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May 14, 2026

Key Themes in Sino-American History

David J. Lorenzo and Ian Murphy
©2026 Ian Murphy

ABSTRACT: This article examines how historical narratives shape the messaging of the Chinese Communist Party and the People’s Republic of China, particularly regarding Sino-American relations. It identifies three key historical themes—trade, discriminatory policies, and Taiwan—that are frequently invoked in China’s statements and information campaigns. By contextualizing these themes, the article argues that military and national security professionals need a deeper understanding of Sino-American history to interpret China’s messaging correctly and counter its influence effectively. The article advocates for the integration of Sino-American historical content into professional military education curricula to enhance strategic awareness and policy formulation.

Keywords: People’s Republic of China, Chinese Communist Party, Sino-American relations, Century of Humiliation, trade, Exclusion Acts, Taiwan, professional military education

 

Can familiarity with the history of Sino-American relations help military and national security professionals understand People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) statements and counter PRC information operations? This question is relevant because PRC leaders often explicitly reference aspects of Chinese history. Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping, for example, consciously grounds his understanding of the project of China’s “rejuvenation” in the Chinese historical construct of the Century of Humiliation. In this typical passage, Xi supplies a nationalist narrative that places Chinese history at its center:

The Chinese nation is a great nation. With a history of more than 5,000 years, China has made indelible contributions to the progress of human civilization. After the Opium War of 1840, however, China was gradually reduced to a semi-colonial, semi-feudal society and suffered greater ravages than ever before. The country endured intense humiliation, the people were subjected to great pain, and the Chinese civilization was plunged into darkness. Since that time, national rejuvenation has been the greatest dream of the Chinese people and the Chinese nation.1

Such discussions suggest it is not enough to understand CCP and PRC officials’ statements solely through the Cold War lens of communist doctrine or Marxism. The United States should also employ a historical lens that allows us to understand fully how the current CCP leadership conceptualizes its version of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.”2

Further, given the many interactions that have taken place between the United States and China in the past, we can hypothesize that the history of Sino-American relations should constitute an important part of that lens. This article reads a set of PRC and CCP statements that make historical claims in the context of three themes in Sino-American history. This reading suggests that grasping the history of Sino-American interactions is important for understanding the CCP leadership’s worldview and constructing effective counters to PRC information operations.

Theme 1: Trade

Background. From the eighteenth century onward, trade has been the cornerstone of Sino-American relations. American businessmen have been drawn to Chinese goods and China’s vast domestic market. Early American merchants gained significant wealth from the China trade, and those profits helped capitalize early US infrastructure projects and fuel the growth of American port cities.3 Notably, American businessmen have consistently taken the initiative in engaging with China by establishing connections with the Chinese population and government in the absence of formal diplomatic relations. They have persistently pursued trade despite restrictions and prohibitions imposed by both governments. Such persistence has had important policy implications for the US government, including the adoption of a policy of engagement with the PRC after the Cold War to allow access to China’s market.4

American merchants have pursued trade even when they encountered less-than-optimal market conditions, and their efforts to overcome those conditions sometimes generated unfortunate effects. While Americans sought Chinese goods in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Chinese merchants and consumers showed little interest in American goods, and American and other Western products struggled to gain traction in China. In response, European and American merchants aggressively pursued the opium trade to balance accounts. The Qing government’s opposition to that trade was met by the British government’s determined efforts to force the opium trade upon China by diplomatic and military means. The lesson subsequent Chinese governments drew is that foreigners are willing to use force to access China’s goods and markets.

This tenet is central to the Century of Humiliation construct. That era of Chinese history (stretching from the 1840s through the 1940s), witnessed foreign governments’ political and military support for their merchants’ economic engagements in China, resulting in various wars, China’s subjugation, and partial dismemberment into foreign-dominated economic zones. In the aftermath of the Opium Wars, the British and French were primarily responsible for imposing the “Unequal Treaties,” on the Chinese government. Nonetheless, US actors benefited significantly from the terms of those treaties, even as the US government resisted the movement to carve China into foreign-dominated economic zones. American merchants and missionaries gained access to Chinese markets, Chinese ports, and the Chinese interior and enjoyed the privileges of extraterritoriality. Furthermore, while the US government worked to preserve the sovereignty of China through the Open Door policy at the turn of the twentieth century, it was primarily motivated by the goal of maintaining US access to China as a single market and only secondarily with a concern for preserving Chinese sovereignty.5

