China’s Securitization of Agricultural Imports: A Case of Economic Statecraft Mixed Successes

Gustavo Ferreira and Bert Cramer

ABSTRACT: This article argues that the People’s Republic of China’s agricultural import diversification from 1995–2023 reflects a strategic effort to reduce reliance on US and allied suppliers while prioritizing national food security. Unlike prior studies focused on production or consumption, this analysis centers on trade patterns of high-value, strategically critical commodities. Using trade data and policy documents, it assesses shifts in supplier dependency, notably toward Brazil. This research offers policy and military practitioners insights into how food security intersects with economic statecraft, revealing vulnerabilities and strategic choices in global supply chains relevant to deterrence and resilience planning.

Keywords: economic statecraft, agriculture, strategic competition, China, international trade

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is one of the world’s largest corn, rice, and wheat producers. Simultaneously, it is the leading importer of many globally important agricultural commodities and a net importer of food since 2004.¹ According to Trade Data Monitor – Global Trade Data Statistics Supplier (TDM), the PRC’s annual import value of food and agricultural products increased from $11 billion in 1995 to $215 billion in 2023, with a visible acceleration in the last decade.² As with other countries around the world, rising household incomes and access to global markets are changing diet and food consumption rates in the People’s Republic of China.³ These changes drive increased consumption of higher-quality and more heavily processed food products. The People’s Republic of China is now nearly 70 percent import-dependent for edible oils (common in processed foods), comparable to its import dependence on crude oil.⁴

The PRC ruling class recognizes the politically sensitive national security importance of this growing dependence on imported food products. The 2025 “Plan for Accelerating the Construction of China into an Agricultural Powerhouse (2024–2035)” clearly states: “A world power must first strengthen its agriculture, and only when agriculture is strong can a country be a world power.”⁵ This plan was presaged by PRC President Xi Jinping’s proclamation at the 2022 Central Rural Work Conference, “ensuring a stable and secure supply of food and important agricultural products has always been the top priority in building a strong agricultural country.”⁶

Further examination of PRC policy documents is telling. Every calendar year for the last 21 consecutive years, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the CCP Central Committee have issued the Number One Document, which describes the Chinese Communist Party priorities for national food security.⁷ Recent years have seen an acceleration of strategic documents addressing food and agriculture security. In March 2022, the Chinese Communist Party implemented the Seed Law of the People’s Republic of China, followed by the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Assuring Food Security in December 2023 and the Plan for Accelerating the Construction of China into an Agricultural Powerhouse (2024–2035) in April 2025.⁸ The 2023 food security law establishes the CCP as the primary leader for promulgating national food security concepts as part of an “overall national security concept” and binds “development and security” together to “ensure that grain is basically self-sufficient and staple grain for daily use is absolutely secure.”⁹ It is important to note that the term “food security” translates literally to “grain security” in the Chinese language.¹⁰ Within the PRC state apparatus, the state-owned enterprises COFCO Limited and the state grains stockpiler Sinograin manage most of the PRC’s significant imports of grain and oilseed commodities.¹¹ The 2025 Agricultural Powerhouse plan reaffirms the 2022 and 2023 national security objectives and exhorts the Chinese people to “maintain strategic resolve and keep in it for the long haul.”¹²

These strategy documents reinforce the annual Number One Document emphasis on maintaining political control over improvements to the national food-security posture.¹³ Improvement is achieved through policy prescriptions for strengthening domestic production of feed supplies, protecting arable land against nonagricultural uses, and building stockpiles of strategically important commodities.¹⁴ The Chinese Communist Party’s stated intent is to achieve 92 percent self-sufficiency in staple grains and beans by 2033, up from 84 percent during 2021–23.¹⁵ Nevertheless, the People’s Republic of China will likely remain dependent on agricultural imports due to a series of structural challenges that include extreme weather events and limited and continuously declining land, labor, and water resources.¹⁶

The 2023 Number One Document’s requirement to “implement the diversification strategy of agricultural product imports in depth” reflects these vulnerabilities.¹⁷ This call for trade reorientation includes sourcing agricultural products from a broader range of trading partners (for example, African and South American countries or Russia) while reducing reliance on imports from the United States and other countries with whom the People’s Republic of China faces growing geopolitical tensions.¹⁸

In 2025, PRC top officials announced the country’s grain supply would not be affected by the loss of US feed grain and oilseed imports because they (1) built enough commodity strategic stockpiles and (2) developed enough alternative suppliers on the global market.¹⁹ This announcement likely poses significant national security implications for the United States. Such a public declaration implies that the United States has lost its ability to flex its status as a global agricultural powerhouse to deter a possible military conflict with the People’s Republic of China.

