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Dec. 17, 2025

A Hybrid Deterrence Model for Countering China

Lucas Ziller
©2025 Lucas Ziller

ABSTRACT: This article argues that the United States deterrence-by-denial strategy is insufficient to deter China from attempting forcible unification with Taiwan, due to its neglect of ideological and psychological drivers in the Chinese Communist Party’s decision-making calculus. Unlike existing military-centric models, it introduces a hybrid deterrence framework that integrates denial and punishment across domains, coordinated by a Joint Interagency Organization. The article offers a practical model for deterring ideologically motivated adversaries through synchronized, multidomain planning based on coercion theory, behavioral deterrence literature, and strategic documents from US and Chinese sources.

Keywords: deterrence, interagency, China, Taiwan, operational-level planning

 

The United States’ approach to deterring the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from pursuing forcible unification with Taiwan increasingly rests upon a deterrence by denial strategy.1 Unfortunately, this strategy suffers from critical conceptual and operational flaws. Chief among them is a failure to account for behavioral drivers shaping the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) decision making—drivers rooted not solely in material cost-benefit calculations, but also deeply embedded political, ideological, and moral principles.2 China’s perception of Taiwan through these lenses elevates Taiwan’s status from a strategic interest to an existential imperative and diminishes the efficacy of rational deterrence models that emphasize denial approaches based on conventional military posturing.3 Moreover, the lack of a US interagency mechanism at the operational level further undermines its ability to execute a deterrence by denial strategy effectively or to signal intent with coherence and credibility. Unless deterrence by denial moves beyond its rational-actor assumptions and conventional force-centric posture and incorporates hybrid approaches and operational-level interagency integration, it will remain an incomplete and ineffective strategy for managing the Taiwan flashpoint.

To address the limitations of rationalist models, this article proposes a hybrid deterrence model that deliberately integrates denial and punishment across military, economic, informational, and diplomatic instruments.4 By combining credible threats of failure with credible threats of cost—and aligning them with the CCP’s behavioral, ideological, and political drivers—this model seeks to exploit PRC-specific vulnerabilities more effectively than denial alone. In doing so, the article uses Taiwan as a case study for exploring broader deterrence literature and challenges the rationalist and materialist frameworks. The article proceeds in five sections: it first examines the CCP’s strategic calculus; second, critiques flaws in current US strategy; third, engages with counterarguments; fourth, offers operational recommendations; and finally, reflects on the theoretical and strategic implications for deterrence in an era of potential great power crisis and conflict.

CCP Strategic Calculus: Interests, Identity, and the Bargaining Environment

Coercion theory highlights that deterrence outcomes rely on how an adversary interprets threats as much as capability. Understanding how the opposition thinks is especially important for deterrence by denial, which aims to stop aggression by making success feel out of reach, often by placing forces or defenses in the adversary’s way. As Thomas Schelling noted, denial relies on the ability to frustrate an adversary’s expected gains, which requires insight into what the adversary wants and how it intends to get it.5 Without this understanding, denial efforts risk targeting the wrong vulnerabilities or sending ineffective signals. This section analyzes CCP strategic calculus through the interaction of national interests, moral principles, and behavioral patterns within a bargaining framework. Deterrence strategies must grapple with these drivers head-on and not just fall back on conventional assumptions about rational actors.

National Interests and Moral Principles in Chinese Strategic Thought

Chinese leaders consistently articulate three core national interests: maintaining the power of the CCP, safeguarding sovereignty and territorial integrity, and sustaining economic and societal development.6 Taiwan directly intersects with the first two, making it more than a policy preference—it is central to regime legitimacy and national identity. The CCP has codified reunification as a core mission in its official doctrines; framing Taiwan’s reunification as a “historic mission” and a necessary step toward achieving the “Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation” by 2049.7 The CCP does not pursue reunification solely for pragmatic reasons of power or security; the issue is infused with nationalist narratives of territorial restoration and redressing the historical injustices of the century of humiliation.8