Relevance. Contemporary CCP portrayals of trade with the United States are rooted in these historical representations of foreign merchants in China as either supplicants or bullies. Chinese officials build narratives by referencing these portrayals when engaging outside audiences in discussions of trade. For example, at a meeting of American business representatives, following a fractious economic period, Xi commented on the allure of China’s markets, observing, “China is both a super-large economy and a super-large market . . . modernization for 1.4bn Chinese is a huge opportunity that China provides to the world.”6 The CCP’s characterization of the relative positions of the United States and the PRC during the trade disputes that occurred during the first Trump administration continued this historical narrative by emphasizing the gravity the Chinese market creates. As China scholar Xiaolin Duan observed, PRC officials explicitly assumed the “US needs China more than China needs the US.”7

The historical portrayal of outsiders as bullies also informs PRC officials’ characterizations, especially those of US attempts to address trade imbalances. Responding to US requests placed before PRC officials during trade and tariff talks in 2018, the PRC government-controlled Global Times headlined its discussion with the question, “Is it now 1840?” This historical connection infuses the entire article, culminating in the assertion that the Chinese people were outraged by the terms of the proposed agreement “[b]ecause this is an unequal treaty that bullies China as a weak country!” CCP arguments that US sanctions against the PRC are “discriminatory restrictive measures” intended to harm China and violate its sovereignty also contribute to this narrative of victimization.8

The same is true of accusations of neocolonialism that the CCP levies against the United States. These are not merely expressions of Marxist dogma but are tied directly to Xi’s description of China during the Century of Humiliation as “reduced to a semi-feudal and semi-colonial society, when bullying by foreign powers and frequent wars tore the country apart and plunged the Chinese people into an abyss of great suffering.” Chinese information campaigns routinely connect current events to this history to persuade international audiences that the US government wields trade and commerce as nationalist weapons in much the same way the great powers did during the nineteenth century. The PRC has drawn on this history to justify its rejection of US trade regulations. For instance, the PRC has portrayed the US government’s use of tariff threats to halt China from exporting fentanyl precursors as hypocritical, comparing it to the way colonial powers forced the trade in opium on China in the nineteenth century.9

The CCP’s attempts to leverage this history of economic relations seek to divert attention away from the complexities of the present (in which national economies are intertwined through trade, and a series of agreements and norms regulate economic interactions) toward a simpler narrative that has a timeless Chinese superiority at its center. In this narrative, Chinese superiority has always made its market attractive; thus, it can demand concessions for access. Chinese superiority also creates desperation on the part of trade partners; thus, those partners’ attempts to negotiate agreements that regulate Chinese economic behavior must be informed by envy, greed, and brute force. China is either an economic hegemon or a victim, depending on the context in which the CCP deploys this narrative.

We cannot displace this narrative and its uses within the CCP, nor deny that China was the subject of economic exploitation in the past. We can, however, counter CCP attempts to substitute the past for the present by clarifying the nature of the current global economy. The world is interdependent, not Sino-centric. While China forms an important part of the global economy, it does not dominate it. Further, China has grown rich and powerful largely due to trade with global partners. It has prospered because developed economies (like the United States) engaged it in mutually beneficial economic relations when the failures of Mao’s economic policies left it underdeveloped. China is not a victim in the current global economy; rather, it is an important beneficiary of current economic relations.

Theme 2: Discriminatory Policies and Human Rights

Background. From 1840 to 1880, thousands of Chinese men migrated to the United States. Like other first-generation immigrants, they were not quick to assimilate, nor did local communities accept them. While American missionaries in China preached the equality of humans, racial views and policies in the United States burdened Chinese residents. Accusations that they rejected Christianity and democracy, posed health and safety threats, engaged in numerous vices, and possessed innate criminal tendencies generated hostile reactions. Unions charged them with undercutting the wages of White workers and attacked them as tools of big capital. Locally, they were the targets of racist legislation, discriminatory law enforcement, and violence by disempowered White ethnic groups.10

In response, Qing officials defended migrants and migration. One result was the transactional Burlingame-Seward Treaty of 1868, which connected the US business community’s desire for access to the Chinese market with protections for Chinese people residing in the United States. In exchange for granting expanded trade opportunities, the Chinese government gained the right to appoint official consuls in American ports to assist Chinese citizens, secured the right of Chinese to migrate to, travel to and within the United States, and won most-favored-nation status for Chinese citizens resident in the United States.11

These measures, however, did little to protect Chinese immigrants at the local level. In the mid-1880s, violence against Chinese workers broke out in Wyoming; San Francisco, California; and Tacoma, Washington. The Chinese government demanded indemnities for the victims’ families, punishment of the perpetrators, effective police action to prevent future incidents, and a public apology from the president. While providing indemnities, the US government denied culpability for these events, blamed them on private citizens, and held that these were local affairs beyond the federal government’s reach.12

