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May 14, 2026

The State of the US Army

Richard D. Hooker Jr.
©2026 Richard D. Hooker Jr.

ABSTRACT: This article argues that the US Army remains dangerously optimized for counterinsurgency, leaving it ill-equipped for a high-intensity ground war against near-peer adversaries like Russia or China. Unlike standard modernization literature that focuses solely on technology, this analysis highlights how bloated staffs and personnel policies that prioritize equity over battlefield excellence undermine combat readiness. The analysis evaluates 2026 force-structure projections against current personnel metrics and acquisition timelines to identify systemic readiness gaps. The findings provide military and policy practitioners with actionable frameworks to reallocate personnel resources and address critical gaps in field artillery, electronic warfare, and short-range air defense before a major conflict occurs.

Keywords: Army modernization, military readiness, capability gaps, force structure, lethality

 

The US Army today can be proud of its status as a premier land force in the world. Worn by a generation at war, it has endured severe challenges and has remained a resilient and vital component of American national security. These virtues, however, should not stop the Army from constantly improving.

Several key areas call into question the Army’s readiness to fight and win in major theater wars against near-peer adversaries. The following critique focuses on these areas and how the Army can overcome its challenges to prevail in the next great conflict.1

The Army Is Too Small

The projected Army end strength of 454,000 for the active force in 2026 falls far below the 485,000 authorized in 2022.2 This active-duty force size as currently organized cannot meet the requirements of two simultaneous major campaigns, even with substantial augmentation from the reserve component.3 For effective deterrence, US allies must have confidence that America will be available, on the ground, early in the fight. Aggression on the Korean Peninsula, for example, cannot mean the collapse of deterrence in Europe or the Middle East due to a lack of ground forces. Nor can airpower or sea power offset a too-small Army, as air and naval units cannot seize or control the land.4

Since the end of the Cold War, Army leaders have prioritized new technology over end strength, dangerously assuming that technology can compensate for a lack of boots on the ground.5 Striking the right balance between these two critical elements can make the difference between victory and defeat. Precision fires, improved C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), and other technological advances, though essential, cannot seize, hold, and control the land or opposing land forces. Nor can the reserve component fill the gaps in come-as-you-are campaigns, as it takes time to mobilize and deploy substantial National Guard combat formations. Thirty-one active maneuver brigades are not enough. America needs a 12-division active Army with 37 maneuver brigades to meet its national security requirements.6 The United States can achieve this increase by eliminating or downsizing redundant staffs and organizations, increasing Army end strength, or a combination of both.

The Army Is Too Light

In 2026, only 11 of the Army’s 31 active maneuver brigades are heavy brigades. Fourteen of the Army’s maneuver brigades are light infantry formations, ill-equipped to contend with Russian, Chinese, or North Korean heavy forces and massed artillery. While cheaper and easier to deploy, the Army’s light units cannot realistically compete with today’s threats (in fact, the Russian army has no light infantry for this reason; even its airborne formations are fully mechanized). In 2024, the US Army eliminated the anti-tank companies in light infantry battalions, along with the brigade cavalry squadrons, further reducing combat power in light formations. The loss in recent years of up-armored vehicles and their replacement with the Infantry Squad Vehicle—essentially a dune buggy—only exacerbates this trend. Except in close terrain, light brigades are only marginally useful against dangerous, mechanized opponents.7

The active Army includes six Stryker brigades, originally called the “interim armored vehicle” and intended to serve as a bridge until the Army could field the Future Combat System (FCS). From the outset, Stryker units suffered from doctrinal and conceptual confusion.8 Stryker units are wheeled, not tracked, and they carry more dismounts than Bradley units, which are intended to fight primarily mounted. But they have poor off-road mobility, are vulnerable to hand-held anti-armor systems, and feature towed rather than self-propelled artillery. Repeated National Training Center rotations have shown they cannot survive against armor.9 A better solution—convert Stryker brigades into true heavy brigades, perhaps with reconditioned M1 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle platforms now in storage. If retained, Stryker brigades should include an armor battalion, similar to Russian motor rifle brigades.

The Army Is Undergunned

Army field artillery, formerly a powerful fiefdom, experienced dramatic reductions in the 1990s and further downsizing following the September 11 terrorist attacks. The field artillery community at the end of the Cold War comprised 218 battalions. By 1999, this number had been reduced to 141 battalions. By 2011, 61 tactical field artillery battalions remained on active duty.10 The Army disestablished the Division Artillery headquarters and assigned direct support artillery battalions to “modularized” brigade combat teams, where artillerymen were often used as provisional infantry or drivers, while their leaders manned “non-lethal effects” cells as information operations officers. It retained five “fires brigades” in the active force, though they were seldom used in their primary roles. Even in a counterinsurgency environment, maneuver commanders publicly decried this loss of capability.11 Today, Army divisions include the organic cannon battalions supporting maneuver brigades, while each corps has a single artillery brigade equipped with multiple launch rocket systems. A generation of field artillery officers has limited experience in massing fires, while field artillery force structure remains atrophied.12

A quick comparison with the Russian army highlights this conundrum. Russian ground forces feature plenty of heavy artillery in cannon, rocket, and missile units, with rates of fire and ranges greater than US systems. Russian maneuver brigades include three artillery battalions (two cannon and one multiple rocket launcher) backed up by fire assets at the division and army levels. The Russian brigade’s anti-tank battalion, equipped with the 2A19 100mm anti-tank gun, can also serve in the indirect fire role. The Russian army does not possess a counterpart to the US Army’s M119 105mm towed howitzer that equips the Army’s light formations. All Russian cannon units are 122mm or larger. The US Army is outranged and outgunned.13

