Rethinking Power: E. H. Carr’s Enduring Lessons for Modern Strategists

Brian J. Hasse
©2026 Brian J. Hasse

ABSTRACT: This article argues E. H. Carr’s classic conception of power provides enduring lessons for national security, but these lessons are easily lost in application. Unlike much of the existing literature, this article emphasizes how modern conceptions of power convey an illusion of balance, while the national security bureaucracy constrains the effective synchronization of power. The analysis leverages both historical and contemporary case studies to identify what a balanced conception of power looks like in practice, with the hope of informing US national security strategy and policy in today’s complex security environment.

Keywords: E. H. Carr, power, balance, integration, DIME (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic)

President John F. Kennedy was grappling with his first major foreign policy decision in April 1961. A year earlier, Fidel Castro’s regime had formally aligned with the Soviet Union against the United States, and Washington viewed this development as an imminent threat to national security.¹ The historical account given by Richard Neustadt and Ernest R. May outlines three primary options considered by Kennedy’s staff: (1) diplomatic and economic pressure only, (2) covert action, and (3) overt military intervention. The staff discarded option one because it assessed diplomacy and economic pressure promised minimal results. Furthermore, Kennedy had explicitly stated he had no appetite for the overt military intervention of option three. Option two, covert military action, seemed to be the best compromise.² The ensuing fiasco that became known as the Bay of Pigs invasion would go down as Kennedy’s most significant foreign policy blunder.³

The original plan Kennedy inherited from President Dwight D. Eisenhower included multiple elements of power, including the use of propaganda and political pressure, but the plan’s military aspect was considered the “prime vehicle” for achieving the objectives.⁴ Despite this disposition, military leadership took a back seat to the CIA during the planning process.⁵ Moreover, Kennedy chose not to leverage the full power of the US military and stripped the plan of its protective features, most notably air support for the invasion force.⁶ Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson was called upon by Kennedy for consultation and had thought the plan preposterous from the beginning. In a letter to his former boss, President Harry S. Truman, Acheson wrote, “Mere inertia of the Eisenhower plan carried it to execution. All that the present administration did was to take out of it those elements of strength essential to its success.”⁷ Acheson’s comments illuminate the incredible power and responsibility presidents inherit from their predecessors. Moreover, the comments reflect an enduring lesson from E. H. Carr—power is most effective when balanced.

Carr was a British historian, diplomat, and professor of international politics.⁸ In his seminal work, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations, Carr distinguished three categories of political power: military power, economic power, and the power over opinion. Carr ascribed a measure of “supreme importance” to the military instrument of power, contending “the ultima ratio of power in international relations is war.”⁹ But, he was quick to highlight the symbiosis between war and the economic instrument, contending the economic arm could be, at times, “an equal, if not a superior, partner.”¹⁰ Finally, Carr referred to the third leg of power as the “power over opinion,” referring to the ability to shape the political narrative, which he termed “propaganda,” in both the domestic and international arenas.¹¹ Again, Carr ascribed a supreme quality to this form of power but concluded the power over opinion is rendered ineffective unless it “becomes linked with military and economic power.”¹² In short, Carr deemed the isolated use of the elements of power to be a sterile enterprise, contending, “In its essence, power is an indivisible whole.”¹³

Modern conceptions of power, however, often fail to realize the full potential of Carr’s wisdom. Models such as the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) framework compartmentalize power into the stovepipes of the national security bureaucracy.¹⁴ Moreover, the DIME model feeds an illusion of balance and parity among the elements of power, though in practice, those elements hold shares of power that are far from equal. On the contrary, the compartmentalization of the interagency establishment fuels bureaucratic priorities and leads to prescriptive uses of the individual instruments of power, disregarding sequencing and synchronization. Moreover, organizational processes and bureaucratic inertia drive the budgeting and resourcing of the tools of power, often leading to a deference toward the military’s capacity and competence.

This article explores why, despite repeated calls for integration and whole-of-government approaches, policymakers and practitioners consistently struggle to apply Carr’s balanced notion of power. It addresses national security practitioners’ and scholars’ explicit calls for integration and whole-of-government approaches and explains why achieving a balanced application of power is so challenging, looking at cases of failure and success. The goal is to identify what a balanced conception of power looks like in practice. The article concludes with broader conceptions of integration necessary for national security moving forward. In sum, this article demonstrates that success in foreign policy is possible when national security professionals embrace Carr’s wisdom. In contrast, using the elements of power in isolation is a recipe for failure.

