Home : News : Display
March 6, 2026

Legacies Worth Considering: (Re)examining the Assumptions behind Denial Strategies

Samuel Zilincik
©2026 Samuel Zilincik

ABSTRACT: Contemporary analyses of denial strategies risk conceptual confusion because they neglect the legacies of two distinct traditions: coercion versus control. This article explores the two traditions’ legacies from a broader perspective. It shows how neglecting those legacies contributes to conceptual confusion concerning operational conduct and strategic affairs in the South China Sea. The article facilitates smoother communication between and among civilians and military members involved in operational planning, which is essential if the United States and its allies want to combine military and nonmilitary instruments in future operations.

Keywords: denial, coercion, control, deterrence by denial, area denial

 

The United States and its allies consider “denial” to constitute both a challenge and a solution in the context of potential adversarial interactions with China. The alleged challenge resides in China’s capacity to deny allied tactical performance and operational sustainment in the South China Sea, thus deterring allies from taking meaningful actions in the theater. In response, the United States and its allies have proposed a diverse pool of operational patterns, ranging from passive and defensive to aggressive and offensive and place many under the broad label of denial strategies.1

The growing prominence of denial in contemporary strategic thought brings forward questions of conceptual, and by extension, communicational utility. Does denial still help allies effectively analyze and coherently communicate about contemporary strategic affairs? Or has denial become an all-encompassing basket for operational approaches that have little in common? Indeed, previous scholarship has documented how denial connotes a range of different meanings when discussed as a Western strategic concept. Scholars of strategy have attributed this variance in meaning primarily to the fact that denial has historically been conceptualized in distinct traditions of strategic thought, though the meaning behind the term has also evolved within each tradition. The concept widely known as “deterrence by denial” (and its variants) belongs to the legacy of the coercion tradition, which has predominantly focused on nuclear power. In contrast, “denial of control” (and its variants) originated in strategic thought on maritime strategy. As others have pointed out, ignoring the important differences between distinct denial traditions risks creating conceptual confusion, which has practical consequences for force structure and operational planning.2

This article argues that though each denial concept can make sense in its own tradition, attempts to apply particular denial concepts outside their respective traditions may contribute to conceptual, and, therefore, communicational confusion. This confusion may occur because each tradition holds different, often contrasting assumptions about denial’s multiple aspects. Since experts increasingly combine conceptualizations of denial from both the coercion and control traditions, especially in contemporary discussions about operational conduct in the South China Sea, experts’ audiences may become confused regarding the meaning of key terms. Therefore, those discussing denial strategies need to take denial’s conceptual legacies seriously if they wish to communicate their ideas effectively.3

This article has academic and practical value. Academically, the article’s novelty resides in identifying each tradition’s assumptions about denial and illustrating how treating denial as a single strategic concept, at least in its current state, is problematic. Although this article builds upon excellent analysis by Adam Lockyer and Michael D. Cohen, it also differs in important ways. Whereas Lockyer and Cohen focus exclusively on denial in the Australian strategic context, this article engages with denial more broadly, including in the United States and Europe. This broader scope yields a rather different story about the coercion and control traditions and their legacies. Specifically, this article argues both anti-access and area-denial efforts, in fact, belong to a broad control tradition and not to two distinct traditions, as Lockyer and Cohen suggest. Consequently, the identified assumptions also meaningfully differ from those spelled out by Lockyer and Cohen. By offering a fresh look at the conceptual legacies of the coercion and control traditions, this article’s analysis allows scholars to analyze wars in any period in a more nuanced manner. After all, denial is a form of strategic effect and, as such, has the potential to shape any war’s character.4

This article further facilitates smoother communication between and among key stakeholders in operational planning. This improved communication is especially relevant for the United States and, more broadly, for NATO, whose concept of multidomain operations (MDO) aspires to combine various military and nonmilitary efforts to achieve positive strategic effects. A shared understanding of the necessary effect and its generative process is essential to such an ambitious endeavor.5

The next section introduces the two traditions of denial conceptualization and describes each tradition’s assumptions vis-à-vis the denial concept. The subsequent section explains why experts should take the divergence in assumptions seriously and shows how neglecting the traditions’ legacies creates grounds for conceptual confusion in contemporary debates about strategic affairs in the South China Sea. The concluding section reviews the argument and discusses options to minimize the risk of conceptual confusion.