The conflict in Ukraine also highlights the virtues of decentralization and faster response times.14 Ukrainian-developed software leverages Starlink and other commercial applications to reduce the artillery sensor-to-shooter cycle to under a minute. Called the “Geographic Information System Art for Artillery” (GIS Arta), this innovation can run on cell phones, tablets, or laptops, linking observers, commanders, and firing units to mass fires quickly on the target.15 Enabled by near-persistent drone surveillance, this “Uber for artillery” helps Ukrainian ground forces offset Russia’s artillery advantage with speed and precision. These technical and cultural adaptations represent a change in mindset and approach that US Army leaders should study and emulate.

In recent years, Army leadership has partially addressed these issues by restoring the Division Artillery headquarters and supporting funding for artillery systems. The standard artillery system in heavy formations is the M109A7 155mm “Paladin” howitzer system, continuing the upgrade of this venerable system. (Of note, the German PzH155, the Polish KRAB, and the South Korean K9A2 feature smaller crews, higher sustained rates of fire, and greater range.) The current focus on fielding future technologies—above all, a very long-range, precision fires capability—continues.16 The active force, meanwhile, needs more cannon artillery now, on the order of one general support 155mm battalion in each division and an additional cannon artillery brigade per corps. Revolutionary artillery systems that can fire accurately on the move will soon come online.17 Advances in cheaper Global Positioning System (GPS) technology; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); propellants; metallurgy; and microexplosives mean that field artillery can now transition from area to point fire, even against moving targets—a true revolution. These technologies must come at prices that permit maintainability, training, and replacement. Above all, field artillery in light brigades and divisions remains outmoded, with poor lethality and obsolete towed systems that are unarmored, over-crewed, slow going into battery, and difficult to displace—fatal weaknesses against America’s likely opponents. Better options with higher rates of fire, greater range and mobility, and smaller crews (such as the French Caesar, the Swedish Archer, and the German RCH 155) are available.

The Army Lacks Short-Range Air Defense

Like the armor and field artillery communities, air defense artillery became a bill payer following the September 11 terrorist attacks as the Army reorganized for the global war on terrorism. While the high- and mid-altitude air defense communities remained protected, short-range air defense (SHORAD) effectively disappeared as all divisional air defense artillery battalions ceased to exist. Army leaders “accepted risk” by assuming that the Air Force could and would take on this mission.18

For various reasons, the Air Force cannot by itself provide effective short-range air defense. China and Russia have invested heavily in anti-access / area-denial (A2/AD) technologies that threaten America’s ability to achieve air dominance in many scenarios. Evolving hypersonic technology and the proliferation of low-flying cruise missiles and unmanned aerial systems complicate this picture. Most urgently, the Army does not have a good answer for drone swarms used to target maneuver forces, fire systems, command posts, and the like.19 Without SHORAD units, today’s Army divisions are vulnerable.

Army leaders and planners acknowledged this problem and proposed the reintroduction of SHORAD battalions into the divisional structure on an indeterminate timeline.20 Current plans project four active Army SHORAD battalions in the future, with “air and missile defense” ranking fifth of the Army’s six modernization priorities.21 In time, the “Maneuver-SHORAD” system—planned to include the Hellfire anti-tank missile, a 30mm gun, and Stinger missiles on a Stryker platform—will replace legacy Stinger and Avenger systems.

These moves will take years and depend on funding and successful acquisition that offer no guarantees. Meanwhile, the Army needs low-altitude air defense now at the brigade and division levels. Military leadership should make the reactivation of the Army’s divisional SHORAD battalions a top priority and initially equip them with existing Avenger systems, armed with the FN Herstal .50 caliber heavy machine gun and the FIM-92J Stinger missile, while the defense industry develops more advanced replacement systems.

The Army Is Far Behind in Drone Warfare

Currently, in Ukraine, drones cause 70–80 percent of casualties.22 Effective electronic warfare by both sides has evolved from “first-person view” drones controlled by radio to unjammable wire-guided drones.23 The scale of use has become enormous—both sides produce several million small, tactical drones per year in addition to larger, more sophisticated systems with greater range and payloads. All services employ drones at all echelons, while Ukraine and Russia have established separate military services for the development and employment of unmanned systems. Ukraine procures most of its unmanned tactical systems commercially in a decentralized manner.24 In contrast, the Army Modernization Priorities published in 2017 remain essentially unchanged. Procurement and employment of drones in the US Army are in their infancies.25 Long acquisition timelines, industry pressure to field larger, more expensive systems, bureaucratic obstacles, and opposition to change by entrenched communities make rapid progress difficult. The US Army must make dramatic and urgent progress to compete with America’s adversaries. While arguably less decisive in the air and at sea, unmanned platforms dominate on land.26 The success of the Ukrainian armed forces against a far larger and more powerful opponent suggests a way forward: procure off the shelf; proliferate in all combat branches and at every echelon; decentralize; aggressively tackle associated DOTMLPF (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities) issues; and adapt and update at speed. Failure here will result in a potentially fatal outcome.

