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Sept. 16, 2025

Bangladesh in Transition: Testing Democratization in South Asia and the Indo-Pacific

Rudabeh Shahid
©2025 Rudabeh Shahid

ABSTRACT: This article argues that Bangladesh’s post-crisis transition following Sheikh Hasina’s 2024 exit as prime minister marks a pivotal moment for democratization with implications for South Asia’s stability and the Indo-Pacific strategic framework. Using Stanley J. Wiechnik’s democratization framework, the study examines the phases of liberalization, transition, and consolidation in Bangladesh’s polarized and factionalized society. Drawing on news reports and policy documents, it examines domestic instability and pressures of geopolitical competition between China and India. The findings provide actionable insights for policymakers and military practitioners, emphasizing the need for strategic engagement to support democratic consolidation and manage regional security interests.

Keywords: Bangladesh, democratization, Indo-Pacific strategy, political factionalism, South Asia

 

Bangladesh stands at a critical juncture in its political history as it emerges from a period of democratic backsliding under Sheikh Hasina’s government into a fragile and complex democratic transition. The interim government, led by Nobel Peace laureate Muhammad Yunus, inherited a fractured political landscape marked by economic instability, intense political factionalism, and the influence of regional and international actors.1

Democratization in post-crisis states like Bangladesh is fraught with difficulties, as political liberalization, institutional reform, and social cohesion must advance simultaneously against the backdrop of historical grievances and structural deficits. Using Stanley J. Wiechnik’s framework for democratization, found in the Spring 2017 issue of Parameters, this article examines Bangladesh’s current trajectory and assesses its progress across the phases of liberalization, transition, and consolidation during the first four months of the transition (August–November 2024). Wiechnik’s theoretical insights—which highlight structural, elite-driven, and bottom-up dynamics—provide a lens through which to analyze the interplay of domestic and international forces shaping Bangladesh’s democratization process.2

The United States has key interests at stake in Bangladesh, as periods of political transition are fertile ground for violence and instability. The risk of internal conflict threatens Bangladesh’s democratic transition and raises serious concerns for regional stability in South Asia. Additionally, Bangladesh’s political instability and the strategic maneuvers of external factors, such as China, highlight the complexities of securing US interests under the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity. Chinese infrastructure projects are transforming Bangladesh’s economic and strategic landscape. Notably, a $2.667 billion contract signed in 2018 between Bangladesh Railway and China Exim Bank supports the construction of a 169-kilometer rail line connecting four districts via the Padma Bridge, boosting connectivity and economic integration.3

Concurrently, the Rohingya crisis, stemming from an influx of refugees from neighboring Myanmar, presents a complex security and humanitarian challenge for Bangladesh. This situation unfolds in a region marked by an intense rivalry between America and China. While China has substantial investments in Myanmar and has maintained a hands-off approach to the humanitarian crisis, the United States sees an opportunity to assert its influence in Southeast Asia. These dynamics highlight the critical need to manage internal and broader regional challenges to maintain stability in the Indo-Pacific. Therefore, Bangladesh’s instability poses internal challenges and undermines broader US strategic objectives under the Indo-Pacific framework, particularly the containment of China’s influence in South Asia.4

This article advances the literature on post-crisis democratization by being the first to apply Wiechnik’s framework to a South Asian context. This study demonstrates the framework’s versatility and relevance by adapting Wiechnik’s metrics to Bangladesh’s unique sociopolitical context. Integrating identity-based factionalism and geopolitical dynamics within the democratization process provides a novel extension to Wiechnik’s framework. The policy recommendations presented here offer a practical road map for balancing competing interests and stabilizing fragile transitions.

The discussion first explores Hasina’s tenure and the sociopolitical conditions that led to the 2024 crisis. It then expands and applies Wiechnik’s framework to understand Bangladesh’s democratization challenges. Finally, the article proposes strategies to address political factionalism by leveraging international support fostering democratic values and offers a road map for stabilizing Bangladesh’s democratic aspirations.

Democratic Backsliding and the Post-Crisis Situation

The political landscape of Bangladesh has been influenced by the personal rivalry, often referred to as the “Battle of the Begums,” between Sheikh Hasina of the Awami League and Khaleda Zia of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party. Each leader hails from a significant political lineage. Hasina is the daughter of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Bangladesh’s founding father, while Khaleda is the widow of Ziaur Rahman, one of Bangladesh’s former presidents. Their leadership, marked by different ideologies, has included mutual accusations of corruption and episodes of violence, echoing the tumultuous legacy of their assassinated family members. This bitter power struggle has exacerbated national instability and undermined efforts to address poverty and manage the natural disasters that afflict Bangladesh, a country where 70 percent of the total area has an elevation that does not exceed 15 feet above sea level, which is prone to annual flooding and inundation, posing severe risks to its population and economy.5

Economic achievements and troubling democratic erosion characterized the recent leadership of Hasina, which spanned more than 15 years. Her administration oversaw rapid industrialization, particularly through the growth of the ready-made garments (RMG) sector, propelling Bangladesh into the ranks of the world’s fastest-growing economies. By 2024, the country was ranked the 35th largest economy globally due to increased exports and an expanding labor force.6