The Two Denial Traditions

Denial strategies have been conceptualized in two broad but distinct traditions of strategic thought: the coercion tradition and the control tradition. Each tradition emerged in a unique historical context, engaged with unique challenges, and subsequently conceptualized denial differently. The coercion tradition emerged shortly after World War II as a response to the invention and first employment of nuclear weapons. Initially, the coercion tradition’s main task was to understand how the new weaponry transformed the military and political realities of the mid-twentieth century. The tradition’s leading proponents were mostly civilians, such as the historian Bernard Brodie; the mathematician Herman Kahn; the economist Thomas C. Schelling; and political scientists, including Albert Wohlstetter, Alexander George, and Glenn Snyder. More interested in using threats than weapons, these experts developed what is widely known as coercion theory, usually further divided into deterrence and compellence theories. In this tradition, coercion is a psychological mechanism through which one actor convinces its adversary to maintain (deterrence) or change (compellence) its policies. Although the tradition’s adherents tend to disagree about whether coercion only includes threats of violence or if coercion includes the actual application of violence, they agree the adversary’s psychology matters the most to coercion’s ultimate success. Since they assume humans are rational actors, coercion theorists usually distinguish between coercion by punishment (which mainly increases the costs of the adversary’s noncompliance) and coercion by denial (which is supposed to negate the benefits of the adversary’s noncompliance). Denial itself, in the coercion tradition, stands for the negation of the adversary’s desires. This understanding of denial has remained popular even after the Cold War era, and the adherents of coercion theory continue to apply similar logic to the new character of conflicts and to the expanding pool of military and nonmilitary instruments of power.6

In contrast, the origins of the control tradition date back to the nineteenth century and are closely tied to the increased importance of maritime trade to national security. By the nineteenth century, states such as the United Kingdom increasingly depended on sea commerce, which rendered sea trade routes of paramount importance. Therefore, the control tradition, the early proponents of which were naval and maritime theorists such as Alfred T hayer Mahan and Sir Julian S. Corbett, has long been preoccupied with the relationship between sea power and commerce. Mahan and Corbett were the first authors to develop the core concepts of sea command, sea control, and sea denial (or disputation). They understood sea command to be the achievement of overwhelming military supremacy at sea, sea control to be the successful securing of one’s communication lines, and sea denial to be the successful disruption of the adversary’s communication lines. Subsequent sea-power theorists such as Herbert Rosinski, Henry E. Eccles, Joseph Wylie, Ian Speller, Robert C. Rubel, Geoffrey Till, and Milan Vego then picked up Mahan and Corbett’s concepts and refined them to navigate the particular challenges of the theorists’ ages or to develop more general theories of strategy. The control tradition gradually gained adherents among air- and space-power theorists, which has led to further conceptual revisions. In recent years, some have made notable attempts to broaden the concept of control (making it relevant to grand strategy) and to narrow the concept (especially by focusing on area-denial or access-denial measures).7

The legacies of the coercion and control traditions have resulted in diverging assumptions about multiple aspects of denial strategies. First, the two traditions differ in their understandings of what is to be denied. The coercion tradition usually sees denial as being about the denial of objectives, either political or military. In contrast, the control tradition focuses on denying control, which is usually understood to mean freedom of action, freedom of movement in general, or freedom of movement in particular areas.8

Although the two objects of denial may overlap, they are not identical. For example, suppose a strategist decides to deny a terrorist’s objectives by increasing the resilience of the terrorist’s society, as some contemporary coercion scholarship recommends. The strategist’s measure has little direct impact on the terrorist’s control because the terrorist can still do whatever they want; only the consequences of their actions may be diminished. Conversely, denying the adversary control may not frustrate the achievement of its objectives. Sun Tzu has famously advised generals to put soldiers into positions in which retreat is impossible, to make those soldiers more willing to fight. So, in the case of Sun Tzu’s argument, the adversary’s objective is to decrease its own control. Consequently, if the strategist surrounds and paralyzes the adversary’s army, the strategist facilitates the achievement of the adversary’s objectives instead of denying them. Another common theme of the divergence between objectives and control comes from nuclear strategy, where actors may deliberately try to decrease their freedom of action to increase the credibility of their threats. In this case, too, denying control is not tantamount to denying objectives. Therefore, though often overlapping, objectives and control constitute theoretically and practically distinct objects of denial.9

