Welcome to the Summer 2026 issue of Parameters, which consists of two In Focus special commentaries, three forums (Indo-Pacific, Strategy, and Historical Studies), and the Strategic Competition Corner.
In the first In Focus special commentary, “The State of the US Army,” Richard D. Hooker Jr. argues that the US Army remains dangerously optimized for counterinsurgency, leaving it ill-equipped for a high-intensity ground war against near-peer adversaries like China or Russia. He offers actionable frameworks to reallocate personnel resources and address critical gaps in field artillery, electronic warfare, and short-range air defense. The second special commentary, “Fighting for Intelligence in Large-Scale Combat Operations: The Role of the Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Battalion–Next,” by Richard Appelhans, Michael Liesmann, B. Clay Jackson, and Mikael Heikkinen, contends the US Army’s proposed intelligence and electronic warfare battalion–next concept constitutes an organizational solution essential for achieving intelligence dominance in large-scale combat. The authors provide insights into how the Army is adapting to the future of warfare.
The first forum, Indo-Pacific, features two articles. In the first, “Geopolitical Chessboard: How Vietnam Shapes American-Chinese Competition,” Kiet H. Lê and Hiep X. Trần contend that the United States should support Vietnam’s neutrality and strategic autonomy as a means of countering Chinese influence. They offer practical insights for military and policy practitioners about how geography shapes alliance formation and strategic competition. The second article, “Key Themes in Sino-American History,” by David J. Lorenzo and Ian Murphy, examines how historical narratives shape the messaging of the Chinese Communist Party and the People’s Republic of China, particularly regarding Sino-American relations. The article advocates for the integration of Sino-American historical content into professional military education curricula to enhance strategic awareness and policy formulation.
The second forum, Strategy, contains two articles. In the first, “Rethinking Power: E. H. Carr’s Enduring Lessons for Modern Strategists,” Brian J. Hasse argues E. H. Carr’s classic conception of power provides enduring lessons for national security. He identifies what a balanced conception of power looks like in practice, with the hope of informing US national security strategy and policy in today’s complex security environment. The second article, “How Is Going to War Like Buying a Car?: The Bargaining Model of War,” by Richard R. Johnson, explores the bargaining model of war, which examines how nations communicate signals regarding military strength, resolve to fight, and foreign policy goals.
The third forum, Historical Studies, includes two articles. In “A New Security Framework for NATO’s Eastern Flank,” Matthew J. Kukla and Anna Batta argue for a NATO-EU–led security strategy to achieve long-term deterrence in Ukraine after the end of the Russia-Ukraine War. The proposed solution provides strategic planners and policymakers with a low-risk, high-reward approach that leverages burden sharing through a multinational framework. The second article, “Turning Tactical Victories into Strategic Success: Counterinsurgency in the Irish Civil War, 1922–23,” by Gareth Prendergast and John A. Nagl, posits that the fundamentals the Irish National Army used in the Irish Civil War (1922–23) are a model for the successful application of a classic counterinsurgency. The authors offer practical guidance for how counterinsurgent forces can foster trust and use appropriate tactics that lead to strategic success.
The issue closes out with the Strategic Competition Corner by Antulio J. Echevarria II. In “Closing the Gap Between Threat and Rival,” Echevarria argues that US defense professionals could leverage interstate rivalry frameworks to reduce strategic uncertainty and to inform force-structure and force-allocation decisions. This analysis will benefit defense professionals responsible for directing war-gaming efforts, as they can test strategic-rivalry theory. ~CAP