This economic success came at a steep political cost. Hasina’s government adopted increasingly autocratic measures to maintain control, stifling opposition parties, performing mass arrests of dissenters, curbing free speech, and centralizing power. The Cybersecurity Act of 2023, which succeeded the 2018 Digital Security Act, became a symbol of the Hasina administration’s repressive tendencies, as it targeted journalists, activists, and dissenters under the guise of national security. Opposition leaders faced imprisonment and suppression, narrowing political freedoms.7

By 2024, public discontent with Hasina’s governance reached a tipping point. Inflation soared, and allegations of corruption surfaced, implicating her government in laundering nearly $150 billion. Mass protests led by student activists supporting various social and political factions erupted across the country and called for transparency, accountability, and a return to democratic governance. The military, previously aligned with the Awami League, withdrew its support amid the escalating violence, which led to Hasina’s resignation on August 5, 2024.8

Interim Government and Domestic Challenges

The resignation of Hasina marked a precarious yet critical turning point in Bangladesh’s political history. Yunus, appointed to lead an interim government, was tasked with stabilizing a nation grappling with economic, political, and social crises. This government inherited a fractured landscape shaped by entrenched factionalism, systemic corruption, and institutional weaknesses that had accumulated during Hasina’s tenure.

Economic instability remains one of the most urgent challenges. Inflation has surged, eroding household purchasing power and pushing millions into poverty. The RMG sector, a cornerstone of Bangladesh’s economy, faces declining global demand and internal disruptions. Compounding these difficulties, billions in laundered funds have left the interim government struggling to meet financial obligations and increasing its reliance on international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. These economic pressures undermine public trust and hinder the government’s ability to prioritize long-term reforms.9

Political polarization has further complicated governance in Bangladesh, with the interim government navigating competing interests among various factions. This article identifies six key domestic factions with different and often conflicting priorities that collectively define the country’s post-crisis political landscape.

The Bangladesh Nationalist Party has positioned itself as a central advocate for democratic restoration, emphasizing the need for free elections and accountability for victims of repression under the Awami League. Internal divisions and the Party’s perceived associations with Islamist factions (such as Jamaat-e-Islami) raise questions about its commitment to secular democratic principles. Notably, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party has opposed banning the Awami League outright, arguing that such measures could undermine the legitimacy of democratic processes.10

Student protesters played a pivotal role in mobilizing public dissent against Hasina’s government. These activists continue to push for systemic reforms, with many calling for the banning of the Awami League and the adoption of a new constitution. Their demands place significant pressure on the interim government to act swiftly and decisively and highlight the broader societal push for accountability and change.11

Islamist factions, particularly Hefazat-e-Islam and Jamaat-e-Islami, wield considerable grassroots influence. Hefazat-e-Islam advocates for stricter adherence to religious principles, while Jamaat-e-Islami seeks to rehabilitate its image, burdened by the historical baggage of being on the wrong side during Bangladesh’s independence movement. These factions complicate efforts to establish an inclusive democratic framework by challenging secular groups and influencing the broader political discourse.12

Minority rights groups, including civil society organizations advocating for religious and ethnic minorities, face heightened challenges in the current political arena. In the wake of Hasina’s resignation, attacks on minority communities, particularly Hindus, have intensified, driven by perceptions of their alignment with the Awami League. This violence underscores the vulnerability of these groups and the critical need for policies promoting pluralism. Business groups, especially those tied to the RMG sector, play an essential role in shaping the post-crisis recovery. These groups have demanded policies to stabilize inflation, support exports, and rebuild global confidence in Bangladesh as a reliable trade partner. Their economic influence underscores the interdependence between political stability and economic recovery.13

Finally, the military leadership, which played a crucial role in facilitating Hasina’s ousting, continues to wield influence. While the army sees itself as the guardian of Bangladesh’s political framework, it does not seem inclined to hold onto power indefinitely. Bangladesh was under military rule from 1975 to 1990. The last military-backed government was in power until December 2008, when it was replaced following a landslide election victory by the Awami League. While the military ostensibly ensures national security, its ongoing involvement in governance raises concerns about the balance of power between civilian authorities and military actors. This ongoing dynamic poses a significant challenge for the interim government, which must work to strengthen democratic governance while managing the military’s deep-seated influence in the political system.14

In balancing these factions’ competing priorities, the interim government faces the difficult task of fostering stability, addressing economic grievances, and creating an inclusive political environment. These dynamics illustrate the complexities of governance in a deeply polarized society and underscore the need for systemic reform.

