Home : News : Display
Sept. 16, 2025

Book Reviews

China

Upstart:
How China Became a Great Power

by Oriana Skylar Mastro
Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Kelly R. M. Ihme, PhD, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg Chair of Aerospace Studies and assistant professor, Department of Distance Education, US Army War College


“The nature of a nation’s rise is to surpass the strongest nation in the world, and the strongest nation in the world can only be its barrier and not supporter.”
Yan Xuetong (24)

Cover of Upstart: How China Became a Great Power

The book Upstart: How China Became a Great Power by Oriana Skylar Mastro, is an academic investigation about how China developed from a minor regional player in the mid-1990s into a global power, challenging the United States with every major instrument of power without instigating a major conflict thus far. Using a unique model interpreting rising power success, Mastro developed the Upstart Strategy following conversations with organizational and business leaders. The model is grounded in business competition theories about how small businesses rise and innovative startups succeed. Her three Es—emulation, exploitation, and entrepreneurship—provide a useful perspective regarding China’s effectiveness and efficiency in gaining parity with the United States in merely three decades. This model is useful for considering China’s decision-making process and provides predictive modeling for political and military leaders to anticipate China’s future directions (34).

The book is broken into three sections focusing on the emulation, exploitation, and entrepreneurship, approaches used by China in political, military, and economic spheres. Within each section, Mastro analyzes where and why China used or considered a particular element of the Upstart Strategy. She supports the analyses with existing data, newly created data sets in previously unexplored areas, and Chinese leaders’ and strategists’ documents, speeches, and conversations.

Emulation is a common and historical tool in international politics where convergent, mimetic, or normative behaviors see the rising power engaging in known successful activities. While effective, it is incomplete and often costly. That is not to say China does not emulate the United States, on the contrary, there are specific areas where China sees the benefit of the US approach and follows it. Some emulation areas include international organization membership, robust homeland defense, global peacekeeping missions, free-trade agreements, and arms control. Mastro expands on the limitations of emulation alone, particularly for China, which leads to the other elements of the Upstart Strategy—exploitation and entrepreneurship.

Exploitation helps the rising power compete by focusing on areas where the hegemon fails to engage or suboptimally engages. For China, this means investing in regions America ignores or discounts, such as Africa or parts of Asia, to gain influence and strategic advantage. Since there is no direct competition (or an inability for the United States to compete), China’s activities are less overtly threatening and, in some cases, China’s interventions create a stabilizing effect without the inconvenience of US conditionality. China relies on exploiting gaps in arms sales, anti-access / area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, informaticized warfare, and informal economic sanctions to defend, coerce toward, and advance its interests.

Not all cases of exploitation and emulation have been successful, and Mastro discusses areas where China’s leaders made choices inconsistent with the Upstart Strategy (such as building aircraft carriers) but at great economic or political cost. In the areas where exploitation and emulation proved unsuccessful, or China assessed futility in trying, it resorted to entrepreneurship.

Innovation, with new actions and ways of acting to capitalize on market gaps or inefficiencies, is key to any upstart. For China, entrepreneurship activities, like the Belt and Road Initiative and infrastructure investments in developing countries, demonstrated a new way to gain influence without competing with US investments in medical and government initiatives. China uses an entrepreneurial approach with strategic partnerships; foreign internal security; surveillance technology; China’s “three warfares: public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare;” dual-use commercial logistics networks; domestic industrial policy; and developing technology (117).

A key feature of this book is the data-driven approach, which uses analysis from six original data sets and other existing data sets about Chinese activities. The author capitalizes on Chinese perceptions of their own behaviors and strategies using native language sources, adding weight to primary analysis. Mastro also addresses counterpoints to many of her assertions throughout the book, which is a notable investment that provides additional evidence and support. The concluding chapter offers specific and actionable policy recommendations for the United States and its allies to protect their interests over the next 10 years. The exhaustive reference list is valuable to researchers interested in Chinese strategic policy. Finally, Upstart’s writing and tone are accessible to lay readers less familiar with China while maintaining a high level of scholarship desired for academia. The book offers insight and considerations for strategic and operational leaders.