The PRC’s approach to Taiwan is shaped by the moralization of national interests, where security objectives are elevated by deeply held normative beliefs about national identity, justice, and sovereignty. This framing, evident in Xi Jinping’s assertion that unification is a “historic mission” and “unshakable commitment,” transforms the issue into a moral imperative central to the CCP’s mandate.9 Consequently, as Jonathan Mercer notes, Beijing’s flexibility in bargaining is limited, as actors prioritizing moral outcomes may prefer conflict to compromise.10 This effect is compounded by Robert Jervis’s observation that leaders are often more willing to take risks to avoid perceived losses than to pursue gains, meaning even credible military threats may not deter action if the CCP perceives failure to unify as both a moral betrayal and a loss of national destiny.11

Interactional Behavior and the Bargaining Framework

Classical deterrence models emphasize cost-benefit analysis and credible signaling of intentions. Yet, as Robert Jervis, Glenn Snyder, and Paul Diesing argue, these models often fail in crises where incomplete information, misperception, and domestic political constraints shape decisions.12 In Taiwan’s case, deterrence operates within a bargaining environment characterized by asymmetric interest levels. For example, the United States identifies peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as an important interest, the CCP categorizes unification as vital and non-negotiable.13 This asymmetry skews risk tolerances and complicates efforts to establish credible red lines for both the United States and China, as each side interprets threats and commitments through different political lenses.

China’s use of coercive diplomacy, military signaling, and gray-zone activities reflects a deliberate strategy of escalation management. Nevertheless, even calculated attempts to control escalation can exacerbate the risk of crisis or conflict when three factors are present: (1) disagreement over relative capabilities or expected outcomes, (2) uncertainty regarding the defender’s willingness to act, and (3) disputes over issues framed as non-negotiable.14 All three are evident in the Taiwan scenario. The CCP’s persistent assertion that Taiwan is an indivisible part of Chinese territory, combined with US strategic ambiguity and shifting perceptions of the cross-Strait military balance, creates a volatile deterrence environment prone to miscalculation.

The United States’ policy of strategic ambiguity, meant to deter Taiwanese declarations of formal independence and PRC aggression, only leaves Beijing unsure of the United States’ commitment thresholds. Schelling’s analysis of deterrence and credibility notes that strategic ambiguity may offer flexibility but also risks signaling inconsistency or lack of resolve.15 When the PRC sees US red lines as vague or unenforceable, it may misjudge the likelihood of a denial response and take actions that trigger a failure of American deterrence.

Elite dynamics within the CCP further shape these misperceptions. Xi Jinping’s consolidation of authority has centralized decision making to a small circle, suppressing dissenting views and heightening ideological rigidity. Elite messaging reinforces public expectations for aggressive action on Taiwan, raising the political costs of restraint. This environment reflects James Fearon’s logic of audience costs: leaders who threaten action and later fail to follow through risk domestic credibility.16 As China’s 2019 Defense White Paper, China’s National Defense in the New Era indicates, the CCP may interpret US ambiguity as exploitable indecision enabling them to operate between America’s conception of peace and war.17

These perceptual and ideological factors shape how the PRC interprets US deterrence signals and assesses risk. A strategy based on rational actor assumptions—relying primarily on conventional force posture and denial logic—is unlikely to resonate with decisionmakers driven by ideological factors. The credibility of deterrence by denial depends not only on military capability but also on whether US signals account for the domestic, ideological, and perceptual context in which CCP leaders make decisions—a standard it currently falls short of.

Flaws in the US Deterrence-by-Denial Strategy

The emerging US deterrence by denial strategy, as outlined in the Fiscal Year 2025 Defense Budget Request and the March 2025 Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance, aims to prevent adversary aggression by positioning US military forces to convince the CCP that any attempt at forcible unification would be met with sufficient resistance to ensure failure.18 When applied to the specific challenge of countering the PRC’s coercive strategy toward Taiwan, however, this approach exhibits critical conceptual and practical shortcomings. This section critiques deterrence by denial through three principal lenses: (1) the denial-centric bias of its conventional military posture, (2) signaling deficiencies and misalignment with CCP perceptions, and (3) structural incoherence across US interagency processes. Together, these flaws inhibit the credibility and effectiveness of deterrence efforts in the Taiwan scenario.

