Review Essay
The Army: A Primer to Our Profession of Arms – Field Manual 1
by Headquarters, Department of the Army
Reviewed by Colonel Darren Buss, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, US Army War College; and Dr. John A. Nagl, General John J. Pershing Professor of Warfighting Studies, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, US Army War College
The United States Army is the foundation of the country. A bold statement, certainly, but in many ways a true one. The Army predates the nation and created it.
The Second Continental Congress created the Army on June 14, 1775; George Washington assumed command of the Army a few weeks later, on July 3—a year and a day before the signing of the Declaration of Independence from Great Britain, marking the founding of the greatest country the world has ever known.
That volunteer US Army defeated the world’s greatest power, Great Britain, through force of arms over the next five years, culminating in victory at the Battle of Yorktown in 1781; famously, Lord Charles Cornwallis had the British band play “The World Turned Upside Down” at the surrender of his Army. Although the Crown had slipped, it would not fall until that same British Army was bled white at the Battle of the Somme more than a century later, picked up by the same Americans who started the end of the British Empire with their pesky revolution.
Since Yorktown, the Army has expanded and contracted to meet the needs of the nation. Army Captain Meriwether Lewis and Second Lieutenant William Clark led the Army-based Corps of Discovery Expedition that opened the continent; it was the Army that later secured the continent from sea to shining sea, defeating the native inhabitants and taming the nation’s great rivers through the Army Corps of Engineers.
Generations later, it was the Grand Army of the Republic that answered Abraham Lincoln’s call and preserved the Union. That same Army played the deciding role on the Western Front in World War I and defeated fascism in World War II. Thomas Ricks called the Civil War the Old Testament and the World War II the New Testament of the Army.
The years since its triumph in the greatest war the world has ever known have been hard ones for the Army; it fought to a draw in Korea and was defeated in Vietnam and Afghanistan. Its lone triumph came in Iraq, during Operation Desert Storm, a victory that tasted like defeat after the toppling of Saddam Hussein a decade later resulted in a prolonged insurgency that left the Middle East and America unsettled.
America celebrated the victory in Desert Storm with a military parade in Washington, DC, a parade that was repeated for the Army’s 250th birthday celebration in June 2025. The recent parade was a history lesson that included tanks and artillery pieces and soldiers wearing the uniforms of the Army that fought, bled, and died in each of our nation’s wars since its founding.
A month before the 250th birthday parade, the Army—importantly and appropriately—published a revised The Army: A Primer to Our Profession of Arms – Field Manual (FM) 1. This book tells the story of the Army in a format easily accessible to new lieutenants and sergeants who are assuming leadership positions for the first time. It inspires them with the stories of their predecessors, men and women just like them—many volunteers, some compelled to serve by the power of the state, all of them risking their lives and their well-being for their nation and, fundamentally, for each other.
While priming new members to the profession of arms, FM 1 provides inspiration, context, and references for all soldiers. The foreword and opening preface expertly set the foundation and describe the manual’s purpose. The foreword, written by the Chief of Staff of the Army General Randy George, succinctly describes the manual’s purpose while noting its relevance to all soldiers. The opening preface, “Joining the Army Profession,” effectively leverages Specialist Salvador “Sal” Guinta’s combat experience in Afghanistan to convey the need for all Army soldiers and civilians to uphold the Army’s dual mission: caring for its soldiers while accomplishing the mission.
The manual’s chapters, organized into sections, describe the American soldier (warrior, professional, leader), the Army’s role (mission, structure, soldiers), and the Army’s obligations (to teammates, to civilian leaders, and to fellow citizens). Like the preface, each chapter begins with a quote followed by a historical vignette of a soldier whose actions merit consideration. Readers benefit from in-text references to Army and Joint publications that encourage additional study. Pencil sketches reminiscent of World War II soldier artwork enhance the narrative while illustrating the Army’s historical lineage and current capabilities. Four appendices define key terms, describe essential doctrinal publications, and provide the profession’s oaths and creeds. The organization of the manual makes it easily digestible by a broad audience while avoiding the density typical of doctrinal publications, including the previous version published two decades ago with the Army still adapting to the growing insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan.
This revision of FM 1 comes at a pivotal time for the Army, which is changing in size, structure, and tempo, as it has many times before, to meet Department of War priorities while also transforming to prevail in future operations. Today’s Army, like the Army of the late 1930s or 1990s, looks to a horizon where, should deterrence fail, large-scale combat looms. As recent relevant combat experience wanes from within the Army’s ranks, professional soldiers must read this manual, require their subordinates to do likewise, and lead earnest conversations about our profession to safeguard its future and the nation it created.
Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2025 ▪ 74 pages
Keywords: profession of arms, American soldier, Army values, military ethics, leadership
Strategy
The Impossible Mission: The Office of Security Cooperation and the U.S. Forces Drawdown in Iraq
by Robert L. Caslen Jr.
Reviewed by Dr. Kate Tietzen-Wisdom, US Army Center of Military History
Starting a war is one thing; ending it is another. In The Impossible Mission, Robert L. Caslen Jr. takes readers through the frenzied conclusion of the Iraq War. Caslen arrived in Iraq in September 2011 after being tapped to lead the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I), a small force tasked with training local partners and managing military equipment transfers. Three years prior, President George W. Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki signed an agreement that stipulated the withdrawal of American forces from Iraq no later than December 31, 2011. Several US senior leaders expected a new deal would allow a large residual force to stay; however, it became clear by October 2011 that Washington and Baghdad could not agree on terms, prompting President Barack H. Obama to order a complete withdrawal. The OSC-I, and its 157 troops, would remain behind as the only US military presence in Iraq.
Part memoir of Caslen’s command and part history of the OSC-I, this book fills an important gap in Iraq War literature, one that often overlooks the critical transition between Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003–10) / New Dawn (2010–11) to Operation Inherent Resolve (2014–). In an era of overclassification and amid the growing declassification backlog, this welcome work makes for a great primary source.
Caslen’s frustration with the events is palpable and justified. With the war in Iraq officially ending, OSC-I found itself in chaos. Its personnel were tasked to conduct foreign military sales (FMS), as its contractors provided training and security tasks. However, the organization’s existence and performance were immediately handicapped by a bureaucratic battle between the then–Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of State (DoS). For one, both departments had competing visions for Iraq. The other issue was legal: OSC-I was a DoS Title 22 (security assistance) mission and, therefore, could not tap into DoD Title 10 (security cooperation) funds.
The book illustrates how various US entities considered the OSC-I as persona non grata. While the DoS clearly resented Caslen’s office, in his telling, other DoD commands refused to help in times of need. Even DoD leadership in the Pentagon or at US Central Command (CENTCOM) seemed to forget about the OSC-I at crucial points. As US forces left Iraq, benefits, including mail delivery and the clothing and sales exchange, went with them. Once, Caslen could not pay for a haircut after the office managing the Eagle debit card system closed. The general had to make many phone calls to restore those services.
Despite the interagency infighting, OSC-I attempted to complete its mission. Yet, Caslen details how the outdated FMS system, created for the Cold War, combined with inflexible and somewhat contradictory US legal codes, complicated OSC-I’s purpose. Furthermore, it became clear that “Americanizing” the Iraqi security forces was not working. Caslen believes the United States failed to identify the proper decisionmakers to ensure suitable lines of effort.
The US mission struggled to adapt as the host nation flexed its sovereignty. Almost immediately after American troops departed, Iraqi officials began detaining contractors, citing their lack of permission to work in the country. American goods were also held at the border as they had not paid import taxes. At one point, the situation had become so dire for OSC-I that the US Embassy had to supply emergency MREs. Meanwhile, the DoS would not issue diplomatic passports to OSC-I staffers, forcing them to seek Iraqi visas initially. Iraqi authorities held Caslen’s passport for nearly three months before it was stamped.
Political realities ultimately blocked a deal to keep US forces in Iraq. Chief among them was the nonnegotiable issue of legal immunity for troops, a point the book understates. For the Obama administration, the potential of detained US servicemembers was too much of a political risk. The legacy of prior US misconduct, including the Abu Ghraib prison scandal and events in Haditha, Yusufiyah, and Nisour Square, haunted the Iraqis. Even though individuals who perpetrated those crimes faced (some levels) of justice, they did so in the United States—not in Iraq. The Maliki government was in no mood to offer further protection from criminal prosecution.
Caslen contends that the United States should have remained in Iraq to honor the sacrifices of its servicemembers (more than 4,600 killed and 32,000 plus wounded) to ensure stability and check Maliki’s autocratic tendencies, which Caslen blames for the rise of ISIS. To be sure, the Iraqi leader was no angel. The book, however, does not consider how critical the Arab Spring and subsequent Syrian Civil War were to ISIS; the chaos reinvigorated the Sunni insurgency. Although a continued US presence might have helped, one cannot correctly assess the near collapse of the Iraqi state without considering this crucial context.
While Caslen’s perspective is invaluable, several issues—repetitive narratives, copy-edit mistakes, factual errors, and missing citations—limit the book’s overall impact on Iraq War historiography. Nevertheless, readers will undoubtedly be convinced that, due to a lack of authority, funding, and higher-echelon support, OSC-I’s mission in Iraq was indeed doomed, or “impossible,” from the start.