Army Aviation Has Dramatic Potential

For speed, lethality, and decisive influence on the land battle, aviation is the Army’s crown jewel. Its proven principal platforms—the AH-64E Apache helicopter, the UH-60M Black Hawk helicopter, and the CH-47F Chinook helicopter—reliably and effectively operate day or night and in all types of weather. The Army in 2026 maintains 11 combat aviation brigades in the active force and 10 in the Army National Guard. (The 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment directly supports the US SOF [special operations forces] community.) Army divisions include a combat aviation brigade with 48 AH-64 attack helicopters, 30 UH-60 assault helicopters, and 12 CH-47 heavy-lift helicopters. The combat aviation brigade also fields 8 UH-6C modified as command-and-control aircraft, 12 HH-60M MEDEVAC aircraft, and 12 MQ-1C Gray Eagle unmanned aerial vehicles. The division’s 48 Apaches can launch hundreds of fire-and-forget anti-tank missiles at once, each with a range of 8 kilometers. Operating at standoff ranges, they are survivable and, with cruise speeds of 150 knots, they can rapidly reposition to engage and destroy massed enemy armor. The Apache can also integrate with and control the MQ-1C, which can also be armed. Given the decline in field artillery, Army attack aviation is the most powerful striking weapon available to division commanders.

Considering its firepower deficit relative to near-peer competitors, the US Army should also arm its assault helicopter fleet. Currently equipped with two 7.62mm door guns, the UH-60 can accommodate a full complement of anti-tank missiles and rockets—16 externally loaded Hellfire missiles (with another 16 carried internally) and the mounted GAU-19 .50 caliber machine gun, or the M134 7.62mm mini-gun.27 The aircraft can also be configured with 2.75-inch rockets and the Stinger anti-air missile. The MH-60L DAP aircraft flown by the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment and the MH-60R Seahawk helicopters flown by the US Navy are currently configured with the Hellfire.28 This change would dramatically improve the combat power available to division commanders and enable them to mass lethal fires more quickly than with ground maneuver units, while retaining the capability to conduct troop-carrier operations.

Two issues intrude in this discussion—the survivability of Army aviation on today’s battlefield and recent Department of War decisions to cut the number of attack helicopters in Army divisions by half.29 A careful analysis of the first, based on lessons from the Russia-Ukraine War, suggests that rotary-wing aircraft can survive and fight successfully when properly employed as part of the Joint and combined arms team—but not otherwise.30 This means suppression of enemy air defenses, terrain masking for ingress and egress, and leveraging the standoff capabilities of Army munitions such as the AGM-114 Hellfire missile. Dispersing tactical assembly areas and clandestine rearm / refuel points will become increasingly important in an age of round-the-clock drone surveillance. In time, militaries will field unmanned airframes with superior flight and weapons characteristics at scale, forcing dramatic changes in Army aviation. Until then, deep cuts to the helicopter community without concomitant, offsetting fielding of newer, more capable systems can only create dangerous capability gaps. In this regard, Army leaders must weigh costs and availability before committing to new technology.

A controversial proposal that merits serious consideration is to provide the Army with its own fixed-wing close-air support.31 The Army needs its own fixed-wing air arm for the same reasons the Navy and Marine Corps do. It has unique needs—vital to its success in ground campaigns—that are not met by sister services or by appealing for more “jointness.” These needs do not encompass classical Air Force missions of air dominance, long-range interdiction, or strategic bombing.

Long before the Air Force separated from the Army, the Navy and Marine Corps established air arms tailored to their needs and missions and retain them to this day. As long as the Army Air Forces remained subordinate to the Army, they met its requirements for tactical airpower, even as an increasingly independent strategic Air Force evolved.

Today, the Air Force possesses one airplane optimized for the close-air-support (CAS) mission, the A-10 Thunderbolt. All other fighter aircraft were designed for different missions and flight profiles. The Air Force has repeatedly attempted to retire the A-10 or, when faced with congressional opposition, to push it into the reserves.32 In 2026, there are 281 A-10s in service. The bid to retire the aircraft, along with deep cuts in the US Air Force Joint Terminal Attack Controllers community, signals a lack of commitment to the CAS mission that should concern Army leaders and the Joint Force.33

One solution is to transfer the A-10 to the Army. The current inventory will support one squadron of 18 aircraft in each division, leaving 81 for training and spares.34 As an alternative option, the Army could develop its own fixed-wing CAS platform. Although the Army’s attack helicopter community is vital, the A-10 is superior to the AH-64 given its survivability, range, speed, and mighty weapons load. So configured, the Army could serve as its own primary CAS provider. By making this move now, the Army would gain the flexible, rapid combat power it needs, ease interservice rivalry, and enhance national security.

The Army Is Poorly Prepared for Electronic Warfare

Electronic warfare (EW) represents another adversary capability that overmatches America’s. Russian and Chinese EW, an integral element of their war-fighting doctrines, disrupts enemy command and control while protecting their own.35 The Russian army uses EW units at all levels—from the EW company in every maneuver brigade to the EW brigades at army level. The Chinese take a similar approach. Russian and Chinese planners have correctly identified US reliance on secure, satellite communications and navigation systems.36 They can also conduct offensive cyber operations, though not principally against tactical formations.

Here, the Army lags well behind its adversaries.37 The Army program of record, the Terrestrial Layer Intelligence System, or TLIS, combines signal intercept and jamming functions. Variants for use in Army brigades and at echelons above the brigade level have been under development for about six years.38 An airborne EW pod for Army drones called the Multi-Functional Electronic Warfare-Air, or MFEW-Air, is also in the works.39 All are awaiting fielding. Meanwhile, the Army has minimal EW capabilities.40 The Army should accelerate the fielding of capable EW systems in divisions and corps. The current plan to stand up an EW platoon in maneuver brigades is inadequate. Lessons from the Russia-Ukraine War show that a company in Army brigades, a battalion at the division level, and a brigade at the corps level are optimal.