Oxford University Press, 2024 ▪ 313 pages ▪ $11.00


Keywords: instruments of power, China, grand strategy, foreign policy, great-power competition

 
 

China’s Quest for Military Supremacy

by Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders
Reviewed by Dr. Zenel Garcia, associate professor of security studies, Department of National Security and Strategy, US Army War College
©2025 Zenel Garcia


Cover of China’s Quest for Military Supremacy

Written by Joel Wuthnow and Phillip Saunders, China’s Quest for Military Supremacy is a meticulously researched and timely analysis of the dramatic transformation of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The book offers a nuanced exploration of China’s military modernization, strategic ambitions, and the complex interplay between technological advancement and organizational culture. It is a comprehensive resource for scholars and a lucid guide for general readers interested in understanding the shifting balance of military power in Asia.

At the heart of the book is a central thesis: while the PLA has become a far more capable and confident force, its evolution is marked by significant internal vulnerabilities that technology and funding alone cannot resolve (3). The authors argue that the PLA’s modernization has been patient and methodical, with a clear strategic focus on deterring US intervention, especially in the context of Taiwan. This strategic orientation has shaped every facet of China’s military reforms since the early 1990s and continues to drive the PLA’s priorities under Xi Jinping’s leadership.

The book provides a comprehensive overview of the PLA’s modernization, which has resulted in the production and deployment of fifth-generation stealth fighters, prototype sixth-generation aircraft, advanced bombers, modern warships, and a growing fleet of submarines. This modernization has also enhanced the PLA’s ability to challenge US missile defenses with an array of modern long-range precision missiles and hypersonic glide vehicles. Perhaps most striking is the rapid expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal, which has grown from several hundred deployed warheads to more than 500, with projections exceeding 1,000 by 2030. Coupled with a move toward a “launch on warning” posture, this nuclear build-up may signal a new approach to strategic deterrence (128). Wuthnow and Saunders illustrate how the PLA’s modernization has been supported by a burgeoning domestic defense industry that can produce state-of-the-art systems and be less reliant on foreign technology.

Despite advances, the authors contend that the PLA still faces significant challenges. They persuasively argue that the PLA’s greatest weaknesses are not resource-based but structural. In essence, the PLA still operates under limited external oversight, with Xi standing as the sole civilian authority with any real influence. This concentration of power has led to persistent corruption and information distortion. As a result, the PLA remains opaque and largely self-policing. Wuthnow and Saunders further contend that Xi’s prioritization of political loyalty over operational autonomy may strengthen Party control but undermines the decentralized decision making and innovation essential for modern warfare. Consequently, while this system reinforces internal discipline and Party oversight, it may ultimately impair the PLA’s ability to respond quickly and adaptively in a crisis or conflict.

Wuthnow and Saunders also situate the PLA’s rise within the broader context of regional and global power dynamics. Despite its impressive capabilities, the PLA remains a regional force, lacking the overseas logistics, command and control, and alliances that characterize a truly global military. The choice is deliberate, as China prioritizes dominance in its immediate environment over global reach. The book underscores how the PLA’s focus on “gray-zone” coercion—actions below the threshold of lethal force—allows China to shape its security environment without risking direct confrontation with the United States or its allies (134).

In its final analysis, China’s Quest for Military Supremacy offers a balanced and insightful assessment of the PLA’s strengths and limitations. It is a thoughtful, well-documented, and highly readable account of one of the most consequential military transformations of our time. Wuthnow and Saunders conclude that while the PLA is increasingly capable of coercive action against Taiwan and is on track to meet Xi’s ambitious modernization goals, its internal weaknesses and regional focus will continue to shape its trajectory. The book cautions against underestimating China’s military progress, but also against overstating its ability to project power globally. This balanced perspective is one of the book’s greatest strengths.

Polity Press, 2025 ▪ 256 pages ▪ $56.00


Keywords: military strategy, modernization and resourcing, force structure, diplomacy, People’s Liberation Army

 
 

Russia

Spetsnaz: A History of the Soviet and Russian Special Forces

by Tor Bukkvoll
Reviewed by Colonel Chase Metcalf, assistant professor, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, US Army War College


Cover for Spetsnaz:A History of the Soviet and Russian Special Forces

Tor Bukkvoll, a well-respected expert in Russian military studies, delivers an in-depth history of the founding and evolution of Soviet-then-Russian Spetsnaz. This book, aimed at security professionals and the general public, makes for compelling and insightful reading. Anyone seeking to understand Russian special operations forces and their employment across the competition continuum should read this book.