The Challenge of Integration

Carr’s notion of power represents an enduring challenge for the national security establishment. Former Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates has likened this challenge to a “symphony of power,” where leaders serve as maestros, masterfully orchestrating the instruments in a concert to create harmony.¹⁵ Gates contends even the most adept leaders can find this challenge formidable, especially when the collaboration of multiple agencies is required.¹⁶ National security scholar Gabriel Marcella has portrayed this collaboration as a challenge of “strategic integration,” where the interagency process should serve as the nexus for integrating the instruments of national power.¹⁷ In 2024, the Commission on the National Defense Strategy reemphasized the need for a holistic approach to national security with a resoundingly Carr-like report, advocating for the use of all instruments of national power in the nation’s defense strategy.¹⁸ Moreover, the commission emphasized the need for an integrated approach that requires departments across the government to have consistent priorities.¹⁹

With so much emphasis on integration, why does it prove so challenging in execution? One reason is the compartmentalization of power in practice evident in the DIME model’s visualization (see table 1).²⁰ The model is not the problem as it represents a cross sectional view of policy tools that exist within the national security bureaucracy. The problem lies in the operationalization of the model. In application, the bureaucracy divides power into organizational lanes, each containing disparate resources, personnel, and expertise, which Marcella frames as functional interdependence.²¹ This compartmentalization cuts against Carr’s wisdom, and planners tend to generate policy options and courses of action within compartmented lanes. Furthermore, bureaucratic inertia can take over and lead one to assume others are completing essential tasks within their lanes of power. In effect, the nature of the bureaucracy can lead to weighted policy options that ignore Carr’s notion of balance.

These dynamics were evident in the military’s planning efforts for the Bay of Pigs invasion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff appointed a committee to assess multiple options to unseat Castro, but this effort occurred in a vacuum, without knowledge of the plans already underway. The committee outlined six alternatives: (1) economic warfare, (2) a blockade, (3) the infiltration of a guerilla force, (4) a guerilla force with US backup, (5) air and naval warfare with no invasion, and (6) an all-out invasion.²² The closest the military came to considering other instruments of power was in entertaining the use of economic coercion. But the committee concluded nothing short of option four (overt military power) would work.²³ In the end, Kennedy’s guidance ruling out the use of US forces rendered the committee’s report a fruitless effort.²⁴

Marcella’s architecture provides another lens through which to view the challenge of integration—the interagency process itself. From this perspective, disparate priorities are fought over in a bureaucratic “power game.”²⁵ Viewed through this lens, the interagency process resembles Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow’s governmental politics model of policy making, in which complex security issues are subjected to “pulling and hauling” among government politicians—a process that often results in compromises and suboptimal outcomes.²⁶

This perspective further explains the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion. The military took a back seat in the planning process, its advice limited by the heavy-handed influence of CIA Director Allen W. Dulles and CIA Deputy Director Richard M. Bissell Jr., who were regarded as skilled bureaucrats with “real power” and, according to some involved, “didn’t just brief us on the Cuban operation. They sold us on it.”²⁷ The Joint Chiefs of Staff deferred to the CIA because they did not view the deliberations over the invasion as a priority. The US Department of State also took a back seat in the deliberations, with Secretary of State Dean Rusk reluctant to voice concerns in public.²⁸ Additionally, Ambassador Whiting Willauer incorrectly assumed an invasion would not take place unless “the U.S. Government were prepared to do everything else needed overtly or covertly . . . in order to guarantee success.”²⁹ This deference to a single agency’s outsized influence prevented a balanced application of power by limiting outward diplomatic engagement and diminishing the strength of the military.