Accordingly, this article assesses three decades of PRC efforts to diversify agricultural imports away from the United States and like-minded countries to articulate a different conception of national strategic power, as promulgated and operationalized by the People’s Republic of China. We find that rather than implementing a narrow, well-defined strategy, the People’s Republic of China has sought to diversify its agricultural imports via initiatives ranging from deliberately negotiated bilateral agreements to opportunistic commodity purchases. Nevertheless, to focus on key commodities, specific countries, and particular policy solutions, we group our assessment into two broad categories: places and things.²⁰

1. Places – The PRC’s main agricultural import supplying countries and countries or groups of countries of strategic importance, for example, Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS); NATO; the United States; and such. This selection is based on economic, geopolitical, and agricultural considerations and factors shaping PRC national diversification efforts such as free trade agreements (FTAs), the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), or third-country defense arrangements with the United States.

2. Things – The People’s Republic of China’s key agricultural import commodities. In some instances, the People’s Republic of China publicly identifies the need to reduce import dependencies of specific commodities. These commodities are either the top agricultural imports in volume terms (for example, soybeans or corn) or of strategic importance (for example, sugar or palm oil).²¹

While the People’s Republic of China publicly states it has broken dependence on US agriculture to meet domestic consumption requirements, the findings from this study reveal a more nuanced reality.²² Where the People’s Republic of China reduced dependency on the United States and US allies for some commodities, it became more reliant on a small pool of other supplying countries.²³ A central finding is the emergence of Brazil as the People’s Republic of China’s major supplier of key agricultural products (such as corn, soybeans, and animal protein) at the expense of the United States and US allies.²⁴ Interestingly, diplomatic tools such as FTAs and the BRI appear to have minimal effect on the People’s Republic of China diversification attempts. Going forward, it will need to balance domestic food security priorities against significant external constraints: highly concentrated global production of certain agricultural commodities, crop failures or military conflict in major agricultural supplying countries, bilateral or bloc trade wars, and changing phytosanitary import/export restrictions and controls.²⁵

Diversification of PRC Agricultural Imports

This section assesses PRC efforts to diversify its pool of supplying countries for overall agricultural imports. This assessment uses the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI), which is a measure of international trade diversification or concentration.²⁶ Mathematically, this index sums the squared shares of each country to total PRC agricultural imports and can be expressed as follows:

where,

• x_i is the nominal value of PRC agricultural products imports from country i,

• X is the total nominal value of PRC imports of agricultural products,

• N is the total number of countries supplying agricultural products to the People’s Republic of China.

The HHI results range between a lower bound of near zero (perfect diversification) and a maximum of 1 (perfect concentration with all agricultural imports originating from a single country).²⁷ The index was estimated for every year between 1995 and 2023, using the annual value of PRC agricultural imports published by Trade Data Monitor. Results ranged from 0.082 to 0.133, indicating that imports remain unconcentrated; however, figure 1 shows modest improvements in the HHI score—and even a score deterioration in the last five years—signaling limited success in overall diversification. Given the array of agricultural goods imported by the People’s Republic of China and sheer volumes involved, a more granular analysis is warranted.

Figure 1. Estimated Herfindahl–Hirschman Index for value of PRC imports of agricultural products across all supplying countries
(Source: Created by the authors using Trade Data Monitor)

Places: Main Agricultural Import-Supplying Countries and Countries / Groups of Countries of Strategic Importance

This section focuses on countries and country groups’ shares of total PRC agricultural imports to understand whether the People’s Republic of China decreased dependence on certain nations while increasing agricultural trade with others. Policy decisions, overseas investment, phytosanitary restrictions / permissions, and other actions can achieve such trade reorientations.

We analyzed countries and country groups based on economic, geopolitical, and agricultural considerations and hypothesized that countries joining the BRI or signing FTAs increased their roles as agricultural suppliers to the People’s Republic of China. In contrast, the research assumes that the People’s Republic of China seeks to reduce agricultural import dependency from countries with which it is experiencing geostrategic tensions—such as the United States or other closely aligned countries.²⁸ Although some countries increased agricultural exports to the People’s Republic of China over time, their overall market share of PRC agriculture imports decreased. This decrease happens when other competing nations gain market share at a more rapid pace. For example, according to TDM trade data, between 1995 and 2023, the nominal value of Australian agricultural exports to the People’s Republic of China increased by 1,460 percent; however, Australia’s share of PRC agricultural imports decreased from 7 percent to 6 percent over the same period.

BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) Group

BRICS member countries are economically and politically heterogeneous, accounting for more than 40 percent of total global population and 37 percent of global gross domestic product, though overall trade integration among members remained low as of 2023.²⁹ This study hypothesizes that, where possible, the People’s Republic of China increased its share of agricultural imports from the original BRICS countries at the expenses of other non-BRICS agricultural suppliers. This bloc accounts for a large share of global exports of soybeans, soy meal and oil, and rice.³⁰

From 1995 to 2023, BRICS’ share of the People’s Republic of China agriculture imports increased from 7 percent to 31 percent, mostly because of the rapid growth of Brazil as a global commodity exporter.³¹

Brazil. Brazil alone accounted for 27 percent of PRC agricultural imports in 2023.³² As it will be discussed later, significant growth in exports of grains, oilseeds, and animal proteins to the People’s Republic of China has driven Brazil’s growing market share.³³

Russia. Although on a much smaller scale, Russia’s market share more than doubled from less than 1 percent in 1995 to 2.6 percent in 2023, mostly driven by a $26 billion agreement signed in 2023 that opened the Chinese market to Russian food exports and the lift of numerous phytosanitary restrictions in 2022 that opened Russian wheat to the PRC market.³⁴

India. Despite the People’s Republic of China being one of the largest export markets for India’s agricultural products, India’s market share averaged just above one percent over the last decade.³⁵ Furthermore, India has a significant agricultural trade deficit with the People’s Republic of China.³⁶

South Africa. South Africa has an unremarkable agriculture trade relationship with the People’s Republic of China and runs a large trade deficit, exporting mostly ores and precious metals.³⁷

In summary, over the last 30 years, BRICS unevenly emerged as a key supplier of agricultural products to the People’s Republic of China. This trend is mostly explained by Brazil becoming a global agricultural export powerhouse that replaced some US agricultural main exports to the People’s Republic of China.³⁸ While Brazilian macroeconomic national policy and strong public-sector research and development spending drove this agricultural transformation, the enabling role played by direct US bilateral development aid and international development financing is notable.³⁹ It is uncertain how agricultural trade between BRICS members and the People’s Republic of China would be affected by continued escalations of tension between the United States and the PRC. A Banque de France study triangulating geopolitical distances between BRICS countries, the United States, and the EU shows the People’s Republic of China as the most geopolitically distant BRICS country overall, whereas Brazil is closest to the United States and the EU.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, the agricultural sector is Brazil’s main economic engine and accounts for a quarter of the country’s gross domestic product—up from 18 percent a decade ago—with the People’s Republic of China as the top export market.⁴¹ Due to national production capacity and existing international supply chains, Brazil will likely remain one of the People’s Republic of China’s few agricultural providers capable of serving as an alternative to the United States.

Countries with Free Trade Agreements with China

Free trade agreements between two or more countries determine the values of tariffs and duties those countries impose on imports and exports.⁴² The assumption is that FTAs provide indications of geopolitical direction, especially for nations caught between powerful economic partners such as the United States and the People’s Republic of China. Under that premise, this section analyzes how multilateral and bilateral FTAs have shaped PRC agricultural imports and tests the assumption that FTAs increase agricultural trade, or for the People’s Republic of China, agricultural import diversification.⁴³

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been China’s largest trading partner since 2009 and is comprised of Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.⁴⁴ Studies show that ASEAN-PRC agriculture trade has surged in recent years and PRC agricultural investment in ASEAN countries accounts for 40 percent of the People’s Republic of China’s total national outbound agricultural investments.⁴⁵ TDM trade data shows that China’s agricultural imports from ASEAN nations increased from $2 billion in 1995 to $36 billion in 2023, with Thailand, Indonesia, and Vietnam being the main supplying nations.⁴⁶ Despite this expansion in trade value, ASEAN’s total share of imports remained virtually unchanged—18 percent in 1995 versus 17 percent in 2023. This lack of increased market share may be partially explained by ASEAN nations not being significant suppliers of the People’s Republic of China’s fastest growing agricultural imports (grains and oilseeds) emphasized in PRC national food security policy and the 2023 Food Security Law.⁴⁷ Rather, ASEAN’s top three PRC agricultural exports are palm oil, durian, and cassava.

Outside ASEAN, bilateral FTAs exist between the People’s Republic of China and 17 other countries.⁴⁸ An economic cooperation framework agreement also exists between Beijing and Taiwan.⁴⁹ People’s Republic of China’s agricultural imports from this country group increased.⁵⁰ Australia, New Zealand, and Chile are the top agricultural trade suppliers. Nevertheless, TDM trade data shows this group’s combined shares also remained virtually unchanged from 12 percent in 1995 to 14 percent 2023. Accordingly, FTAs as mechanisms for the People’s Republic of China to diversify its pool of agricultural suppliers appear to have limited success thus far.