The Army Is Over-Invested in Special Operations Forces

The post–September 11 era saw significant growth in Army Special Operations Forces, with a fourth battalion added to each Special Forces Group and a special troops battalion and a military intelligence battalion added to the 75th Ranger Regiment, which also added a “specialty” company and a support company to each battalion. Following the end of large-scale combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, special operations forces retained this growth even as the conventional force reduced. While versatile and high-quality, these formations cannot take and hold ground and do not, whatever their proponents may say, deliver decisive strategic results as Army divisions and corps do. Soldier for soldier, they are far more expensive to recruit, train, equip, and retain. Perhaps most importantly, special operations forces drain an inordinate amount of leadership talent and quality from the conventional force. A continuing concern is their stovepiped method of employment—SOF operations typically coordinate poorly with conventional battlespace owners—a chronic problem exacerbated by the tendency to employ SOF outside the normal chain of command to the detriment of campaign plans.41 The price is a steep one.42

The 2018 formation of 800-soldier Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs), primarily composed of officers and noncommissioned officers drawn from the conventional force, amplifies this trend. Five are active, with one in the reserve component. Although the active Army includes 20 special forces battalions, which exist to train and advise forces, that community resists such missions in favor of employment with host nation special operations forces and for direct action. Such a heavy investment in the advise-and-assist mission conflicts with the national security, national defense, and national military strategies, which prioritize great-power and near-peer competition, not counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, or security assistance. Although the Trump administration has announced the deactivation of one regular and one reserve SFAB, the others remain active.43

Accordingly, Army and national leaders should assess current investments in SOF and rationalize these decisions against other priorities.44 Reversion to pre–September 11 force levels for SOF can ensure higher-quality performance and less impact on the conventional force. The drain of high-quality leaders from the conventional force and into special operations forces has posed a serious concern for decades. Of course, special operations forces have an important place, but the Army does not win wars with commandos—it wins wars on land with conventional forces, and their quality is all-important.

The Army Is Too Top-Heavy

The Army in 2026 is awash in staffs, many of which did not exist during World War II, or even in the 1990s.45 Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Army staff grew by 60 percent.46 Army Futures Command, Installation Management Command, US Army Network Enterprise Technology Command, the Army Acquisition Support Center, the Army Capabilities and Integration Center (now the Army Futures and Concepts Center), the Army Security Force Assistance Command, and many other organizations were created in a welter of organizational churn—mostly executed in the midst of two ongoing wars. The active Army fields four corps headquarters, each able to provide command and control for up to five divisions, though it has only 10 divisions. Meanwhile, staffs have exploded in size in recent decades, despite the advent of information technology specifically developed to increase soldier productivity and, in theory, reduce soldier requirements.47 These headquarters are leader intensive and represent resources withheld from the war-fighting Army. Leadership cannot conclusively show that Army functions are executed more effectively or efficiently because multiple large headquarters run them.

A case in point is the Army Installation Management Command, created in 2006 and chartered “to reduce bureaucracy, apply a uniform business structure to manage US Army installations, sustain the environment and enhance the well-being of the military community.” The Army Installation Management Command includes includes a workforce of 120,000 soldiers and civilians headed by a lieutenant general, with a major general as deputy and a brigadier general as chief of staff. Formerly, garrison commanders managed Army installations and reported to local commanding generals, with an assistant secretary of the Army for installation management. In theory, centralizing the installation management function promised common standards and greater expertise. In practice, results fell short, with the Army experiencing a “crisis of major proportion” in installation management in recent years.48

The Army Acquisition Corps provides another compelling example. Created in 1989, the organization includes more than a dozen general officers, 1,600 other commissioned officers, and many more senior civilians. In the 1980s, without a dedicated acquisition career field, the Army fielded the M1 Abrams main battle tank, the M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle, the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter, the UH-60 Black Hawk assault helicopter, the M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System, and the MIM-104 Patriot air defense missile system. All performed well in the Persian Gulf War, and all remain in service today in upgraded variants. Since 1989, however, the Army’s major program acquisitions have failed, with tens of billions squandered on unsuccessful programs like the Crusader Field Artillery System, the Future Combat System, the Ground Combat Vehicle, the M1 “Grizzly” assault breaching system, the RAH-66 Comanche helicopter, the Extended Range Cannon Artillery system, and the Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft, among many others. No major Army program has been successfully fielded since the 1980s, a trend described by one Secretary of the Army as a “tale of failure.”49 It is difficult to make the case that the Army Acquisition Corps has improved performance in this key sphere.

The Army Acquisition Corps, one of many “single-track” career fields created in recent decades, performs quasi-civilian functions not requiring uniformed officers. Formerly, officers served in “secondary specialties” when not assigned to troop units. Those not selected for higher command or general officer spent the latter part of their careers in these specialties, which became full-time occupations. The system worked well because the needs of the field Army were well represented across the institution, with officers who brought recent experience in the field Army to bear as foreign area officers, acquisition officers, or budget programmers. For example, most battalion commanders would not advance to command brigades but would bring impressive skills and field experience into these communities, in addition to their prior functional area expertise.