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Congress addressed Chinese immigration by bowing to local pressures. It passed a series of discriminatory laws: the Exclusion Acts of 1880, 1882, and 1884, the Scott Act of 1888, the Geary Act of 1892, and the Deficiency Act of 1904. These laws restricted travel to and around the United States for all Chinese immigrants except those who were well-educated or wealthy. They also imposed onerous requirements on Chinese persons already resident. Immigration officials interpreted these laws strictly. In 1880, Qing officials were forced to agree to the Angell Treaty, which conceded in principle that the United States had the right to restrict Chinese immigration. The Gresham-Yang Treaty of 1894, meanwhile, gave Qing sanction to the specific US policy (implemented in the previous Exclusion Acts) which prohibited the entry of Chinese laborers into the United States. Popular outrage in China over these and associated measures grew as these immigration rules were enforced on the US mainland, Hawaii, and the Philippines. That outrage contributed to a growing Chinese nationalism and led to a mass boycott of US goods from 1905 to 1906.13

Relevance. The PRC’s information activities are rife with references to these discriminatory policies, especially its information activities that address human rights. American criticisms of the PRC’s human rights record are met and rejected with references to the US record. The US government, PRC officials argue, “[turns] a blind eye to the systematic violation of the human rights of its own people.” News publications in the PRC connect domestic incidents of discrimination against people of Chinese origin in the United States, with unpopular American policies directed at the PRC. The PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs routinely references the history of discrimination against Asians in the United States to blunt US claims to leadership in the realm of human rights. Charges of US double standards also inform PRC calls for discarding concepts of universal human rights as they pertain to the PRC. Instead, PRC officials offer formulations of human rights grounded in Chinese culture and subordinated to understandings of Chinese sovereignty and nationalism.14

The first step in dealing with these information efforts is to acknowledge rather than to deny the reality of past US discriminatory policies. Denial—whether as a conscious policy or the result of ignorance— only increases the effectiveness of the PRC’s weaponization of the past and erodes US credibility. The second step is to demonstrate that the past does not dictate current US policy. Statutory discrimination no longer exists in the United States, and the legal measures taken against people of Chinese origin were removed in the early 1940s.

These steps are crucial to countering PRC influence, since PRC officials now use messaging around American “anti-Chinese” discrimination as a political tool. Chinese government and government-related sources invoke the Chinese Exclusion Act to rally PRC citizens and ethnic Chinese abroad behind the PRC’s international agenda. Their immediate goal is to politicize these communities by drawing on historical grievances and to link historical racial discrimination with the specific US policies the PRC officials reject. “Anti-Chinese” messaging is further used to encourage people with Chinese heritage to engage politically with their governments to encourage increased ties to the PRC.15

American entities should counter such assertions by clarifying that disagreements with the PRC’s government are grounded in important policy differences rather than national animus. Further, US officials should continue to promote a universal conception of human rights to demonstrate the distance between current US practices and the past. They should underline the contention that any condemnation of past US policies addressing people of Chinese origin should apply equally to current PRC policies addressing the culture and status of the peoples of Xinjiang and Tibet. The United States has moved past discriminatory actions, and the PRC should as well.

Theme 3: The United States, the People’s Republic of China, and Taiwan

Background. The aftermath of World War II and the Chinese Civil War brought about complications in American-Chinese relations. Despite significant efforts, US attempts to bring together the Nationalist and Chinese Communist camps after World War II failed. Subsequent US support for the Nationalists during the resulting civil war proved insufficient to keep the latter in power while fueling CCP suspicions of American intentions. The Nationalist defeat and retreat to Taiwan made it the center of anti-CCP activities in the region. The outbreak of the Korean War increased the strategic importance of Taiwan for the Harry S. Truman administration, which made it clear that it would resist any attempt by the Communists to invade the island. The United States refused to recognize the newly established People’s Republic of China and instead continued to recognize the Nationalist’s Republic of China (ROC) regime in Taiwan. The Dwight D. Eisenhower administration strengthened this tie by signing a mutual defense treaty with the ROC. Nevertheless, to the dismay of the Nationalist government, successive administrations clarified that the treaty was purely defensive, and that the United States would not back any Nationalist attempt to retake the mainland.16