Belt and Road Initiative. The BRI—formerly One Belt, One Road—is a PRC-led globally promulgated framework under which the Chinese Communist Party pursues an assortment of diplomatic, investment, development, trade, and security engagements and initiatives. Belt and Road Initiative rhetoric and expressed intent has evolved over the years.⁵¹ The People’s Republic of China also publicly regards the BRI as an instrument to increase agricultural trade and cooperation, ostensibly also driving regional food security among cooperating countries.⁵² To achieve this goal, the People’s Republic of China has spearheaded agricultural and fishery cooperation initiatives with BRI countries.⁵³ The PRC has also directed national investment into BRI countries’ agricultural sectors likely to secure control over certain overseas food supplies.⁵⁴

According to PRC state media, BRI efforts paid off as food trade with BRI partners surged.⁵⁵ The Chinese Communist Party credits 80 agriculture and fishery agreements and more than 650 agriculture investment projects as affecting this surge in trade.⁵⁶ A recent BRI economic study suggests a positive impact on agricultural trade between the People’s Republic of China and the rest of the world and concludes that, for certain products (for example, vegetable products) the BRI leads to a reallocation of China’s agricultural imports away from traditional suppliers and toward neighboring BRI-participating countries.⁵⁷

Figure 2 portrays the increased value of PRC agricultural imports from BRI countries over the last three decades. The rapid acceleration coincides with numerous countries joining the BRI, notably in 2018 when 63 countries joined.⁵⁸ Moreover, PRC agricultural imports from 50 BRI countries more than doubled between the year that any given country joined the BRI and 2023.⁵⁹

Figure 2. Value of PRC import of agricultural products from BRI countries and the cumulative number of countries joining the BRI from 1995 to 2023
(Source: Created by authors using Trade Data Monitor)

A detailed analysis reveals that despite the growing number of BRI members, the group’s total share of PRC agricultural imports increased only modestly from 31 percent in 1995 to 37 percent in 2023.⁶⁰ Like with ASEAN countries, this increase may partially be explained by fast-growing PRC agricultural imports from non-BRI countries such as Brazil or the United States during the same period.⁶¹ Additionally, TDM trade data shows that 57 BRI countries saw their agricultural exports to the People’s Republic of China decrease or did not experience any growth after joining the initiative. Another plausible explanation includes large-scale farming investment projects in BRI countries never coming to fruition or otherwise failing to generate significant agricultural exports to China.⁶² For countries on the African continent, promises of BRI- and PRC-directed agriculture investment have failed to translate into expanded PRC export market opportunities.⁶³ This failure is significant as most BRI-targeted African countries rely on agricultural products for most of their gross domestic product and exports.⁶⁴

The United States and Its Allies. This section looks at the changes in PRC reliance on agricultural products from the United States and countries with collective or bilateral defense treaties with the United States. This analysis assumes that in a military conflict between the People’s Republic of China and the United States, some US allies might reduce, restrict, or cease trade with the People’s Republic of China either as overt policy or as global trade networks reduce exposure to risk. Critically, the United States does not treat food or agriculture as a weapon—and, in fact, has led a United Nations 91-member state effort to ban the use of food as a weapon, an effort the People’s Republic of China declined to support.⁶⁵ In contrast, the People’s Republic of China acknowledges the use of food as a “foreign policy instrument” that can be deployed to “induce acceptable US behaviors.”⁶⁶

Although the People’s Republic of China remains the overall largest export destination for US agriculture, TDM data confirms that the US share of PRC agricultural imports decreased from 30 percent in 1995 to 15 percent in 2023.⁶⁷ Much of this market share loss is explained by gains from competing countries (such as Brazil or Australia) in products such grains, oilseeds, and animal proteins, which the research addresses in subsequent sections.⁶⁸

Analysis of countries with collective or bilateral defense arrangements with the United States provides mixed results. For NATO, we assess its member nations share with and without the United States.⁶⁹ This is because US agricultural exports to the People’s Republic of China far exceed the combined total from all other NATO members. The combined total value of NATO members’ PRC agricultural exports increased from $6 billion in 1995 to $60 billion in 2023; however, NATO’s overall share decreased from 51 percent in 1995 to 28 percent in 2023, mostly due to the reduction of the US share. Still, the combined share of NATO minus United States dropped from 21 percent in 1995 to 13 percent in 2023 as shown in figure 3.⁷⁰ Within that market share loss, however, there are some important nuances that we discuss later.

