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Dec. 17, 2025

Security Implications of the China-Russia-North Korea Triangle

Brian G. Carlson

ABSTRACT: This article analyzes the evolving strategic dynamics within the China-Russia-North Korea triangle and their implications for global security. It argues that while the strengthened Russia–North Korea relationship poses risks for China’s global strategy and its major economic partnerships, for now, China also derives some benefits from these close ties and considers the risks to be manageable. Drawing on recent diplomatic developments, military cooperation, and regional responses, the article offers a nuanced assessment of how this alignment affects European and Indo-Pacific theaters. The analysis provides US policymakers with insight into the risks of opportunistic aggression and the strategic calculations driving these partnerships.

Keywords: China, Russia, North Korea, international security, Indo-Pacific, Korean Peninsula

 

Russia’s war in Ukraine has stimulated interactions among China, Russia, and North Korea with great significance for international security, both in Europe and in the Indo-Pacific. China’s support for Russia since the invasion, especially through its purchases of energy resources and provision of dual-use goods, has helped to sustain Russia’s economy and war effort. For its part, North Korea has provided Russia with military assistance that China has been unwilling to offer, including artillery, missiles, and combat troops. In June 2024, Russia and North Korea sealed a mutual defense pact, thus reviving a security relationship first enshrined in a 1961 treaty that lapsed at the time of the Soviet Union’s demise. Emboldened by his country’s strengthened ties with Russia and the likelihood of further Russian military assistance, North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un has grown increasingly bellicose in his rhetoric and actions, adding to instability on the Korean Peninsula.

The Russia-Ukraine War has exerted influence on international politics that is analogous, in some respects, to the effects of the Korean War. In the past few years, as in the early 1950s, the great-power rivalry between a strengthened Moscow-Beijing axis, on the one hand, and the United States and its allies and partners, on the other, has grown increasingly tense.1 For North Korea, this shifting international landscape presented an opportunity to exploit what Kim called a “neo-cold war” in order to gain increased support from China and Russia.2 Growing cooperation among China, Russia, and North Korea arouses concerns that these three authoritarian countries, along with Iran, could pose an urgent threat to the existing international order in the coming years.3 At the same time, certain aspects of this cooperation, particularly the warming relationship between Russia and North Korea, pose risks for China, the most powerful country in this grouping, thus calling into question the durability of the China-Russia-North Korea triangle.4 This article attempts to assess these trends and to analyze their implications for international security.

North Korea Exploits the “Neo-Cold War”

Russia’s war in Ukraine and the resulting disruption to the international order offered North Korea an opportunity to break out of its decades-long period of “strategic isolation.”5 Following several years of tension in China–North Korea relations, China joined Russia in supporting UN Security Council sanctions on the regime in Pyongyang for its nuclear test in September 2017. A failed bout of diplomacy between Kim and US President Donald Trump in 2018–19 dashed North Korean hopes for improved relations with the United States and relief from international sanctions. Kim turned again to China and Russia, which increased their support for his regime. During the following period, cooperation in support of North Korea became one of the most prominent examples of the strengthening China-Russia relationship.6 North Korea closed itself to the outside world during the COVID-19 pandemic, resulting in the further deterioration of its already grim economic conditions but allowing Kim to tighten his authoritarian control over society.

Several factors pushed North Korea to search for new strategic opportunities following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Despite the progress in its nuclear weapons and missile programs, North Korea may have been losing confidence in its deterrent capacity in the face of South Korea’s growing conventional superiority and expanding security cooperation with the United States. In terms of international relations theory, North Korea was approaching the limits of internal balancing and therefore sought to strengthen security cooperation with China and Russia for purposes of external balancing.7

At the same time, North Korea was concerned by its overwhelming reliance on China, which had the capacity to interfere in North Korea’s domestic politics and to limit its autonomy. Russia, which had never recovered the channels of political influence inside of the North Korean regime that the Soviet Union lost in the 1960s, was in this sense a more comfortable partner than China.8 While strengthening cooperation with both China and Russia, Kim also perceived an opportunity to follow in the footsteps of his grandfather, Kim Il-Sung, by playing his patrons in Beijing and Moscow against each other.9

Kim’s diplomatic overtures to Russia began in the early months following the start of the war. North Korea was one of the few countries that expressed open support for Russia’s position. When the UN General Assembly considered resolutions condemning the war and Russian territorial annexations, North Korea voted against them. In July 2023, during a visit by Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu to Pyongyang, Kim vowed to expand military cooperation with Russia in its confrontation with the United States.10 In September of that year, Kim traveled to the Russian Far East, where he viewed Russian aviation technology and rockets during tours of an aircraft factory and the Vostochny Cosmodrome. During a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Kim toasted the two countries’ “sacred struggle” against the “band of evil” in the West.11 The following month, the United States revealed that North Korea had begun shipping ammunition to Russia.12 According to the head of Ukrainian military intelligence, by July 2025 North Korea was providing 40 percent of the ammunition that Russia was using in the war in Ukraine.13