Bukkvoll provides an organizational and operational history of Soviet / Russian Spetsnaz organized by time period. The first period focuses on Spetsnaz’s establishment in 1951 and its preparation for major war until 1979. Operationally focused on strategic reconnaissance, direct action, and unconventional warfare, Spetsnaz saw limited combat during this period, but its evolution shaped it well beyond the post-Soviet era. The second period covers Afghanistan from 1979–89—a period that many Spetsnaz view as “their golden hour” (xxii). While Spetsnaz forces constituted only about 3.2 percent of the Russian force, some claim they “were responsible for 70 percent of the positive military results” (106). Despite this “success,” many capability shortfalls and interorganizational challenges remained unaddressed following the war, and lessons learned through practical combat experience were forgotten.

The third period focuses on how Spetsnaz coped with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the period of Russian weakness from 1989–2008. Bukkvoll covers, among other things, Spetsnaz’s role in domestic power struggles, the “political entrepreneurship” of Spetsnaz commanders operating in former Soviet spaces, and involvement in the two Chechen wars. Perhaps most thought-provoking is the observation that those now entering the senior ranks of the Russian military began their careers during these “interesting times,” thus, interfering in politics may not be unthinkable for them, raising interesting questions about the future of Russia in times of political uncertainty (162).

The fourth section focuses on the return of great-power competition from 2008–23. This period includes a poor performance in Georgia, the erosion of Spetsnaz’s independence under the Serdiukov reforms, the establishment of the Russian Special Operations Command (SSO) as an additional special operations capability, and the restoration of Spetsnaz’s prestige with Crimea (2014) and Syria (2015). This period highlights Spetsnaz’s irregular warfare capabilities, collaboration with private military contractors, and role in sabotage and subversion campaigns.

The book provides several key takeaways about Spetsnaz’s past, present, and future role in the Russian military. Despite sharing similarities with Western special operations forces—especially the 75th Ranger Regiment—Spetsnaz forces have historically lacked organic mobility or fully professional forces that have often limited their operational effectiveness. Commanders routinely use Spetsnaz forces in ways inconsistent with their doctrine due to a lack of experience or understanding of their capabilities, an unwillingness or inability to provide them with the needed general-purpose forces support, or the need to use better trained Spetsnaz forces to buttress less capable conventional Soviet / Russian forces. Finally, given the history and evolution of Russian Spetsnaz, they will undoubtedly remain a key capability for Russian military and political leaders across the competition continuum.

This book is a compelling read that combines anecdotal storytelling with well-researched analysis. The book relies on various sources captured in the 18-page bibliography and is well-documented with 29 pages of endnotes. Its reliance on the published memoirs of 46 former Spetsnaz soldiers and officers is noteworthy, as it brings the story to life. If there is any gap, it is the absence of an organizational chart to help readers track the diversity of Spetsnaz units across Russian military intelligence (GRU) and Intelligence (KGB/FSB) organizations.

In conclusion, Spetsnaz: A History of the Soviet and Russian Special Forces is an essential read for anyone interested in understanding Russian special forces. Bukkvoll’s in-depth research and engaging narrative illuminate the historical evolution of Spetsnaz and provide insights into their future role in hybrid and irregular warfare. Given Russian adventurism and willingness to use military force to pursue foreign policy objectives, the lessons and insights from this book are increasingly relevant, making it a must read for scholars, military professionals, and anyone interested in the complexities of modern warfare.

University Press of Kansas, 2024 ▪ 306 pages ▪ $34.99


Keywords: special operations, Russian military, warfare, Spetsnaz, Afghanistan

 
 

The First Cold War: Anglo-Russian Relations in the 19th Century

by Barbara Emerson
Reviewed by Dr. Whitney Grespin, Irregular Warfare Initiative fellow
©2025 Whitney Grespin


Cover for The First Cold War:Anglo-Russian Relations in the 19th Century

Revisiting the intellectual architecture underpinning Russian antagonism with near-peer competitors is more than academic—it is imperative in an era defined by hybrid threats and great-power competition. This history of Anglo-Russian relations in the nineteenth century is a must-read for any military practitioner given the foundational framing it offers of the Russian experience and how those have imprinted on the persona of the Russian people.