Figure 3. NATO’s share of PRC agricultural imports in 1995 and 2023
(Source: Created by authors using Trade Data Monitor)

For brevity, the combination of security treaties between the United States and allies in Southeast Asia is termed “US–Southeast Asia allies” and covers Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Japan, South Korea, and Thailand.⁷¹ The total value of PRC agricultural imports from this group increased rapidly after 2008, mostly driven by Australia, New Zealand, and Thailand. Nevertheless, this group’s share remained stable over time at around 18 percent. This statistic is an important finding given the growing diplomatic tensions between the People’s Republic of China and countries within this group.⁷² Furthermore, in the event of a conflict with the United States, it is unlikely that the People’s Republic of China would sustain current trade levels with these countries.

Combined, NATO (with the United States) and the US–Southeast Asia allies accounted for 46 percent of PRC agricultural imports in 2023, meaning nearly half of the value of the PRC agricultural imports originates from the United States and countries with collective or bilateral security treaties involving the United States.⁷³

Other Countries of Strategic Importance

This section analyzes the PRC agricultural trade dependencies with countries or groups of countries becoming strategically important based on PRC promulgated international cooperation efforts.

Association for the Promotion of Agricultural Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries (APACCCEEC). This organization was established in 2012 and includes Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Greece, Herzegovina, Hungary, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Slovenia.⁷⁴ The association is a policy mechanism supported by Beijing to facilitate cooperation and trade in the agricultural sector between the People’s Republic of China and these countries, most of which are NATO members.⁷⁵

The association’s overall market share is modest and accounted for less than half of 1 percent of PRC agricultural imports in 2023. However, in value terms, PRC agricultural imports from this group expanded from $3.7 million in 1995 to just under $1 billion in 2023, mostly driven by Bulgaria, which has emerged as the People’s Republic of China’s largest agricultural product trade partner in the central and eastern European regions.⁷⁶ Bulgaria’s agricultural exports to China include grains and oilseeds and, in 2023, it was the People’s Republic of China’s fourth largest corn supplier.⁷⁷ Furthermore, recent European Investment Bank loans to Bulgaria for increasing Bulgaria’s Varna seaport grain export capability will likely support this trend.⁷⁸

The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). In 2000, the People’s Republic of China established the African continent-aspirational Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, ostensibly to provide “South-South cooperation” as an alternative to Western and African-country individual development models.⁷⁹ In 2006, under the auspice of Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, the People’s Republic of China announced a Chinese Agricultural Technology Demonstration Center (ATDC) concept designed to leverage PRC technology transfers to African national partners. These centers increase agricultural productivity and reduce African nations’ reliance on external trade for food security while also creating African-continent business opportunities for PRC entities.⁸⁰

Accurate and reliable information about the intended effect of the ATDCs and accordingly engaged countries is not available. Chinese Academy of Social Sciences–funded researchers note the ATDC concept was unevenly and fitfully implemented.⁸¹ Publicly available literature suggests 23 African nations have engaged in ATDC activities with PRC state-owned enterprises, private companies, and other state-affiliated institutions and funds.⁸² Some ATDC countries have rapidly expanded agricultural exports to the People’s Republic of China since 1995 (for example, Mozambique or Zambia).⁸³ The actual role of the ATDC is unclear, however.⁸⁴ Overall, the ATDC group’s share of PRC total agricultural imports remained modest throughout the analysis period—1 percent in 1995 versus 2 percent in 2023.⁸⁵ These findings question the efficacy of the ATDC model to diversify PRC agricultural imports and seem to be in line with other PRC development efforts in Africa.

Things: Key Agricultural Imports

This section analyzes the suppliers of the People’s Republic of China’s most important agricultural commodity imports in volume terms. We also examine trade of agricultural food products for which the People’s Republic of China either maintains centrally administrated and CCP-controlled reserves (for example, sugar) or on which the highest-level governance bodies like the State Council have provided formal strategic guidance (dairy, for example).⁸⁶ Often, the food processing industry uses these strategic commodities, and they are ingredients in many processed food products such as palm oil.

TDM trade data shows that soybeans, beef meat, and corn are the PRC top three agricultural imports in terms of overall dollar value. In volume terms, soybeans, corn, barley, wheat, meslin, and palm oil accounted for 62 percent of the PRC total agricultural imports volume in 2023.⁸⁷ The United States and Brazil have long been dominant suppliers of many of these commodities, but recent CCP policy suggests continued intent to broaden import sourcing to other national supply sources.⁸⁸ Increased PRC investing in Africa under the auspice of the BRI to boost soybean and corn imports from countries such as Tanzania, Ethiopia, or Benin suggests potential operationalization of this policy priority.⁸⁹