Second, the two traditions differ in their assumptions about the purpose of denial. For the coercion tradition, the primary purpose of denial is to coerce, to change the adversary’s thinking and ideally, their behavior. In other words, the purpose of denial is to elicit specific psychological and behavioral response, and all the other purposes are subordinate. In contrast, the control tradition does not assign an overarching purpose to denial. The tradition’s adherents consider denial useful even if it only affects the adversary’s capabilities and thus restricts the adversary’s pool of potential actions. To be sure, denial can exhaust the adversary, but such exhaustion does not have to be the primary reason why actors rely on denial. Indeed, “denying” control may often be seen as merely the first step toward “taking” and “exercising” control. Hence, the two traditions instrumentalize denial in different ways.10

Third, and relatedly, the coercion and control traditions’ divergent assumptions about denial’s purpose translate into divergent thoughts about how to achieve denial. The coercion tradition has usually advocated achieving denial in overt ways, to signal resolve and the capability to frustrate the adversary’s achievement of its objectives. In contrast, the control tradition has no such concerns because its adherents care less about the adversary’s perception and more about how particular measures contribute to operational objectives. Indeed, denial in this tradition is often achieved through surprise strikes. Additionally, denial in the control tradition is understood to be a defensive measure, whereas the coercion tradition does not hold a strong opinion about the primacy of either defensive or offensive measures. Therefore, the two traditions diverge in their understandings of the means and ways suitable for the purpose of denial.11

Fourth, the two traditions think differently about denial’s targets. In the coercion tradition, denial usually aims to attack the adversary’s armed forces. The control tradition does not associate specific targeting preferences with denial. Some denial tactics, such as guerilla warfare, target the adversary’s military forces. In contrast, other denial approaches, such as terrorism and raiding, mainly (though not exclusively) harm civilians. Overall, the pool of denial targets among the control tradition’s adherents is broader than among the coercion tradition’s proponents.12

Finally, the two traditions differ in their assumptions about the relative utility of denial. In the coercion tradition, denial is usually seen as being more useful than, and therefore preferable to, punishment. One reason for this view is that the coercive potential of denial is considered greater than the coercive potential of punishment. Another reason is, even if deterrence efforts fail, denial measures can still be more useful to winning the war than measures associated with punishment. Consequently, the coercion scholarship usually recommends using denial when possible and relying on punishment only if denial is unlikely to work. In contrast, the control tradition considers denial to be born out of necessity rather than preference. In general, using control is preferred over denying control because only the former allows practitioners to shape a war’s outcome decisively. Accordingly, actors usually only deny when they cannot control, which often occurs when they are in some way militarily inferior to the adversary.13

Conceptual Confusion in Contemporary Debates

The existence of the two traditions and, therefore, the varied meanings of denial, is not inherently problematic. As long as the coercion and control traditions use the concept for their particular purposes, the danger of conceptual or communicational friction is minimal. As Antulio J. Echevarria II explains, for much of the Cold War, each tradition sought answers to different questions. Given the immense destructiveness of nuclear weaponry, the coercion tradition was preoccupied with the issue of avoiding war. In contrast, the control tradition, whose proponents during the Cold War were almost exclusively maritime strategic theorists, sought ways to project military power usefully both in peace and war. These differences in interest were reflected in the lack of engagement between the two schools, at least in their core terminology and concepts.14

Nevertheless, the legacies of the coercion and control traditions can contribute to conceptual confusion when experts grounded in distinct traditions employ the language of denial to discuss similar strategic subjects. In such cases, different assumptions about denial strategies make effectively communicating practical propositions to a broader audience difficult. Contemporary discussions about strategic affairs in the South China Sea constitute a fitting example of this problem. These discussions are grounded in combined concerns about power projection and deterrence, thus attracting attention from experts in both traditions. In fact, given that the United States has recently shifted its attention to the South China Sea at the expense of other theaters, the subject is likely to receive even more attention in the near future. Therefore, now is the time to pay attention to the conceptual and communicational friction interactions that disparate experts may generate. In the following paragraphs, I review some of the contributions to recent discussions about strategic affairs in the South China Sea to show how the employment of denial terminology, when accompanied by neglect of the relevant assumptions, contains seeds of conceptual confusion.15