For military and policy professionals, Emerson’s work is instructive as a historical case study and as a strategic diagnostic. In many ways, the current confrontation between Moscow and the West is less a revival of the Cold War than a continuation of a century-long ideological and psychological standoff. Emerson’s work reminds us that strategic empathy—understanding how adversaries perceive their security environment—is essential to effective deterrence and diplomacy. Emerson’s rigorous documentation and clear prose provide a framework for analyzing Russian strategic behavior without resorting to fatalism or moral equivalency. It is a reminder that to contend with Russia today, we must understand its present motives and enduring fears.

Perhaps Emerson’s greatest strength is her ability to condense complex dynamics into mere paragraphs for context without confusion. She covers the grounds of The Great Game, King Kaiser Tsar, Peter the Great, Catherine the Great, Road to Oxiana, and The Bloody White Baron, but does so in a concise tome rather than leaving readers to tote around a small library. Conversely, one of the few criticisms the reviewer can offer of Emerson is that she perhaps underplays the vast nature of British commitments elsewhere—India, Africa, the Far East, plus the aftermath of American independence a half century prior—however, it would be impossible for publishers to print a volume larger than the 560 pages of quality content that this work offers.

Emerson’s work traces Russia’s expansionist evolution from coalition or multilateral movements to independent pursuit of more space—and the resources contained therein—and the entitlement that grew commensurately with the Russian state’s ability to govern vast tracts of land and a diversity of inhabitants (54, 240). Emerson discusses the critical role that infrastructure played in changing priorities (397). There, is, however, notable foreshadowing that all external actors should have heeded of in terms of troop commitments in Afghanistan, to include the quote following a diplomat’s meeting with the Afghan Amir, “We Afghans are people of the hills, and. Please God, we can take care of ourselves, and give a good account of any foe who tries to enter our mountains . . . Whoever be our invader, whether Russian or English, the Afghans will never rest til they get the enemy out of the country” (324).

While the United States continues to reflect on the lessons it might learn from its foray in Afghanistan and as the military prepares leaders to navigate the evolving character of conflict, The First Cold War stands as a valuable tool in decoding the continuity of Russian strategic culture. Emerson’s scholarship bridges the gap between history and policy, making this work essential reading for military professionals seeking to grasp the full arc of US–Russia relations.

Hurst Publishers, 2024 ▪ 560 pages ▪ $46.65


Keywords: Britain, Russia, Crimean War, imperial expansion, diplomatic brinkmanship

 
 

Technological Warfare

Algorithms of Armageddon: The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Future Wars

by George Galdorisi and Sam J. Tangredi
Reviewed by Kevin M. Boyce, retired aviation command and control officer, US Marine Corps, and Futures Lab director, Center for Strategic Leadership, US Army War College


Cover of Algorithms of Armageddon:The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Future Wars

Retired naval officers George Galdorisi and Sam J. Tangredi deliver a sobering assessment of the impact of artificial intelligence (AI) on national security in their timely book Algorithms of Armageddon: The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Future Wars. Drawing on their experience in national security, military operations, and strategic thought, they argue that the United States has been thrust into an AI arms race with China and Russia, which seek asymmetric advantages through weaponized AI systems. The authors emphasize that America is falling behind in this critical technological competition and must make extraordinary efforts to regain its advantage. Their central message is clear—master the algorithms of war now or fight on terms dictated by rivals who already have.

Examining parallels to the transformative impact of electricity as an inescapable utility in the early 1900s and how the moon race awakened US strategy half a century later, Galdorisi and Tangredi effectively frame AI as more than just a general-purpose technology. Instead, AI promises to rewrite the way wars are fought. Those benchmarks give readers solid footing before the authors dive into AI’s darker promise as a self-directed weapon. They begin by breaking down the field’s philosophical roots, mapping its boom-and-bust cycle, and charting its current resurgence. They further include an exploration of how AI will combine with other advanced technologies, the evolving dynamics of human-machine teaming, and the critical debate surrounding the inevitable lack of control over the technology. The authors worry that military leaders and policymakers will be unable to control this technology given its current trajectory. Finally, the book confronts the possibility of AI-driven global conflict, thoughtfully pondering whether such an outcome is inevitable in an era of increasingly autonomous military capabilities.