Ambiguity regarding US policy toward Taiwan marked then–President Richard Nixon’s diplomatic opening to the PRC. Records of talks among Nixon, Henry Kissinger, Zhou En-lai, and Mao Zedong held in Beijing indicate an implicit US acceptance of a PRC takeover of Taiwan. Yet, while the PRC insists that the US explicitly accepted the premise that Taiwan is part of a united China governed by the PRC in the First (Shanghai) Communique, the US text of that communique merely “acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.” The later passage and signing of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) also pushed against Beijing’s interpretation of that statement. While the United States followed through with formal recognition of the PRC, the TRA made unofficial US relations with Taiwan possible. Further, the TRA put into US policy the directive to supply Taiwan with sufficient weapons to defend itself.17

The full series of joint communiques and messages between the United States and the PRC issued in the 1970s and 1980s, while ostensibly representing agreement over important policy issues regarding Taiwan, instead underlined critical disagreements as the two sides interpreted (and translated) those communiques differently.18 The US government at times has also appeared to tell the PRC and Taiwan’s government different things simultaneously. In its 1982 joint communique with the PRC leadership, the Reagan administration agreed (premised on its understanding that the question of Taiwan would be settled peacefully) that it had no intention of “pursuing a policy of ‘two Chinas’ or ‘one China, one Taiwan’” and promised that weapons sales to Taiwan would be reduced in the future and not exceed existing technological standards. Yet, the Six Assurances given Taiwan’s officials at approximately the same time (and communicated to the PRC) promised Taiwan’s government that the United States would not consult with the PRC over weapons sales, would not repeal the TRA, and that “The United States would not formally recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan.”19

Relevance. The CCP treats the question of Taiwan as a holdover of the Century of Humiliation. In that concept, Taiwan’s alienation from the mainland that began with its transfer to Japan in accordance with the Treaty of Shimonoseki (which ended the first Sino-Japanese War in 1895) must be reversed if China’s process of national rejuvenation is to be complete. Unification is paramount in the CCP’s stance. The views of the people of Taiwan only count if those views agree with this CCP position.20

Many on Taiwan address the question differently. Their experiences with successive mainland governments since the nineteenth century (Qing, Nationalist, and Chinese Communist) have disillusioned them. The Qing gave Taiwan away to protect the interests of the mainland. The Nationalists treated Taiwan as a mere extension of the mainland, first as a territory to be recovered, later as a military bastion for the re-conquest of the mainland. The CCP has also treated Taiwan merely as an extension of the mainland, to be subjugated if necessary.

Consequently, many inhabitants of Taiwan will not trust any mainland government. They have developed their own identity and have become attached to the liberal democratic government they have constructed since the 1990s. They specifically distrust the CCP and most reject the One Country-Two Systems paradigm the CCP has developed.21

In this context, the legacy of US-PRC-Taiwan relations is confusing for the non-US sides of the triangle. What US policymakers perceive as careful balancing and nuance placed in Taiwan policy to promote stability across the Taiwan Strait is often perceived differently and negatively in Beijing and Taipei. Both PRC officials and the people of Taiwan can also point to apparent contradictions on the part of US policymakers.

For CCP officials, the appearance of US backpedaling from Nixon’s promises over Taiwan’s future is a sign of duplicity and an attack on the PRC’s sovereignty. They routinely condemn and demand the repeal of the TRA, criticize US arms sales to Taiwan, denounce visits by US officials to Taiwan, and demand that US officials respect and abide by the PRC’s One China Principle. Unsurprisingly, CCP officials continually refer back to Richard Nixon. They interpret his position as exuding a deep sympathy for the CCP’s stance on Taiwan. That interpretation, in turn, leads to statements in which CCP officials contrast current US policies on the PRC and Taiwan unfavorably with those Nixon promulgated and generate calls for US officials to “correct” their views by returning to what the CCP perceives to have been Nixon’s policy positions.22

In Taipei, the US withdrawal of formal recognition from the ROC in 1979 and the abrogation of the mutual defense treaty, coupled with a refusal to commit definitively to Taiwan’s defense or to arm it with the most modern weapons, is sometimes portrayed as a betrayal of a long-standing ally and (more recently) of a fellow democracy in the face of existential threats from a hostile authoritarian power. Rather than nuance, some in Taiwan view the US position of strategic ambiguity with regard to defending Taiwan as timid: expressive of a transactional desire to pursue economic gain at Taiwan’s expense and an indicator of an uncertain commitment to democracy and the current rules-based international order.23 Some Taiwanese also see US officials’ inconsistencies as evidence that the United States is using Taiwan as a pawn in its great-power competition with the PRC, a belief that PRC information operators have embraced and amplified.24

Making sense of US policy in Taiwan requires an acquaintance with its history. Strategic ambiguity is responsive to the historical US goal of maintaining stability across the Taiwan Strait in the face of long-standing PRC threats to take Taiwan by military force, a background of previous Nationalist plans to retake the mainland from Taiwan, and a more recent history of gestures by some in Taiwan to declare independence unilaterally. Likewise, understanding why the United States developed its One China policy (which holds that the PRC is the legitimate government of China while simultaneously holding that the status of Taiwan is undetermined) and its refusal to accept the PRC’s One China principle (which insists that Taiwan is an inalienable part of a China governed by the CCP) is predicated on understanding that the United States has developed important economic ties with Beijing since the 1990s but is unwilling to abandon the political and economic ties it has developed with Taiwan since the 1950s.