Deterrence by denial emphasizes the forward deployment of military forces capable of defending contested regions and denying an adversary’s ability to achieve its objectives through force. In the context of Taiwan, this approach is supported by joint military exercises, forward positioning of conventional military capabilities, arms sales to Taipei, and contingency planning aimed at preventing a rapid PRC fait accompli. This denial-centric strategy presumes that the CCP will calculate costs and risks primarily in material and military terms and will rationally refrain from aggression if success is uncertain.19

In fact, the CCP has a long history of absorbing material losses to achieve what it considers vital national interests. For example, its involvement in the Korean War, 1969 Sino-Indian War, and 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War, all of which were driven by regime legitimacy, ideological commitments, and nationalist concerns more than military necessity.20 By focusing on the conventional military balance, the US deterrence posture underweights the significance of non-material drivers in Beijing’s Taiwan calculus.

Signaling Deficiencies and Misaligned Messaging

Deterrence theory emphasizes the importance of credible signaling—adversaries must believe that defenders will follow through with threats if red lines are crossed.21 Yet US signaling in the Taiwan context suffers from persistent confusion and credibility gaps that weaken deterrence efficacy. The US policy of strategic ambiguity, designed to deter both unilateral Taiwanese independence and PRC aggression, creates uncertainty for Beijing about the conditions triggering a US military response. While offering flexibility, this ambiguity risks being perceived as a lack of resolve, particularly when contrasted with the CCP’s ideologically driven commitment to unification, and is further undermined by inconsistencies between declaratory strategy, force posture, and the readiness of US capabilities in the Indo-Pacific.

Following then–Speaker of the US House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taipei in August 2022, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) launched an unprecedented large-scale strategic deterrence exercise that included live-fire drills, a joint air and naval encirclement, and missile launches—some of which overflew Taiwan.22 This episode marked a shift in Beijing’s willingness to engage in overt, escalatory signaling below the threshold of armed conflict. In response, the United States issued strong diplomatic statements but conducted no proportional show of force. This incident and subsequent Chinese demonstrations likely reinforced Beijing’s perception that US deterrent signaling is reactive and inconsequential. While the US regional posture has evolved since 2022, this signaling failure underscores the challenge of converting forward presence into credible, adversary-specific threat communication.

This signaling gap reflects another concerning issue: US deterrence strategy frequently defaults to restraint in the face of gray-zone coercion, hesitating to impose cost or risk escalation in response to assertive but sub-conflict Chinese behavior. The PRC exploits this caution through hybrid competition—blending economic coercion, diplomatic isolation, and calibrated military activity—knowing that US tools for integrated, nonmilitary response remain underdeveloped and poorly synchronized across agencies.

Interagency Incoherence

Effective deterrence by denial depends on the synchronization of multiple instruments of national power across various agencies and departments. The current interagency architecture, however, lacks the operational-level mechanisms to achieve integration and synchronization. The National Security Council remains focused at the strategic level, Combatant Commands operate at the theater level, and embassy country teams function tactically within host nations, leaving a gap at the operational level where deterrence must be planned and executed.

Existing structures, such as Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) within Combatant Commands, were designed to enhance interagency awareness and coordination but lack the authority, resources, and continuity to function as effective integrating and synchronizing mechanisms. These weaknesses are compounded by divergent agency priorities—such as the Department of State’s emphasis on preserving diplomatic flexibility, the Department of Treasury’s sanctioning authorities, and the Department of War's kinetic orientation. Recent strategic guidance from the Department of War reflects the shift toward denial-centric planning, but risks becoming ineffectual due to its failure to establish a structural mechanism for interagency integration or synchronization at the operational level.23

Bridging the Credibility Gap

The United States deterrence-by-denial strategy, in its emerging form, suffers from a disconnect between theory and execution. Its overreliance on denial, neglect of punishment mechanisms, and failure to align signaling with CCP perceptions risks rendering it ineffective against an opponent whose calculus is shaped more by ideology and domestic politics than material cost assessments. Moreover, without interagency operational integration, the United States cannot fully leverage or synchronize the range of deterrence tools available across military, economic, informational, and diplomatic domains. To achieve credible deterrence against PRC aggression toward Taiwan, the United States must revise its approach to reflect the behavioral realities of the CCP and establish the structural means to synchronize its instruments of national power accordingly.