North Korea soon appeared to reap benefits from its invigorated relationship with Russia. In November 2023, it launched a military reconnaissance satellite into orbit. The success of this launch, following two failed attempts earlier that year, led the South Korean government and independent analysts to conclude that North Korea had secured Russia’s help in this effort.14 Kim’s maneuvering in the new international environment, especially the support that he secured from Russia, left him in a triumphant mood.15

This newfound confidence led to increasing belligerence. In January 2024, North Korea fired hundreds of artillery shells near South Korean border islands. Then Kim ordered the revision of North Korea’s constitution to abandon the long-standing goal of peaceful reunification, declaring instead that South Korea was an enemy state that must be defeated and subjugated.16 Two experienced observers of North Korea assessed that the situation on the Korean Peninsula had become more dangerous than at any time since 1950 because “Kim Jong Un has made a strategic decision to go to war.”17 That same month, the United States accused North Korea of providing Russia with ballistic missiles for the war in Ukraine.18 By the spring of 2025, North Korea had provided Russia with at least 100 ballistic missiles.19

In June 2024, Putin made his first visit in 24 years to North Korea, where he and Kim agreed to a defense pact that pledged mutual assistance if either country faced aggression.20 In October of that year, reports emerged that North Korea had begun sending troops to Russia. Eventually, an estimated 14,000 North Korean soldiers, including special operations forces, assembled in Russia’s Kursk region to assist Russia with efforts to retake territory that Ukrainian forces had seized during an incursion in August.21 Despite reports that the North Korean troops suffered heavy casualties, their contributions helped Russia to regain control of Kursk by the spring of 2025. The troop deployments, like the provision of missiles and ammunition, allowed the North Korean regime to earn much-needed revenues and to obtain food, oil, and weapons from Russia. The troop deployments also gave North Korea an opportunity to gain combat experience and to test its new weapons systems.22

As a result of his deepening relationship with Russia, Kim potentially gained some room to maneuver in foreign policy, though North Korea’s economic conditions remained dire. From the perspective of international security, the Russia-North Korea rapprochement strengthened Russia’s hand in the war against Ukraine while also heightening instability on the Korean Peninsula, at precisely the moment when US-China tensions were rising over Taiwan.

Russia Plays the North Korea Card

Russia had a variety of motivations for its diplomatic outreach to North Korea. Most pressing was its need for missiles, ammunition, and eventually manpower to support its war of attrition against Ukraine. Despite its rhetorical and economic support, China was unwilling to provide Russia with weapons or other forms of direct lethal assistance because it feared secondary sanctions and a sharp deterioration in its relations with the United States and Europe. North Korea, which already faced diplomatic isolation and onerous international sanctions, volunteered to provide military assistance that China withheld. North Korea’s decision to send troops improved Russia’s prospects of regaining territory in Kursk without having to weaken its own front line in eastern Ukraine by diverting Russian troops for the defense of the homeland.

Russia also perceived an opportunity to strengthen its influence on the Korean Peninsula. Russia shares an 11-mile border with North Korea and has a keen interest in the peninsula’s affairs, but its influence there is slim by comparison with Soviet times. Although North Korea has reaped material benefits from its military assistance to Russia, the bilateral economic relationship remains small. According to one study, Russia accounts for less than 2 percent of North Korea’s trade aside from arms deals.23 The North Korean Rason Special Economic Zone, which sits at the border with Russia and China, could eventually become a focal point for expanded Russia–North Korea trade.24 Russia is interested in additional infrastructure projects, but these are unlikely to make progress in the near future in light of regional tensions.25

Russia, however, has now firmly established itself as North Korea’s main military partner. North Korea regards any potential Russian deliveries of conventional weapons and technology, intelligence sharing, and offers to conduct joint military exercises as welcome contributions to its security. In this sense, Russia could complement the role of China, which is by far North Korea’s most significant economic partner but has been reluctant to expand military cooperation.26 North Korea’s recent launches of solid-fuel Hwasong-18 and Hwasong-19 ICBMs have led to widespread suspicion that it received Russian assistance with missile technology.27 Potential Russian support for North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, including offers to supply plutonium and highly enriched uranium or to offer assistance with missile technology or warheads, could arouse concerns in China’s leadership.