Interim Government and Geopolitical Challenges

Bangladesh’s strategic location along the Bay of Bengal underscores its significance in South Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific. As a vital maritime hub, the country connects South and Southeast Asia, facilitating regional trade and security. Its instability, however, poses challenges for regional powers and global stakeholders invested in stability and development. India, Bangladesh’s closest neighbor, has a vested interest in maintaining stability to safeguard its northeastern states, which are prone to unrest and insurgency. As a long-standing ally of Hasina, India has relied on Hasina’s government to align with its regional interests. New Delhi also seeks to counter China’s growing influence in Bangladesh, where Beijing has established a strong presence through Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects. These investments, including infrastructure development and strategic partnerships, signal China’s ambition to deepen its foothold in South Asia.15

For the United States, Bangladesh is a key partner in its Indo-Pacific strategy. Ensuring stability in Bangladesh supports broader US objectives, including the promotion of democratic norms, the protection of human rights, and the security of vital maritime routes. The Bay of Bengal, a vital economic corridor south of Bangladesh, is integral to global trade. It ensures freedom of navigation and handles one-third of the world’s bulk cargo through its strategic shipping lanes. Additionally, a stable Bangladesh reduces the risk of regional spillovers that could disrupt South Asia’s economic and security frameworks. The interim government, therefore, must foster collaborative efforts with regional and international actors to support Bangladesh’s democratic transition while ensuring these engagements do not upset domestic factions.16

Understanding Democratization in Post-Crisis States

Wiechnik’s democratization framework offers a structured approach to the complexities of transitioning from autocracy to democracy, particularly in post-crisis environments. It highlights the phased nature of democratization, the diverse pathways through which transitions occur, and the key metrics used to assess democratization potential. By synthesizing structural, elite-driven, and bottom-up approaches, Wiechnik’s model provides critical insights into the multifaceted process of democratic transformation, making it applicable to states emerging from political turmoil.

Phases of Democratization

Wiechnik identifies three overlapping but distinct phases of democratization: liberalization, transition, and consolidation. Carsten Q. Schneider and Philippe C. Schmitter, noted that specific institutional and societal developments are required to progress through these phases. Liberalization represents the initial phase and involves the gradual recognition of individual and collective rights, often in response to societal demands for reform. This phase includes loosening authoritarian controls, granting political freedoms, and developing basic civil liberties. In post-crisis contexts, however, liberalization is marked by competing pressures—on one hand, demands for accountability and reform from the populace, and on the other, resistance from entrenched elites. This phase is often uneven, with significant regression risks, particularly in highly factionalized societies.17

The transition phase focuses on institutionalizing democracy through political and legal reforms. Key elements of this phase include drafting constitutions, conducting free and fair elections, and replacing autocratic institutions with democratic ones. Transition is especially fragile in post-crisis states, where competing political interests and weak institutional frameworks may undermine the legitimacy of nascent democratic processes.

Finally, consolidation involves embedding democratic norms and practices into a society’s political landscape, reducing the likelihood of a return to autocracy. Consolidation often requires decades of sustained effort and hinges on successfully resolving economic and identity-based challenges. This phase is the most elusive for post-crisis states and is often derailed by factionalism, economic instability, and external interference.

Approaches to Democratization

Thomas Carothers challenges the traditional transition paradigm by arguing that democratization is often nonlinear and shaped by unique national contexts. This perspective is particularly relevant to Bangladesh, where entrenched factionalism, economic instability, and external pressures complicate the straightforward application of democratic transition models. Understanding Bangladesh’s trajectory requires a context-specific approach that accounts for these complex dynamics. Wiechnik’s framework incorporates multiple theoretical approaches to democratization, recognizing the interplay of structural, elite-driven, and grassroots dynamics, which are particularly relevant in post-crisis states where transitions are rarely linear or uniform.18

The structural approach, rooted in modernization theory, emphasizes the role of economic development, education, and social transformation in fostering democracy. Higher levels of income, urbanization, and literacy correlate with shifts toward egalitarian values, which support democratic governance. Post-crisis states, however, often lack these foundational conditions, making democratization efforts reliant on external aid or long-term developmental strategies.

The elite-driven or top-down approach focuses on the role of political and economic elites in initiating and managing transitions. In these contexts, elites often bargain for power-sharing arrangements to prevent the complete collapse of governance structures. While such approaches can stabilize transitions, they may also entrench oligarchic or military dominance, as elites prioritize their interests over democratic ideals.

In contrast, the bottom-up approach highlights the role of grassroots movements and civil society, with democratization driven by public demands for representation, rights, and accountability. Post-crisis states often witness significant mobilization from marginalized groups, though the fragmentation of these movements can undermine their effectiveness in shaping democratic outcomes.

The hybrid approach integrates structural, top-down, and bottom-up theories, acknowledging that interactions between elites, societal forces, and external pressures influence democratization. This approach is particularly relevant for post-crisis states, where the recovery dynamics involve simultaneous negotiations among domestic and international actors.