Events following the book’s publication have underscored its central arguments. Recent reports indicate closer collaboration between China and Russia on military AI applications. Concurrently, China’s nuclear modernization is proceeding alongside rapid advancements in AI technologies for military use. The urgency Galdorisi and Tangredi convey feels increasingly justified. Drawing from authoritative sources across defense, peer-reviewed journals (such as the Naval War College’s International Law Studies), academic presses, and subject-matter scholars, Galdorisi and Tangredi construct a persuasive case that AI-enabled military systems could potentially escalate to global conflict. With this scholarly foundation in place, the authors stress the only way to avoid escalation is to pair rapid AI adoption with equally rigorous investment in doctrine, allied transparency, and human in the loop safeguards.

While the book’s focus on the weaponization of AI by state adversaries is sharp and well-argued, two blind spots remain. First is how AI-enabled cyberattacks could paralyze the power grids and data centers AI depends upon. A second blind spot is the insider threat pipeline funneling talent and intellectual property to Beijing. Galdorisi and Tangredi could have sharpened their call for tighter public-private safeguards and export-control compliance in America’s AI workforce. Nonetheless, the core message resonates with increasing urgency, especially as external events seem to validate the authors’ concerns. Reports of Sino-Russian collaboration on military AI and China’s concurrent nuclear modernization and AI advancements lend credence to the book’s warnings. For the defense community, Galdorisi and Tangredi offer clear takeaways—adversary adoption demands faster US adaptation, AI-driven speed necessitates resilient command structures, and the concept of responsible AI requires concrete implementation to ensure human control over lethal force.

Algorithms of Armageddon is essential reading for senior defense officials, military strategists, and policymakers who want to understand its roots and implications. Unlike speculative works on AI replacing humans or protests on the technology itself, this book delivers a clear-eyed assessment of AI’s military applications and the strategic imperatives facing American defense planners. In an increasingly complex technological environment, Galdorisi and Tangredi have provided a valuable road map for navigating AI’s growing impact on US national security.

Naval Institute Press, 2025 ▪ 230 pages ▪ $29.95


Keywords: artificial intelligence, future warfare, autonomous weapons, national security, algorithmic warfare

 
 

Warfare in the Robotics Age

by Ash Rossiter and Peter Layton
Reviewed by Jeremy Lewis, US Army (retired)
©2025 Jeremy Lewis


Cover of Warfare in the Robotics Age

The book Warfare in the Robotics Age by Ash Rossiter and Peter Layton provides a solid introduction to the history of robotics in war and the contemporary implementations and capabilities of war-fighting robots. The book includes real-world examples and explains how its topics impact air, maritime, land, space, and cyber operations.

Technological advancements can have immediate implications on the battlefield. Rossiter and Layton explore humanity’s relationship with robots, specifically how designing levels of autonomy into a machine versus human authority over robots impact the machine’s design, implementation, and lethality. Although the book centers on the United States, it touches on developments in China, Russia, and non-state violent actors.

Decisionmakers, such as policymakers, strategists, practitioners, and senior leaders, will benefit from reading Warfare in the Robotics Age. Those mainly concerned with war-fighting capabilities can focus on chapters 2, “Drafting Robots into Military Service: The Story So Far;” 4, “Producing Tomorrow’s Military Robots: Who, Where, and Why;” 6, “Adapting to a Robot Way of War;” and 7, “Reimagining Robotic Warfare.” Those interested in manufacturing and anticipating future capabilities should read chapters 3, 4, and 6.

Chapter 5, “The Diffusion of Robotic Weapons: Ethical and Legal Issues,” reviews the moral and legal implications of robots on the battlefield. The authors attempt to discuss robotics without bias, expressing concerns about the design, implementation, and iteration of technologies and their tactical uses.