Putin and the Russian leadership have also expressed their determination to weaken US power and to revise the existing international order. Featuring prominently in this effort is Russia’s opposition to US alliances in the Indo-Pacific, including the US-South Korea alliance and recently enhanced trilateral cooperation among the United States, Japan, and South Korea.28 One of Russia’s likely motivations in raising the specter of support for North Korea’s military buildup was to deter South Korea from providing weapons to Ukraine.29 Russia was also irritated by growing US–South Korea security cooperation, including visits by US aircraft carriers to South Korean ports and the first appearance of a nuclear-capable strategic bomber at an air base in South Korea.30

In August 2023, before Kim visited the Russian Far East, US President Joe Biden hosted a summit at Camp David to strengthen trilateral security cooperation with Japan and South Korea. In comparison to China, Russia has relatively little to lose from a further deterioration of relations with Japan and South Korea, which support Ukraine and participate in the international sanctions regime against Russia.31 Russia therefore sought to promote cooperation with China and North Korea to counter the US-Japan-South Korea grouping.32 During his visit to North Korea in 2023, Shoigu proposed China-Russia-North Korea joint naval exercises, though China failed to respond to this suggestion.33 Russia appears to be more eager than China to energize the China-Russia-North Korea triangle to oppose the US-led international and regional orders.34

China Watches Warily

China has mostly sought to dispel the notion of a strengthening China-Russia-North Korea bloc or a larger axis also involving Iran.35 China’s relationship with Russia has grown steadily closer in recent years, culminating in the declaration of a “no limits” friendship on the eve of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Yet, the two countries have not established a formal military alliance and insist that their partnership is not directed against third countries. China’s only formal treaty ally is North Korea, a relationship enshrined in a 1961 alliance treaty that was renewed in 2021. China frequently expresses its opposition to military alliances and a bloc mentality, which it calls relics of the Cold War, despite the persistence of its own such relationship with North Korea.

As reports emerged of North Korean support for Russia’s war, spokesmen for the Chinese government denied knowledge of these developments. China declined to respond to Shoigu’s suggestion that North Korea join China-Russia naval exercises in September 2023. Following the announcement of the Russia–North Korea defense pact in June 2024, China sent subtle diplomatic signals to suggest its unease. China’s ambassador to North Korea skipped the 2024 “Victory Day” celebrations in Pyongyang, which mark the anniversary of the Korean War armistice. Additionally, the two countries broke with previous practice by celebrating the anniversary of China’s entry into the Korean War with separate ceremonies in Beijing and Pyongyang, rather than holding a joint commemoration.36 China’s foreign ministry claimed that it was “not aware” of North Korean troops in Russia after news of their deployment emerged in October 2024.37 In 2025, however, the ambassadors of both China and Russia attended the commemoration of the Korean War armistice in Pyongyang, and Chinese leader Xi Jinping hosted both Putin and Kim, among other world leaders, at a military parade in Beijing commemorating the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II.

The growing cooperation between Russia and North Korea poses several risks for China.38 As Russia’s ties with North Korea expand, China stands to lose influence on the Korean Peninsula and leverage over the regime in Pyongyang.39 China is also concerned about the risks of nuclear proliferation. Russian assistance to North Korea in missile delivery systems, warhead construction, miniaturization technology, or plutonium and enriched uranium supplies could accelerate a regional arms race that might encourage Japan or South Korea to build their own nuclear weapons. If Russia’s support emboldens North Korea to engage in risky behavior while simultaneously diminishing China’s influence on the regime, then it could lead to increased instability on the Korean Peninsula and in the broader region that would be difficult for China to contain. From China’s perspective, this situation risks the possibility of an unwanted conflict with the United States.40

The perception of a consolidated China-Russia-North Korea bloc could also further strengthen US alliances. Growing collaboration among Japan, South Korea, and the United States is of particular concern to China, as is the prospect of increased involvement by NATO in Indo-Pacific security affairs.41 Chinese analysts have warned that the perception of Ukraine and Taiwan as interconnected security crises could fortify transatlantic efforts to oppose China.42 Russia–North Korea security cooperation lends further credence to this perception.