Consider, for example, an article by Derek Grossman and John Speed Meyers. At one point, Grossman and Meyers argue a US denial strategy against China would involve measures such as “antisubmarine warfare, antisurface warfare, and large-scale mining operations.” These operational patterns are usually associated with the control tradition of strategic thought. The authors also suggest the United States would perform the denial strategy offensively to coerce China to submit to the United States’s will by denying the former access to its objectives. The appeals for offense and coercion are more closely associated with the concept of denial in the coercion tradition of strategic thought. The authors further contrast denial with “mainland strikes” and “distant blockade,” each of which would fit into the denial label of many coercion theorists because both phenomena impede the adversary’s ability to achieve its objectives. Interestingly, the authors seem unsure whether to characterize mainland strikes as a denial strategy, acknowledging a terminological debate is ongoing in the literature. Whereas such strikes would fit the coercion tradition’s understanding of denial, they would contradict the defensive tone associated with the control tradition. Overall, understanding what denial entails in Grossman and Meyers’s article may be difficult because the article contains important but contradictory features of both the coercion and control traditions.16

Another example comes from the work of Luis Simón. In his article, Simón associates denial with “a disperse and resilient regional military footprint . . . to complicate China’s military movement within the first island chain.” Attempts to impair China’s movement imply adherence to the control tradition’s understanding of denial. This impression is further reinforced by Simón’s assertion “denial is the go-to option for the weaker party,” which fits the control tradition’s assumption that denying control is easier than performing control. At the same time, Simón references Snyder’s and Robert A. Pape’s works about denial, which implies allegiance to the coercion school. Confusingly, Simón also asserts that denial differs from punishment in that denial is supposed to relate mainly to one’s own homeland, whereas punishment mainly affects the adversary’s homeland. This distinction seems more in line with the control tradition than the coercion tradition because the former considers denial to be inherently defensive, whereas the latter has no such stance. Simón associates punishment with direct attacks against Chinese anti-access / area-denial capabilities, whereas denial measures are supposed to avoid Chinese anti-access / area-denial capabilities and only limit the adversary’s ability to move in the relevant locations. This distinction has little basis in the coercion literature, where denial is often associated with warfighting and, therefore, targeting the adversary’s military capabilities. Instead, Simón’s framing is conceptually closer to how denial is understood in the control tradition, which associates denial with evasion rather than direct engagement. Simón also contradicts Grossman and Meyers, as he suggests deterrence by denial also includes blockade, which presupposes combining features of both traditions: blockade from the control tradition, and blockade’s deterrent potential from the coercion tradition. Overall, Simón’s work combines features of denial from both traditions in a way that may be hard for readers from either tradition to comprehend.17

The last example comes from the work of Eirik Torsvoll, who compares the deterrent potential of three strategic approaches: “air-sea battle,” “offshore control,” and “deterrence by denial.” He posits air-sea battle revolves around aerial and naval attacks conducted in the adversary’s territory, targeting military forces and their supporting infrastructure. Torsvoll’s characterization may be confusing because in the classical coercion literature, these measures would fall under the term denial. Torsvoll argues offshore control should employ submarine warfare, mines, and air strikes to restrict China’s ability to move resources in and through particular zones. This characterization fits the control tradition’s understanding of denial. In line with the coercion tradition, Torsvoll reserves the term denial only for measures that frustrate China’s ability to capture new territories. At the same time, he asserts denial conveys developing anti-access / area-denial capabilities, which relates more to the control tradition’s understanding of denial. Therefore, though Torsvoll tries to keep the diverse concepts of denial separate, his categorization contains significant overlaps between traditional notions of denial and other strategically relevant concepts. This overlap may confuse readers studying the subject from the perspective of either the coercion tradition or the control tradition.18

Conclusion

The increased interaction between the coercion and control traditions seems to have rendered denial a loose and ambiguous concept with the potential to confuse rather than communicate. Since current notions of denial are often insufficiently grounded in either tradition’s legacies, such notions propose a set of loosely related and sometimes contradictory recommendations for strategic practice. Despite the resulting confusion, maintaining and even strengthening communication between the two traditions is necessary to navigate contemporary and future strategic practice more effectively. At least three options seem appropriate to minimize the risks of conceptual confusion.

The first option would involve developing an overarching concept of denial that would satisfy the analytical needs of both the coercion and control traditions. This approach would reduce confusion by imbuing the term with a meaning that would make sense from the perspectives of both traditions. Developing such a concept is bound to be difficult and would require finding a delicate balance between the often-contradictory assumptions the two traditions hold. Moreover, attempts to broaden the concept to encompass all the relevant meanings from both traditions risk stretching the concept too far, thus impairing its analytical utility. After all, if experts describe every strategically relevant effort as denial, the concept becomes meaningless. Still, if the adherents of both traditions can find sufficient common ground to establish a unified concept, this avenue is worth exploring. If anything, the very process of reflecting on how the legacies of both traditions shape contemporary understandings of denial may cast new light on the value of particular assumptions, thus helping experts decide which assumptions are worth preserving.