Chapter 3, “Shaping What’s Possible: The Key Technology Drivers,” describes technology concepts, including artificial intelligence (AI), neural networks, machine learning (ML), the Internet of Things (IoT), and large language models (LLM). These systems allow machines to partner with humans or other machines. The chapter ends with a list of the modes a human-machine team can take and clearly explains differences based on how humans interact with the machine during its workflow. Between the options of human-in-the-loop, where humans maintain authorization over operations and machine-to-machine, where a machine is entrusted with operational command over other machines, there are other options, each with trade-offs regarding battlefield responsiveness and human responsibility. The addition of charts or diagrams would help present the material to people unfamiliar with current science and technology trends. Still, the text does a good job explaining the application of these technological advancements to warfare.

Warfare in the Robotics Age is well-indexed with a comprehensive bibliography. Future editions would benefit from a glossary listing acronyms, abbreviations, and terms. Adding an annex with open-source images, descriptions, and capabilities of some of the robots mentioned in the book would make the content more accessible to a broader audience.

Often in US Army training, servicemembers are reminded that “the enemy gets a vote.” Due to the proliferation of technology, the enemy can be more creative in improvising robots, drones, sensors, communications, and weapons systems. Manufacturing capabilities ranging from industrial machinery to hobbyist 3-D printers can now create and maintain single-purpose or generalized robotic devices. The accessibility of robotics by nation-states and non-state organizations introduces complexity to the battlefield in near-peer and asymmetrical battlespaces. Their use in supplementing or replacing human effort in war-fighting functions can disrupt the opponent’s ability to identify and counter threats. Reading an introductory book on the subject, such as Warfare in the Robotics Age, can inform decisionmakers about these challenges and opportunities. The improvised explosive device, or IED, defined the global war on terrorism. America’s next war could be defined by the improvised autonomous weapon system delivered on an uncrewed vehicle.

Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2024 ▪ 257 pages ▪ $110.00


Keywords: artificial intelligence, AI, robotics, technology, Internet of Things, machine learning

 
 

Biography

America’s Cold Warrior: Paul Nitze and National Security from Roosevelt to Reagan

by James Graham Wilson
Reviewed by Rev. Dr. Wylie W. Johnson, US Army War College class of 2010
©2025 Wylie W. Johnson


Cover of America’s Cold Warrior: Paul Nitze and National Security from Roosevelt to Reagan

Author James Graham Wilson’s political biography of Paul Henry Nitze presents the saga of a determined man of action who influenced the courses of governments. Nitze admired and patterned his life after action takers. Passing college entrance exams for the University of Chicago at 15, he pivoted and chose Connecticut’s elite Hotchkiss School before entering Harvard University. He married into wealth and became successful on Wall Street, which enabled him to live comfortably in future government service. At school and in business, he made influential friends. The advent of World War II found Nitze prepared to be summoned by powerful friends to Washington, DC.

Working through various wartime government positions, Nitze eventually joined the US Strategic Bombing Survey, which assessed the effectiveness of strategic bombing in Europe and the Pacific. In that capacity, Nitze did not arrive in Japan until six months after the cessation of hostilities. After surveying the damage caused by American strategic bombing in Japan, he noted that the two atomic bombs were not as effective as conventional bombing. His observations were not well received. He stated in the Summary Report (Pacific War) that “trains were running through Hiroshima 48 hours after the dropping of the atomic bomb on that city” (43). This assignment proved to be the foundation of his life’s work. In future strategic arms debates, Nitze was the only one with firsthand experience of nuclear devastation.

During Nitze’s wartime service, he rose from working for politicians to “issuing orders” to general officers at the close of the war (46). He came to several decisive conclusions during this time, including the following:

  1. The fundamental principle is that the best preventative of war is national preparedness and strength.

  2. The best way to win a war is to prevent one.

As for his later negotiations with the Soviets seeking limits and reductions in strategic weapons, he found the guiding principle from the Greek philosopher Heraclitus: “truth and beauty were to be found in the tension between opposites. The power of the bow comes from the tension between the two arms of the bow and it’s directed release” (8–9).