Top Three Agricultural Imports by Volume

Soybeans. Over the last three decades, PRC soybean imports increased significantly to meet growing domestic demand for animal feed and edible oils and are now the country’s top agricultural import in value and volume terms. These imports range from 100 to 120 million metric tons every year.⁹⁰ China’s annual domestic soybean production is about 20 million metric tons.⁹¹ As a result of this supply and demand imbalance, the People’s Republic of China accounts for about 60 percent of total global soybean imports. For years, the United States was the People’s Republic of China’s primary soybean supplier but, in the past 15 years, Brazil emerged as the trade partner of choice. In 2023, some 73 percent of total Brazilian soybean exports went to the People’s Republic of China, compared to a 55 percent US export market share of the same.⁹² All NATO countries combined supplied 25 percent of the People’s Republic of China’s total soybean imports in 2023.⁹³

The HHI was estimated for soybeans and showed a high import concentration, with the score increasing from 0.36 in 1995 to 0.56 in 2023. This reflects the People’s Republic of China’s increasing reliance on a single supplier—Brazil. Although this national trade reorientation may represent an attempt to mitigate perceived geopolitical risks with the United States, it also makes the People’s Republic of China heavily dependent on weather and crop conditions in Brazil.⁹⁴

Corn (Maize). China’s corn imports were almost nonexistent between 1995 and 2009 but have surged in recent years. Historically, the United States was the People’s Republic of China’s single largest corn supplier, commanding a 96 percent share in 1995. However, since November 2022, a new Brazil-PRC agreement has enabled Brazil’s bilateral corn trade by relaxing complex inspection, quarantine, phytosanitary certificate, and permitting requirements. As a result, in 2023, Brazil became the People’s Republic of China’s top corn supplier, and the People’s Republic of China became the main export market for Brazilian corn producers.⁹⁵ To add a sense of scale, Brazil went from practically no corn trade with the People’s Republic of China in 2022 to accounting for 13 out of the 27 million metric tons corn imported by the People’s Republic of China in 2023.⁹⁶

The United States also lost some of its corn market share to Ukraine, now the People’s Republic of China’s third most important corn supplier.⁹⁷ This happened despite Russian systematic targeting of agriculture production and storage sites and Russian state-sponsored theft and smuggling of Ukrainian grain.⁹⁸ Bulgaria and Myanmar became the fourth and fifth largest corn suppliers to China, respectively. Also of note is Argentina’s decade-long negotiating for access of its corn—mostly genetically modified—to the PRC market. The two countries struck an initial agreement in 2023, and Argentina’s government officials stated that the People’s Republic of China authorized the import of two varieties of herbicide-tolerant genetically modified corn.⁹⁹ At the writing of this paper, no documented shipments have occurred.

In summary, the People’s Republic of China has transitioned from minimal corn imports to being almost completely dependent on the United States to now having a broader number of suppliers. Nevertheless, the estimated HHI for corn imports shows high levels of geographic concentration and high volatility—HHI score ranges from 0.20 to 0.96. It is likely that this trend will continue as countries such as Brazil continue to expand their domestic corn production, however, the same climate risk caveats with soybean hold true with corn.

Barley. Despite its lower profile in commodity markets, barley is the People’s Republic of China’s third-largest agricultural import in volume terms, mainly used as animal feed. The People’s Republic of China is also the primary export market for leading barley-producing countries such as Australia.¹⁰⁰ The estimated HHI shows that, in 2023, the People’s Republic of China achieved the highest level of import diversification for barley with a 0.21 HHI score but, between 2002 and 2018, imports became more concentrated with scores oscillating between 0.40 and 0.70. These changes are explained by year-to-year non-market shifts in imports among the People’s Republic of China’s top suppliers—Argentina, Australia, Canada, and France. For example, following growing diplomatic tensions, in 2020, the People’s Republic of China applied high tariffs to key Australian agricultural imports, including barley.¹⁰¹ As a result, PRC imports of Australian barley halted in 2020 and 2021. The People’s Republic of China has also recently increased barley purchases from Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine—although on a much smaller scale.

In summary, there is evidence that the People’s Republic of China successfully diversified imports of this commodity; however, trade data shows that the United States, plus three close military allies—Australia, Canada, and France—accounted for 66 percent of the PRC barley imports in 2023.¹⁰² Thus, the People’s Republic of China’s ability to procure much of its barley needs in global markets could be disrupted in the event of a conflict with the United States.