The second option is to eschew denial terminology altogether and search for viable alternatives. If the key assumptions associated with the coercion and control traditions are irreconcilable, the best way to facilitate effective communication may be to find other terms. The existing strategic theories and recent scholarship provide solid grounds for this approach. For example, some aspects of denial as classically understood in the control tradition overlap with the concept of “strategic paralysis,” which, in turn, resembles some versions of the denial concept from the coercion tradition. Meanwhile, recent research on coercion proposes breaking down the term denial into more specific elements such as “capability elimination,” “operational paralysis,” “tactical degradation,” and “strategic effect reduction.” This approach’s main challenge is leaving the well-established and popular terminology behind and getting accustomed to new labels. At the same time, sticking with the old terminology merely out of convenience is intellectually lazy and presents real risks to future communication. Therefore, the logical path is to search for alternatives to analyze contemporary strategic affairs with more precision and nuance.19

The third option is to maintain the status quo but to unpack one’s assumptions explicitly when speaking or writing about denial. If the first two options prove unfeasible, the easiest way to minimize the risk of conceptual confusion may be to stick to the established terminology while being transparent about the tradition to which one adheres. The individual assumptions summarized in this article may prove useful for this approach. Nonetheless, important nuances may risk getting lost in the communication process because there is seldom enough time to ruminate on various features of denial when individuals must make strategically relevant decisions. Therefore, the third option should be considered only after the first two proposals have been tried and proven inadequate.

 
 

Note
The author used ChatGPT to ask for several word choice and sentence structure suggestions, and some of these were subsequently implemented.

 
 

Samuel Zilincik
Samuel Zilincik, formerly of the Czech University of Defense, is currently an assistant professor at the Royal Danish Defence College and received his PhD in security and strategic studies from Masaryk University. His current research focuses on how military operations generate strategic effects. He is published widely, including in The Journal of Strategic Studies, Contemporary Security Policy, the Texas National Security Review, the RUSI Journal, and Military Strategy Magazine.

 
 