Metrics of Democratization

Wiechnik outlines specific metrics to evaluate democratization potential and progress, an essential tool for assessing post-crisis states like Bangladesh. Economic indicators such as gross domestic product per capita and employment rates are foundational to democratization, as economic stability is a prerequisite for fostering political legitimacy and institutional reforms. Post-crisis states, however, often face economic disruptions that hinder democratic progress, necessitating external financial support and long-term economic strategies. Literacy and education also play a crucial role, as higher education and literacy levels correlate to democratic resilience. In post-crisis contexts, investments in education are critical for fostering democratic values and citizen participation.19

Another significant metric involves identity and factionalism, as ideological divides pose substantial barriers to democratization. Wiechnik emphasizes that addressing these divides through inclusive governance and cross-cutting identities is essential for stabilizing fragile democracies. Without these measures, identity-based politics can lead to zero-sum power struggles, destabilizing post-crisis states. Additionally, indicators of freedom and political participation, such as independent media, political pluralism, and civil liberties, provide valuable insights into a state’s liberalization phase. Post-crisis states often score poorly on these metrics, reflecting the need for sustained reforms to improve political inclusivity and accountability.20

Wiechnik’s framework particularly applies to Bangladesh, where the interplay of domestic and international factors complicates democratization. Weak institutional capacity, economic instability, and ideology-based fragmentation create unique challenges. Wiechnik’s framework offers a strategic guide for Bangladesh’s democratization efforts in the aftermath of its political crisis by providing a phased road map, diverse approaches, and actionable metrics.

Application of Wiechnik’s Framework to Bangladesh

Phases of Democratization

The ousting of Hasina marked the beginning of a fragile liberalization phase in Bangladesh. Wiechnik’s framework identifies liberalization as the initial phase of democratization, characterized by loosening authoritarian controls and recognizing individual and collective rights. In Bangladesh, the interim government’s early measures to restore press freedom and political pluralism signified steps toward liberalization. Entrenched factionalism, however, posed immediate challenges. Islamist factions such as Hefazat-e-Islam resisted secular reforms, viewing them as Western impositions, while minority rights advocates pressed for greater inclusivity and accountability. Elite interests within the military and business sectors prioritized stability over reform, underscoring the tension between short-term order and long-term liberalization. These dynamics reflect Wiechnik’s insight that liberalization is often uneven and prone to regression in polarized environments.21

The transition phase in Bangladesh has centered on building democratic institutions and preparing for national elections. Wiechnik’s framework emphasizes that this phase involves institutional reforms and democratic capacity building but is also the most vulnerable to reversals. Bangladesh’s interim government has prioritized electoral reforms to ensure transparency and fairness alongside governance measures to curb corruption. Such initiatives come in a broader regional context, where South Asia has been identified as the most corrupt region globally, according to Transparency International’s 2013 report. Specifically, in 2024, Bangladesh ranked as the 14th most corrupt country worldwide.22

Economic recovery has become a cornerstone of political stability, with international stakeholders like the International Monetary Fund and World Bank linking financial aid to anti-corruption measures and democratic benchmarks. Student protestors have advocated for safeguards against authoritarian resurgence, highlighting the bottom-up dynamics of transition. Despite these efforts, the process remains fraught with challenges, including persistent factional disputes and the balancing of domestic pressures with international demands. Wiechnik’s framework underscores that successful transitions hinge on mediating competing interests while maintaining momentum toward democratic governance.

Democratic consolidation in Bangladesh remains precarious. Wiechnik’s framework stresses the importance of embedding democratic norms into political setting and institutions, which requires decades of sustained effort. In Bangladesh, economic vulnerabilities, such as inflation and an overreliance on the RMG sector, complicate consolidation efforts. Ideological factionalism, particularly the divide between Islamist and secular groups, threatens to undermine gains made during the transition phase. External pressures from actors like India, which favored the Hasina regime, also present conflicting priorities that can derail consolidation. Achieving this phase will foster socio-economic parity, strengthen institutions, and reduce reliance on elite dominance. These objectives remain distant in the face of ongoing instability and reflect the challenges Wiechnik identifies in post-crisis states.

Approaches to Democratization

Wiechnik’s framework integrates structural, elite-driven, and bottom-up approaches to democratization, recognizing the interplay of these dynamics in post-crisis contexts. In Bangladesh, structural challenges form a significant barrier to democratization. Economic stability, particularly through revitalizing the RMG sector, is critical to a successful transition. Efforts to diversify exports and implement fiscal reforms underscore the importance of macroeconomic stability in democratic governance. Structural deficits (such as widespread poverty and low literacy rates), however, remain hurdles the interim government and international stakeholders must address. Wiechnik emphasizes that addressing these foundational issues is essential for creating an environment conducive to democratization.

The elite-driven approach is evident in Yunus’s leadership and ability to balance domestic and international actors during this transitional period. Wiechnik’s framework highlights the role of elite negotiations in stabilizing transitions, particularly in post-crisis states. The military, which played a significant role in facilitating Hasina’s departure, has assumed a stabilizing role but continues to emphasize surveillance and security. This dual role raises concerns about the potential for authoritarian overreach, a risk inherent in elite-driven approaches. Business leaders have also focused on economic recovery and reducing regulatory burdens, often sidelining broader democratic reforms. While elite-driven strategies can provide short-term stability, Wiechnik’s framework cautions against their tendency to entrench oligarchic dominance at the expense of inclusivity.