Throughout the 1990s, the Army’s corporate ethic held that officers who worked primarily in office settings and were not exposed to battlefield dangers or the organizational stress found in field units should not expect to be promoted at rates equal to those of combat arms officers. That ethic disappeared in favor of equal promotion opportunities for all. In fact, in some single-track, noncombat career fields today, promotion opportunities are far better than in the combat arms. Today, guidance for general officer promotion boards explicitly notes that “all assignments are important . . . the absence of command or combat experience should not be a basis for non-selection.”50 Many colonels and general officers have not served in troop units since the rank of captain. By definition, they are not “generalists” trained to run large, complex organizations. They are specialists with narrow skill sets and narrower perspectives. The Army personnel system is more focused on enterprise management and promotion equity than on war fighting.51

A tendency to “over-officer” the force accompanies larger staffs and the proliferation of unneeded headquarters.52 In 2026, 1:6 soldiers is a commissioned officer (a 21 percent increase since 2000), compared to World War II when the ratio in the US Army was 1:11.53 Between 1965 and 2018, the number of general and flag officers in the US military as a percentage of the total force increased by 46 percent (four-stars by 114 percent and three-stars by 149 percent).54 In World War II, =the ratio of generals to enlisted soldiers was 1:6,000; today it is 1:1,400, with 90 percent of general officers not serving in combat units.55 About one-third of the Army’s personnel budget goes to the officer corps.56 Such deliberate rank inflation and overstaffing contribute to a bureaucratic culture that demands constant reporting from junior commanders, so much so that one US Army War College study found such a “suffocating amount of mandatory requirements” that they are “literally unable to complete . . . forcing them to resort to dishonesty and evasion.” This environment contributes to an exodus of young officers frustrated by crushing administrative burdens they cannot reconcile with their duty to train their soldiers for war.57 The foregoing suggests the Army would improve its performance and free scarce resources for its combat units by shuttering superfluous headquarters, streamlining staffs, and reducing the size of the officer corps.58

The Army’s “tooth-to-tail” ratio—the number of combat to support soldiers in the force—parallels these trends. While disagreement about definitions exists, in general, combat soldiers train to engage the enemy with direct or indirect fire, and support soldiers include everyone else. Since World War II, the number of support soldiers has increased, while the number of combat troops has fallen—a trend primarily found above the division level. Army divisions and maneuver brigades have approximately one combat soldier for each support soldier. Army-wide, the ratio sits closer to 1:4.59 The need to man the institutional Army necessarily accounts for much of the Army’s support structure. Rank inflation and growth in administrative overhead account for most of the rest.60 Automation and the advent of artificial intelligence offer clear opportunities to trim this overhead.

Readiness Versus Modernization

At all times, the Army must balance readiness versus modernization—to weigh the demands of the present against those of the future. To quote the 2019 Army Modernization Strategy, “Readiness risk increases as resources are prioritized toward modernization efforts. The Army has no choice but to do both—remain ready and modernize. Increasing the resources devoted to program development to support modernization will likely put pressure on the resources available for near-term needs,” revealing the pressures exercised by defense industries and their congressional supporters to push “investment” in future systems at the expense of training and current readiness.61

Yet, despite large increases in the defense budget, the Army continues to favor future modernization at a real cost to readiness. Data collected at the Combat Training Centers support the conclusion that many units arrive poorly trained.62 Despite the lessons from the Russia-Ukraine War, the Army has not moved expeditiously to strengthen its cannon artillery formations or field-capable drone, air defense, and electronic warfare units in its brigades and divisions. Instead, the modernization priorities laid down in 2017 remain essentially unchanged. Units need fuel, ammunition, spare parts, and reliable, effective equipment to be ready to deter and to fight. New technology in fields like quantum computing, robotics, hypersonic weapons, and artificial intelligence will doubtless transform the conduct of war in profound ways in future years.63 Yet, an Army optimized to fight and win in 2035 is meaningless if that Army is defeated by a major power in 2027. This special commentary has identified major vulnerabilities that demand programmatic and organizational solutions urgently. While modernization for tomorrow is important, the Army cannot sacrifice readiness now.

Landpower Versus Jointness

The Army’s mission is to win the nation’s wars on land. While the Army will always operate as part of the Joint Force and support and be supported by other services, its primacy in land warfare is enshrined in law and policy.64 In the struggle for defense resources, other services may assert capabilities that substitute for Landpower or suggest one-service solutions to national strategic challenges.65 This possible assertion of capabilities is a fundamental error. Just as the Air Force enjoys primacy for air warfare and the Navy for war at sea, the Army is responsible for the outcome of conflicts waged on land. While sister services may deliver combat power against land targets inside the theater of operations, the ability to seize and control the land is determinate in major theater war.66 The foregoing argues for an Army sized, trained, and equipped to fulfill the nation’s strategic requirements in land campaigns. With an active end strength of 454,000, the Army remains too small to meet this test. Today, US airpower and sea power dominate potential adversaries; American Landpower does not. Army leaders must be ever mindful of their charter and push hard and persistently for parity and balance among the services.67

Summary

A study of the Army in 2026 suggests the transition from a land force optimized for the global war on terror to one focused on large-scale combat operations has progressed slowly. The Army remains too small, too light, and too weak in field artillery, short-range air defense, unmanned aircraft, and electronic warfare. Its personnel resources are concentrated where they cannot be used to best effect, in over-large, top-heavy staffs, in special operations units, and in specialized career fields far removed from troops. Army personnel policies are improperly focused on promotion equity and not on rewarding excellence on the battlefield. Program acquisition is troubled. In a ground war against China or Russia near their borders, the Army would be hard pressed to prevail—even with substantial help from allies and sister services.