Understanding this background allows us to craft justifications for US policy toward Taiwan, in part by countering the PRC’s narratives addressing Taiwan and the Century of Humiliation. The core of this counternarrative would draw attention to the observation that for most of its modern history, Taiwan has been treated as a pawn in international bargaining, and that the essence of its victimization is the removal of its inhabitants’ voice. Taiwan, too, was victimized during the Century of Humiliation, the Chinese Civil War, and the Cold War. Outsiders from the mainland and elsewhere controlled its fate and governance until its democratization in the early 1990s. This counternarrative would then describe the US diplomatic, economic, and military support for Taiwan as a move to address that injustice and the effects of this history on Taiwan. This effort is exemplified in US policy, which holds that Taiwan’s status and future should not be decided by force or coercion.25

This narrative performs several functions. It acknowledges the importance of the Century of Humiliation while displacing the PRC as its sole interpreter. It broadens the interpretation of that history so that it no longer functions to justify every PRC policy position, particularly the PRC’s position on Taiwan. It instead holds that the events of the Century of Humiliation harmed more than just mainland China and points out that the resolution of the problems that era and its aftermath created must address the harms done to Taiwan. American policy addresses those harms by ensuring that the people of Taiwan have a meaningful voice in their dialogue with the PRC.

Recommendations

This article highlights the need for professional military education (PME) courses to foster a deeper understanding of Chinese and Sino-American historical dynamics. It also presents a first and very basic thematic discussion of Sino-American history to facilitate an understanding of that history for professionals with a minimal acquaintance with China.

While curriculum is generally responsive to calls for enhancing China education in PME institutions, a historical focus on Sino-American relations is only intermittently present in PME courses. Descriptions of the Air University’s “Introduction to China” course indicates that it does not address those relations. The Naval War College’s elective course in its Naval Command College covers that history only from 1949. The China-related courses at the National Defense University do not appear to cover that history. Meanwhile, discussions addressing the study of China in American PME institutions tend to focus on other topics.26

To equip military and national security officials with the knowledge needed to understand and counter PRC messaging, we propose two enhancements to existing PME curricula. First, PME courses should incorporate a larger overview of Sino-American relations as part of the examination of Chinese history, extending beyond a purely military or post-1949 focus. This historical lens should encompass the multifaceted interactions—diplomatic, social, military, cultural, and economic—that have shaped the relationship between the United States and China. By examining these historical complexities, students can gain a deeper understanding of Chinese perceptions of the United States and of the potential for past frictions to influence current PRC narratives and information operations. To achieve this integration, PME courses could be restructured to include dedicated modules on Sino-American history, covering these and other key historical themes such as the US military presence in China, and the complex interplay of trade, diplomacy, and cultural exchange. Additionally, the incorporation of guest lectures and workshops by historians and experts on China would provide students with diverse perspectives and deeper insights into this historical context. Finally, analyzing specific historical events through case studies can offer valuable lessons for PME students.

Second, PME institutions should consider expanding their faculty expertise to include historians and scholars specializing in Sino-American relations. This interdisciplinary approach would enrich the curriculum and provide students with a more holistic understanding of the complexities involved. This enhanced understanding will enable them to formulate effective strategies and policies for navigating the Sino-American relationship in the twenty-first century.

Conclusions

Reflecting on this discussion, we see that a familiarity with the history of Sino-American relations and Chinese history enhances the ability to grasp and respond to the PRC’s moves in the current era of great-power competition. Narratives informed by that history continue explicitly and openly to inform the information disseminated by PRC and CCP officials. Understanding those narratives requires military leaders and policymakers to acquire at least a passing acquaintance with that history.27

Familiarity with this part of Chinese history is also necessary to understand how PRC sources perceive and portray US policies around the world. America’s interest in China, whether in the political, economic, or social realms, is not new. Historically, that interest has also not been minor.28 Understanding the history of Sino-American relations is a crucial precondition for reflecting critically on the assumptions, analyses, strategies, and goals which inform US policies.