Outskirts Press, 2025 ▪ 327 pages
Keywords: Iraq War, Iraq, Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq, withdrawal, U.S. Army
Look for the podcast coming soon at https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Podcasts/Conversations-on-Strategy/
Securing Space: A Plan for U.S. Action
by Nina M. Armagno and Jane Harman, chairs, and Esther D. Brimmer, project director
Reviewed by USSF Lieutenant Colonel David C. Zesinger, aerospace operations director, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, US Army War College
In Securing Space: A Plan for U.S. Action, retired United States Space Force Lieutenant General Nina Armagno and former California State Representative Jane Harman (CA-38) offer practical choices the United States must make to preserve superiority in the space domain. Each paragraph conveys a sense of urgency, as American dominance in space hangs in the balance. Space, after all, affects every aspect of modern life and underpins the global economy, significantly transforming the American way of war. This vital domain is increasingly vulnerable to external threats and environmental factors, and Securing Space offers a roadmap to navigate these obstacles.
The authors begin by highlighting the drastic advances in space, noting the “changing nature of space,” which is no longer the exclusive realm of a few superpowers. Today, nearly half the world’s nations and dozens of commercial entities possess space assets. This crowded arena developing the final frontier, while ostensibly a good thing, makes for a continuously contested and congested environment. In this context, US leadership must curb unrestrained adversaries and establish respected norms for operating in orbit.
Moreover, the nascent statutes from the Sputnik and Apollo eras are no longer sufficient. As the authors point out, “the international organizations and treaties currently governing space were not designed with the proliferation of actors and the rapid rise in space traffic in mind” (vi). Therefore, the current administration must prioritize American-led cooperation in space and improve space traffic management. The authors ominously warn that “in the increasingly chaotic realm of space, the United States’ position is slipping” (3). This sentiment is echoed on Earth, where pugnacious Russia and China repeatedly disregard international norms and test the boundaries of safe and acceptable conduct across air, land, and sea.
With more than 40,000 softball-sized objects orbiting overhead—and commercial innovation reducing the cost of launching a payload from $8,100 per kilogram in 2005 to $2,600 today—cooperation in space is a must. The lines are already being drawn. In his first administration, President Trump launched the Artemis Accords, a 60-nation (and growing) agreement that seeks to align space norms with American ideals and return humans to the moon by 2027. In response, China and Russia established the International Lunar Research Station in 2021, joined by 17 primarily non-Western aligned nations, presumably supporting China’s competing vision for space and the establishment of a lunar base on a similar timeline.
Another recommendation is to treat space as a “global commons” akin to the high seas and open trade, where all can benefit (41). While a lofty idea and appropriate approach, it will prove challenging as global geopolitics shift toward great-power competition—even among allies. The authors note that “the space economy needs a peaceful and predictable environment, and humanity needs powerful countries to make responsible choices. The threat of miscalculation is real” (44). America is best positioned to lead with proper governance.
While the choices presented are sensible, from a military perspective, the need to declassify space to the public remains as another, ironic, key to “securing space.” The report underscores the rapid gains made by adversaries, including the deployment of offensive capabilities. The United States must choose to better publicize Chinese and Russian space capabilities. Satellites are highly vulnerable, and their infrastructure and signals are susceptible to interference on earth and in space (and everywhere in between). Adversaries are engaging in “gray-zone” activities—actions that push the boundaries of hostility—making space a prime target. The public must understand the vulnerability of space. Declassification and public awareness will drive investment and enable better coordination between Department of War elements to leverage multidomain effects.
This report serves as a critical waypoint in identifying the threats in space and reiterating the importance of this domain to our collective way of life. The proposed solutions—focused on promotion, partnerships, and policy—offer a viable path for America to reassert its leadership in space for decades to come. These choices involve strategic adjustments, rather than financial burdens, making them practical and feasible to accomplish.
Council on Foreign Relations, 2025 ▪ 84 pages
Free download available at https://www.cfr.org/task-force-report/securing-space.
Keywords: space, Space Force, great-power competition, resilience, hard power
Irregular Warfare
The Spy and the State: The History of American Intelligence
by Jeffrey P. Rogg
Reviewed by Dr. Thomas W. Spahr, Francis W. De Serio Chair of Strategic and Theater Intelligence, US Army War College
While civil-military relations has been a robust field since Samuel Huntington’s seminal The Soldier and the State (1957), civil-intelligence relations has lagged. In The Spy and the State: The History of American Intelligence, Jeffrey P. Rogg fills this void, offering a work that is poised to become a staple in college classrooms.