China also faces risks to the pursuit of its global strategy from the perception that it is collaborating too closely with Russia and North Korea.43 North Korea’s support for Russia’s war in Ukraine is clearly at odds with China’s declared opposition to outside interference in, and expansion of, the war.44 At a time when the Chinese economy faces growing challenges, China’s integration in the global economy remains crucial. China especially values its economic links to the United States and Europe and wants to limit decoupling, de-risking, or other interruptions to these ties that could result from the further deterioration of relations. China’s collaboration with Russia and North Korea, which could damage China’s international reputation and undermine its calls for global peace and stability, also potentially poses risks to the implementation of its Global Security Initiative.45

Despite these risks, China also derives important benefits from collaboration within the China-Russia-North Korea triangle. China’s paramount concern at present is its rivalry with the United States, which it expects to last for the long term. This consideration largely explains China’s continued support for Russia throughout the war in Ukraine. Despite the risks to its international reputation and economic ties with the United States and Europe, which it has mitigated by refraining from providing Russia with direct lethal assistance, China has repeatedly reaffirmed its commitment to Russia. Amid its intensifying rivalry with the United States, China continues to view Russia as an invaluable partner.

Similarly, the rivalry with the United States underscores North Korea’s continued importance for China. As the United States strengthens its alliances with Japan and South Korea, China’s alliance with North Korea serves as an important, if imperfect, counterweight.46 North Korea acts as a buffer between South Korea, where US forces are stationed, and Chinese territory. China also fears the regional instability, including refugee flows into China, that would result from a collapse of the North Korean regime. With these considerations in mind, China most likely perceives that cooperation between Russia and North Korea strengthens both countries, yielding important benefits that at least partially offset the risks. The shared desire to maintain North Korea’s support, in turn, is an additional factor that strengthens the China-Russia partnership.47

The strengthening of the US-Japan-South Korea triangle is a source of concern for China.48 Chinese leaders may believe, however, that the United States is driving this process in response to China’s growing power and that neither China’s own actions nor the Russia–North Korea collaboration are the cause of it.49 Moreover, in the view of some Chinese scholars, the close ties and shared interests that both Japan and South Korea retain with China will likely limit the usefulness of the US-Japan-South Korea trilateral grouping as a mechanism for countering China. In their view, this grouping will be unable to disregard, let alone replace, the existing China-Japan-South Korea dialogue and cooperation mechanism.50 Indeed, China, Japan, and South Korea jointly called for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula during a trilateral summit in May 2024, provoking an angry response from North Korea.51

Collaboration between Russia and North Korea also potentially serves China’s interests in other respects. Kim’s willingness to supply Russia with ammunition and missiles relieves pressure on China to provide Russia with such forms of lethal assistance. By sending oil, food, and money to North Korea, Russia strengthens the stability of the regime in Pyongyang. Russian support for North Korea’s missile program could also strengthen the regime’s deterrent capacity. China perceives both outcomes to be in its own interests. China might also calculate that the United States would put pressure on Japan and South Korea not to acquire nuclear weapons, thus easing concerns about nuclear proliferation.52

China most likely also remains confident in its ability to maintain control over the situation. Although China cannot always bend Russia and North Korea to its will, it retains significant leverage over both. Russia’s economic dependence on China has grown significantly during the course of its war in Ukraine.53 North Korea’s dependence on China, with which it conducts 90 percent of its foreign trade, is far greater.54 Russia, which has limited economic relations with North Korea outside of the arms trade, cannot compete with China’s economic influence. Although China is frequently annoyed by North Korea’s provocative behavior, its leadership likely remains confident that Kim would not provoke a confrontation with the United States without China’s approval.55

Whatever misgivings China may have about the growing Russia–North Korea collaboration, its leadership has apparently done little in word or deed to resist it. This inaction is notable considering that, in the opinion of many analysts, it would be capable of doing so. This reticence suggests that despite the risks, China views the Russia–North Korea collaboration as tolerable or possibly even as a net benefit.56 Given China’s interest in ensuring that Russia achieves a favorable outcome in Ukraine, this situation is unlikely to change.57

Implications of the China-Russia-North Korea Triangle

The China-Russia-North Korea triangle has deservedly captured the attention of US strategists. Each of these countries threatens US interests individually. Cooperation among them complicates US strategy by strengthening their respective military capabilities and by constraining US foreign policy options for addressing each of them.58 Particular risks that this grouping poses to the United States include proliferation of weapons technology to North Korea, opportunistic aggression conducted simultaneously in multiple theaters, or coordination in a crisis.59

Despite their growing cooperation, this grouping currently falls short of a coherent bloc comparable to the Warsaw Pact or to US alliances. The failure of China and Russia to provide more than rhetorical support to Iran at the time of the Israel-Iran war and the US bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025 calls into question the significance of the broader authoritarian axis. In a crisis involving North Korea, however, China and Russia would be likely to engage more directly than in the case of Iran, given the closer geographical proximity, the more immediate interests at stake, and the greater similarities in national identity among the three countries based on their shared communist history.

