable deal, but the buyer mistakes this behavior as part of the bargaining game.14

Likewise, intelligence analysts may misinterpret an adversary’s benign unit movements as a sign of hostility or a shift in strategy. For example, in the United States, base closing and realignment decisions are governed less by grand strategy and more by local politics, with legislators protecting the economic interests of the districts they represent. Intelligence analysts in highly autocratic nations would struggle to grasp such a bureaucratic process, misinterpreting this reassignment of air or ground units as an intentional signal to America’s potential adversaries.

A famous example of misinterpreted signals occurred in July 1990 between Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and the US Ambassador to Iraq April Glaspie. In a meeting with Hussein and Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, Glaspie noted the buildup of Iraqi forces along the border of Kuwait and inquired about Iraq’s intentions. The Iraqi leaders responded with complaints about Kuwait’s demands to repay money Kuwait loaned to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War. In the context of this discussion, Glaspie reportedly said, “We have no opinion on your Arab-Arab conflicts, such as your dispute with Kuwait,” and “the Kuwait issue is not associated with America.” Glaspie believed her comments conveyed that the United States was unwilling to mediate the dispute, preferring that an Arab nation fulfill the role of mediator. The Iraqi leaders, however, interpreted these comments as a signal that the United States would not intervene in an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.15

Further Refinements

Since Fearon’s original work, other scholars have added to the bargaining model of war. Many have claimed it is harder for democracies to conceal or fake their resolve; because of the freedoms of speech and press and the public debate in democratic governments, it is clear to outsiders whether the nation is unified or divided about going to war. The North Vietnamese and Vietcong were aware of the weakening US resolve in Southeast Asia, as evidenced by large-scale antiwar protests, heated debates in Congress, and presidential candidates running on platforms for a quick end to the war in Vietnam. The North Vietnamese exploited this weakening resolve through propaganda and at the negotiation table.16

Leaders in democracies must appear responsive to the will of the people, so if there is significant resistance to going to war, democratic leaders will likely be more hesitant to choose war. This argument suggests that dictators do not have these concerns about the will of the people and do not permit protests against national policies. This point is debatable as even dictators have powerful constituent groups they must keep satisfied (such as the military, religious leaders, or other elites). Nevertheless, proponents of the model argue that the true resolve of democracies is easier to estimate. This ability to determine the true resolve of the other party would be equivalent to a scenario where the car salesperson overheard a discussion between the buyer and the buyer’s spouse about how expensive a car they can afford.17

Some research has revealed that third-party mediators can reduce the potential for war by creating an opportunity for the nations in dispute to display their signals regarding capabilities, preferences, and resolve, with the mediator determining the authenticity of each side’s signals. Peacekeeping troops can help ensure that a ceasefire remains in place, while weapons inspectors can verify if parties have disarmed in the manner they agreed on. Through these mechanisms, some suggest international organizations such as the United Nations, the European Union, or the African Union have reduced the frequency and severity of interstate wars. Obviously, there is no equivalent in the car-buying analogy. Regardless, it makes sense that if a neutral arbiter were to mediate the bargaining process, there would be more confidence for the buyer that the car deal was fair.18

Other scholars have claimed that agreements between states to respect each other’s sovereignty or interests are subject to constant change. Political scientist Wagner Harrison argued that constant fluctuations in incentives, expectations, and the balance of military capabilities within the international system change the conditions of pre-existing international agreements. These changes in the conditions of pre-existing agreements are part of the commitment problem Fearon noted. A weakened Germany, for example, accepted punitive conditions in the Treaty of Versailles that ended World War I in 1919. By 1939, Germany had regained military and economic dominance in Europe. A reinvigorated Germany rejected the treaty conditions and began to assert its power on the rest of Europe. Political scientist Robert Powell also identified commitment problems caused by large and rapid shifts in the distribution of power. In his view, the fundamental cause of wars is that actors cannot credibly commit to abide by any agreement in a shifting international scene. Powell also argued that bargaining over indivisible issues is a form of commitment problem, as it prevented actors from reaching a bargain.19

