Welcome to the Spring 2026 issue of Parameters, which consists of an In Focus special commentary, three forums (Clausewitz and Modern Warfare, Operational Considerations, and Historical Studies), and the Strategic Competition Corner.
In his special commentary, “Legacies Worth Considering: (Re)examining the Assumptions behind Denial Strategies,” Samuel Zilincik explores the legacies of coercion versus control and promotes communication between the two concepts. He offers three approaches to minimizing the risk of confusion between the two concepts.
The first forum, Clausewitz and Modern Warfare, features two articles. In the first, “Approaching the Military as a Profession Through the Clausewitzian Trinity,” Adam T. Biggs highlights the relationship between the Clausewitzian trinity and military leadership skills. He promotes the trinity as a foundational concept when evaluating civil-military relations and managing uncertainty in war. The second article, “Strategic Theory and Clausewitz’s Trinitarian Test,” by Lukas Milevski, uses the Clausewitzian trinity as a test to illustrate how good theory considers all the forces of war, while bad theory emphasizes one. His work reveals the relevance of the trinity to practitioners and theorists alike.
The second forum, Operational Considerations, contains two articles. In the first, “Successful Large-Scale Combat Operations Require Artificially Intelligent Breaching Munitions,” Michael P. Carvelli argues that the US Army must invest in artificial intelligence–enabled breaching munitions to succeed in large-scale combat operations. His analysis combines existing technologies to reveal potential artificial intelligence systems to improve breaching munitions. In the second article, “Imitating US Doctrine Cost Europe Its Heavy Combat Power,” Bence Nemeth argues that following US doctrinal shifts cost Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom heavy combat power. His analysis stresses doctrinal and fiscal balance as crucial to future planning.
The third forum, Historical Studies, includes two articles. In “Risk Decision Making and Intertemporal Choice: Lessons from the Taiwan Strait,” Rachel Downing uses the First and Second Taiwan Strait Crises to examine presidential risk-taking and priority management. Her research advocates balancing near-term risks with long-term modernization goals to inform presidential decision making. The second article, “Spezialpropaganda: The East German Military’s Covert Information-Warfare Program,” by Joe Cheravitch, details the Cold War covert propaganda program of the East German military. He explores East German information warfare and its intersection with modern efforts by state actors to influence audiences abroad.
In the Strategic Competition Corner, “Strategic Rivalries: How Are They Won?” Antulio J. Echevarria II argues that strategic rivalries are best understood as contests in which states prioritize weakening a specific opponent’s capacity to compete. He uses historical statistics to analyze modern rivalries and examine how they end. ~CAP