The course of the war in Ukraine could have a decisive effect on the China-Russia-North Korea triangle. If the war were to end, eliminating Russia’s need for North Korean military assistance, then the impetus for closer Russia–North Korea relations might be weakened.60 Even in this scenario, however, North Korea would continue to reap the benefits of its recent cooperation with Russia, leading to continued instability on the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, the terms of the war’s settlement are likely to be crucial. A settlement of the war on overly favorable terms for Russia, especially one that leaves Ukraine vulnerable to future Russian aggression, could strengthen the China-Russia-North Korea grouping rather than dissipate it. In this case, China and Russia would probably conclude that their partnership had proven its worth in a successful challenge to US global leadership.61 Similarly, North Korea would claim vindication for its strategy of close alignment with China and Russia while maintaining the ability to maneuver between them.

As the leading geopolitical rival to the United States, China plays the most important role in the triangle and drives its strategic relevance.62 This observation leads some analysts to conclude that US efforts to improve relations with China offer the best path to weakening the wider grouping of autocratic countries.63 Others argue that the United States should treat this grouping as a coherent axis. Such a strategy, according to this view, might drive the group closer together in the near term but would force China to face the costs of its collaboration with these partners. This approach would call China to account for its strategy to date, which has been to leverage these partners for gains while avoiding some of the attendant costs by disavowing any interest in forming a bloc with them.64

The recent track record suggests that the scope for US efforts to limit China’s cooperation with either country is limited. At times, China has cooperated with international efforts to pressure North Korea over its development of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. These efforts have correlated with periods in which China had confidence in US adherence to the One-China policy, suggesting that offering reassurance to China on the Taiwan issue could encourage its cooperation in reining in some of North Korea’s most destabilizing behavior.65 China’s overriding focus remains on its rivalry with the United States, however, thus precluding the possibility of more meaningful coordination to address the North Korea issue.66

As China’s approach to the war in Ukraine demonstrates, attempts to persuade China to reduce its support for Russia are also unlikely to succeed. For China, a Russian victory or a favorable outcome in Ukraine would demonstrate the value of partnerships with other autocratic countries, including Russia and North Korea. The worst outcome, from China’s standpoint, would be a devastating Russian defeat that would diminish Russia’s value as a partner. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reflected this way of thinking when he reportedly told European Union officials in July 2025 that China did not wish to see a Russian defeat in Ukraine because this would allow the United States to focus all of its attention on China.67 A Russian victory or favorable outcome in Ukraine, by contrast, would preserve Russia as a valuable partner for China in challenging the existing international order.

Such an outcome could also heighten the triangle’s overall threat to international security, including opportunistic aggression or collaboration in a crisis. Under the current US force structure and doctrine, the United States would be hard-pressed to fight great-power wars against China and Russia simultaneously. Amid a war in the Indo-Pacific, Russia could exploit the situation by creating distractions in Europe. These could take the form of large military maneuvers or actual armed aggression. The achievement of its aims in Ukraine would increase Russia’s ability to create such distractions in Europe.

Following a favorable settlement of the war in Ukraine, Russia might also have the capacity to offer China limited forms of military assistance in the event of a future war over Taiwan or on the Korean Peninsula. During a Taiwan crisis, Russia might conduct air patrols near Japanese airspace or send submarines to the central Pacific.68 Russia could also influence the course of a war on the Korean Peninsula. In the view of some Russian experts, China might wish to bring Russia’s powerful nuclear deterrent into play, along with its air defense and anti-ship systems.69 Such scenarios would become even more complicated if a war over Taiwan were to spread to the Korean Peninsula, or vice versa.70

In contrast to such unpleasant outcomes, continued US and allied support for Ukraine could deal a setback to this grouping by denying Russia victory, deterring China, and limiting North Korea’s strategic options.71 Therefore, the United States should increase support for Ukraine, aiming to strengthen its negotiating position in future talks to end the war, while also developing military forces capable of fighting two major wars simultaneously.72 Such steps would offer the best hope for limiting the negative security implications of the China-Russia-North Korea triangle.

 
 

Brian G. Carlson
Brian G. Carlson is research professor of Indo-Pacific security studies at the China Landpower Studies Center, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College.