Alternative Approaches and Counterarguments

Despite the issues with the United States’ current implementation of deterrence by denial—particularly its failure to align with CCP behavioral drivers—several defense scholars, policymakers, and strategists contend that denial-focused strategies, strategic ambiguity, and forward military presence remain effective tools for deterring the PRC. Further, in arguments against punishment strategies, some point to the risks of overextension and unintended consequences. The serious nature of these consequences requires careful consideration before exploring an alternative approach to deterrence by denial.

The Case for Denial-Only Deterrence

Proponents of deterrence by denial argue that the most credible way to prevent aggression is to convince adversaries that military objectives cannot be achieved at an acceptable material cost.24 Advocates highlight not only the CCP’s preference for a rapid, decisive victory but also PLA doctrine, which explicitly calls for achieving military objectives quickly and at minimal cost. According to the 2020 Science of Military Strategy, if deterrence fails, the PLA should “strive to achieve the goal of the war quickly with a small cost,” avoiding escalation that could invite international condemnation, economic sanctions, or outside intervention.25 Deterrence by denial supporters therefore contend that enhancing Taiwan’s defensive capabilities—combined with a persistent US forward presence and force modernization—will raise cost and uncertainty, deterring aggression.

Denial-only approaches, which are heavily reliant on military means, misread the nature of the PRC’s stakes in Taiwan, though. Beijing frames unification not simply as a military objective but as a vital national interest tied to regime legitimacy and historical grievance.26 Furthermore, a singular focus on military denial neglects the PLA’s ability to shape conditions through gray-zone tactics, coercive diplomacy, and psychological operations, activities that operate below the threshold of armed conflict and exploit vulnerabilities in economic, informational, and diplomatic arenas.

Strategic Ambiguity as Flexible Deterrence

A second common defense of the current approach is the utility of strategic ambiguity. Proponents claim that ambiguity complicates adversary planning by creating uncertainty about the circumstances under which the United States would intervene militarily on Taiwan’s behalf.27 It is designed to deter Taiwanese moves toward independence and PRC aggression, preserving space for diplomatic flexibility and crisis management.

Yet, the effectiveness of ambiguity depends ultimately on CCP perception of credible US resolve. Beijing’s ideological certainty regarding unification means that it may perceive the US policy of ambiguity as indecision or weakness, and increase the risk of miscalculation and further provocations. Indeed, the PRC’s steadily escalating tempo of military exercises around Taiwan and the dramatic rise in PLA airspace incursions suggest that strategic ambiguity may have incentivized incremental coercion rather than deterred it.28 Where the PRC’s signaling is highly declarative and categorical, the absence of comparable clarity from Washington may undermine the psychological and political components of credible deterrence.

The Forward Presence Argument

Some analysts assert that forward US military presence alone serves as a deterrent by demonstrating capability, readiness, and a visible commitment to the defense of allies and partners.29 This view holds that the US military posture within the First Island Chain, including exercises and Freedom of Navigation Operations, signals to Beijing that aggression would face immediate consequences.

While forward presence is a critical element of deterrence signaling, it is insufficient when not matched by clear political intent and nonmilitary instruments of power. In recent years, the United States has taken steps to underscore US resolve and readiness in the region, including the addition of four new Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement sites in the Philippines, the operational deployment of Multi-Domain Task Forces in the Indo-Pacific, and the largest-ever Balikatan joint exercises in 2023, featuring live-fire drills and High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) deployments.30

However, the PLA’s assertive response to President Tsai Ing-wen’s 2023 meeting with US Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy—including large-scale air and naval exercises simulating a blockade of Taiwan—revealed the limits of forward presence signaling.31 While the absence of kinetic escalation suggests that the US posture had some deterrent effect, the overall episode highlighted the CCP’s ability to escalate within the gray zone and shape perceptions without crossing clear thresholds. This situation demonstrates the limits of conventional presence to influence CCP decision making, especially without a broader campaign integrating political, informational, and economic instruments.

The Cost of Overextension and Escalation Risks

Finally, critics caution that deterrence-by-punishment strategies carry significant risks, including overextension and unintended escalation.32 The argument posits that punitive measures—such as economic warfare, horizontal escalation, or hybrid competition—may yield unintended strategic consequences, including global market disruption, strained alliances, and unpredictable escalatory dynamics. Advocates of strategic restraint go further, warning that punishment-based approaches, particularly when directed at a nuclear-armed peer, could provoke the conflict they intend to deter.