Grassroots movements have strongly influenced Bangladesh’s democratization, particularly through student protests and minority advocacy groups. Wiechnik’s framework recognizes the critical role of bottom-up dynamics in democratization. In Bangladesh, grassroots mobilization proved instrumental in Hasina’s ousting and continues to pressure the interim government for accountability and reform. Fragmentation and competing priorities among these movements, however, have diluted their impact, underscoring Wiechnik’s point that grassroots efforts require coordination and representation to achieve long-lasting democratic outcomes.

Bangladesh’s transition also exemplifies Wiechnik’s hybrid approach, which integrates structural, elite-driven, and bottom-up elements. International aid programs and trade agreements reflect structural priorities, while grassroots demand for inclusivity and elite-led negotiations shape political reforms. This hybrid nature underscores the complexity of democratization in post-crisis contexts where diverse actors must balance immediate stabilization with long-term democratic objectives.

Metrics and Indicators

Wiechnik identifies specific metrics for evaluating democratization potential and progress, providing a practical framework for assessing Bangladesh’s transition. Economic indicators are foundational to democratic governance. Bangladesh’s reliance on the RMG sector underscores the need for diversification to ensure long-term stability. Inflation control and the repatriation of laundered funds remain critical for economic recovery. The International Monetary Fund and World Bank’s involvement, linked to fiscal reforms and anti-corruption measures, highlights the intersection of economic recovery and democratic benchmarks. Wiechnik’s framework emphasizes that economic stability is a prerequisite for preventing democratic backsliding.23

Literacy and education are also central metrics in Wiechnik’s framework. In Bangladesh, student-led movements have called for integrating the 2024 protests into public education curricula, highlighting the role of education in civic participation. Literacy remains a significant challenge, however, with the quality of education being compromised at a general level. Despite a reported literacy rate of 74.66 percent among those aged seven and above, a survey conducted by the Wave Foundation in 2022 revealed educational deficiencies in Bangladesh. Covering 88 villages and assessing 1,533 children aged 5 to 16, the survey showed that 16.78 percent of boys and 15.22 percent of girls could not read English. The survey also highlighted that 10.28 percent of boys and 8.71 percent of girls could not read Bengali, and about 14 percent of children could not identify single digits in mathematics. Simply improving literacy rates is not enough; the quality of education must also be enhanced, with a focus on civic education to equip citizens with the knowledge and skills needed for meaningful engagement in democratic processes.24

Identity and factionalism remain a substantial barrier to democratization in Bangladesh. Wiechnik highlights the destabilizing effects of identity-based divisions, which foster zero-sum politics and undermine trust. In Bangladesh, the ideological divide between Islamist groups and secularists, coupled with the marginalization of minorities such as Hindus, exacerbates political instability. Managing these divides through inclusive governance and cross-cutting identities is critical to stabilizing the transition. Wiechnik’s framework underscores that addressing factionalism is essential for building a resilient democracy.

Freedom and political participation are key indicators of liberalization in Wiechnik’s framework. Years of media suppression under Hasina’s regime stifled pluralistic debate. The interim government’s attempts to restore press freedom and civil liberties represent early steps toward liberalization. Persistent distrust among factions, intensified by reputational policing, complicates the process of fostering meaningful political participation. Wiechnik emphasizes that ensuring diverse representation and addressing historical grievances are vital for cultivating a participatory political setting.

Wiechnik’s framework provides a comprehensive lens for understanding Bangladesh’s democratization process, highlighting the interplay of structural, elite-driven, and bottom-up dynamics. By evaluating economical, educational, and political metrics within the context of Bangladesh’s unique challenges, the framework offers actionable insights for navigating the complexities of post-crisis transitions. This approach underscores the importance of balancing immediate stabilization efforts with long-term goals for enduring democratic governance.

Conclusion and Policy Implications

This article examined Bangladesh’s democratization process following the resignation of Hasina in 2024, utilizing Wiechnik’s democratization framework to analyze the structural, elite-driven, and bottom-up dynamics in a post-crisis context. By exploring the phases of liberalization, transition, and consolidation, the article highlighted the multifaceted challenges that complicate democratic consolidation, including entrenched factionalism, economic instability, and geopolitical pressures. This analysis situates Bangladesh’s political transformation within broader theoretical and empirical debates on post-crisis democratization and provides valuable insights into the interplay of identity, economics, and external influences.

A significant contribution of this article is its adaptation of Wiechnik’s framework to the unique sociopolitical conditions of Bangladesh, including addressing the impact of political and ideological factionalism, the strategic importance of the RMG sector, and the influence of regional powers like China and India. By demonstrating the flexibility of Wiechnik’s model in addressing the complexities of South Asian post-crisis states, the article extends existing scholarship. Moreover, integrating structural, elite-driven, and grassroots approaches enriches the understanding of democratization as a nonlinear and contested process, offering actionable insights for stabilizing transitions in fragile states like Bangladesh.