 
 

Endnotes

  1. 1. Jo Inge Bekkevold, “Ukraine Is the Korean War Redux,” Foreign Policy, June 28, 2022.
  2. 2. Choe Sang-Hun, “North Korea Sees New Opportunities in ‘Neo-Cold War,’ ” The New York Times, November 13, 2022.
  3. 3. Philip Zelikow, “Confronting Another Axis? History, Humility, and Wishful Thinking,” Texas National Security Review 7, no. 3 (Summer 2024), 80–99; Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Richard Fontaine, “The Axis of Upheaval: How America’s Adversaries Are Uniting to Overturn the Global Order,” Foreign Affairs 103, no. 3 (April/May 2024), 50–63; Hal Brands, “The New Autocratic Alliances: They Don’t Look Like America’s—but They’re Still Dangerous,” Foreign Affairs, March 29, 2024; and Daniel Byman and Seth G. Jones, “Legion of Doom? China, Russia, Iran and North Korea,” Survival 66, no. 4 (August-September 2024), 27–50.
  4. 4. Oriana Skylar Mastro, “The Next Tripartite Pact? China, Russia, and North Korea’s New Team Is Not Built to Last,” Foreign Affairs, February 19, 2024.
  5. 5. Artyom Lukin, “The End of the DPRK’s Strategic Isolation?” [Конец стратегического одиночества КНДР?], Russia in Global Politics 22, no. 1 (2024): 126–43.
  6. 6. Brian G. Carlson, “Sino-Russian Relations and Security Ties to North Korea,” in The East Asian Whirlpool: Kim Jong-un’s Diplomatic Shakeup, China’s Sharp Power, and Trump’s Trade Wars, ed. Gilbert Rozman, Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies 30 (Korea Economic Institute, 2019), 59–74.
  7. 7. Lukin, “DPRK’s Strategic Isolation?.
  8. 8. Andrei Lankov, “Alternative to China: What Is the Purpose of North Korea’s Rapprochement with Russia” [Альтернатива Китаю. Зачем Северной Корее сближение с Россией], Carnegie Politika, June 28, 2024.
  9. 9. Robert A. Manning, “The Risk of Another Korean War Is Higher Than Ever,” Foreign Policy, October 7, 2024.
  10. 10. Choe Sang-Hun, “North Korea Vows Support for Moscow in Visit by Russian Delegation,” The New York Times, July 27, 2023.
  11. 11. Paul Sonne, “As Kim Inspects Russia’s Military, Putin Cultivates ‘Axis of the Sanctioned,’ ” The New York Times, September 15, 2023.
  12. 12. Tianran Xu, “North Korea’s Lethal Aid to Russia: Current State and Outlook,” 38 North, February 14, 2025.
  13. 13. Daryna Krasnolutska and Olesia Safronova, “Ukraine Spy Chief Says 40% of Russian Ammunition is North Korean,” Bloomberg, July 11, 2025.
  14. 14. Victor Cha and Ellen Kim, “The Fruits of Kim-Putin Summitry: North Korea’s Military Satellite Launch,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Critical Questions, November 21, 2023.
  15. 15. Christian Davies, “Kim Jong Un’s Comeback,” Financial Times, November 9, 2023.
  16. 16. Choe Sang-Hun, “North Korea Says It Is No Longer Interested in Reunifying with the South,” The New York Times, January 16, 2024.
  17. 17. Robert L. Carlin and Siegfried S. Hecker, “Is Kim Jong Un Preparing for War?,” 38 North, January 11, 2024.
  18. 18. Michael D. Shear and David E. Sanger, “White House Says North Korea Providing Russia with Ballistic Missiles,” The New York Times, January 4, 2024.
  19. 19. Jessie Yeung, “14,000 Troops, 100 Ballistic Missiles and Millions of Munitions: What North Korea Has Sent to Russia, Report Finds,” CNN, May 30, 2025.
  20. 20. Choe Sang-Hun and Paul Sonne, “Putin and Kim Sign Pact Pledging Mutual Support Against ‘Aggression,’ ” The New York Times, June 19, 2024. For the text of the treaty, see “DPRK-Russia Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,” KCNA, June 20, 2024, https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1718870859-459880358/dprk-russia-treaty-on-comprehensive-strategic-partnership/.
  21. 21. Yeung, “14,000 Troops.
  22. 22. Choe Sang-Hun, “What North Korea Gains from Its Alliance with Russia—and What It Risks,” The New York Times, December 17, 2024; and Choe Sang-Hun and Ivan Nechepurenko, “North Korea Gets a Weapons Bonanza from Russia,” The New York Times, May 31, 2025.
  23. 23. Choe Sang-Hun, “What North Korea Gains.”
  24. 24. Ju-min Park, “North Korean Special Economic Zone Poised for Revival in New Russia Trade,” Reuters, November 29, 2023.