These risks are real and warrant caution. Nonetheless, this article contends that the emerging denial-heavy approach already suffers from credibility gaps and leaves critical coercive spaces uncontested. The choice is not between denial and punishment, but between an incomplete, incoherent, and ineffective denial strategy and a fully integrated hybrid approach that combines denial with credible punishment options across the diplomatic, informational, economic, and military domains.

While denial, ambiguity, and forward presence are valuable components of deterrence, none is sufficient against an adversary whose decision-making calculus is shaped by ideological imperatives and moral commitments. A deterrence posture that acknowledges this reality must integrate denial and punishment approaches, refine signaling strategies, and create the organizational mechanisms necessary for synchronized interagency action at the operational level.

Recommendations: Toward Hybrid Deterrence and Interagency Integration

To address the flaws in the current US deterrence posture, the United States must transition from a denial-centric and structurally fragmented model to a hybrid deterrence approach underpinned by integrated and synchronized interagency action at the operational level. This section outlines a framework for implementing such an approach, focusing on four key areas: (1) blending deterrence by denial and punishment across domains; (2) establishing an operational-level interagency synchronization mechanism; (3) realigning deterrence messaging to CCP perceptions; and (4) deepening alliance and partner integration through coordinated planning, capability development, and regional posture alignment.

Combine Denial and Punishment through a Hybrid Deterrence Approach

The United States must complement its deterrence by denial strategy with credible threats of punishment tailored to adversary vulnerabilities.33 An analysis of the PRC’s integration into global markets and information systems reveals vulnerabilities that remain underleveraged, particularly in the economic, financial, and informational domains. The logic of deterrence through punishment is critical, given the CCP’s willingness to absorb military risk to pursue its vital national interests. A hybrid deterrence model should therefore synchronize conventional force posture with carefully integrated economic, informational, and diplomatic coercive tools.

Military denial efforts should continue to focus on preventing a successful PLA fait accompli, particularly through the development of resilient, distributed, and forward-positioned forces. Nonetheless, the United States must pair them with punitive measures, designed to shape the political and economic cost calculus of CCP decisionmakers, such as:

  • Information operations that undermine CCP competition and crisis narratives, including proactive exposure of PRC malign activity and disinformation through rapid declassification of intelligence.

  • Targeted financial and trade sanctions aimed at elite networks and CCP-linked commercial entities, with mechanisms for rapid imposition in crisis scenarios.

  • Cyber capabilities postured to deter and ready to respond to aggression through targeted disruption of state-linked and military-adjacent digital systems.

To operationalize hybrid deterrence, the United States must shift from ad hoc interagency coordination toward purpose-built deterrence campaigns. Hybrid deterrence is not an additive checklist; it requires integrated planning and synchronized operations across agencies and domains.34 This model is not limited to imposing battlefield costs: it raises the stakes of coercion at the political, economic, and cognitive levels, where the PRC remains most sensitive. Therefore, this hybrid model requires the creation of an integrated interagency mechanism capable of synchronizing deterrence tools at the operational level, where day-to-day signaling and crisis response are managed.

Establish an Operational-Level Interagency Mechanism

To realize a hybrid deterrence model that integrates denial and punishment across instruments of national power, the United States must address strategic design and operational execution. The current deterrence posture suffers from institutional fragmentation below the strategic level, where no empowered interagency mechanism exists to plan and synchronize full-spectrum deterrence campaigns. To overcome this issue, the Department of War, supported by the National Security Council and interagency partners, should establish a Joint Interagency Organization dedicated to deterring PRC aggression against Taiwan. This organization would function at the operational level, composed of campaign planners and active agents from key agencies such as the Departments of War, State, Treasury, and Commerce, and the Intelligence Community, to facilitate horizontal integration. This organization would:

  • Fuse military planning with diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power.

  • Provide continuity between peacetime competition and crisis escalation dynamics.

  • Ensure synchronized crisis response planning and execution, including red-team assessments to evaluate how adversaries perceive US actions and signaling.