These interagency dynamics remain. The 2024 Commission on the National Defense Strategy identified the core issue of prioritization, but its prescription was incomplete. Prioritizing efforts within government departments is not sufficient—prioritization must extend across the bureaucracy to achieve Carr’s balance. This goal remains aspirational, and a cursory review of Joint publications by the US Department of War (DoW) reveals the US military’s sense of primacy in national security affairs. Joint Force doctrine emphasizes the imperative role of the military in national security policy, even when the military supports other instruments of power. Whereas the doctrine underscores the importance of the DIME model, it eschews Carr’s requirement for balance. Instead, Joint Force doctrine advocates for the military to serve as the “primary means” when other forms of power become insufficient.³⁰ When viewed in this context, DoW doctrine reflects one of Carr’s key contentions: “Military power . . . becomes not only an instrument, but an end in itself.”³¹

Additionally, data show an increasing prevalence of military interventions in the conduct of US foreign policy. Recent research indicates the United States has undertaken almost 400 military interventions since its founding, with more than 200 occurring since World War II and more than 25 percent taking place in the post–Cold War period.³² This upward trend warrants further analysis. Why is the military given such a prominent role in foreign policy?

One argument is that the nature of the bureaucracy incentivizes the use of government departments with the highest capacities and the biggest budgets. Whereas the DIME model implies these departments are equal partners, their budgets say otherwise. The critical mass and overwhelming capacity of the Department of War generate incredible momentum, presenting an enticing option for policymakers. With more than 3.4 million employees spread across 4,800 sites in more than 160 countries, the department is easily the largest and most prolific US federal agency.³³ When combined with a proposed budget of just over $1 trillion for 2026, these capabilities make the department a formidable force.³⁴

Moreover, evidence suggests this sense of military primacy may not be exclusive to practitioners. Recent research by civil-military scholars demonstrates the military is generally regarded as a highly trustworthy and competent institution.³⁵ Peter D. Feaver’s research indicates this confidence might even reflect a higher level of public support for DoW resources and budgets.³⁶ If more support results in bigger budgets, one can easily see how national security has become primarily a DoW responsibility. If higher trust yields more capacity, this relationship creates a self-amplifying effect and makes the military a convenient first responder.

Professional opinion and the historical literature on war indicate this imbalanced approach to the military is flawed. Carl von Clausewitz framed the objectives of war as fundamentally derived from politics.³⁷ Indeed, this idea explains why Carr framed his notion of power in terms of political power.³⁸ National security professionals also share Clausewitz’s view, with former US Ambassador Stuart E. Eizenstat contending the “marriage” of diplomacy and force can serve as a model for conflict resolution.³⁹ These perspectives underscore the demand for balance and synergy among the instruments of power.

Despite this recognition, the Department of State’s budget pales in comparison to the military’s budget—a difference representing a gross imbalance of resources. From 2021 to 2025, the department’s budget ranged from just over $79 billion to a peak of just under $87 billion.⁴⁰ Compared with the military’s budget, these figures make the Department of State appear to be a second-tier player in the game of bureaucratic bargaining. Scholars such as Gordon Adams contend this institutional imbalance often leads to the “militarization” of statecraft and a diminished role for experts with a core competence in diplomacy.⁴¹ The resource imbalance creates an overreliance on military diplomacy, with trained diplomats taking a back seat in the execution of foreign policy. Evidence suggests this imbalance causes the military instrument to be misapplied to problem sets better suited to diplomacy—a misapplication that is due to the Department of War’s significant program budgets.

Two such examples include the Department of Defense’s humanitarian assistance program and the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program. In 2010–12, the US Government Accountability Office reported several incidents in the activities of the humanitarian assistance program that reflected the Department of Defense’s lack of experience in diplomacy, specifically citing a poor understanding of the cultural, economic, and political factors necessary for the program’s success. Additionally, the office heavily criticized of the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (specifically the program’s implementation in Iraq and Afghanistan), identifying gaps in project management and oversight. The core of the concerns surrounding the programs was the then–Department of Defense’s focus on quick visibility wins over the Department of State’s long-term goal of helping countries achieve viable developments.⁴² Carr might see this trade-off as a failure to balance the short-term effects of military power with the long-term value of the power over opinion.

Current trend lines indicate significant reductions in resource allocations to the Department of State are likely to continue, including significant cuts to discretionary spending.⁴³ Many diplomats and strategists feel these reductions will hinder the department’s effectiveness in diplomacy and undermine US national security over time. Others contend the reductions are needed to make foreign policy more streamlined and efficient.⁴⁴ How the dismantling of the US Agency for International Development, as well as other forms of public diplomacy, will impact national security over time remains unclear. Any trade-off that reduces the ability to leverage political power over opinion, however, will require rebalancing.