  25. 25. Andrei Lankov, “In Spite of Experience: What Russia Wants from North Korea” [Назло опыту. Чего хочет Россия от Северной Кореи], Carnegie Politika, September 22, 2023.
  26. 26. Lukin, “DPRK’s Strategic Isolation?.
  27. 27. Edward Howell, “North Korea and Russia’s Dangerous Partnership,” Chatham House Research Paper, December 4, 2024, 13.
  28. 28. Georgy Toloraya, “Cooperation Between Russia and the DPRK Has Reached a New Level” [Сотрудничество России с КНДР вышло на новый уровень], Nezavisimaya Gazeta-Dipkur’er, November 24, 2024.
  29. 29. Davies, “Kim Jong Un’s Comeback.
  30. 30. Alexander Zhebin, “Pyongyang Wants Stable Relations with Moscow” [Пхеньян хочет стабильных отношений с Москвой], Nezavisimaya Gazeta-Dipkur’er, October 29, 2023].
  31. 31. Lukin, “DPRK’s Strategic Isolation?.
  32. 32. Alexander Vorontsov, “The Reincarnation of the USA-Japan-South Korea Triangle” [Реинкарнация треугольника США – Япония – Южная Корея], Valdair International Discussion Club, August 23, 2023; and Vitaly Sovin, “Russia-North Korea-China: the Re-creation of the Strategic Triangle” [Россия – Северная Корея – Китай: воссоздание стратегического треугольника], Valdai International Discussion Club, August 24, 2023].
  33. 33. Choe Sang-Hun, “North Korea Finds New Leverage in the Ukraine War,” The New York Times, September 5, 2023.
  34. 34. Sergey Radchenko, “China Doesn’t Want to Lead an Axis: Beijing’s Deep Doubts About Russia and North Korea,” Foreign Affairs, February 18, 2025.
  35. 35. Radchenko, “China Doesn’t Want”; and Oriana Skylar Mastro, “China’s Agents of Chaos: The Military Logic of Beijing’s Growing Partnerships,” Foreign Affairs 103, no. 6 (November/December 2024): 26–32.
  36. 36. Hearing on An Axis of Autocracy? China’s Relations with Russia, Iran, and North Korea, Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 119th Cong. (2025) (statement of Jake R. Rinaldi, Defense Analyst, US Army War College).
  37. 37. “China Says Not Aware of North Korean Troops in Russia,” Reuters, October 24, 2024.
  38. 38. Michał Bogusz, “Acceptance Regardless of the Costs: China’s Stance on the Russia–North Korea Alliance,” OSW Commentary, no. 636, Centre for Eastern Studies, December 3, 2024, 2.
  39. 39. Mastro, “Next Tripartite Pact?.
  40. 40. Bogusz, “Acceptance Regardless of Costs,” 2.
  41. 41. Ling Shengli and Wu Yuejin, “ ‘NATO’s Foray into the Asia-Pacific’: Alliance Transformation or Alliance Enlargement” [“北约亚太化”：联盟转型还是联盟扩员”], Northeast Asia Forum, no. 2 (2024): 47–62; Xiao He, “Strategic Irrationality or Else: An Alliance Theory Analysis of NATO’s Asia-Pacification in the Context of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict” [俄乌冲突背景下北约亚太化的联盟理论分析：战略非理性抑或其他], Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies, no. 2 (2024): 131–59; Joe Leahy and Christian Davies, “ ‘China Will Not Like It One Bit’: Beijing Uneasy with North Korean Troops in Russia,” Financial Times, October 25, 2024; and Amy Hawkins and Helen Davidson, “North Korea’s Involvement in Ukraine Draws China into a Delicate Balancing Act,” The Guardian, November 6, 2024.
  42. 42. “Second Anniversary of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Effects and Implications” [俄乌冲突两周年：影响与启示], CSIS Interpret: China, original work published in Remin University Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies [中国人民大学重阳金融研究院], February 21, 2024, cited by Rinaldi, Hearing on An Axis of Autocracy?
  43. 43. Mastro, “Next Tripartite Pact?.
  44. 44. Hearing on An Axis of Autocracy? China’s Relations with Russia, Iran, and North Korea, Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 119th Cong. 9 (2025) (statement of Elizabeth Wishnick, Senior Research Scientist, Center for Naval Analyses).
  45. 45. Emanuele Rossi, “Caught in Contradiction: China’s Uneasy Role in the CRINK Alliance,” China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe (CHOICE), November 19, 2024.
  46. 46. Andrew Scobell, “Grappling with Great-Power Competition: China Bandwagons with Petulant North Korea,” Asia Policy 19, no. 3 (July 2024): 40–44.
  47. 47. Lukin, “DPRK’s Strategic Isolation?.