  • Lead the planning and design of hybrid deterrence campaigns, applying campaign design methodology that integrates all instruments of national power.

It would report to a designated authority—such as the Deputy National Security Advisor or a senior NSC-led interagency coordination body—to ensure vertical integration with strategic-level planning.

Several existing bodies, such as the Department of State Office of China Coordination, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security, and the Department of War Office of the Assistant Secretary of War for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs, play critical roles in shaping US strategy toward the PRC. Nonetheless, these entities largely function at strategic or policy formulation levels, with limited authority in campaign-level operational planning and execution. Similarly, while organizations like the CYBERCOM–NSA Integrated Cyber Center and Joint Operations Center demonstrate high-level interagency collaboration in specific domains, they are functionally stovepiped and do not synchronize effects across instruments of power. What remains absent is an enduring, empowered, campaign-focused mechanism that bridges strategy and execution across agencies—one that plans and coordinates full-spectrum deterrence activities at the operational level and across multiple time horizons. Unlike previous interagency efforts, a Joint Interagency Organization should wield directive planning authority, possess dedicated interagency staffing, and operate under a shared operational planning cycle. Effective deterrence, however, requires not only integrated planning and synchronized execution but also tailored messaging calibrated to how adversaries perceive and interpret US intent.

Tailor Deterrence Messaging to CCP Perceptions and Escalatory Triggers

Even the most well-conceived deterrence plan will fail if the adversary misinterprets its signals. Effective deterrence depends on US capability and resolve and the CCP’s perception and interpretation of US messaging.35 Deterrence messaging must speak in a language the CCP understands, grounded in its worldview, habits of behavior, and deeply held beliefs. Specific measures should include:

  • Creating clear, flexible guidelines that anticipate how Beijing defines its red lines so the United States can respond with purpose, not improvisation, when tensions rise.

  • Getting ahead of the narrative by shaping public understanding before the PRC can frame the story—using information campaigns that anticipate and undercut Beijing’s efforts to legitimize its actions.

  • Pairing clear diplomatic messages with visible shifts in military activity to send unmistakable signals and avoid mixed messages.

  • Comprising the Joint Interagency Organization with linguistic and culturally fluent Chinese-language speakers to translate messages accurately, monitor responses, and evolve narratives.

The CCP favors tightly controlled signaling, scripted responses, and the United States should tailor its signaling accordingly. Vague threats or routine deterrent gestures will miss the mark. Escalation does not need to be linear or proportional. The United States should develop flexible signaling options—combining public actions like visible force movements, private warnings through diplomatic channels, and occasional operational and tactical deception. What matters is sending a clear message to the CCP and making sure America’s words match its actions.

Integrate States into a Regional Deterrence Architecture

In the end, deterrence does not work in pieces. The United States must plan and act in concert—not just across its agencies, but alongside allies and partners who bring their own strengths to the table. When national efforts are linked into a truly shared framework, deterrence becomes more than posture—it becomes a collective signal that aggression will not go unanswered. These efforts include:

  • Linking Japanese anti-access systems, Philippine forward basing, and US naval presence into a unified Indo-Pacific response framework. This integration will enhance deterrence and the capacity for sustained multidomain campaigning across the region.

  • Establishing a shared planning forum to link economic levers and export control regimes across allies and partners. To counter PRC gray-zone coercion, regional stakeholders must shift from reactive, ad hoc coordination to institutionalized, standing collaboration that enables unified and timely responses.

  • Bring allies and partners together for practical, multinational exercises that address complex operational problems like cyber escalation, maritime interdiction, and coordinated responses to financial and economic coercion.

  • Encouraging and supporting partners such as Japan, South Korea, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states in crafting and delivering their own public diplomacy campaigns. Deterrent messages carry more weight when they originate from the region, not just Washington, making the CCP more likely to take them seriously.