In the ensuing five decades, Nitze developed a new and increasingly vital role—that of national security professional. From this vantage, he commanded the attention of presidents from Harry S. Truman through Ronald Reagan, and he became the universally recognized expert in nuclear warfare, strategy, and disarmament.

Nitze developed policies that guided the American government for decades. His most significant achievement was the top secret (now declassified) National Security Council (NSC) Paper 68, United States Objectives and Programs for National Security (NSC-68). Subsequent NSC documents are largely built upon the philosophies, theories, and principles found in NSC-68.

When President Dwight D. Eisenhower took office, Nitze remained at his post in the Department of State for six months. From there, he returned to the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He and Christian Herter, his wife’s cousin, had begun SAIS in 1943 to be “an institution in Washington that would be outside the government but close enough to it to exploit the knowledge and wisdom of those in it with ties to business, labor, and the media, and with an academic core to give it continuity and depth” (83). Today, we are familiar with the phenomenon of extra-governmental think tanks. At that time, it was a ground-breaking concept. Eventually, SAIS would be incorporated into Johns Hopkins University and, later, renamed the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies.

The rest of Nitze’s career entailed determined foresight and development of the terrain, political infighting, diplomatic negotiations, and remarkable prescience in American military strategy. His legacy became the international Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and treaties. Nitze’s life is more than an interesting story, it suggests the way forward for aspiring senior leaders.

Cornell University Press, 2024 ▪ 336 pages ▪ $32.95


Keywords: Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, national policy, Cold War, Hiroshima, nuclear weapons

 
 

Revolutions

Age of Revolutions: Progress and Backlash from 1600 to the Present

by Fareed Zakaria
Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Martin, director, Defense Strategy Course, US Army War College, and John Erickson, senior engineer, Axiom Technologies
©2025 Timothy Martin and John Erickson


Cover of Age of Revolutions:Progress and Backlash from 1600 to the Present

Author Fareed Zakaria’s Age of Revolutions: Progress and Backlash from 1600 to the Present is a fascinating perspective on history as an interplay of revolutions within societies. Zakaria spent more than 10 years writing it and traced revolutions—and their backlashes—over the last 400 years. The primary thesis of Age of Revolutions argues that revolutions bring progress, which triggers backlash. Since the nature of revolutions—and the human nature that drives them—has remained constant throughout history, studying examples of past revolutions helps decisionmakers understand the implications of modern trends. Zakaria asserts that we are experiencing unprecedented change in nearly every aspect of society. We find ourselves in an age of revolutions—not political uprisings but a period of significant changes that disrupt the status quo. Zakaria identifies three overarching forces that generate revolutions within nations: technology, economics, and identity. He states, “First we see broad structural changes—tremendous advances in technology and accelerations of economic activity and globalization. These disruptions trigger another significant shift—in identity” (14). These forces, together, “almost always generate backlash that produce a new politics” (15).

Zakaria asserts that revolutions are morally neutral; while some bring astoundingly positive change, others can foment unconstrained human depravity and misery. Describing today’s revolutionary period, he observes, “China owes its rise to economic and technological revolutions that have catapulted the country into the ranks of major powers, while Russia under Vladimir Putin has harnessed identity politics and jingoism as a response to his nation’s structural decline” (16). Importantly, these revolutionary periods have a dualistic nature: They upend the existing political order while provoking a nostalgic backlash characterized by a “yearning for a past golden age imagined as simple, ordered, and pure” (7). The book explores how this revolution / backlash dynamic has unfolded from 1600 onward.

Part 1, “Revolutions Past,” treats several historical case studies of revolutions. Zakaria’s selection of the case studies is not meant to be comprehensive but illustrative. He scrutinizes three types of revolutions: socioeconomic, political, and technological. For the first, he examines how the Dutch’s embrace of individual liberty, republican political representation, expansion of markets and trade, and tolerance of religious minorities catapulted the Netherlands to dominance in the sixteenth century. For political revolutions, he dissects the successful Glorious Revolution in seventeenth century England, and the unsuccessful French Revolution. Finally, he examines how technology fundamentally altered society in the British and American Industrial Revolutions. Take, as an example of his theme that history is “ceaseless action and reaction, progress and backlash,” Zakaria’s observation that the Dutch Revolution established the first modern republic, which fostered powerful markets, land reclamation, and a concentration of knowledge and creativity in coastal cities (309). Nonetheless, this economic shift negatively impacted rural inland communities and traditional guilds, which struggled with the loss of their monopolies. Zakaria argues that this backlash was “augmented by nostalgia. Once the war for independence was over, peace eroded the social cohesion and unity of purpose that patriotic nationalism had provided” (48).