Democratic consolidation, as emphasized by Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, is a protracted process requiring the embedding of democratic norms within institutions and society. Bangladesh must address significant structural and societal challenges to avoid backsliding into authoritarianism. The policy recommendations outlined below bridge theoretical insights with actionable strategies and provide a road map for stabilizing Bangladesh’s transition while addressing internal and external challenges.25

Addressing Factionalism via Dialogue Facilitated by Third-Party Mediators

Factionalism represents a significant barrier to democratic consolidation in Bangladesh. Arend Lijphart’s consociational model offers a valuable approach to mitigating deep factional divides through power-sharing arrangements that prioritize proportional representation, autonomy for distinct groups, and mutual vetoes on sensitive issues. In Bangladesh’s context, where tensions persist between Islamist factions, secularists, and minorities, adopting elements of consociational governance could foster a welcoming environment and reduce political polarization.26

Establishing a National Reconciliation Council, including representatives from key factions such as Hefazat-e-Islam, Jamaat-e-Islami, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, student protestors, and minority communities, could provide a platform for mediated negotiations. This council could focus on shared goals like economic recovery and social stability, with facilitation by neutral third-party mediators from international organizations. Furthermore, such third-party mediators should encourage local development initiatives, emboldening collaboration among diverse groups and civic education campaigns and promoting pluralism and democratic participation to reduce intergroup tensions and create a foundation for inclusive governance.

Leveraging International Support for Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure Building

Economic stability is central to Bangladesh’s democratization. The interim government collaborates with international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank to secure financial aid while demonstrating a commitment to fiscal transparency and anti-corruption measures. It should also focus on diversifying the economy beyond the RMG sector—by investing in technology, agriculture, and renewable energy—which would reduce economic vulnerabilities and foster long-term resilience. For the long term, and particularly for the next elected administration, these reforms must receive backing from international stakeholders. International support should link financial assistance to democratic benchmarks, including the conduct of reasonably quick free and fair elections and the upholding of press freedom, ensuring a more accountable governance framework.

As Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way observe, external actors play a significant role in shaping hybrid regimes and often complicate domestic democratization processes. Bangladesh’s democratic transition holds broader strategic significance for the United States, particularly within the evolving Indo-Pacific framework. A politically stable Bangladesh enhances maritime security in the Bay of Bengal—an essential gateway for global trade—and contributes to broader efforts to maintain an open and rules-based Indo-Pacific region. The influence of regional actors like China and India must be carefully managed. Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative investments in Bangladesh, have expanded China’s strategic footprint, raising concerns in Washington about the long-term implications for regional power shifts. While the Belt and Road Initiative can diversify Bangladesh’s economic partnerships and strengthen its economy, there must be cautious engagement with it. The United States must offer economic and security partnerships that provide viable alternatives to excessive Chinese dependence while avoiding direct intrusion in Bangladesh’s internal affairs. Assistance from the United States, particularly through initiatives like Millenium Challenge Corporation (MCC) grants, can foster strategic partnerships that expand Bangladesh’s infrastructure development beyond its reliance on India. Such support could also help counterbalance anti-India sentiments stemming from India’s close association with Hasina’s regime. As the United States aims to counterbalance the economic and military influence of the two major powers in South Asia, it should support a stable and democratic Bangladesh that aligns with US strategic regional interests. Reviving multilateral frameworks like the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) should enhance regional cooperation and mitigate tensions.27

Strengthening Education and Media to Promote Democratic Values

Charles Tilly argues that empowering social movements is critical to durable democratic practices. Reforming the education system to integrate democratic principles, human rights, and conflict resolution into national curricula is essential for instilling values of pluralism and tolerance in young citizens. Despite significant infrastructural improvements in schools, such as increased internet access, only 1.83 percent of gross domestic product was allocated to education in fiscal year 2022–23, starkly below the 6 percent recommended by the United Nations. Along with a more significant portion of the national budget being allocated to education, efforts should be pushed for civic education programs that emphasize the benefits of democratic participation and pluralism.28

A robust and independent media is equally critical to Bangladesh’s democratization. Actions by the interim government, such as the cancellation of press accreditations for 167 journalists between October 29, 2024, and November 7, 2024, have drawn widespread condemnation from an association of editors and rights groups, highlighting the fragility of press freedom in the country. Repealing restrictive laws like the Cybersecurity Act of 2023 and reversing such repressive measures are essential to empowering journalists to report on government activities without fear of persecution.29

Larry Diamond cautions hybrid regimes often stagnate in partial democratization, a risk Bangladesh faces if factional divides and economic instability persist. By addressing factionalism, stabilizing the economy, and fostering democratic values through education and media, Bangladesh can navigate the complex path from crisis to consolidation. These measures offer a road map for achieving a resilient and inclusive democracy, reflecting theoretical and empirical scholarship lessons on post-crisis democratization.30

 
 

Rudabeh Shahid
Dr. Rudabeh Shahid is a scholar of comparative politics and international relations. Her research focuses on civil society, migration, and South Asian geopolitics, including China’s regional influence. She is a visiting assistant professor at Wesleyan University and trains American diplomats at the US State Department’s Foreign Service Institute. She is also a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center. Her public scholarship has appeared in NBC News, South Asian Voices, and The Diplomat, among others, and her work has been featured in The Washington Post and PBS News Hour.