  • Giving trusted partners a larger role in deterrence will lighten America’s load—and build resilience. With allies involved in planning from the start, responses become faster, more unified, and harder for Beijing to outmaneuver, leaving fewer gaps for the CCP to exploit through divide-and-conquer tactics or gray-zone coercion.36

Conclusion

The prevailing US strategy of deterrence by denial falters conceptually and operationally. This approach assumes that Beijing will rationally assess risk and avoid conflict if the potential costs outweigh the perceived benefits. Nevertheless, this logic overlooks the deeply held political convictions, ideological narratives, and identity-based pressures that shape CCP decision-making. Unification is not treated as a negotiable policy outcome, but rather as a historic duty and moral imperative, altering the risk-reward calculation in ways conventional deterrence models fail to account for. Furthermore, structural fragmentation within the US interagency undermines the clarity and coherence of deterrence signaling, potentially incentivizing a more aggressive approach. The result is a deterrence posture that, despite substantial military investment, lacks the necessary credibility to dissuade Beijing effectively. A more effective approach demands a shift.

Deterrence is not built on promises of integration or denial alone; it requires structural reforms, signaling that resonates with the adversary, and coordinated action with allies and partners. A hybrid deterrence model addresses these shortcomings by combining denial and punishment. This method involves establishing a Joint Interagency Organization at the operational level to drive campaign planning, tailoring deterrent messaging to CCP perceptual biases and thresholds, and integrating partner capabilities into a cohesive regional deterrence framework reflecting shared goals and strengthening collective resolve. This approach transforms scattered efforts into a synchronized campaign, boosting credibility and mitigating the risk of miscalculations that can escalate tensions into crisis.

The utility of this hybrid framework extends beyond the Taiwan scenario. It offers a model for future deterrence challenges in an era of persistent great-power competition. Looking forward, two promising paths for exploration exist. First, there is a need for deeper investigation into how to build a Joint Interagency Organization capable of translating strategy into synchronized action. Second, a closer examination of how beliefs, perceptions, and moral frameworks shape decisions in moments of crisis is warranted. Exploring these questions across disciplines could shed new light on how adversaries respond to pressure, manage escalation, and navigate the difficulties of gray-zone conflict, ultimately moving hybrid deterrence from theory to practice and shaping how it is understood, tested, and applied. Without shifting towards the more subtle and integrated approach hybrid deterrence offers, US strategy risks remaining a rhetorical aspiration rather than an effective deterrent.

 
 

Lucas Ziller
Major Lucas Ziller is an Infantry officer serving as a battalion operations officer in the 82nd Airborne Division. Prior to this assignment, he served in various units within US Central Command, US Special Operations Command, and US Army Forces Command. Ziller holds degrees from the University of Toronto, the University of Kansas, the US Army School of Advanced Military Studies, and the US Army Command and General Staff College.

 
 