Imported Agricultural Products of Strategic Importance

Palm Oil. The People’s Republic of China is the world’s second-largest importer of palm oil—primarily from Indonesia and Malaysia.¹⁰³ Other much smaller suppliers are concentrated in the Southeastern Asia region: Myanmar, Thailand, Taiwan, and the Philippines. It is unlikely that the People’s Republic of China will be willing or capable of diversifying imports of palm oil, given the global market dominance of Indonesia and Malaysia. Conversely, Indonesia and Malaysia rely on palm oil exports as national economy cornerstones. Such trade dependencies might contribute to a public sentiment in Indonesia and Malaysia that is more aligned with the People’s Republic of China than with the United States.¹⁰⁴

Animal Proteins (Beef, Pork, and Chicken). The People’s Republic of China has been the world’s largest meat (beef, pork, chicken) importer since 2019.¹⁰⁵ Meat imports increased significantly from $95 million in 1995 to a peak of nearly $32 billion in 2021.¹⁰⁶

Beef. As of 2023, MERCOSUR—the Southern Common Market, which includes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay (Venezuela has been in suspended status since 2016)—was the People’s Republic of China’s primary beef source, with a 71 percent share of Chinese beef import.¹⁰⁷ Prior to 2016, US beef exports were banned in the People’s Republic of China due to PRC-claimed phytosanitary concerns. While the United States has since gained a small market share (9 percent as of 2023), export gains are still limited by targeted US export facility bans by the People’s Republic of China.¹⁰⁸ The recent 2024 unbanning of Australian beef exports to the People’s Republic of China further limits US potential for market recapture.¹⁰⁹ Combined, Australia and New Zealand accounted for 16 percent of the People’s Republic of China’s beef imports in 2023.¹¹⁰ Resource and land-intensive production requirements for beef, combined with the People’s Republic of China’s domestic sector inability to meet increasing consumer demand, will support future beef imports.

Pork. The People’s Republic of China is the world’s largest producer and consumer of pork, which remains the country’s animal protein of choice, accounting for around 60 percent of all domestic animal protein consumption.¹¹¹ The People’s Republic of China imported approximately $3.5 billion worth of pork in 2023 to meet growing domestic demand. The combined import share of NATO members’ pork declined from nearly 100 percent between 1998 and 2015 to 63 percent in 2023. Spain and Denmark are the main European suppliers but currently face market uncertainty because (at the time of this analysis) the People’s Republic of China is actively engaged in a tit-for-tat tariff war with the EU, initiating an “anti-dumping probe” into EU pork exports in response to EU overcapacity/subsidy tariffs on PRC electronic vehicle imports.¹¹²

American access to the PRC pork market has been constrained by non-tariff barriers to trade imposed by Chinese government institutions. As a result, the US share of People’s Republic of China’s pork imports was 6 percent in 2023. Noteworthy is the growing role of Brazil as a pork supplier, which had its share grow from nearly zero to 30 percent in less than a decade. Despite the People’s Republic of China’s strong domestic recovery from devastating herd losses from the African Swine Fever outbreak in 2019, rising domestic production costs and tougher national regulations addressing widespread environmental and disease problems in the domestic pork industry will probably ensure continued imported pork market growth.¹¹³

Poultry. The People’s Republic of China is also the world’s largest importer of poultry meat, and its dependence on US poultry meat imports drastically decreased from a maximum share of 97 percent in 2003 down to 19 percent in 2023. Brazil now accounts for nearly half of the People’s Republic of China’s poultry meat imports, while Russia and Belarus have emerged as important suppliers with a combined share of 18 percent in 2023. In addition, the People’s Republic of China partially relies on chicken genetics imports to ensure its domestic productive capability. As Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) concerns persist globally, the People’s Republic of China has subsequently placed restrictions on chicken meat and chicken genetics imports and, in some cases—like with Argentina, Chile, and Türkiye—total import restrictions. The United States has seen significant market loss for chicken genetics import due to claimed HPAI concerns. In turn, genetics import prohibition is thought to have spurred PRC-domestic private company genetics capability development, though reliable data is lacking.¹¹⁴

Dairy. As of 2024, the People’s Republic of China’s dairy market is estimated to be worth about $70 billion USD, with an estimated 99 percent of all pasteurized milk produced domestically.¹¹⁵ For all other non-fresh pasteurized dairy products (fluid milk [UHT], whole milk powder, skim milk powder, cheese, and butter), New Zealand is the People’s Republic of China’s dominant trade partner, except for whey and whey products (primarily used for infant formula and piglet feed). Whey and modified whey products import share is dominated by the United States with about half of total share in 2024. Expected efficiency in domestic dairy production will likely soften future imports as overproduction in fresh milk could drive secondary non-fresh product conversion market opportunities.¹¹⁶ The People’s Republic of China’s willingness to apply retaliatory tariffs on EU dairy in response to the EU’s electric vehicle tariffs suggests a certain level of comfort with domestic production/import substitution capability.