Rogg brings significant expertise to this project, holding degrees in history, law, and security studies. His professional background includes academic roles within the US Naval Academy and US Special Operations Command; he currently serves as a senior research fellow at the Global and National Security Institute. While this topic is deeply researched and complex, Rogg, an accomplished author, avoids the stylistic pitfalls of many dissertation-based books.
The Spy and the State is logically organized into four sections, each with approximately six concise chapters, starting with the American Revolution and ending with the first Trump administration. By reaching back to the American Revolution, the work demonstrates that the tension between secrecy and transparency, security and liberty, and the idea that Americans are morally above employing “sneaky spies,” dates to early America (149). A central theme of the work is the United States’ historical resistance to professionalizing intelligence. Rogg argues this hesitation created a damaging “boom-and-bust” cycle for US intelligence. During crises, the government expanded capabilities recklessly; in the aftermath of perceived overreach, they drastically—and dangerously—reduced them. Rogg contends that maintaining a nonpartisan, professional force accountable to Congress, and thus the American people, is essential for security and liberty.
The Spy and the State covers the expanse of the Intelligence Community, including chapters on the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and early military intelligence in the Navy and the Army. Rogg details the “firm wall” between domestic law enforcement and foreign collection, noting that efforts to maintain this separation have occasionally led to catastrophic failures, including the September 11 attacks. Rogg dedicates several chapters to J. Edgar Hoover’s leadership of the FBI from the interwar period into the Cold War, when the newly formed Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the then–Department of Defense (DoD) seized authority over external intelligence. Rogg traces how the DoD became the dominant entity in the US Intelligence Community (USIC), expressing concern over the current military dominance as the Internet and ubiquitous surveillance are revolutionizing intelligence.
Rogg’s central thesis is that while intelligence is an inextricable part of American history, the public remains deeply uncomfortable with it—especially when they feel they are the targets of collection. This anxiety affects how Americans control and organize intelligence and was exacerbated in every era by popular literature. As Rogg progresses through American history, he describes how spy novels, academic journals, and newspapers affected the American populace’s perception of intelligence.
Do not be intimidated by this book’s girth (609 pages) because its final chapters, “Revelation Without Reform” and “In Intelligence We Trust,” are among its best. Rogg hammers home his argument with familiar examples to demonstrate the dangers of an uneducated public and the politicization of intelligence. He renders harsh criticism on intelligence officers, active and former, who use their credibility to advocate for political candidates, arguing that a lesson of history is that “anytime intelligence and politics have mixed . . . the outcome was bad for both the USIC and the country” (437). Partisan intelligence officers exacerbate American distrust, leading to limitations on intelligence when the nation’s security requires it most.
Some of Rogg’s judgments remain open to debate. Rogg considers the CIA’s enhanced interrogation program and the National Security Agency’s (NSA) President’s Surveillance Program (PSP) as being of “unclear or at least unproven” effectiveness (426). While it is clear these programs compromise American values, a final judgment on their efficacy remains elusive until more records are declassified. Additionally, while Rogg paints a bleak picture of technology making citizens “less safe and less free,” he offers few specific prescriptions for how the public can effectively intervene (453). I presume through better education and a more active role in Congress, but that remains unclear, perhaps because of the complexity of this problem in a highly polarized America.
The Spy and the State is an essential history for intelligence professionals, politicians, and the public. It challenges us to bridge the gap between the American people and the Intelligence Community. The American people and the USIC have much to learn about each other, and The Spy and the State should help this relationship.
Oxford University Press, 2025 ▪ 609 pages
Keywords: intelligence, American history, civil-intelligence relations, counterintelligence
Winning Without Fighting: Irregular Warfare and Strategic Competition in the 21st Century
by Rebecca Patterson, Susan Bryant, Ken Gleiman, and Mark Troutman
Reviewed by Dr. John A. Nagl, General John J. Pershing Professor of Warfighting Studies, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, US Army War College
©2026 John A. Nagl
On a recent holiday, several undersea cables between Estonia and Finland were damaged, including the severing of one power line. Finland then seized a Russian ship it believed was responsible for the sabotage. This incident is just one example of a growing number of disturbing attacks across Europe targeting countries, businesses, and individuals supporting Ukraine’s defense against Russia. While many of these attacks appear to originate from Vladimir Putin’s regime, others seem to have Chinese origins. Meanwhile, the People’s Republic of China is conducting increasingly brazen operations in its own hemisphere against nations that oppose its territorial ambitions in East Asia. These actions are variously labeled as gray–zone warfare, irregular warfare, or hybrid war—all designed to advance the interests of the states conducting them while remaining below the threshold that would trigger a military response.