None of this is new. The Army has been here before. Its roots run deep in the American experiment, and its resilience and adaptability are defining features of an institution unique among the Armed Forces. As Carl H. Builder explained:

The Army has never seen itself as having an independent sense of mission or purpose apart from the country’s . . . the Army is the nation’s most loyal and obedient servant. The Army, unlike the Air Force and Navy, has no vision of a war on its own terms. For the Army, war will always be on terms chosen by others—partly by the nation’s enemies, partly by the nation’s leadership—terms that are never satisfactory or welcome, but always to be met with a sense of duty, honor, and courage.68

As a flexible and forward-thinking organization, the Army does and should constantly strive to improve its capabilities in a dangerous world. This special commentary highlights areas of concern and suggests possible solutions. In an uncertain world, one thing is certain—the Army will be called upon again, and its success will depend on its readiness to fight and win. That goal above all is the true priority.

 
 

Richard D. Hooker Jr.
Colonel Richard D. Hooker Jr. (US Army, retired) is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council. His most recent book is The High Ground: Leading in Peace and War (Casemate and the Association of the United States Army, 2023).

 
 

Endnotes

  1. 1. Portions of this special commentary appeared previously at R. D. Hooker Jr., “Major Theater War: Challenges for the U.S. Army,” Association of the United States Army (AUSA, January 28, 2022,) https://www.ausa.org/publications/major-theater-war-challenges-us-army, and in other published articles as cited below.
  2. 2. See Nicholas M. Munves, FY2026 NDAA: Active Component End-Strength, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Insight IN12651 (CRS, February 6, 2026).
  3. 3. Hal Brands and Evan Braden Montgomery, “One War Is Not Enough: Strategy and Force Planning for Great-Power Competition,” Texas National Security Review 3, no. 2 (Spring 2020): 81.
  4. 4. See the author’s article: R. D. Hooker Jr., “Airpower in American Wars,” Survival 58, no. 6, (June 2016).
  5. 5. Joel Rayburn and Frank K. Sobchak, The U.S. Army in the Iraq War – Volume 1: Invasion – Insurgency – Civil War, 2003–2006 (Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press, 2019), 616, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/386/.
  6. 6. Eric V. Larson et al., Defense Planning in a Decade of Change: Lessons from the Base Force, Bottom-Up Review, and Quadrennial Defense Review (RAND Corporation, 2001), 25; and “Recognizing General Eric Shinseki on His Retirement as Army Chief of Staff,” Congressional Record Online 149, no. 90, (June, 2003).
  7. 7. See the author’s article: R. D. Hooker Jr., “The Army Is Too Light to Win,” Defense One, May 29, 2025, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2025/05/us-army-too-light-win/405669/.
  8. 8. Matthew D. Allgeyer, “The American Motor-Rifle Brigade: Issues with the Stryker Brigade Combat Team Concept,” Military Review 97, no. 4 (July-August 2017): 72.
  9. 9. James King, “Never Bring a Stryker to a Tank Fight,” Modern War Institute, May 2017.
  10. 10. Julian T. Urquidez, “The King Is Dead: Regaining the Throne: The Current State of the Field Artillery, Core Competency Atrophy, and the Way Ahead” (graduate thesis, US Marine Corps College of Command and Staff, 2011).
  11. 11. See Sean MacFarland et al., “The King and I: The Impending Crisis in Field Artillery’s Ability to Provide Fire Support to Maneuver Commanders” (white paper, prepared for the Chief of Staff of the Army, 2007), https://coinenirak.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/05/white-paper-field-artillery-mai-2008-sur-la-crise-de-lartillerie-en-coin.pdf.
  12. 12. David E. Johnson and David D. Halverson, Massed Fires, Not Organic Formations: The Case for Returning Field Artillery Battalions to the DivArty, Spotlight 20-1 (AUSA, April 2020), 5.
  13. 13. “Overmatched: Why the U.S. Military Must Reinvent Itself,” The New York Times, December 8, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/12/08/opinion/us-china-taiwan-military.html.
  14. 14. James Johnson et al., “Fires Lessons Learned,” in A Long, Hard Year: Russia-Ukraine War Lessons Learned 2023, ed. John A. Nagl and Michael T. Hackett (US Army War College Press, January 2026), 83, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/irps/2/.
  15. 15. David Zikusoka, “How Ukraine’s ‘Uber for Artillery’ Is Leading the Software War Against Russia,” New America, May 25, 2023.
  16. 16. Cedric T. Wins, "RDECOM's Road Map to Modernizing the Army: Long-Range Precision Fires," U.S. Army, September 26, 2018, https://www.army.mil/article/211569/rdecoms_road_map_to_modernizing_the_army_long_range_precision_fires.
  17. 17. Peter Felstead, “The US Army’s Search for New Self-Propelled Artillery: A Long Haul for Long Guns,” European Security and Defence, October 14, 2025, https://euro-sd.com/2025/10/articles/exclusive/47218/the-us-armys-search-for-new-self-propelled-artillery-a-long-haul-for-long-guns/.
  18. 18. Gary W. Beard, “Maneuver Air and Missile Defense in an Anti Access/Area Denial Environment” (graduate thesis, US Army War College, 2018), 6.
  19. 19. See Kateryna Bondar, “Inside Russia’s Plan to Build Autonomous Drone Swarms,” Breaking Defense, January 8, 2025, https://breakingdefense.com/2025/01/inside-russias-plan-to-build-autonomous-drone-swarms/.