  48. 48. Man Yan, “U.S.-Japan-ROK Security Cooperation in the Context of U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy” [美国”印太战略”背景下的美日韩安全合作], Journal of Northeast Asia Studies, no. 4 (2024): 35-51; Lu Zhongwei, “The Negative Impact of “NATO-ization” of U.S.-Japan-ROK Relations in Northeast Asia” [美日韩关系”北约化”遗祸东北亚], Journal of Northeast Asia Studies, no. 1 (2024): 1–7; and Ma Jing and Wang Xiabo, “The Motivation, Trend and Impact of Strengthening Trilateral Security Cooperation Among the U.S., Japan and ROK” [美日韩强化三边安全合作的趋势及影响], Journal of Northeast Asia Studies, no. 3 (2024): 47–61.
  49. 49. Bogusz, “Acceptance Regardless of the Costs,” 3.
  50. 50. Yang Yanlong and Zhang Yunling, “US-Japan-ROK Trilateral Cooperation Mechanism: Establishment and Implication” [美日韩三边合作机制的建立及影响], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu, no. 6 (2023): 71–84.
  51. 51. Cynthia Kim and Josh Smith, “North Korea Condemns Denuclearisation Call at Neighbours’ Summit in Seoul,” Reuters, May 27, 2024.
  52. 52. Bogusz, “Acceptance Regardless of the Costs,” 3.
  53. 53. Janis Kluge, “Russia-China Economic Relations: Moscow’s Road to Economic Dependence,” SWP Research Paper 6, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, May 2024.
  54. 54. Choe Sang-Hun, “What North Korea Gains from Its Alliance with Russia—and What It Risks.
  55. 55. Bogusz, “Acceptance Regardless of the Costs,” 3.
  56. 56. Leahy and Davies, “China Will Not Like It One Bit’ ”; and Choe Sang-Hun and Sonne, “Putin and Kim Sign Pact Pledging Mutual Support Against ‘Aggression,’ ” The New York Times, June 19, 2024.
  57. 57. Jacob Stokes, “China Is Just Fine with North Korean Troops in Ukraine,” Center for a New American Security, January 16, 2025; and Hearing on An Axis of Autocracy? China’s Relations with Russia, Iran, and North Korea, Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 119th Cong. (2025) (statement of Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Senior Fellow and Director of Transatlantic Security Program, Center for New American Security).
  58. 58. Kendall-Taylor, Hearing on An Axis of Autocracy?
  59. 59. Hearing on An Axis of Autocracy? China’s Relations with Russia, Iran, and North Korea, Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 119th Cong. 12 (2025) (statement of Christopher Chivvis, Senior Fellow and Director of American Statecraft Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).
  60. 60. Christopher S. Chivvis and Jack Keating, “Cooperation Between China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia: Current and Potential Future Threats to America,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 8, 2024, 6.
  61. 61. Jeffrey Mankoff, “The Realist Case for Ukraine,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, January 25, 2023.
  62. 62. Chivvis and Keating, “Cooperation Between China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia,” 1–2.
  63. 63. Chivvis and Keating, “Cooperation Between China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia”; and Radchenko, “China Doesn’t Want to Lead an Axis.
  64. 64. Mastro, “China’s Agents of Chaos.
  65. 65. Shuxian Luo, “China’s North Korea Problem,” Foreign Affairs, August 21, 2025.
  66. 66. Scobell, “Grappling with Great-Power Competition,” 44.
  67. 67. Finbarr Bermingham, “China Tells EU It Does Not Want to See Russia Lose Its War in Ukraine: Sources,” South China Morning Post, July 4, 2025.
  68. 68. Brian Carlson, host, CLSC Dialogues, podcast, episode 20, “Potential Forms of Russian Support for China in a Protracted War,” with David Stone, China Landpower Studies Center, January 6, 2025, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Recent-Publications/Article/4022081/potential-forms-of-russian-support-for-china-in-a-protracted-war/.
  69. 69. Artyom Lukin and Georgy Toloraya, “Moscow’s Diplomatic Game on the Korean Peninsula,” in Artyom Lukin et al., Nuclear Weapons and Russian–North Korean Relations (Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2017), 56.
  70. 70. Markus Garlauskas and Matthew Kroenig, “The U.S. Must Prepare to Fight China and North Korea at the Same Time,” Foreign Policy, August 6, 2024.
  71. 71. Kendall-Taylor, Hearing on An Axis of Autocracy?
  72. 72. Byman and Jones, “Legion of Doom?,” 41.
 
 

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