The United States and its allies have struggled to mount a comprehensive response to these assaults on the rules-based international order (RBIO). Fortunately, four retired Army officers—three of whom hold graduate degrees from Georgetown University and all of whom are respected national security practitioners and thinkers—have stepped into the breach with a book that systematically addresses this challenge. Their book, Winning Without Fighting: Irregular Warfare and Strategic Competition in the 21st Century, proposes nothing less than a new grand strategy for America in the wake of the two decades of counterinsurgency campaigns. I would say so even if I were not personally acquainted with all four authors and a former close colleague of two.
In the introduction, they rightly observe that since the collapse of the Soviet Union, “America has lacked a guiding grand strategy for leveraging its impressive means to achieve major ends and defend vital interests” (1–2). They also note that “China and Russia seek to contest the ability of the US to legitimately wield power and influence and foster an alternative international order that promotes values like sovereignty over human rights” (4). So far, so good.
However, I part ways with my friends when they continue that thought: “they are unlikely to initiate World War III to achieve those outcomes” because “[m]odern war is simply too costly, especially when fought against a technologically advanced military”(4). Do not get me wrong—I wish that were true. I spent my recent vacation reading about the Combined Bombing Offensive (CBO), the Battle of Guadalcanal, and Nimitz’s island-hopping campaign. History shows that even though modern war against a technologically advanced military is costly in lives and treasure, states continue to roll the iron dice of war. Putin invaded Ukraine less than four years ago, sparking the largest war in Europe since the aforementioned CBO shattered Germany. Every generation seems to relearn that war is nasty and brutish—and rarely as short as the initiators expect. I am not at all confident that Putin has learned this lesson, or that China’s President Xi Jinping is taking notes on why not to invade Taiwan.
I have one complaint about Winning Without Fighting—but it is a significant one. I strongly agree with statements like: “Failure to perceive these (gray zone) activities as warfare and central to strategic competition impedes America’s ability to compete geopolitically” and “[p]ast American strategies have neglected the role that information, resilience, and economics play in generating power, influence, and legitimacy” (5, 15).
I also support many of the book’s recommendations for a new grand strategy—one that emphasizes increasing American and allied resilience and employs irregular warfare tactics to challenge adversaries. For example, “China’s increasing vulnerabilities—a slowing economy, faltering BRI [Belt and Road Initiative] investments, and a declining and restive population . . . all provide opportunities to decrease Chinese influence and legitimacy through non-military means (such as by offering economic incentives to counter BRI), by fomenting domestic dissent, or both” (217).
I am not willing, however—as the authors apparently are—to invest in comparatively inexpensive instruments of power like information and diplomacy at the expense of hard–power tools like aircraft carriers. Admittedly, when the only tool you have is a hammer, many problems look like nails—but when you need to drive a nail, only a hammer will do. I fundamentally disagree with the authors’ assertion that our current defense budget “over-invests limited American resources and capabilities towards one particular threat at the expense of other priorities” and that “another fundamental problem is that most of these expenditures are in conventional military capabilities for great-power war” (216). Rather than stepping back from investing in hard power, I agree with the Commission on the National Defense Strategy that America is dramatically underinvesting in weapons, munitions, and the defense industrial base—by as much as $500 billion a year, or roughly an additional two percent of GDP.
I do not oppose additional investments in the State Department or recreating the US Information Agency, as the authors recommend, but not at the expense of more Burke-class destroyers, Virginia-class attack submarines, or an additional heavy corps stationed in Eastern Europe. I marked my copy of the book with a question in the final chapter—one I will leave with readers of this review: Why not both?
Cambria Press, 2024 ▪ 332 pages
Keywords: irregular warfare, grand strategy, resilience, gray zone, hard power
Economic War: Ukraine and the Global Conflict Between Russia and the West
by Maximilian Hess
Reviewed by Dr. Joel R. Hillison, director, National Security Policy and Strategy, Department of Distance Education, US Army War College
While the United States faces increasing threats from around the globe, it sorely misunderstands the advantages and limitations of geoeconomics. In his book, Economic War: Ukraine and the Global Conflict Between Russia and the West, Maximilian Hess, a political risk analyst and fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, describes the beginning and evolution of the economic war between the United States and Russia, from 2012–23. In doing so, Hess exposes the economic strengths and weaknesses of the United States and Russia in conducting economic warfare in the context of the conflict in Ukraine. The book’s main argument is that global competition is primarily being carried out in the economic realm using energy, sanctions, and financial assets to wage war. Each chapter examines a different move or countermove in this global competition. The book ends with insights into how economic warfare between the United States and China might differ from the current struggle with Russia.
The book begins by tying the Maidan protests in 2013 and 2014 to Russia’s broader aims to weaken the dominant role of the United States in the global economic order. Hess describes how Putin used energy and financial resources as leverage to keep Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych within Moscow’s sphere of influence. When Yanukovych fled to Russia, Putin turned to his military to seize Crimea and support a separatist movement in Eastern Ukraine.