Part 2, “Revolutions Present,” covers the economic, technological, identity, and geopolitical revolutions happening today, which exhibit the same progress/backlash pattern. Zakaria observes that the information age has created new digital worlds, made knowledge universally accessible, enabled instant business transactions, developed endless options for entertainment, and facilitated new kinds of social connections. In most respects, information technology has improved the average person’s life. Alternatively, it has caused depersonalization, loneliness, loss of connection, digital addiction, mental illness, echo chambers, and a decline in critical thinking. Furthermore, some of society’s adaptations to ubiquitous information, such as the new digital dating landscape.

The author’s style and background make the book engaging. Zakaria, an Indian American journalist and political commentator, hosts Fareed Zakaria GPS (Global Public Square), which has aired continuously on CNN since 2008. He also holds a PhD in government from Harvard University, where he studied under Samuel P. Huntington. He openly acknowledges his presuppositions. He views populism as mostly lacking a firm intellectual grounding and sees it as a nostalgic reaction to progress. In this context, another major thesis of the book argues that noninterventionism and related concepts such as realism, isolationism, and populism are suboptimal, if not dangerous. This self-confessed bias should not deter readers from the lessons observed throughout history up to the present day. There is predictive power in recognizing when revolutions occur or are about to occur based on known variables. For example, citing Graham Allison’s study that sparked a debate over the “Thucydides Trap,” Zakaria questions, “Are America and China destined to go down the same path? Were they to do so, it would make for a turbulent and bloody twenty-first century” (273).

Critics of the book complain that Zakaria willfully ignores some of the more prominent revolutions that shaped our world, like the American Revolution and the Russian Revolution, while others lament that his singular focus is on the West. Others complain that his treatment is superficial and provides no revelations not known by most political scientists. These critics miss the point. Zakaria, while an academic, is not writing a dissertation. He is explaining a perspective about the contemporary world to average readers. He does this by describing the patterns in revolutions, explaining the positive effect liberalism has had on the world, and overlaying that effect with current global changes.

Zakaria’s combination of historical analysis and insights into the dominant worldviews during each revolutionary period makes the book a fun and engaging read. It is not just an international relations book; it blends history with ethics, making it suitable for deep thinkers. This book is suited for a wide audience, especially lovers of international relations, history, philosophy, and strategic studies. Military and intelligence officials and policymakers will benefit from reading the book as they place nation-impacting decisions into context.

W. W. Norton & Company, 2024 ▪ 400 pages ▪ $29.99


Keywords: revolution, history, society, religion, China

 
 

Disclaimer: Articles, reviews and replies, review essays, and book reviews published in Parameters are unofficial expressions of opinion. The views and opinions expressed in Parameters are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of War, the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. The appearance of external hyperlinks does not constitute endorsement by the Department of War of the linked websites or the information, products, or services contained therein. The Department of War does not exercise any editorial, security, or other control over the information readers may find at these locations.

 
 
Parameters Bookshelf Masthead


Find additional online book reviews on the US Army War College Press website at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters_bookshelf/.

Online Book Reviews

The US Army War College Press publishes reviews of books on defense studies, grand strategy, history, military history, military strategy, national security, and political science in Parameters traditionally and now in the new online feature, Parameters Bookshelf. We are currently assigning books to be featured online.

Content Requirements

Online book reviews range from 500 to 750 words and should follow The Chicago Manual of Style, 18th Edition for style and grammar. The US Army War College Press reserves the right to edit and abridge online book reviews per our in-house style guide and The Chicago Manual of Style.

Books Available for Review

To request a list of books available for online review, e-mail the Parameters book review editor at usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil and provide a short biography and your areas of interest. All online book reviewers receive an assignment letter specifying the submission deadline and guidelines for writing and submitting the review.