Criticisms of the Model

Scholars and analysts disagree over the model’s validity. While many scholars and policymakers embrace the model, many others do not. One illustration of this contention is the disagreement over whether the model explains the US involvement in the Vietnam War. Political scientist John Garofano maintained that the bargaining model of war did not explain the escalation of the Vietnam War. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara believed he was using the bargaining model, sending signals intended as threats to manipulate the communists. The North Vietnamese, however, misinterpreted these signals of restraint and warnings as signs of weakness. The goal of the North Vietnamese was an indivisible issue—a unified Vietnam—and their resolve was extremely high. According to Garofano, no manner of signals would have resolved the conflict short of total war to topple the Hanoi regime.20

Other scholars, such as Dan Reiter and Fearon, have argued that the Vietnam War was a perfect example of the model at work. They contend that the war illustrated the effects of misjudging an opponent’s resolve, sending and misinterpreting signals due to each side’s biases, the influence of casualties on public resolve for democracies, and the influence of sunk costs on the unwillingness to compromise without risk of domestic political damage. Reiter also claimed that the outcome was divisible since the United States and North Vietnam compromised to achieve the 1973 Paris Peace Accords, with the final fall of South Vietnam in 1975 illustrating the commitment problem. Once the United States was no longer politically able to aid South Vietnam, the conditions that prompted the peace accords changed.21

Harry G. Summers, in his classic work On Strategy, revealed that McNamara and his advisers were exercising a different model of strategy than US generals were trained to employ. While the McNamara team of game-theory analysts focused on bargaining with the North Vietnamese leadership via threats and incremental uses of force, their incrementalist strategies directly contradicted the strategies and tactics upon which the US military was designed. General William Westmoreland, his battlefield commanders, and most of the units they commanded had been trained and equipped to fight a large-scale conventional war against a peer nation. They were not designed for use in an incremental way or for using limited violent force purely as a political signal. Some might say the military still has not fully addressed this issue, as the use of limited drone strikes without a declaration of war are common today.22

Political scientist Jonathan Kirshner noted that the failure of the model to predict wars was due to analysts and leaders interpreting the same signals differently. Even when examining past decisions to go to war, scholars David Lake and Joshua Kertzer observed that we can never know what the various leaders were thinking and what information influenced their decisions and in what way. Hein Goemans and Lake also question whether national decisions to compromise or go to war result from the leaders’ aims or the will of the people. Finally, Max Gallop revealed that international disputes involving only two parties in the last century rarely occurred. He exposed a need for the model to incorporate multiplayer bargaining involving more than two actor nations.23

Erik Gartzke agreed that the model could not predict the onset of war in individual cases, largely because of the uncertainty and mistaken interpretations of the signs in any international dispute. Conversely, he defended the bargaining model as useful for thinking probabilistically about international conflict because it points to the necessary conditions for war. In other words, the theory can reveal when the likelihood of war is high or low—providing the international community with an opportunity to try to defuse the situation—but it cannot determine with surety if or when war will break out.24

Powell suggested that the bargaining model does not explain prolonged wars. He argued that if uncertainty about each nation’s military capabilities, preferences, and resolve are supposed to dissipate once combat is engaged, then war should end quickly. Alex Weisiger made the counterargument that prolonged wars are explained by commitment problems and false signals when one nation believes that the other will not agree to any bargain, especially if that nation keeps claiming a willingness to fight to the end. Likewise, Goemans proposed that prolonged wars occur because nations still have incentives to misrepresent their capabilities and resolve even while at war. Deception is a part of military strategy and concealing waning capabilities or resolve bolsters one’s position at the negotiation table.25