  20. 20. James H. Dickinson, Army Air and Missile Defense Vision 2028 (US Army Air and Missile Defense Command, March 2019), 10, https://www.smdc.army.mil/Portals/38/Documents/Publications/Publications/SMDC_0120_AMD-BOOK_Finalv2.pdf.
  21. 21. Andrew Feickert, U.S. Army's Maneuver Short-Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD) System, CRS In Focus IF12397 (CRS, updated January 15, 2025).
  22. 22. David Kirichenko, “Artificial Intelligence’s Growing Role in Modern Warfare,” War Room, August 21, 2025, https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/ais-growing-role/.
  23. 23. David Kirichenko, “Russia Has Learned from Ukraine and Is Now Winning the Drone War,” UkraineAlert (blog), December 4, 2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/russia-has-learned-from-ukraine-and-is-now-winning-the-drone-war/.
  24. 24. Johannes Schmidt, “Agile Acquisition Now: Lessons from Ukraine,” U.S. Naval Institute, September 2024, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/september/agile-acquisition-now-lessons-ukraine.
  25. 25. Christopher J. Cox, Army Modernization (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2018); and Pete Hegseth, memorandum for senior Pentagon leadership, “Army Transformation and Acquisition Reform,” April 30, 2025, https://media.defense.gov/2025/May/01/2003702281/-1/-1/1/ARMY-TRANSFORMATION-AND-ACQUISITION-REFORM.PDF.
  26. 26. Justin Bronk, “America’s Drone Delusion: Why the Lessons of Ukraine Don’t Apply to a Conflict with China,” Foreign Affairs, December 15, 2025, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/americas-drone-delusion.
  27. 27. David Donald, “Armed Black Hawk Completes Qualification,” Aviation International News, February 6, 2018.
  28. 28. DAP stands for "direct air perpetrator."
  29. 29. Aaron Mehta and Ashley Roque, “Hegseth Orders ‘Comprehensive Transformation’ of US Army, Merging Offices and Cutting Weapons,” Breaking Defense, May 1, 2025.
  30. 30. Howard Altman, “The Lessons U.S. Army Aviation Is Learning from the War in Ukraine,” The War Zone, October 16, 2025, https://www.twz.com/air/the-lessons-u-s-army-aviation-is-learning-from-the-war-in-ukraine.
  31. 31. See the author’s article: R. D. Hooker Jr., “A New Army Air Force,” Joint Force Quarterly 114 (3rd quarter 2024), https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/joint-force-quarterly/vol114/iss2/14/.
  32. 32. Oriana Pawlyk, “Lawmakers Move Once Again to Rescue A-10 Warthog from Retirement,” Military News, June 12, 2020.
  33. 33. Hooker, “New Army Air Force.”
  34. 34. Russ Niles, “A-10 Retirement Moved Up Two Years,” Aviation News, June 30, 2025, https://avweb.com/aviation-news/a-10-retirement-moved-up-two-years/.
  35. 35. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2019 (Department of Defense, 2019), 64, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/AD1077680.pdf; and Lester Grau and Charles Bartles, The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces (US Army Foreign Military Studies Office, May 8, 2016), 289–90, https://oe.t2com.army.mil/product/the-russian-way-of-war-force-structure-tactics-and-modernization-of-the-russian-ground-forces-dr-lester-w-grau-and-charles-k-bartles-2/.
  36. 36. Tin Pak and Yu-cheng Chen, “Weaponizing the Electromagnetic Spectrum: The PRC’s High-Powered Microwave Warfare Ambitions,” China Brief 25, no. 9 (May 2025), https://jamestown.org/weaponizing-the-electromagnetic-spectrum-the-prcs-high-powered-microwave-warfare-ambitions/; and Clara Le Gargasson and James Black, “Electromagnetic Warfare: NATO’s Blind Spot Could Decide the Next Conflict,” RAND Corporation, November 24, 2025, https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/11/electromagnetic-warfare-natos-blind-spot-could-decide.html.
  37. 37. “[T]he Army lacks the ability to sense, locate, attack, and protect” across the electromagnetic spectrum, according to a January memo about the new electromagnetic spectrum operations (EMSO) concept of operations signed by General David Hodne, commander of Transformation and Training Command. Cited in Michael Peck, “US Army Revamping Its Electronic Warfare Acquisition System,” Defense News, February 25, 2026, https://www.defensenews.com/land/2026/02/25/us-army-revamping-its-electronic-warfare-acquisition-system/.
  38. 38. Mark Pomerleau, “Army to Provide ‘Transforming-in-Contact’ Units Electronic Warfare Prototypes for Divisions,” DefenseScoop, May 12, 2025, https://defensescoop.com/2025/05/12/army-transforming-in-contact-electronic-warfare-prototypes-divisions/.
  39. 39. “Electromagnetic Warfare Capabilities Update,” U.S. Army Acquisition Support Center, July 7, 2025, https://cpeisw.army.mil/2025/07/07/us-army-electromagnetic-warfare-capabilities-update/.
  40. 40. Parick Tucker, “The US Is Still Falling Behind on Electronic Warfare, Special Operators Warn,” Defense One, May 13, 2024, https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2024/05/us-still-falling-behind-electronic-warfare-special-operators-warn/396533/.
  41. 41. See Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 205–6; and R. D. Hooker Jr. and Joseph J. Collins, eds., Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War (National Defense University Press, 2015), 10, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/portals/68/documents/books/lessons-encountered/lessons-encountered.pdf.
  42. 42. See the author’s article: R. D. Hooker Jr., “America’s Special Operations Problem,” Joint Force Quarterly 108 (1st Quarter 2023), https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/3264605/americas-special-operations-problem/.
  43. 43. See Andrew Feickert and Ebrima M'Bai, Army Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs), CRS In Focus IF10675 (CRS, January 13, 2026), https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF10675.