Endnotes

  1. 1. For a formulation of these reciprocal denial dynamics, see Bradford A. Lee, “Strategic Interaction: Theory and History for Practitioners,” in Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century: Theory, History, and Practice, ed. Thomas G. Mahnken (Stanford University Press, 2012), 32–34. For Western perspectives on Chinese denial capabilities, see Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, “Future Warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese Antiaccess/Area Denial, U.S. AirSea Battle, and Command of the Commons in East Asia,” International Security 41, no. 1 (Summer 2016): 7–48; Chaka Ferguson, “The Strategic Use of Soft Balancing: The Normative Dimensions of the Chinese–Russian ‘Strategic Partnership,’ ” Journal of Strategic Studies 35, no. 2 (2012): 197–222; Sam J. Tangredi, “Antiaccess Warfare as Strategy,” Naval War College Review 71, no. 1 (Winter 2018): 33–51; and James Johnson, “Washington’s Perceptions and Misperceptions of Beijing’s Anti-Access Area-Denial (A2-AD) ‘Strategy’: Implications for Military Escalation Control and Strategic Stability,” The Pacific Review 30, no. 3 (2017): 271–88. For the advocacy of denial strategies, see Elbridge A. Colby, The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict (Yale University Press, 2021); Michael Beckley, “The Emerging Military Balance in East Asia: How China’s Neighbors Can Check Chinese Naval Expansion,” International Security 42, no. 2 (Fall 2017): 78–119; Michael Evans, “Who Denies Wins: How to Prevail in a War against China in Asia,” Quadrant, November 22, 2023, https://quadrant.org.au/magazine/uncategorized/who-denies-wins-how-to-prevail-in-a-war-against-china-in-asia/; Caitlin Lee, Countering China’s Military Strategy in the Indo-Pacific Region (RAND Corporation, 2024); Ionut C. Popescu, “Adapting US Defense Strategy to Great-Power Competition,” Parameters 55, no. 1 (Spring 2025), https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/News/Display/Article/4129357/adapting-us-defense-strategy-to-great-power-competition/; and Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, “Active Denial: Redesigning Japan’s Response to China’s Military Challenge,” International Security 42, no. 4 (Spring 2018): 128–69.
  2. 2. Denial as a strategically meaningful term seems to be an exclusively Western, and particularly Anglo-Saxon invention; other strategic cultures have not found it particularly useful. See, for example, Dean Cheng, “An Overview of Chinese Thinking about Deterrence,” in NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2020: Deterrence in the 21st Century—Insights from Theory and Practice, eds. Frans Osinga and Tim Sweijs (Springer, 2021), 177–200; Michael Kofman et al., Russian Strategy for Escalation Management: Evolution of Key Concepts (Center for Naval Analyses, April 2020); Sumathy Permal, “China’s Military Capability and Anti-Access Area-Denial Operations,” Maritime Affairs 10, no. 2 (2014): 16–32; and Christopher P. Twomey, “What’s in a Name: Building Anti-Access/Area Denial Capabilities without Anti-Access/Area Denial Doctrine,” in Assessing the People’s Liberation Army in the Hu Jintao Era, ed. Roy Kamphausen et al. (Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press, 2014), 129–70, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Recent-Publications/Article/3615297/assessing-the-peoples-liberation-army-in-the-hu-jintao-era/. For the most important work acknowledging the existence of distinct traditions and the associated variance in meanings, see Adam Lockyer and Michael D. Cohen, “Denial Strategy in Australian Strategic Thought,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 71, no. 4 (2017): 423–39. For a similar but brief analysis, see Maximilian K. Bremer and Kelly A. Grieco, “In Defense of Denial: Why Deterring China Requires New Airpower Thinking,” War on the Rocks, April 3, 2023, https://warontherocks.com/2023/04/in-defense-of-denial-why-deterring-china-requires-new-airpower-thinking/. For the evolution of the meaning of denial within the coercion tradition, see Samuel Zilincik and Tim Sweijs, “Beyond Deterrence: Reconceptualizing Denial Strategies and Rethinking Their Emotional Effects,” Contemporary Security Policy 44, no. 2 (2023): 248–75. No similar overview exists for the control tradition, but older and current works on the subject contain clearly different meanings of denial. Compare, for example, Julian Stafford Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (Project Gutenberg, 2005); and Lukas Milevski, “Revisiting J. C. Wylie’s Dichotomy of Strategy: The Effects of Sequential and Cumulative Patterns of Operations,” Journal of Strategic Studies 35, no. 2 (2012): 223–42. For the original conceptualization of deterrence by denial, see Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton University Press, 1961). For the original conceptualization of control denial, see Corbett, Some Principles. For a formulation of detrimental consequences of conceptual confusion, see Lockyer and Cohen, “Denial Strategy.”
  3. 3. The author of this article has also contributed to this confusion by failing to distinguish between the two traditions in his previous work. See Zilincik and Sweijs, “Beyond Deterrence.”
  4. 4. For the influence of strategic effects on the character of wars, see Lukas Milevski, “The Nature of Strategy versus the Character of War,” Comparative Strategy 35, no. 5 (2016): 438–46.