In response, the United States and Europe imposed painful, yet permeable sanctions on Russia. The book does a good job discussing how the West unsuccessfully attempted to use sanctions to punish Russia and deter further Russian aggression. At the same time, Russia skillfully used a combination of economic incentives based on Europe’s dependency upon Russian natural gas to create fissures among the allies. While the sanctions hurt the Russian economy, Putin took the opportunity to tighten political control while rising energy prices muted the domestic impact of the sanctions.
The book then shifts to other actors and theaters in the economic war under way. Hess describes how Russia pursued other partners to push back against US economic dominance in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. Even US allies, such as Türkiye, placed their economic self-interest over their ties to the West enabling Russia to evade the worst effects of sanctions. The attempted isolation of Russia also strengthened the partnership between China and Russia, though the benefits accrued more heavily on China’s side.
Perhaps the most important part comes after the second invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This section clearly describes the limitations and costs of efforts by the West to punish Russia for its invasion of Ukraine and to coerce them to restore Ukraine’s sovereignty. While Europe was able to reduce its energy dependence upon Russia significantly, it suffered heavy economic costs. Russia found new customers elsewhere, though at a significant discount to market prices. The United States used its dominant role in global finance to restrict Russian banks from the SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications) process and deterred other countries from openly evading sanctions on Russia. Even then, the United States and its allies were reluctant to decouple fully from Russian energy due to fears of accelerating inflation and the inability to compensate for lost energy supplies.
The book then briefly discusses how economic warfare would differ between the United States and China as China does not have the energy resources that Russia has used to great effect in Ukraine. China, however, has a much larger economy and is much more interdependent with the United States. China’s large foreign reserves, denominated in US dollars, are a source of power and a vulnerability for China. China is therefore unlikely to use these reserves to damage the US economy.
While the defense community has a minor role in economic warfare, short of using the military to pursue economic objectives, senior leaders need to understand the nature of economic warfare as they develop whole-of-government strategies to compete with states like China and Russia. This book nicely fills that need as it clearly describes the complex and adaptive nature of the global economy and the various tensions that arise from using sanctions and other economic tools to achieve security objectives.
Although the author does a thorough job of describing economic warfare and the limitations of each side, the book would have benefited from a few charts and maps to better synthesize the information. That said, the book is well researched and written. Anyone interested in geoeconomics would benefit from reading it.
Hurst & Co., 2023 ▪ 344 pages
Keywords: global economic order, trade, geoeconomics, international relations
How Drones Fight: How Small Drones Are Revolutionizing Warfare
by Lars Celander
Reviewed by Colonel Chase Metcalf, assistant professor, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, US Army War College
Lars Celander, a former Swedish Army technician and design engineer with a Master of Science in physics, offers a compact survey of small drone systems, operational employment, and emerging trends in drone warfare. In an era where unmanned systems are reshaping the tactical fight and operational-level planning, How Drones Fight serves as a useful primer for military professionals seeking to understand the enabling technologies and evolving concepts driving this transformation. While written in accessible terms, the book is best suited for readers seeking foundational knowledge rather than rigorous doctrinal analysis.
The book consists of 16 short chapters grouped into four broad sections. The book’s first section outlines the physics and engineering behind drone systems, covering types of drones, navigation, sensors, communications, weapons, and their limitations. Celander’s concise descriptions give lay readers or new military practitioners a solid technical baseline. For readers already familiar with unmanned systems, this section may feel introductory.
The second section transitions to tactical employment. Celander addresses how drones support a range of missions and considerations for countering them. Particularly intriguing is his discussion of “fighter drones” to clear enemy drones from the battlespace, a useful idea that invites further development (85–86). While descriptive, the section hints at operational dilemmas facing commanders navigating contested, drone-saturated environments.
The third section reviews drone use in recent conflicts, including the Global War on Terror, the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, and the Russia-Ukraine War. Although brief, these case studies cover core issues, including the role of drones as part of combined arms teams, the implications of persistent surveillance and battlefield transparency, and the psychological impact of constant drone presence. This useful section could benefit from greater analytical depth and sourcing.
The final section presents the author’s thoughts on future drone warfare, including a few potentially provocative arguments. Celander suggests that as drone technology matures, it “might be more efficient to standardize on a small number of drone types and then produce them in huge quantities” (154). This economy-of-scale approach, akin to the Department of Defense Replicator initiative, merits scrutiny given the rapid pace of technological change and emerging counter-drone capabilities but invites debate over cost, interoperability, and the risks of standardizing platforms too early.