  44. 44. For much of the Cold War, a far-larger Army facing far greater threats included far fewer SOF units. This fact suggests that expansion of Army SOF has gone too far and should be scaled back to pre-9/11 levels.
  45. 45. See the author’s article: R. D. Hooker Jr., “The Army Is Too Top Heavy,” Defense One, December 10, 2024, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2024/12/army-too-top-heavy/401571/.
  46. 46. Government Accountability Office, Defense Headquarters: DOD Needs to Reassess Personnel Requirements for the Office of Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and Military Service Secretariats, GAO-15-10 (Government Accountability Office, January 2015), 10–17, https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-15-10.
  47. 47. Stephen Dalzell et al., Main Command Post-Operational Detachments (MCP-ODs) and Division Headquarters Readiness (RAND Corporation, June 2019), 9–10.
  48. 48. Rick Berger, “All the Ways the US Military’s Infrastructure Crisis Is Getting Worse,” Defense One, March 27, 2019, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/03/us-militarys-infrastructure-crisis-only-getting-worse/155858/.
  49. 49. “The US Army’s recent history is replete with spectacular acquisition program failures.” Thomas Holland, “How the Army Ought to Write Requirements,” Military Review (November/December 2019): 1.
  50. 50. Army General Officer Management Office.
  51. 51. See the author’s article: R. D. Hooker Jr., “Building a Warrior Ethos,” RealClear Defense, July 8, 2025, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2025/07/08/building_a_warrior_ethos_1121272.html.
  52. 52. Ben Freeman, Star Creep: The Costs of a Top-Heavy Military (Third Way, updated January 7, 2013), https://www.thirdway.org/report/star-creep-the-costs-of-a-top-heavy-military.
  53. 53. See “More Brass, More Bucks: Officer Inflation in Today’s Military,” Project on Government Oversight, March 1, 1998, https://www.pogo.org/reports/more-brass-more-bucks-officer-inflation-in-todays-military.
  54. 54. Lawrence Kapp, General and Flag Officers in the U.S. Armed Forces: Background and Considerations for Congress, CRS Report R44389, ver. 5 (CRS, February 1, 2019), https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R44389/R44389.5.pdf.
  55. 55. Gregory C. McCarthy, “Are There Too Many General Officers for Today’s Military?,” Joint Force Quarterly 87 (4th Quarter 2017), https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/article/1325984/are-there-too-many-general-officers-for-todays-military/. Of the Army’s 380 or so general officers, only 30 serve in combat divisions.
  56. 56. Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller), FY2026 President's Budget Highlights (US Army, 2026), 15. https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2026/pbr/FY26%20Presidents%20Budget%20Highlights.pdf.
  57. 57. See Leonard Wong and Stephen J. Gerras, Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession (US Army War College Press, February 2015), https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/466/.
  58. 58. From 2001 to 2011, the military added 99 general and flag officer positions. Ben Freeman, “Today’s Military: The Most Top-Heavy Force in U.S. History,” Project on Government Oversight, November 29, 2011, https://www.pogo.org/analyses/todays-military-most-top-heavy-force-in-us-history.
  59. 59. John J. McGrath, The Other End of the Spear: The Tooth-to-Tail Ratio (T3R) in Modern Military Operations (Combat Studies Institute Press, 2007), 85, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/mcgrath_op23.pdf.
  60. 60. Hooker Jr., “Too Top Heavy.”
  61. 61. Department of the Army, 2019 Army Modernization Strategy (Department of the Army, October 2019). https://www.army.mil/article/228552/2019_army_modernization_strategy.
  62. 62. See Jon Bate and Theo Lipsky, “A Clearer Mirror: The Promise of Combat Training Center Data,” Modern War Institute, January 7, 2025, https://mwi.westpoint.edu/a-clearer-mirror-the-promise-of-combat-training-center-data/.
  63. 63. Thomas X. Hammes, “Autonomous Weapons Are the Moral Choice,” New Atlanticist (blog), November 2, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/autonomous-weapons-are-the-moral-choice/.
  64. 64. Department of Defense, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components, Department of Defense Directive 5100.01, incorporating Change 1 (Department of Defense, September 17, 2020). https://www.esd.whs.mil/portals/54/documents/dd/issuances/dodd/510001p.pdf.
  65. 65. See Richard Hallion, Storm over Iraq: Air power and the Gulf War (Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992); and Daniel L. Byman and Matthew C. Waxman, “Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate,” International Security 24, no. 4 (2000), https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/24/4/5/11660/Kosovo-and-the-Great-Air-Power-Debate?searchresult=1.
  66. 66. Francis G. Hoffman, “What the QDR Ought to Say About Landpower,” Parameters 43, no. 4 (Winter 2013–14): 8, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol43/iss4/17/.
  67. 67. See the author’s article: Richard D. Hooker, “ ‘The Strange Voyage’: A Short Précis on Strategy,” Parameters 43, no. 1 (Spring 2013), https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol43/iss1/10/.
  68. 68. Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis – A RAND Corporation Research Study (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 33.
 
 

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