Finally, familiarity with the history of Sino-American relations uncovers opportunities. Military and security professionals should attempt to counter the narratives the PRC promotes, particularly those with the Century of Humiliation at their center. American efforts in this direction can only be effective if they demonstrate a familiarity with China’s history and the United States’ part in it. Only then will military and security professionals gain the foundational understanding necessary to anticipate PRC characterizations of US policies and ground public diplomacy in a discourse that makes sense to those exposed to the PRC’s information operations.

 
 

David J. Lorenzo
David J. Lorenzo is a professor at the Joint Forces Staff College, National Defense University. His recent publications focus on American foreign policy and politics and Taiwan and China.

Ian Murphy
Ian Murphy is a China subject matter expert at SecuriFense Inc., where he advises organizations about developments in China’s economy and foreign policy. He is currently pursuing a PhD in international studies at Old Dominion University.

 
 

Endnotes

  1. 1. Xi Jinping, “Speech at Ceremony Marking CPC Centenary,” The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, updated July 1, 2021, https://english.www.gov.cn/news/topnews/202107/01/content_WS60dd8d8ac6d0df57f98dc459.html, 1. See also Xi's "Speech at the First Session of the 14th NPC," The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, March 13, 2023, http://english.scio.gov.cn/m/topnews/2023-03/15/content_85168965.htm.
  2. 2. Xi Jinping, “Speech at Ceremony,” 3.
  3. 3. Stuart C. Miller, “The American Trader’s Image of China, 1785–1840,” Pacific Historical Review 36, no. 4 (1967).
  4. 4. J. Wang Jisi et al., “Response: Did America Get China Wrong?: The Engagement Debate,” Foreign Affairs 97, no. 4 (July/August 2018): 183–95, https://www-foreignaffairs-com.usawc.idm.oclc.org/articles/china/2018-06-14/did-america-get-china-wrong.
  5. 5. Stephen R. Platt, Imperial Twilight: The Opium War and the End of China’s Last Golden Age (Vintage, 2019); John R. Haddad, America’s First Adventure in China: Trade, Treaties, Opium, and Salvation (Temple University Press, 2013); and Eileen P. Scully, “Taking the Low Road to Sino-American Relations: ‘Open Door’ Expansionists and the Two China Markets,” The Journal of American History 82, no. 1 (1995): 62–83.
  6. 6. “US Business Elite Welcomes Xi Jinping with Standing Ovation,” Financial Times, November 16, 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/a8633d7f-f785-4195-b0b2-0ea9506968c9.
  7. 7. Xiaolin Duan, “Hedging Against the Unknown: PRC Media Coverage of the Sino-US Trade War,” China Brief 18, no. 12 (2018), https://jamestown.org/program/hedging-against-the-unknown-prc-media-coverage-of-the-sino-us-trade-war/.
  8. 8. “Media: The US Proposed an ‘Unequal Treaty’ to China. Is It Now 1840?,” Global Times, May 5, 2018, https://mil.sina.cn/zgjq/2018-05-06/detail-ihacuuvt8294836.d.html?from=wap. An associated New York Times article labeled that headline “curious” and devoted itself to an extensive discussion illuminating the associated historical references. Alan Rappeport, “19th Century ‘Humiliation’ Haunts China-U.S. Trade Talks,” The New York Times, May 27, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/27/us/politics/china-opium-wars-trade-talks.html. See also Tatman R. Savio et al., “The New PRC Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law,” Akin, July 2, 2021, https://www.akingump.com/en/insights/alerts/the-new-prc-anti-foreign-sanctions-law.
  9. 9. Xi Jinping, “Speech at the First Session of the 14th NPC, March 13, 2023”; Joe Cash, “China Urges ‘Practical’ US Action on Sanctions After Yellen Talks,” Reuters, July 10, 2023. For more context, see Martin Danahay, “What the Opium Wars Can Tell Us About China, the U.S. and Fentanyl,” The Conversation, January 20, 2025, https://theconversation.com/what-the-opium-wars-can-tell-us-about-china-the-u-s-and-fentanyl-247170.
  10. 10. See for example, Sam Wong and Brian Wong, “Chinese Perceptions of American Democracy: Late Qing Observers and Their Experiences with the Chinese Exclusion Act,” Journal of American-East Asian Relations 27, no. 4 (2020): 315–46.
  11. 11. “Milestones: 1866–1898 – The Burlingame-Seward Treaty, 1868,” Department of State Office of the Historian, n.d., accessed August 13, 2025, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1866-1898/burlingame-seward-treaty.