More significantly, Celander argues that drones offer “less expensive and more disposable airpower” that transforms air superiority from something you “achieve and retain” to something you “stock up on and spend as required” (155). This conceptual shift envisions using low-cost drone swarms to achieve localized air superiority for defined periods. Whether focused on the close fight and integrated with more traditional airpower doctrine or considered more expansively, this proposal deserves serious consideration from Joint Force planners.
Readers should understand the book’s limitations. It focuses narrowly on “how” drones fight without addressing policy or acquisition recommendations in depth, which may frustrate those looking for concrete implications related to force development or modernization. Furthermore, while the book includes a bibliography with relevant sources, the lack of in-text citations undermines readers ability to evaluate the author’s claims, particularly regarding cost-effectiveness and lessons from recent conflicts.
Still, How Drones Fight succeeds in its intent to explain how small drones function and how they might shape future warfare. It complements more policy-oriented or theoretical works (for example, Paul Scharre’s Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War [W. W. Norton & Company, 2019] or Michael Boyle’s The Drone Age: How Drone Technology Will Change War and Peace [Oxford University Press, 2020]) by grounding its insights in technology and tactics. Military professionals in early conceptual design, war gaming, or professional military education environments may find it a helpful launchpad for discussion.
In sum, while the book stops short of doctrinal depth or policy relevance, it raises important questions about the fundamentals of drone warfare. For readers willing to supply their critical lens, Celander’s work offers a useful, if sometimes speculative, foundation for understanding the evolving battlespace.
Casemate, 2024 ▪ 183 pages
Keywords: drones, technology, modern warfare, drone tactics
Reflections on the Russia-Ukraine War
Edited by Maarten Rothman, Loenneke Peperkamp, and Sebastiaan Rietjens
Reviewed by Dr. Tor Bukkvoll, senior research fellow, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment
©2026 Tor Bukkvoll
Now in its fifth year, and with no immediate end in sight, the Russia-Ukraine War has been examined in numerous books. A quick search on Amazon found more than 70 recent titles with the phrase “war in Ukraine.” It is unsurprising, given that we are witnessing the most destructive war in Europe since World War II. The book stands out from the others, particularly for its varied theoretical approaches and structure. Reflections on the Russia-Ukraine War roughly covers the first year and a half of the conflict and consists of 28 chapters, each discussing one aspect of the war. At 552 pages, it is a substantial book. Its structure, however, makes it easy for readers to choose those aspects of special interest. All chapters are stand-alone and can be read independently—a major advantage that makes the book particularly well-suited for academic institutions.
Nearly all of the authors work at the Netherlands Defence Academy, and some also hold part-time positions at other Dutch academic institutions. Together, they cover a large multitude of political, military, legal, and ethical aspects. A notable strength of the book is that each relatively short chapter begins with a brief introduction to the leading theoretical perspectives relevant to that author’s particular approach. As a result, readers get an update on theoretical debates and an application of those debates to the empirical case of the Russia-Ukraine War. Readers will appreciate different chapters based on their interests and research needs. This reviewer particularly enjoyed the chapters on prewar differences in intelligence assessments among Western nations, morale and moral injury, the importance of the space domain, international humanitarian law, the difficulties of regulating cyber operations, and contraband of war at sea.
Most authors do not seem to be Russian or Ukrainian experts. With few exceptions, the empirical data comes from English-language secondary sources. The value of most chapters is not empirical but in seeing how theory can illuminate existing data. Another consequence of limited area expertise is that contextual understanding is sometimes insufficient. For example, some authors seem to think the 2014 Donbas rebellion against Kyiv was a locally initiated uprising that Russia sympathized with and chose to support. It has long been clear, however, that the uprising would not have occurred without Moscow’s initiative. See Serhii Kudelia’s new book Seize the City, Undo the State: The Inception of Russia’s War on Ukraine (Oxford University Press, 2025) for an excellent and thoroughly researched account. Another example of lacking contextual understanding is the claim that President Vladimir Putin “manoeuvred” Viktor Yanukovych back into power in 2010 (225). No, much as he would have wanted to, Putin did not have the influence to determine who would become president of Ukraine. Yanukovych’s victory was a consequence of the disappointing results of the 2004 Orange Revolution, whose leaders spent more time fighting each other than reforming the country. A third example is that Putin “allowed the conflict in the Donbas region to continue” (156). No—he did not allow it; he ordered it.
Some authors also make strong statements where more caution would have been warranted. The claim that Russia has “the ability to reconstitute its armed forces within a timespan of just a couple of years” is at least controversial (138). Several observers, including this reviewer, believe it will take longer—especially if the now significantly exhausted storages of Soviet-era equipment are to be replaced. Finally, it is now common to write “Ukraine” instead of “the Ukraine.” The latter, a Soviet-era usage, can imply that Ukraine is merely a region rather than a sovereign, recognized nation-state.