 
 

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Endnotes

  1. “Bangladesh Prime Minister Hasina Resigns amid Mass Protests,” Human Rights Watch, August 6, 2024, https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/08/06/bangladesh-prime-minister-hasina-resigns-amid-mass-protests; and Husain Haqqani, “Ouster in Bangladesh Fuels Instability,” GIS, September 12, 2024, https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/bangladesh-ouster/. Return to text.
  2. Stanley J. Wiechnik, “Tracking Democratization: Insights for Planners,” Parameters 47, no. 1 (Spring 2017), https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol47/iss1/7/. Return to text.
  3. Munima Sultana, “China Loan Snag Threatens Padma Rail Link Funding,” The Financial Express, January 13, 2024, http://today.thefinancialexpress.com.bd/last-page/china-loan-snag-threatens-padma-rail-link-funding-1705081745. Return to text.
  4. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 75–90; Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 56, no. 4 (2004): 563–95; Dang Yuan, “Decoding China: Seizing the Moment in Bangladesh,” Deutsche Welle, August 16, 2024, https://www.dw.com/en/decoding-china-seizing-the-moment-in-bangladesh/a-69961454; Sultana, “China Loan Snag”; and Jonah Blank and Shelly Culbertson, “How the U.S. Can Help Resolve the Rohingya Crisis,” RAND Corporation, January 5, 2018, https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2018/01/how-the-us-can-help-resolve-the-rohingya-crisis.html. Return to text.
  5. Ruma Paul, “Khaleda Zia, Bitterest Foe of Sheikh Hasina, Freed after Bangladesh PM Flees,” Reuters, August 6, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/khaleda-zia-bangladeshs-other-female-pm-be-freed-after-hasinas-ouster-2024-08-06/; and Pam Wright, “Bangladesh’s Rising Seas, Erosion Robs Climate Change Refugees of Everything, Again and Again,” The Weather Channel, November 10, 2017, https://weather.com/science/environment/news/2017-11-10-bangladesh-climate-change-victims. Return to text.
  6. Shafiqur Rahman, Development without Governance and Authoritarization of Government in Bangladesh: Two Pieces of the Same Puzzle, ResearchGate, October 8, 2021, https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.18618.72643; Anbarasan Ethirajan and Tessa Wong, “Sheikh Hasina: The Pro-Democracy Icon Who Became an Autocrat,” BBC, August 5, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cg3ee303yxpo; and Femi Akinrebiyo, “Bangladesh’s Leap from Poverty to Textile Powerhouse Offers Lessons for Countries in Africa,” World Economic Forum, February 16, 2024, https://www.weforum.org/stories/2024/02/how-bangladesh-offers-lessons-for-sustainable-industrialization-in-africa/. Return to text.
  7. “Sheikh Hasina: Once Bangladesh’s Democracy Icon, Now Its ‘Authoritarian’ PM,” Al Jazeera, January 8, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/8/sheikh-hasina-once-bangladeshs-democracy-icon-now-its-authoritarian-pm; and “Bangladesh: Interim Government Must Restore Freedom of Expression and Repeal Cyber Security Act,” Amnesty International, August 8, 2024, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/08/bangladesh-interim-government-must-restore-freedom-of-expression-in-bangladesh-and-repeal-cyber-security-act/. Return to text.
  8. Alex Travelli and Shayeza Walid, “How a Country’s Economy Was Siphoned Dry,” The New York Times, December 4, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/04/business/bangladesh-banks.html. Return to text.
  9. Julhas Alam, “Yunus Takes Helm as Bangladesh’s Interim Leader, Tasked with Restoring Peace and Planning Elections,” PBS News Hour, August 8, 2024, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/nobel-laureate-yunus-arrives-in-bangladesh-as-interim-leader; Fahmida Khatun, “12 Steps to Tame Inflation and Stabilise the Market,” The Daily Star, October 29, 2024, https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/views/macro-mirror/news/12-steps-tame-inflation-and-stabilise-the-market-3739011; Selim Raihan and Kunal Sen, “How Bangladesh’s Interim Leaders Can Turn the Country’s Troubled Economy Around,” The Conversation, August 27, 2024, https://theconversation.com/how-bangladeshs-interim-leaders-can-turn-the-countrys-troubled-economy-around-236898; and Pranab Kumar Panday and Linda Chelan Li, “Bangladesh’s Balancing Act,” East Asia Forum, October 26, 2024, https://eastasiaforum.org/2024/10/26/bangladeshs-balancing-act/. Return to text.
  10. Julhas Alam, “World News: Thousands Rally in Bangladesh Capital as Major Political Party Demands Quick Reforms and an Election,” Associated Press (AP), November 8, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/bangladesh-bnp-rally-election-reforms-ff7eee935e3293e68de57818f7414ae8. Return to text.
  11. Ruma Paul, “Bangladesh Bans Student Wing of Ousted Sheikh Hasina’s Party,” Reuters, October 24, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/bangladesh-bans-student-wing-ousted-sheikh-hasinas-party-2024-10-24. Return to text.