Conclusion

While the bargaining model may not precisely predict war, many international relations scholars and leaders believe in its validity and have incorporated it into policy and strategic planning. Therefore, military leaders must understand the model since they transmit signals to opponents and attempt to decipher the signals the opposition sends. Thinking of the difficult-to-grasp bargaining model of war in terms of bargaining over a car can clarify the model. A buyer and seller come together in a landscape of uncertainty about a car’s actual value and transmit and interpret signals to improve their bargaining position vis-à-vis their opponent. If the participants cannot agree on a price, they may reject the deal based on the sunk costs they have already dedicated to the process or prior pledges they have made to others about obtaining or selling the car. If both parties compromise on their price expectations, a sale can occur (or war can be averted). If one or both parties remain unreasonable in their demands and inflexible toward compromise, the deal will fail—the equivalent of war.26

In short, one way to improve the understanding of this model is to view it through the lens of a car sale. Professional military education courses can use this article and the car sale analogy to help mid-career and senior military leaders better grasp the model. The analogy may also help undergraduate and graduate students of international relations programs at civilian universities better understand the model. Since most university students do not frame common concepts in economic terms or view their daily behaviors as ways to signal to others, this analogy can help them grasp the model’s unfamiliar concepts. Finally, those in the intelligence and foreign policy communities that use the model as a framework for policy can use this article and analogy to explain their reasoning to politicians and other policymakers.

 
 

Richard R. Johnson
Richard R. Johnson is currently pursuing a second doctorate in international security studies at Kansas State University while working as an adjunct professor in security studies at East Carolina University. After earning his first PhD in criminal justice from the University of Cincinnati, he worked as a professor of criminal justice at the University of Toledo and the University of Michigan. He was also a reservist in the Army National Guard and Air National Guard (including global war on terrorism active-duty service).

 
 