  5. 5. Lockyer and Cohen, “Denial Strategy.” This article’s position on the existence of a united control denial tradition aligns with Sam Tangredi’s conceptual analysis of the subject in the US context. See Sam J. Tangredi, “Developing the Modern Concept of Anti-Access,” chap. 2 Anti-Access Warfare: Countering A2/AD Strategies (Naval Institute Press, 2013). For a brief introduction to MDO, see “Multi-Domain Operations in NATO – Explained,” NATO, October 5, 2023, https://www.act.nato.int/article/mdo-in-nato-explained/.
  6. 6. A brief history of the traditions can be found in Antulio J. Echevarria II, War’s Logic: Strategic Thought and the American Way of War (Cambridge University Press, 2021), pts. 2, 3. Note: In Echevarria’s terminology, coercion tradition roughly corresponds to “strategy intellectuals” and control tradition to “military intellectuals.” The intellectual roots of the coercion tradition can be traced back to the interwar period. See Richard J. Overy, “Air Power and the Origins of Deterrence Theory before 1939,” Journal of Strategic Studies 15, no. 1 (March 1992): 73–101. For an overview of Cold War–era coercion theorizing, see Jeffrey W. Knopf, “The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research,” Contemporary Security Policy 31, no. 1 (2010): 1–33. For overviews of coercion, deterrence, and compellence theories, see Peter Viggo Jakobsen, “Pushing the Limits of Military Coercion Theory,” International Studies Perspectives 12, no. 2 (2011): 153–70; and Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Sage Publications, 1977). For the differences between deterrence and compellence, see Tami Davis Biddle, “Coercion Theory: A Basic Introduction for Practitioners,” Texas National Security Review 3, no. 2 (Spring 2020): 94–109. For the conditions that facilitate coercion, see Patrick C. Bratton, “When Is Coercion Successful?,” Naval War College Review 58, no. 3 (Summer 2005): 99–120. For the difference between punishment and denial, see Snyder, Deterrence and Defense. For the understanding of denial as a frustration of the adversary’s desires, see Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Cornell University Press, 1996). For overviews of recent deterrence-by-denial and coercion-by-denial theorization, see Patrick Morgan, “Deterrence by Denial from the Cold War to the 21st Century,” in Deterrence by Denial: Theory and Practice, eds. Alex S. Wilner and Andreas Wenger (Cambria Press, 2020), 15–40; and Zilincik and Sweijs, “Beyond Deterrence.” For specific examples of such scholarship, see Erica D. Borghard and Shawn W. Lonergan, “Deterrence by Denial in Cyberspace,” Journal of Strategic Studies 46, no. 3 (2023): 534–69; James M. Smith, “Strategic Analysis, WMD Terrorism, and Deterrence by Denial,” in Deterring Terrorism: Theory and Practice, ed. Andreas Wenger and Alex Wilner (Stanford University Press, 2012), 159–79; and Alex S. Wilner, “Deterring the Undeterrable: Coercion, Denial, and Delegitimization in Counterterrorism,” Journal of Strategic Studies 34, no. 1 (2011): 3–37.
  7. 7. For the origins of the control tradition and its relation to sea commerce, see Hew Strachan, The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 152; and David Morgan-Owen and Louis Halewood, “Introduction: Strategy, Economics, and the Sea,” in Economic Warfare and the Sea: Grand Strategies for Maritime Powers, 1650–1945, ed. David Morgan-Owen and Louis Halewood (Liverpool University Press, 2020), 4–5. For Corbett and Mahan, see Corbett, Some Principles and Alfred Thayer Mahan, Mahan on Naval Warfare: Selections from the Writings of Rear Admiral Alfred T. Mahan, ed. Allan Westcott (Dover Publications, 1999). For later maritime theorists, see Herbert Rosinski, The Development of Naval Thought: Essays (Naval War College Press, 1977); Milan Vego, Maritime Strategy and Sea Denial: Theory and Practice (Routledge, 2019); Joseph C. Wylie, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control (Naval Institute Press, 1967); Scott A. Boorman, “Fundamentals of Strategy—The Legacy of Henry Eccles,” Naval War College Review 62, no. 2 (Spring 2009): 91–115; Robert C. Rubel, “Command of the Sea: An Old Concept Resurfaces in a New Form,” Naval War College Review 65, no. 4 (Autumn 2012): 21–33; Ian Speller, Understanding Naval Warfare, 2nd ed. (Routledge, 2019); and Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century (Routledge, 2009). For the adaptation of the control tradition’s ideas to air and space power, see Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari(Air University Press, 2019); Bleddyn E. Bowen, Warin Space: Strategy, Spacepower, Geopolitics (Edinburgh University Press, 2020); and John J. Klein, Understanding Space Strategy: The Art of War in Space (Routledge, 2019). For the recent conceptual broadening, see Lukas Milevski, “ ‘Fortissimus Inter Pares’: The Utility of Landpower in Grand Strategy,” Parameters 42, no. 2 (Summer 2012): 6–15, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol42/iss2/10/; and Milevski, “Revisiting J. C. Wylie’s Dichotomy.” For what has become known as “anti-access” and “area denial,” see Michael Raska, “Conceptualising the A2/AD Debate: Perspectives, Responses, and Challenges,” in Countering Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges: Strategies and Capabilities (Nanyang Technological University, 2017).