Sugar. The People’s Republic of China is the world’s third-largest sugar producer, with production divided into two geographically distinct subsectors: sugarcane in the south of the country, which accounts for more than 85 percent of national production, and sugar beet in the far north. Like petroleum and grains, sugar is managed in a centralized strategic reserves system run by the National Development and Reform Commission, directly subordinate to the all-powerful State Council.¹¹⁷

As average household use of sugar in the People’s Republic of China is estimated to be about half the global average, future demand will likely outstrip domestic production ability, ensuring continued import reliance.¹¹⁸ Trade data confirms that trend: PRC sugar imports increased by nearly 100 percent between 1995 and 2023. The HHI score also confirms an increasing geographic trade concentration, with Brazil accounting for 56 percent of People’s Republic of China’s sugar imports in 2023, followed by Thailand with a share of 29 percent. The United States is a minor supplier with a 2 percent share.¹¹⁹

Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

Historically, Chinese food security has been synonymous with social stability. In that vein, Beijing’s ruling class has publicly voiced growing concerns about how disruptions to food supply chains and domestic food security levels could trigger political instability.¹²⁰ Despite increased domestic food production and improved self-sufficiency in certain agricultural commodities (for example, wheat or rice), the People’s Republic of China remains dependent on certain imported food products (such as soybeans and animal proteins). This dependency has accelerated in the last two decades, fueled by rising incomes and changing diets of Chinese households. While CCP policy clearly articulates the need to increase domestic food production and diversify the nation’s pool of foreign food products suppliers, operational reality differs.

This analysis of trade data across places and things shows a mixed picture for China’s national ability to meet CCP stated intent, but several trends and patterns emerged:

• Between 1995 and 2023, the People’s Republic of China achieved modest progress in geographic diversification of overall agricultural imports. While the People’s Republic of China managed to reduce dependency on the United States and its allies, it also concentrated reliance on other countries, mainly Brazil. Trade data suggests PRC willingness to assume a trade-off between a controlled variable like perceived potential geopolitical risks with the United States at the expense of uncontrolled variables like exposure to crop failure or market risks in another single market, Brazil.

• In the economic statecraft–diplomatic realm, FTAs, BRICS membership, or involvement in PRC-led initiatives such as the BRI were posited to facilitate PRC agricultural import diversification. However, empirical evidence reveals that these efforts have failed to meaningfully expand the People’s Republic of China’s pool of agricultural suppliers, which may be a function of politically driven dealmaking running into market reality constraints.

• The People’s Republic of China’s imports of certain agricultural goods have grown increasingly concentrated over time due to agronomic or market considerations—like with high-import reliance on Malaysian and Indonesian palm oil.

• Despite trade challenges, the combined agricultural trade from the United States, NATO members, and US Southeast Asia allies still accounted for 46 percent of the People’s Republic of China’s total agricultural imports in 2023. This trade challenge would represent a significant vulnerability for the People’s Republic of China’s food security in the event of a military conflict and the resulting inevitable global trade disruptions.

The apparent doctrinal and operational shift of food and agriculture to fall under CCP-led national security control and oversight lacks comparable ideological or practical economic statecraft equivalents in United States. The value of a national security-control approach to food and agriculture remains to be proven. We lack comparable contemporary models demonstrating long-term success by large, technologically sophisticated, and market savvy authoritarian centralized governments to act as efficient managers of national agriculture production and effective interlocuters in complex international commodity markets. As thinking in the United States continues to grapple effectively with the diplomatic, information, military, and economic instruments of national power necessary to address an increasingly assertive and capable China, we must come to terms with asymmetrical understandings of and approaches to national security. Agriculture and food security, firmly enshrined in PRC elite thinking and state operations as a national security priority, is a potentially powerful use case to articulate some asymmetries. We consider this a foundational use case to inform future thinking about “winning without fighting” as military planning considers options to shape the operational environment.

Gustavo Ferreira
Major Gustavo Ferreira is a senior agricultural economist with the US Department of Agriculture and serves as an agricultural officer (38G) at the 353rd Civil Affairs Command, US Army Reserves. He holds a PhD in agricultural economics from Louisiana State University. Prior to joining the federal government, he was an assistant professor in agricultural economics at Virginia Tech University. He has published numerous research articles in top-ranking economic and military journals.

Bert Cramer
Bert Cramer is a civil affairs officer with the 353rd Civil Affairs Command, US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne), US Army Reserves. As a civilian, he leads complex sociotechnical systems risk management strategy development and advises on the operational implementation of the same across the public and private sector.

Endnotes

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