Endnotes

  1. 1. “Department of Defense Releases the President’s Fiscal Year 2025 Defense Budget,” news releases, US Department of Defense, March 11, 2024, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3703410/department-of-defense-releases-the-presidents-fiscal-year-2025-defense-budget/.
  2. 2. Andrew Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March (Cambridge University Press, 2003); and Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton University Press, 1976).
  3. 3. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (Yale University Press, 1966); and Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Polity Press, 2004).
  4. 4. For foundational perspectives on coercion and deterrence, see Schelling, Arms and Influence; Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now (Cambridge University Press, 2003); and Freedman, Deterrence.
  5. 5. Schelling, Arms and Influence, 1–34.
  6. 6. “Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China on Foreign Relations,” adopted June 28, 2023, Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/foreign-relations-law/.
  7. 7. Science of Military Strategy (Academy of Military Sciences, 2020), 78–80; and Xi Jinping, “Full Text of the Report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China,” October 16, 2022, Xinhua, https://english.news.cn/20221025/8c0181aef6c849d6b09d43fa9ad8961f/c.html.
  8. 8. Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations (Columbia University Press, 2012).
  9. 9. Xi Jinping, “Full Text of Xi Jinping’s Speech at the Meeting Marking the 40th Anniversary of the Issuance of the Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,” Xinhua, January 2, 2019, https://eglish.www.gov.cn/news/top_news/2019/01/02/content_281476472828274.htm.
  10. 10. Jonathan Mercer, “Emotion and Strategy in the Korean War,” International Organization 67, no. 2 (Spring 2013): 221–52.
  11. 11. Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 32–57.
  12. 12. Jervis, Perception and Misperception; and Snyder and Diesing, Conflict Among Nations.
  13. 13. Jervis, Perception and Misperception; Graham T. Allison et al., America’s National Interests (Harvard Kennedy School, 2000), 10; and Xi Jinping, “40th Anniversary.”
  14. 14. Paul K. Huth and Bruce M. Russett, “What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980,” World Politics 36, no. 4 (July 1984): 496–526.
  15. 15. Schelling, Arms and Influence, 35–125.
  16. 16. James D. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” American Political Science Review 88, no. 3 (1994): 577–92.
  17. 17. China’s National Defense in the New Era, State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, July 2019, http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html.
  18. 18. Elbridge A. Colby, The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict (Yale University Press, 2021).
  19. 19. Schelling, Arms and Influence; and Freedman, Deterrence.
  20. 20. Taylor M. Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial Disputes (Princeton University Press, 2008); and Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force.
  21. 21. Huth and Russett, “What Makes Deterrence Work?”; James D. Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, no. 1 (1997): 68–90.
  22. 22. David Chen, “Learning from the First Phase of the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis,” China Brief 22, no. 15 (August 12, 2022), https://jamestown.org/program/learning-from-the-first-phase-of-the-fourth-taiwan-strait-crisis/.
  23. 23. While this article focuses on structural and process deficiencies, organizational cultures, silos, and incentives can also shape interagency integration and impede synchronization due to misaligned planning and execution timelines, differing operational languages, and risk tolerances.
  24. 24. Schelling, Arms and Influence; and Freedman, Deterrence.
  25. 25. Academy of Military Sciences Military Strategy Research Department, Science of Military Strategy (战略学), 2020, trans. China Aerospace Studies Institute, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Translations/2022-01-26%202020%20Science%20of%20Military%20Strategy.pdf.
  26. 26. Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force.
  27. 27. Richard C. Bush, “American Ambiguity on Taiwan’s Sovereignty Increases the Island’s Safety,” Brookings, December 4, 2002, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/american-ambiguity-on-taiwans-sovereignty-increases-the-islands-safety/.
  28. 28. In 2024, the PLA conducted 3,615 air sorties into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), more than double the 1,669 recorded in 2023. In January and February 2025 alone, the PLA added another 739 sorties. The frequency of median-line crossings and the scale of naval activity around Taiwan also increased. See Akhil Kadidal, “Special Report: China Sets New Records in Air, Sea Operations around Taiwan,” Janes, March 12, 2025, https://www.janes.com/osint-insights/defence-and-national-security-analysis/china-sets-new-records-in-air-sea-operations-around-taiwan.
  29. 29. Oriana Skylar Mastro, “The Taiwan Temptation: Why Beijing Might Resort to Force,” Foreign Affairs 100, no. 4 (July/August 2021): 58–66.
  30. 30. David Vergun, “New EDCA Sites Named in the Philippines,” U.S. Department of Defense, April 3, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/article/3350297/new-edca-sites-named-in-the-philippines/; “Philippine, U.S. Troops to Hold Largest Ever Balikatan Exercise from April 11 to 28,” U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, April 4, 2023, https://ph.usembassy.gov/philippine-u-s-troops-to-hold-largest-ever-balikatan-exercise-from-april-11-to-28/; Jen Judson, “US Army Tailoring Pacific Commands for Multi-Domain Force,” Defense News, June 27, 2025, https://www.defensenews.com/land/2025/06/27/us-army-tailoring-pacific-commands-for-multi-domain-force/.
  31. 31. Chris Buckley and Amy Chang Chien, “China Brandishes Military Options in Exercises Around Taiwan,” The New York Times, April 10, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/10/world/asia/china-military-exercises-taiwan.html.
  32. 32. Barry R. Posen, Restraint: A New Foundation for US Grand Strategy (Cornell University Press, 2014); and Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, “Dangerous Confidence? Chinese Views on Nuclear Escalation,” International Security 44, no. 2 (Fall 2019): 61–109.
  33. 33. Schelling, Arms and Influence; and Freedman, Deterrence.
  34. 34. Michael Mazarr et al., Understanding Strategic Interaction in the Gray Zone (RAND Corporation, 2022), 33–37.
  35. 35. Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests.”
  36. 36. Posen, Restraint.
 
 

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