  12. Shishir Gupta, “Rise of Jamaat-e-Islami and Bangladesh Political Conundrum,” Hindustan Times, September 7, 2024, https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/rise-of-jamaat-e-islami-and-bangladesh-political-conundrum-101725689018894.html. Return to text.
  13. Mehedi Hasan Marof, “ ‘Our Lives Don’t Matter’: Bangladeshi Hindus under Attack after Hasina Exit,” Al Jazeera, December 12, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2024/12/12/our-lives-dont-matter-in-post-hasina-bangladesh-hindus-fear-future; and Mostafiz Uddin, “We Must Stop the Infighting to Retain Buyers,” The Daily Star, September 11, 2024, https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/views/rmg-notes/news/we-must-stop-the-infighting-retain-buyers-3700081. Return to text.
  14. David Brewster, “Bangladesh’s New Military-Led Government Has a Tough Job Ahead,” The Interpreter, August 6, 2024, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/bangladesh-s-new-military-led-government-has-tough-job-ahead; and Ahmede Hussain, “The Bangladesh Army Must Not Meddle in Politics,” The Diplomat, October 8, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/10/the-bangladesh-army-must-not-meddle-in-politics/. Return to text.
  15. Rudabeh Shahid and Rubiat Saimum, “Navigating the Troubled Waters: ‘Maritimization’ of Bangladesh’s Foreign Policy,” Australian Journal of Maritime & Ocean Affairs 16, no. 2 (June 2023): 270–84; Khandakar Tahmid Rejwan, “Why India Is So Concerned about Bangladesh’s Political Problems,” East Asia Forum, September 14, 2024, https://eastasiaforum.org/2024/09/14/why-india-is-so-concerned-about-bangladeshs-political-problems/; and Abbas Uddin Noyon, “How China’s Belt and Road Changing Bangladesh’s Economy and Infrastructures,” The Business Standard, October 1, 2023, https://www.tbsnews.net/economy/how-chinas-belt-and-road-changing-bangladeshs-infrastructures-709826. Return to text.
  16. Qamar-ul Huda, “Challenges for the U.S. in a New Bangladesh,” The National Interest, September 2, 2024, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/challenges-us-new-bangladesh-212561; and Anu Anwar, “The Bay of Bengal Could Be the Key to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” War on the Rocks, June 17, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/the-bay-of-bengal-could-be-the-key-to-a-free-and-open-indo-pacific/. Return to text.
  17. Wiechnik, “Tracking Democratization,” 59–60; and Carsten Q. Schneider and Philippe C. Schmitter, “Liberalization, Transition and Consolidation: Measuring the Components of Democratization,” Democratization 11, no. 5 (January 2007): 59–90. Return to text.
  18. Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 1 (January 2002): 5–21; and Wiechnik, “Tracking Democratization,” 58. Return to text.
  19. Wiechnik, “Tracking Democratization,” 61. Return to text.
  20. Wiechnik, “Tracking Democratization,” 61. Return to text.
  21. Mubashar Hasan, “What Has Changed in Post-Hasina Bangladesh?” The Diplomat, December 13, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/12/what-has-changed-in-post-hasina-bangladesh/. Return to text.
  22. PTI, “South Asia Is World’s Most Corrupt Region: Transparency International,” Deccan Herald, May 21, 2014. https://www.deccanherald.com/archives/south-asia-worlds-most-corrupt-2193906; and Iftekharuzzaman, “Can We Rise Back Up from the Abyss of Corruption?” The Daily Star, February 12, 2025, https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/views/news/can-we-rise-back-the-abyss-corruption-3821846. Return to text.
  23. Rejaul Karim Byron, “IMF to Provide More Loans on a Fast Track,” The Daily Star, September 26, 2024, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/imf-provide-more-loans-fast-track-3712336. Return to text.
  24. Staff correspondent, “As Bangladesh Turns the Page on Education, Here’s What to Expect in New School Textbooks,” bdnews24.com, November 3, 2024, https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/a803bef74631; and Shamsad Mortuza, “The Statistics That Hide Our Poor Education System,” The Daily Star, November 17, 2023, https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/views/blowin-the-wind/news/the-statistics-hide-our-poor-education-system-3472126. Return to text.
  25. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). Return to text.
  26. Arend Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy,” World Politics 21, no. 2 (1969): 207–25. Return to text.
  27. Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War (Cambridge University Press, 2010). Return to text.
  28. Charles Tilly, Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 2007); and Mortuza, “Statistics That Hide.” Return to text.
  29. New Delhi (AP), “AP in the News: Rights Groups Condemn Bangladesh for Canceling Accreditation of 167 Journalists,” AP, November 13, 2024, https://www.ap.org/media-center/ap-in-the-news/2024/rights-groups-condemn-bangladesh-for-canceling-accreditation-of-167-journalists/. Return to text.
  30. Larry Diamond, “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes,” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (April 2002): 21–35. Return to text.