Balancing Power in Theory and Practice

Over time, the challenge of integration has become overcomplicated. Permutations of the DIME model have exacerbated the effects of the bureaucracy, expanding and rearranging its powers to cover other elements of the interagency establishment. Common extensions such as DIME-FIL (added financial, intelligence, and law enforcement) and MIDLIFE (rearranging the letters) were intended to assign more “mechanistic” qualities of the instruments of power to the interagency establishment.⁴⁵ These extensions fall victim to what Italian political scientist Giovanni Sartori described as playing “musical chairs” with words.⁴⁶ To Sartori, as well as scholars such as John Gerring, seemingly subtle changes to concepts’ lexicons can stretch the concepts beyond their intended value.⁴⁷ This stretching of models fuels the illusion that a blueprint exists for solving national security problems.

American policy has also made more formalized attempts at integration, including through the concept of “integrated deterrence,” introduced in 2022.⁴⁸ Integrated deterrence was intended to address strategic integration by increasing collaboration among agencies, allies, and partners and enabling a cohesive, whole-of-government approach to deterrent strategy.⁴⁹ The concept, however, has also been subject to vigorous scrutiny. Some scholars have argued integrated deterrence lacks the clarity required for effective operationalization.⁵⁰ Others have contended the concept shows little progress toward practical application.⁵¹ At its core, integrated deterrence exemplifies the problem of conceptual overextension.

Indeed, one reason for the timelessness of Carr’s model is its parsimony. For national security practitioners, simplicity and accessibility are essential to cultivating the “shared understanding” championed throughout US Joint Force doctrine.⁵² Moreover, the bureaucratic limitations that come with operationalizing the DIME model can be overcome when practitioners embrace Carr’s wisdom and develop strategies that keep the model’s components in balance, which begins with recognizing what successful applications of the model look like in theory and practice.

Classic theories of coercion provide a useful starting point. Thomas C. Schelling contended coercion is simply an extension of diplomacy—namely, the “diplomacy of violence.”⁵³ Schelling also recognized the critical balance between diplomacy and force, arguing the threat of military force should be used to avoid conflict through accommodation. Schelling believed military force was most effective “when held in reserve.”⁵⁴ Carr, too, framed a state’s power to wage war “not as a desirable weapon, but as a weapon which [the state] may require in the last resort to use.”⁵⁵ Blending these ideas reveals how the tenets of coercive diplomacy rely on Carr’s balanced conception of power.

Table 1 demonstrates how DIME instruments might be optimized for coercive diplomacy when Carr’s lessons of power are incorporated. Diplomacy and information are essential prerequisites for establishing the credible threat of force that underwrites deterrence. For example, an increased force posture can signal a credible threat through various methods, such as formal diplomatic exchanges, back channels, or even public press releases. Table 1 reveals various military and economic instruments the United States can leverage as forms of avoidable punishment. Indeed, the DIME model can be effective when guided by Carr’s conception of balance.

Finding examples of the application of DIME instruments in practice also provides lessons for practitioners at all levels of the national security establishment. In 2023, in the wake of the October 7 attack against Israel, the United States sequenced multiple elements of power to send a credible deterrence signal. Following the attack, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin issued a public statement signaling the deployment of a second carrier strike group to the Mediterranean Sea “to deter hostile actions against Israel or any efforts toward widening this war following Hamas’s attack on Israel.”⁵⁶ Meanwhile, Secretary of State Antony Blinken traveled to Israel to pledge US support for Israel publicly.⁵⁷ Finally, days after the attack, President Joe Biden warned Iran and Hezbollah not to escalate hostilities, using public messaging: “Don’t. Don’t. Don’t. Don’t.”⁵⁸ This combination of military posturing, diplomacy, and public messaging combined key elements of coercive signaling.