  8. 8. See, respectively, Snyder, Deterrence and Defense, 14–16; and Speller, Understanding Naval Warfare, 115–33.
  9. 9. For resilience as a source of denial, see Emanuel Adler, “Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t: Performative Power and the Strategy of Conventional and Nuclear Defusing,” Security Studies 19, no. 2 (2010): 199–229. For Sun Tzu, see Sun Tzu, The Art of Warfare, trans. Roger T. Ames (Penguin Random House, 1993), 115. For guidance on reducing one’s own freedom of action in the nuclear-strategy context, see Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence, 2nd ed. (Yale University Press, 2008).
  10. 10. For the quoted material, see Milevski, “Revisiting J. C. Wylie’s Dichotomy,” 236, 232. For the points relevant to the coercion tradition, see Snyder, Deterrence and Defense, 14–16. For the control tradition, see Tangredi, “Developing the Modern”; and Corbett, Some Principles.
  11. 11. For the points relevant to the coercion tradition, see Morgan, “Deterrence by Denial,” 22; Pape, Bombing to Win; and Snyder, Deterrence and Defense. For the control tradition, see Hugh White, “A Middling Power: Why Australia’s Defence Is All at Sea,” The Monthly, September 2012, https://www.themonthly.com.au/issue/2012/september/1346903463/hugh-white/middling-power; Shawn Finney, Asymmetric Applications of Airpower: Air Denial Operations (Naval War College Press, 2020); John E. Shaw, “On Cossacks, Subs, and SAMs: Defeating Challenges to US Space Superiority,” High Frontier 1, no. 3 (Winter 2005): 24–25;Tangredi, “Developing the Modern”, 1–2; and Milevski, “Revisiting J. C. Wylie’s Dichotomy,” 235.
  12. 12. For the coercion tradition, see Beatrice Heuser, The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 336–41. For the control tradition, see Milevski, “Fortissimus Inter Pares,” 10; Milevski, “Revisiting J. C. Wylie’s Dichotomy,” 237; and Vego, Maritime Strategy, 219.
  13. 13. For points about the utility of, and preference for, the denial-in-coercion tradition, see, Michael J. Mazarr et al., What Deters and Why: Exploring Requirements for Effective Deterrence of Interstate Aggression (RAND Corporation, 2018), 8; Pape, Bombing to Win; Michael S. Gerson, “Conventional Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age,” Parameters 39, no. 3 (Autumn 2009): 38, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol39/iss3/8/; Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Polity Press, 2004), 39; and King Mallory, New Challenges in Cross-Domain Deterrence (RAND Corporation, 2018), 3. For the control tradition, see Milevski, “Revisiting J. C. Wylie’s Dichotomy,” 232; and Till, Seapower, 118.
  14. 14. Echevarria, War’s Logic, pts. 2, 3. For the overall appropriateness of using similar terms to describe different phenomena in distinct realms, see Giovanni Sartori, “Guidelines for Conceptual Analysis,” in Social Science Concepts, ed. Giovanni Sartori (Sage Publications, 1984), 35.
  15. 15. For a sample of research on the strategic affairs in the South China Sea from both perspectives, see Beckley, “Emerging Military Balance,” 79; Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., “How to Deter China: The Case for Archipelagic Defense,” Foreign Affairs 94, no. 2 (March/April 2015): 78–86; Toshi Yoshihara, “Sino-Japanese Rivalry at Sea: How Tokyo Can Go Anti-Access on China,” Orbis 59, no. 1 (2015): 62–75; and Jeffrey E. Kline and Wayne P. Hughes Jr., “Between Peace and the Air-Sea Battle: A War at Sea Strategy,” Naval War College Review 65, no. 4 (Autumn 2012): 35–41.
  16. 16. Derek Grossman and John Speed Meyers, “Minding the Gaps: US Military Strategy toward China,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 13, no. 4 (Winter 2019): 108, 106, 117.
  17. 17. Luis Simón, “Between Punishment and Denial: Uncertainty, Flexibility, and U.S. Military Strategy toward China,” Contemporary Security Policy 41, no. 3 (2020): 2, 4, 10, 11.
  18. 18. Eirik Torsvoll, “Deterring Conflict with China: A Comparison of the Air-Sea Battle Concept, Offshore Control, and Deterrence by Denial,” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 39, no. 1 (Winter 2015): 40–41, 44–45, 48–51, 50–51.
  19. 19. Zilincik and Sweijs, “Beyond Deterrence,” 248. On denial’s resemblance to strategic paralysis, see Vego, Maritime Strategy; Adam Elkus, “The Rise and Decline of Strategic Paralysis,” Small Wars Journal, September 17, 2011, https://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-rise-and-decline-of-strategic-paralysis; and Michael Fowler, “Comparing Compellence Strategies,” Comparative Strategy 40, no. 3 (2021): 261. On the alternatives to deterrence by denial, see Zilincik and Sweijs, “Beyond Deterrence,” 248.
 
 

Disclaimer: Articles, reviews and replies, review essays, and book reviews published in Parameters are unofficial expressions of opinion. The views and opinions expressed in Parameters are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of War, the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. The appearance of external hyperlinks does not constitute endorsement by the Department of War of the linked websites or the information, products, or services contained therein. The Department of War does not exercise any editorial, security, or other control over the information you may find at these locations.