  12. 12. Correspondence with the Legation of China in Washington (Documents 65–71), December 6, 1886, in “Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Transmitted to Congress, with the Annual Message of the President, December 6, 1886” Office of the Historian, United States Department of State, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1886/comp6.
  13. 13. Erika Lee, “The Chinese Exclusion Example: Race, Immigration, and American Gatekeeping, 1882–1924,” Journal of American Ethnic History 21, no. 3 (2002). Experiences with discrimination are discussed in Paul Yin, “The Narratives of Chinese-American Litigation During the Chinese Exclusion Era,” Asian American Law Journal 19, no. 1 (2012); and Shih-shan H. Ts’ai, “Reaction to Exclusion: The Boycott of 1905 and Chinese National Awakening,” The Historian 39, no. 1 (1976).
  14. 14. “Reality Check: US Falsehoods in Perceptions of China,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, June 19, 2022, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zy/jj/diaodao_665718/pl/202206/t20220619_10706059.html; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. “美国对外援助的伪善本质和事实真相” (“The Ugly Face and Truth of American Aid”), trans. Ian Murphy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, April 19, 2024, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/wjbxw_new/202404/t20240419_11284707.shtml; Zhu Zhiqun, “America’s Poor Policies Towards China Fuel Its Domestic Discrimination Against Asians,” China Today, April 12, 2021; and “China Is Firmly Committed to a Path of Human Rights Development That Suits Its National Conditions,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, last modified September 26, 2021, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zygy/hd/202406/t20240603_11374881.html.
  15. 15. Li Aihui, “美国《排华法案》废除80周年 华侨华人融入之路步履不停” (“80 Years After the Repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act, Overseas Chinese Integration Continues”), trans. Ian Murphy, Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the People’s Government of Guangdong Province, December 18, 2023, http://www.qb.gd.gov.cn/qsxw/content/post_1145873.html; Wu Qingcai et al., “排华法案：迟到130年的道歉” (“The Chinese Exclusion Act: An Apology 130 Years Late”), trans. Ian Murphy, People’s Digest, no. 9 (2012), http://paper.people.com.cn/rmwz/html/2012-09/01/content_1113760.htm?div=-1; and Li Wenzheng, “美国排华法案道歉案的始末与思考” (“The Beginning and the End of the U.S. Chinese Exclusion Act Apology Case and Reflections”), trans. Ian Murphy, Overseas Chinese Affairs Review, no. 4 (2012), http://qwgzyj.gqb.gov.cn/qwhg/167/2071.shtml.
  16. 16. Hsiao-ting Lin, Accidental State: Chiang Kai-shek, the United States, and the Making of Taiwan (Harvard University Press, 2016); “Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of China; December 2, 1954,” The Avalon Project, Yale Law School, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/chin001.asp. For Secretary of State Dulles’ emphasis on the defensive nature of the treaty see also “United States – Chinese Joint Statement, December 1, 1954,” University of Southern California US-China Institute, https://china.usc.edu/node/20483; and Mercy A. Kuo, “US Relations with the Republic of China, 1943–1960: Insights from Martin B. Gold,” The Diplomat, April 25, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/04/us-relations-with-the-republic-of-china-1943-1960/.
  17. 17. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, “Taiwan Expendable? Nixon and Kissinger Go to China,” The Journal of American History 92, no. 1 (June 2005). Also see, “Document 1: Memorandum of Conversation, 22 February 1972, 2:10 p.m. - 6:10 p.m,” National Security Archive, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB106/NZ-1.pdf; “Document 3: Memorandum of Conversation, 24 February 1972, 5:15 p.m. - 8:05 p.m.,” National Security Archive, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB106/index.htm; Winston Lord to Henry Kissinger “Memcon of Your Conversations with Chou En-Lai,” July 29, 1971, National Security Archive, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB145/09.pdf; and Taiwan Relations Act, H.R.2479, Public Law 96-8, April 10, 1979, https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/house-bill/2479.
  18. 18. See June Teufel Dreyer, “US–China Relations: Engagement or Talking Past Each Other?,” Journal of Contemporary China 17, no. 57 (2008): 591– 609.
  19. 19. Dreyer, “US–China Relations”; “Joint Communiqué on Arms Sales to Taiwan, 17 August 1982,” Taiwan Documents Project, n.d., accessed August 28, 2025, http://www.taiwandocuments.org/communique03.htm; and “The ‘Six Assurances’ to Taiwan, July 1982,” Taiwan Documents Project, n.d., accessed August 28, 2025, http://www.taiwandocuments.org/assurances.htm.