These lessons extend beyond the president’s cabinet. For example, military diplomacy is an essential element of coercive diplomacy, but only when used in coordination. Senior military officers serve critical functions in quasi-diplomatic roles and, therefore, must understand the critical relationship between diplomacy and force. In Eizenstat’s account of the Balkan Wars during the 1990s, George Joulwan, former US Army general and NATO supreme allied commander, demonstrated this understanding through a cohesive strategy that combined military and political action. From Joulwan’s perspective, “you have to be able to use force in a way to bring about diplomatic solutions. [Because] you can’t just win at diplomacy without strong backup.”⁵⁹ This view is consistent with Carr’s contention about war: “War lurks in the background of international politics.”⁶⁰

Similarly, economic tools have enormous coercive power when successfully linked to other tools of power. According to Carr, economic power could be a coequal arm of power in many instances, such as in the case of Germany during World War I, in which “[t]o cripple the economic system of an enemy Power was as much a war aim as to defeat his armies and fleets.”⁶¹ As with diplomacy, however, Carr emphasized coercive economic tools could be effective only when synchronized, contending “economic power is impotent if the military weapon is not held in readiness to support it.”⁶²

The Iran nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), provides an illustrative case of coercive diplomacy that spanned multiple US administrations. Each administration had unique, coercive approaches toward curbing Iran’s nuclear program, with varying degrees of success. Taken together, these approaches construct a compelling argument for a balanced application of power.

The deal’s foundations began with a steady buildup of economic and political pressure on Iran. President Barack Obama’s administration made a concerted effort toward international diplomacy that resulted in UN resolutions for tighter sanctions. At the same time, the United States increased its military posture in the region, overtly signaling it had the power to strike Iran on short notice. In April 2012, Obama used information to signal to Iran a “last chance” for negotiations.⁶³ A breakthrough occurred when the diplomatic instrument of power was leveraged by using back channels. Steady diplomacy through these back channels resulted in an interim agreement in 2013, paving the way for the JCPOA’s ratification in July 2015.⁶⁴

Long-term, coercive success is difficult to measure, and critics of the JCPOA regarded the deal as fundamentally flawed. These critics included President Donald Trump and his first administration, who claimed the deal was “one-sided” and insufficient.⁶⁵ In 2018, Trump withdrew from the JCPOA and transitioned to a campaign of “maximum pressure,” pairing unilateral sanctions with renewed threats of military force as a compliance measure.⁶⁶ Iran then gradually reduced its compliance with the agreement’s requirements.⁶⁷ Critics of Trump’s coercive strategy have been quick to correlate this noncompliance with breaking the deal.⁶⁸ Others have contended Iran’s noncompliance reflects weak signals of US resolve and critical flaws in the deal’s diplomatic foundations.⁶⁹ Regardless of these debates, the net effect was an erosion of Iranian compliance that bled into the subsequent US administration, preventing Biden from rekindling the agreement.⁷⁰

Early in his second term, Trump chose to conduct military strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites, exuding skepticism about Iran’s “good faith” in the process of renewed negotiations.⁷¹ He again used a combination of power instruments, but in an unconventional fashion. In this version of coercive diplomacy, the president leveraged credible military threats and information through deception, executing the strikes after publicly messaging he would allow Iran more time to negotiate. Militarily, the strikes were considered an “impressive” operational success.⁷²

In essence, Obama and Trump integrated multiple elements of power in the conduct of coercive diplomacy—each with their own degrees of success. Carr’s framework, however, reveals a key distinction between the two strategies. During the initial JCPOA negotiations, the United States garnered wide support from the international community. By his own account, Obama considered buy-in from Russia and China to be an imperative.⁷³ In contrast, the international community had a mixed reaction to the ultimate use of force against Iran. Whereas US allies were relatively cautious in their response, Russia and China publicly condemned US actions.⁷⁴ In Carr’s framework, these differing reactions represent an imbalance in the power over opinion.

Moreover, the difference in strategies illuminates another critical lesson regarding balance. According to Schelling, effective coercion requires a balance between credible threats and credible assurances. Credible assurances involve balancing threats with other instruments of power to signal a willingness to show restraint if the target of coercion complies.⁷⁵ Scholars call this balancing act the “balance of coercion,” contending strategies that lack this balance are more likely to fail.⁷⁶ Some have extended this argument to the US strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites, contending the use of brute force could erode the credibility of future assurances.⁷⁷

Reid Pauly’s research illuminates the critical role assurances played in the JCPOA negotiations, also highlighting how leaders in multiple layers of the US bureaucracy were essential to these assurances. One such leader was Wendy R. Sherman, former deputy secretary of state and a lead negotiator for the JCPOA.⁷⁸ In her 2018 memoir, Sherman described how the outsized power of the United States felt like a burden during the negotiations. In Sherman’s view, “power is a complicated tool, and negotiations rarely come down to a simple calculation of who has more of it.”⁷⁹ The implication is power requires active balancing—or, in Sherman’s words, “The trick, as always, was to use power without depriving everyone else of theirs.”⁸⁰ Carr’s wisdom resonates loudly here, suggesting long-term success in solving the coercive equation with Iran will hinge on a balanced approach.