Endnotes

  1. 1. Dan Reiter, “Exploring the Bargaining Model of War,” Perspectives on Politics 1, no. 1 (March 2003): 27–43.
  2. 2. Lester W. Grau, The Bear Went over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan (Routledge, 2012); Carter Malkasian, The American War in Afghanistan: A History (Oxford University Press, 2021); and Andrew Wiest, The Vietnam War 1956–1975 (Routledge, 2003).
  3. 3. Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Harvard University Press, 1963), 5.
  4. 4. James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49, no. 3 (Summer 1995): 379–414; and James D. Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, no. 1 (February 1997): 68–90.
  5. 5. R. Srinivasa Murthy and Rashmi Lakshminarayana, “Mental Health Consequences of War: A Brief Review of Research Findings,” World Psychiatry 5, no. 1 (February 2006): 25–30; Arthur A. Stein and Bruce M. Russett, “Evaluating War: Outcomes and Consequences,” Handbook of Political Conflict: Theory and Research, ed. Thomas R. Gurr (The Free Press, 1980), 400–402, 409; and Jay E. Austin and Carl E. Bruch, “Introduction,” The Environmental Consequences of War: Legal, Economic, and Scientific Perspectives, ed. Jay E. Austin and Carl E. Bruch (Cambridge University Press, 2000), 1–10.
  6. 6. Reiter, “Bargaining Model”; Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations,” 379–414; and Bryan Frederick et al., Escalation in the War in Ukraine: Lessons Learned and Risks for the Future (RAND Corporation, 2023), 12, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA2800/RRA2807-1/RAND_RRA2807-1.pdf.
  7. 7. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations,” 379–414.
  8. 8. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations,” 379–414; William B. Quandt, Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics (Brookings Institution Press, 2016), 244–64; and Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents, 9th ed. (Bedford-St. Martins, 2017), 349–354.
  9. 9. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations”; and Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy.”
  10. 10. Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy.”
  11. 11. Sergei Khrushchev, “The Military-Industrial Complex, 1953–1964,” in Nikita Khrushchev, ed. William Taubman et al. (Yale University Press, 2000), 242, 255–60; Jack Greene and Alessandro Massignani, Hitler Strikes North: The Nazi Invasion of Norway and Denmark, 9 April 1940 (Frontline Books, 2013), 126–50; and Richard Hargreaves, Blitzkrieg Unleashed: The German Invasion of Poland 1939 (Stackpole Books, 2010), 58–90.
  12. 12. Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy,” 68–90; Peter Baker et al., “Off-the-Cuff Obama Line Put U.S. in Bind on Syria,” The New York Times, May 4, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/world/middleeast /obamas-vow-on-chemical-weapons-puts-him-in-tough-spot.html?_r=1&; Joby Warrick, Red Line: The Unraveling of Syria and America’s Race to Destroy the Most Dangerous Arsenal in the World (Anchor Books, 2022), 104–6, 276; and Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy.”
  13. 13. Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy”; Kenneth J. Campbell, Tale of Two Quagmires: Iraq, Vietnam, and the Hard Lessons of War (Routledge, 2015): 6–9; Malkasian, American War; and Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy.”
  14. 14. Jonathan Kirshner, “Rationalist Explanations for War?,” Security Studies 10, no. 1 (Autumn 2000): 143–50.
  15. 15. William Thomas Allison, The Gulf War, 1990–91 (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2012), 42–43.
  16. 16. Richard C. Eichenberg, “Victory Has Many Friends: U.S. Public Opinion and the Use of Military Force,1981–2005,” International Security 30, no.1 (Summer 2005): 140–77; James D. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” The American Political Science Review 88, no. 3 (September 1994): 577–92; Pierre Asselin, A Bitter Peace: Washington, Hanoi, and the Making of the Paris Agreement (University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 30–41; and Melvin Small, “Influencing the Decision Makers: The Vietnam Experience,” Journal of Peace Research 24, no. 2 (1987): 185–98.
  17. 17. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences.”
  18. 18. Andrew H. Kydd, “When Can Mediators Build Trust?,” American Political Science Review 100, no. 3 (August 2006): 449–62; Scott D. Pauls and Skyler J. Cranmer, “Affinity Communities in United Nations Voting: Implications for Democracy, Cooperation, and Conflict,” Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 484 (October 2017): 438–38; and Barbara F. Walter et al., “The Extraordinary Relationship Between Peacekeeping and Peace,” British Journal of Political Science 51, no. 4 (November 2020): 1706–12.
  19. 19. Richard J. Overy, The Origins of the Second World War, 3rd ed. (Routledge, 2014); and Robert Powell, “War as a Commitment Problem,” International Organization 60, no. 1 (2006): 169–203.
  20. 20. John Garofano, “Tragedy or Choice in Vietnam? Learning to Think Outside the Archival Box: A Review Essay,” International Security 26, no. 4 (Spring 2002): 166.
  21. 21. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences”; Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy,” 68–90; and Reiter, “Bargaining Model of War.”
  22. 22. Harry G. Summers Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Presidio Press, 1982), 1–22.
  23. 23. Kirshner, “Rationalist Explanations”; Joshua D. Kertzer, Resolve in International Politics (Princeton University Press, 2016), 33–35; David A. Lake, “Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist Explanations of the Iraq War,” International Security 35, no. 3 (Winter 2010/11): 8–10; H. E. Goemans, War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First World War (Princeton University Press, 2000); and Max Gallop, “More Dangerous Than Dyads: How a Third Party Enables Rationalist Explanations for War,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 29, no. 3 (July 2017): 353–81.
  24. 24. Erik Gartzke, “War Is in the Error Term,” International Organization 53, no. 3 (Summer 1999): 567–87.
  25. 25. Gartzke, “Error Term,” 567–87; Powell, “Commitment Problem”; Alex Weisiger, Logics of War: Explanations for Limited and Unlimited Conflicts (Cornell University Press, 2013); and Goemans, War and Punishment, 1–30.
  26. 26. Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, Causes of War (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 63–70.
 
 

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