  20. 20. “Treaty of Shimonoseki, Signed at Shimonoseki 17 April 1895, Entered into Force 8 May 1895 by the Exchange of the Instruments of Ratification at Chefoo,” Taiwan Documents Project, n.d., accessed August 28, 2025, http://taiwandocuments.org/shimonoseki01.htm.
  21. 21. For an overview of reasons for rejecting unification, see David J. Lorenzo, “Why Do Many Taiwanese Resist Unification with the People’s Republic of China? An Overview of Explanations,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs 7, no. 3 (2024): 35–49, https://media.defense.gov/2024/May/07/2003458328/-1/-1/1/FEATURE%20-%20LORENZO%20-%20JIPA.PDF.
  22. 22. “A Bristling China Says Biden Remarks on Taiwan ‘Severely Violate’ US Policy,” CBS News, September 19, 2022, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-biden-taiwan-remarks-angry-reaction/; Wang Yi, “Chinese FM Makes Remarks on U.S. Violation of China’s Sovereignty,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, August 3, 2022, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjbzhd/202208/t20220803_10732743.html; “China Says It Resolutely Opposes US Military Sales to Taiwan,” Reuters, July 4, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-says-it-resolutely-opposes-us-military-sales-taiwan-2023-07-05/; “ ‘Adhere to One China Principle,’ China Condemns US Delegation’s Visit to Taiwan,” The Times of India, February 22, 2024, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/adhere-to-one-china-principle-china-condemns-us-delegations-visit-to-taiwan/articleshow/107915740.cms; and “拜登当学尼克松，做好这道必答题!” (“When Biden Learns from Nixon, Do This Must-Answer Question Well!”), trans. Ian Murphy, Reference News, http://www.cankaoxiaoxi.com/china/20220227/2470429.shtml.
  23. 23. On strategic ambiguity, see Ramy Inocencio, “Biden Says U.S. Has ‘Commitment’ to Defend Taiwan If China Attacks,” CBS News, October 22, 2021; Brett Samuels et al., “Biden Showing Little Strategic Ambiguity When It Comes to Taiwan,” The Hill, May 23, 2022. In contrast, see Didi Tang, “Trump Says Taiwan Should Pay More for Defense and Dodges Questions If He Would Defend the Island,” AP News, July 17, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/trump-taiwan-chips-invasion-china-910e7a94b19248fc75e5d1ab6b0a34d8.
  24. 24. Damien Cave and Amy Chang Chien, “Taiwan’s Doubts About America Are Growing. That Could Be Dangerous,” The New York Times, January 20, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/20/world/asia/taiwan-united-states-views.html; and “宝岛寒风中的热切呼声” (“The Fervent Cry in the Cold Wind of Taiwan”), trans. Ian Murphy, People’s Daily Overseas Edition, December 27, 2023, http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrbhwb/html/2023-12/27/content_26033866.htm.
  25. 25. Taiwan Relations Act, Sec. 2(b)(2)-(3).
  26. 26. Military Officers: DOD Can Enhance Promotion and Education Guidance for Addressing Indo-Pacific Region Needs, U.S. Government Accountability Office, June 29, 2023, https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-23-106070; Mikala McCurry and Lori Quiller, “AFCLC Launches New Introduction to China, Russia Courses with Certificates on Culture Guide App,” Air Force Culture and Language Center, January 2, 2022, https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2886215/afclc-launches-new-introduction-to-china-russia-courses-with-certificates-on-cu/; and Paul Smith, “America’s China Game Since 1949: The Past and Future of U.S. China Relations,” EL 812, US Naval War College (NWC) 2024–25 Electives Catalog https://usnwc.edu/naval-command-college/Electives. See course descriptions in National Defense University Course Catalog, 2024–25 for “China Foundations” (NWC-6149) and “The Global Context” (NWC-6500), in National Defense University 2024–2025 Catalog, https://www.ndu.edu/Portals/59/Documents/Incoming/AY25/NDU%20Catalog%20AY25.pdf. See also Steven Metz, “Focusing on China Will Prepare the U.S. Military for the Future,” The National Interest, July 24, 2022, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/focusing-china-will-prepare-us-military-future-203798.
  27. 27. See Kevin Rudd, “The World According to Xi Jinping: What China’s Ideologue in Chief Really Believes,” Foreign Affairs 101, no. 6 (November/December 2022), https://www-foreignaffairs-com.usawc.idm.oclc.org/china/world-according-xi-jinping-china-ideologue-kevin-rudd; and Maria Adele Carrai, “Chinese Political Nostalgia and Xi Jinping’s Dream of Great Rejuvenation,” International Journal of Asian Studies 18, no. 1 (2021).
  28. 28. Gordon H. Chang, Fateful Ties: A History of America’s Preoccupation with China (Harvard University Press, 2015).
 
 

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