Conclusion

Carr’s balanced conception of power as an “indivisible whole” provides an enduring model for national security professionals.⁸¹ Modern constructs such as the DIME model are useful only when Carr’s wisdom is applied. Bureaucracy becomes a barrier to integration when national security professionals focus on departmental priorities and use power prescriptively and in logistical isolation. Moreover, resourcing power in a balanced fashion remains essential to avoid an overreliance on the military instrument of power.

This article shows the United States has an inconsistent track record of carrying out balanced applications of power. Examples such as the Bay of Pigs invasion and the US military’s foreign-assistance efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan underscore Carr’s lessons and demonstrate the limits of using power in isolation. Bright spots in US foreign policy exist, with contemporary applications of coercive diplomacy demonstrating what a balanced conception of power can look like in practice. These historical inconsistencies demonstrate the persistent challenge of integration and underscore the need to rethink power in the application of modern strategy.

Moving forward, national security practitioners must broaden their understandings of integration. Marcella’s concept of strategic integration does not end with synchronizing interagency or even whole-of-government efforts—exercising national power also requires whole-of-industry efforts. More than half the defense budget goes into the pockets of defense contractors and private companies that enable acquisitions and support functions across the Department of War.⁸² The inclusion of these commercial-sector equities—such as the defense industrial base, innovative technology firms, and privatized information—is essential to a broader conception of national power. Recent arguments also call for whole-of-society efforts to achieve common interests.⁸³ This approach will require all forms of power to incentivize the prioritization of national defense over private interests.

Moreover, soft-power tools can strengthen credible assurances. For example, tools such as foreign economic aid and sanctions relief can incentivize positive behavior and provide a balanced approach to foreign policy. As the world’s largest economy, the United States has a powerful arsenal of persuasive tools.⁸⁴ Combined with effective diplomacy, these tools can provide a compelling alternative to coercion by increasing cooperation and easing tensions between competitors.

To conclude, Carr’s vision of power is indeed timeless. Revisiting the example of Cuba is instructive as a closing illustration. Not long after the Bay of Pigs invasion, Kennedy faced another foreign policy dilemma when US intelligence discovered launch sites for Soviet medium-range nuclear missiles on the island.⁸⁵ The events of the ensuing 13 days are widely considered to be the closest the United States and the Soviet Union came to a nuclear exchange during the Cold War.⁸⁶ Kennedy was again presented with three options—all of them involving military force. Many of his civilian and military advisers advocated strongly for the use of force to remove the missile threat.⁸⁷ As Kennedy wrestled with his decision, a sense of moral accountability weighed on him. During the crisis, he confided in his brother Robert F. Kennedy, telling him, “If anybody is around to write after this, they are going to understand that we made every effort to find peace and every effort to give our adversary room to move.”⁸⁸ The president ultimately chose a balanced approach, opting for a naval quarantine, covert diplomatic engagement, and carefully measured signals of military resolve. This balanced application of power paved the way for a peaceful resolution of the crisis, preventing the serious threat of nuclear war.

Author’s Note
I offer my sincere gratitude to my colleagues at the US Naval War College who helped me formulate my ideas and gave me a place to test them. A special thanks to Derek Reveron, Nikolas Gvosdev, Dan Post, Andy Stigler, and Joe Stieb who, along with two anonymous reviewers, provided essential feedback to early drafts of this article.

Brian J. Hasse
Brian J. Hasse is a naval aviator and military professor of national security affairs at the US Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. His research examines the political psychology of power, coercion, and national security decision making.