Despite some inaccuracies and contextual misunderstandings, Reflections on the Russia-Ukraine War is a welcome contribution to the rapidly growing literature on this war. Its main strength is to provide up-to-date theoretical perspectives on many issues related to the largest war in Europe since World War II.
Leiden University Press, 2024 ▪ 552 pages
Keywords: Russia-Ukraine War, geopolitics, strategy, international security, cyberwarfare
Tradecraft, Tactics, and Dirty Tricks: Russian Intelligence and Putin’s Secret War
by Sean M. Wiswesser
Reviewed by Dr. Thomas W. Spahr, Francis De Serio Chair of Strategic and Theater Intelligence, US Army War College
Transparency between the Intelligence Community (IC) and the American public has been a priority for the last four Directors of National Intelligence, peaking in the current administration under the Honorable Tulsi Gabbard. While essential for building public trust, the IC’s openness with its capabilities and missions is difficult in a profession that requires secrecy. Sean M. Wiswesser’s Tradecraft, Tactics, and Dirty Tricks contributes toward transparency and expands our understanding of Russian intelligence services (RIS) and active measures—the Russian term for covert action. Relying on his academic study, Russian language mastery, and 28 years of service as a national security professional, including time serving the CIA inside the former Soviet Union, Wiswesser has written a book intelligence practitioners, scholars, and Western political leaders should pay attention to.
Beyond transparency, Wiswesser’s purpose is “to damage RIS capabilities” and to enable the West to counter Russian intelligence that seeks to undermine freedom and democracy (4). He hopes that by sharing his knowledge and experience, he will empower future intelligence officers and political leaders. While political leaders will benefit from the book, it is not written from the perspective of a senior executive but from the perspective of a ground-level clandestine service operator with a deep background in intelligence tradecraft. This book is a well-sourced testimony from an experienced practitioner, not a comprehensive academic history. In this reviewer’s opinion, this approach makes the book more fun to read, appealing to intelligence enthusiasts, and informative for young people considering a career in the IC.
The book is organized into 10 chapters that describe the organization of the Russian intelligence services—including the Spetsnaz (Special Forces)—intelligence operations (surveillance, active measures, sabotage) and tradecraft (dead drops, signals, technology). Wiswesser sources the work with academic journals, newspapers, interviews with defectors and émigrés, and published journals. Perhaps most compelling are vignettes from his personal experiences and interviews with colleagues. He includes a final chapter on the Russian invasion of Ukraine, arguing that Russian intelligence, which had grown its influence under Vladimir Putin, was responsible for the gross underestimation of the Ukrainians’ capability and will. Supporting the book’s theme, the RIS failed due to its lack of integrity and rampant corruption, both rooted in its political leadership.
The theme of pervasive corruption runs throughout the book and ultimately makes the RIS an inferior organization to its American counterpart, namely the CIA. When describing the Russian training regime for intelligence officers, Wiswesser recounts instances of bribery, family connections, and hazing that prevent meritocracy. He shares stories of corrupt intelligence officers doing little more than parroting The Washington Post in their reports, selling government-provided cell phones on the black market, and stealing gas in Iraq and selling it in Syria. These vignettes are perhaps the greatest strength of this work.
As a trained CIA operative, Wiswesser is critical of Russian intelligence tradecraft and attributes failures to corruption, training, and indifference. The Russian regime often seems more focused on creating the impression of theatrical brutality toward traitors and adversaries than on secrecy and tradecraft. A culture of rampant alcoholism contributes to “drunken incompetence” and Russian intelligence officers letting their “tongues fly” (159). Wiswesser loves the Russian people and their culture, but disdains “the darker forces” inside of Russia that have pitted them against the rest of the free world (2).
If I were to render a criticism of this excellent book, it is that it reflects the emotion of an agent in combat. I tell my students that it takes a generation for us to get good histories of important events; the participants need to die off before historians can look at them dispassionately. Wiswesser loves the CIA and hates the RIS, and, in places, the comparison feels a bit too much like flawless professionals versus criminally corrupt, usually drunk, amateurs, when the truth is rarely so extreme.
This minor criticism aside, Tradecraft, Tactics, and Dirty Tricks: Russian Intelligence and Putin’s Secret War is well written, informative, and entertaining to read. It should be on the professional reading list of defense leaders, Russia specialists, enthusiasts, and those considering a career in the IC. It would also be an excellent addition to undergraduate and graduate school syllabi for courses on intelligence or Russian history.
Naval Institute Press, 2026 ▪ 288 pages
Keywords: intelligence, Russian studies, counterintelligence, CIA
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