Endnotes

1. 1. Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers (The Free Press, 1986), 141.
2. 2. Neustadt and May, Thinking in Time, 146.
3. 3. David M. Barrett, “The Bay of Pigs Fiasco and the Kennedy Administration’s Off-the-Record Briefings for Journalists,” Journal of Cold War Studies 21, no. 2 (Spring 2019): 3.
4. 4. Richard M. Bissell Jr., Reflections of a Cold Warrior: From Yalta to the Bay of Pigs (Yale University Press, 1996), 153.
5. 5. Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, “Anatomy of a Failure: The Decision to Land at the Bay of Pigs,” Political Science Quarterly 99, no. 3 (Fall 1984): 477.
6. 6. Neustadt and May, Thinking in Time, 146.
7. 7. Douglas Brinkley, Dean Acheson: The Cold War Years, 1953–71 (Yale University Press, 1992), 128.
8. 8. Edward Hallett Carr, “A Note About the Author,” in What Is History? (Alfred A. Knopf, 1962).
9. 9. Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1939), 108–9.
10. 10. Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, 116.
11. 11. Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, 134–35.
12. 12. Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, 139–40.
13. 13. Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, 108.
14. 14. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Warfighting, Joint Publication 1, Volume 1 (JCS, August 2023), I-3.
15. 15. Robert M. Gates, “The Symphony of Power,” in Exercise of Power: American Failures, Successes, and a New Path Forward in the Post–Cold War World (Alfred A. Knopf, 2020), 13–57.
16. 16. Gates, Exercise of Power, 56.
17. 17. Gabriel Marcella, “National Security and the Interagency Process,” in U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy, ed. J. Boone Bartholomees (Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press, 2004), 239, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/85/.
18. 18. Jane Harman et al., Commission on the National Defense Strategy (Commission on the National Defense Strategy, July 2024), vi.
19. 19. Harman et al., Commission, 16.
20. 20. Table 1 is not meant to be a definitive or all-encompassing representation of the instruments of national power, nor is it intended to be used as a deliberate planning tool. This visualization was a collaborative effort by the National Security Affairs Department at the US Naval War College to facilitate discussions of national power.
21. 21. Marcella, “National Security,” 248.
22. 22. Peter Wyden, Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story (Simon and Schuster, 1979), 87.
23. 23. Wyden, Bay of Pigs, 87.
24. 24. Neustadt and May, Thinking in Time, 143–46.
25. 25. Marcella, “National Security,” 244.
26. 26. Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc., 1999), 255–58.
27. 27. Vandenbroucke, “Anatomy of a Failure,” 481–82.
28. 28. Vandenbroucke, “Anatomy of a Failure,” 482–83.
29. 29. Bissell, Reflections, 162.
30. 30. JCS, Joint Warfighting, I-3.
31. 31. Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, 111.
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35. 35. Peter D. Feaver, Thanks for Your Service: The Causes and Consequences of Public Confidence in the US Military (Oxford University Press, 2023), 93–102; and Max Margulies and Jessica Blankshain, “Specific Sources of Trust in Generals: Individual-Level Trust in the U.S. Military,” Daedalus 151, no. 4 (Fall 2022): 254–75.
36. 36. Feaver, Thanks for Your Service, 175–201.
37. 37. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton University Press, 1976), 87.
38. 38. Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, 108.
39. 39. Stuart E. Eizenstat, “The Balkan Wars: The Marriage of Force and Diplomacy,” in The Art of Diplomacy: How American Negotiators Reached Historic Agreements That Changed the World (Rowman & Littlefield, 2024), 205.
40. 40. “Agency Profile: Department of State (DOS),” USAspending.gov, updated September 29, 2025, https://www.usaspending.gov/agency/department-of-state?fy=2025.
41. 41. Gordon Adams, “The Institutional Imbalance of American Statecraft,” in Mission Creep: The Militarization of US Foreign Policy?, ed. Gordon Adams and Shoon Murray (Georgetown University Press, 2014), 254.
42. 42. G. William Anderson and Connie Veillette, “Soldiers in Sandals,” in Adams and Murray, Mission Creep, 106–7.
43. 43. Russell T. Vought, memorandum, “Major Discretionary Funding Changes,” May 2, 2025, Washington, DC.
44. 44. Edward Wong and Michael Crowley, “Lawmakers Tell Rubio to Refrain from Mass Layoffs at State Department,” The New York Times, June 27, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/27/us/politics/state-department-rubio-layoffs.html.
45. 45. D. Robert Worley, Orchestrating the Instruments of Power: A Critical Examination of the U.S. National Security System (Potomac Books, 2015), 244.
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