Home : News : Display
Sept. 16, 2025

Russian Arctic Land Forces and Defense Trends Redefined by NATO and Ukraine

Troy J. Bouffard, Lester W. Grau, Charles K. Bartles, and Mathieu Boulègue
©2025 Troy J. Bouffard, Lester W. Grau, Charles K. Bartles, and Mathieu Boulègue

ABSTRACT: This article argues that Russia’s Arctic land forces have been weakened by the Russia-Ukraine War and NATO’s northern expansion, creating a strategic window for Western militaries to bolster their Arctic capabilities. Unlike existing studies that focus on maritime operations and the Northern Sea Route, it integrates technical assessments of ground-based Arctic platforms with analysis of military-district reforms. Using a mixed methodology that incorporates equipment specifications, Russian government documents, media reports, and NATO strategic-response evaluations, this article constructs a comprehensive baseline understanding of Russia’s Arctic land-force potential and readiness. Policy and military practitioners will benefit from actionable insights into Arctic force-design shifts, equipment vulnerabilities, and strategic recommendations to exploit the temporary imbalance between NATO and Russian readiness.

Keywords: Arctic, Russian military, land forces, combined arms, northern warfare

 

The Russian Federation has pursued strategic developments in the Northern Sea Route (NSR) for the last 15 years: a maritime area roughly spanning the Novaya Zemlya islands and the Bering Strait out to the boundary of Russia’s exclusive economic zone. Moreover, the NSR became Russia’s center of gravity in pursuing its major priorities, including economic development, maritime promotion and use, bastion defense, force projection, civil security, and environmental management. This article provides detailed examples of these capabilities and more.1

The development of Russia’s newer Arctic military forces ended abruptly. Russia formed the 200th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade (Arctic) in 2011 and formed the 80th Motorized Rifle Brigade (Arctic) in 2014. Both brigades fell under a provisionally established fifth military district in December 2014 and then fell under the military command of the Russian 14th Combined Arms Army (that is, the 14th Army Corps) in 2017. Most of the Arctic brigades’ personnel and equipment have since deployed to Ukraine, where they sustained heavy losses, effectively reversing much of Russia’s northern progress and flatlining experience.2

This article argues Russia’s Arctic land forces have been weakened by the Russia-Ukraine War and NATO’s northern expansion, creating a strategic window for Western militaries to bolster their Arctic capabilities. In response to Sweden’s and Finland’s NATO memberships, Russia has begun restructuring its forces to provide split coverage for the Arctic and the Baltic regions. This article focuses on Russia’s Arctic land forces as an essential component of combined-arms warfare, complementing works about other Russian military capabilities and domains. Consequently, this article will assist decisionmakers, policy writers, military strategy planners, and others in understanding and preparing for Russia’s total northern ground capabilities.

Background

Developing a baseline understanding of Russia’s readiness is particularly important now, as Russia undertakes its most significant military reorganization since 2010, by recreating the Moscow Military District (MMD) and the Leningrad Military District (LMD) in response to NATO’s Nordic expansion. This article’s technical and organizational details provide context for assessing how Russia may redistribute its remaining Arctic-capable forces and equipment between competing operational requirements in the Arctic and on the NATO frontier. For military planners and policymakers, these details serve as historical background and critical indicators of Russia’s future ability to maintain its desired military posture in the Arctic while adapting to new strategic realities, including the capability gaps presented by the loss of Arctic-capable units in the Russia-Ukraine War.3

Russia’s land forces—coastal missile brigades, artillery battalions, and naval infantry—are the backbone of NSR security, establishing defensive strongpoints that protect the corridor from the Kola Peninsula to the Bering Strait. The land forces’ fixed and mobile ground‐based missile and artillery systems create a layered denial zone, ensuring uninterrupted resupply capabilities and the rapid reinforcement of Arctic garrisons. By anchoring logistics hubs and overland support nodes along key stretches of the NSR, Russia guarantees the passage remains a viable route for military and civilian shipping. Therefore, the detailed technical specifications of Russia’s Arctic land-force capabilities take on new significance as indicators of Moscow’s ability to defend the motherland and project force, particularly as its military resources are stretched between the Arctic and other theaters.4

Russian Northern Bastion and Coastal Defense

Russia’s northern-bastion and coastal-defense land forces consist primarily of coastal-defense troops and naval infantry stationed from the Kola Peninsula to the Bering Strait. These formations operate four key ground-based systems: fixed and mobile missile batteries (including legacy P35 launchers and K300P BastionP, 3K60 Bal, and Kh35 antiship systems) alongside fixed and mobile artillery. Central to Russia’s land-force structure is the 536th Coastal Missile and Artillery Brigade, which fields SPU-35V cruise-missile launchers and coordinates subsonic Kh35U salvos with advanced in-flight targeting. According to Russian policy, these units remain dedicated to the Northern Fleet’s local defense mission and are generally restricted for deployment to external conflict zones such as Ukraine.

Russian Land-Force Arctic-Maneuver Platforms

Although Russia’s Arctic naval and missile defense forces are well-known, the Kremlin’s land-force capabilities have advanced Moscow’s force-projection and warfare capabilities to a point where they were the dominant force in the Arctic. To achieve such a position, Russia developed an Arctic land fleet to serve the northern, mechanized units of the 80th Motorized Rifle Brigade (Arctic) and the 200th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade (Arctic) of the 14th Combined Arms Army, with some adaptations to the main, district-level ground forces of the 61st Naval Infantry Brigade. These additional resources allowed Russia’s Arctic military fleet to advance in development and testing faster than the rest of the Arctic nations’ land forces combined.5

Russia has spent nearly a decade developing and training with weapons platforms and systems that advance its Landpower capabilities in the Arctic. These platforms and systems are uniquely adapted to the Arctic region and include the Vityaz DT-30PM, Vityaz DT-10PM, GAZ-3344-20, Ruslan TTM-4902PS-10, and Trekol-39294.6

  • Currently, the premier platform is the Vityaz DT-30PM: a double-tracked, amphibious, all-terrain vehicle capable of carrying 59 tons and traveling five kilometers per hour in water. Its wide tracks enhance traction on snow and soft ground, making it ideal for Arctic operations, and the vehicle’s chassis should prove easy to modify for frigid temperatures. Additionally, the trailers of the Vityaz DT-30PM adapt to numerous weapons-platform variants, including the following.7
    • The upgrade from the BM-21 Grad to the Tornado-G 122mm multiple-launch rocket system provides rapid, surface-to-surface, short-range, high-intensity firepower through increasingly automated, precise, and accurate delivery.8
    • The Tornado-G multiple-launch rocket system and the Tor M2DT air defense system operate in temperatures as low as -50° Celsius. The M3 version, equipped with a new battlefield missile system, includes improved algorithms that allow it to recognize, classify, and prioritize targets and engage four threats simultaneously within a 15-kilometer radius. The M3 version has been deployed to remote Arctic locations like Franz Josef Land.9
    • The Pantsir-SA system provides longer-range (40-kilometer) surface-to-air, antiaircraft capabilities and is fitted with a SOTS S-band radar designed to work in the Arctic.10
    • The Vityaz DT-30PM has been coupled with the Magnolia 120mm self-propelled artillery platform and tested in the Arctic with a 10-round-per-minute firing capability and a range of 8.5 kilometers to 10 kilometers (guided round). The Vityaz DT-10PM chassis has been modified for the Arctic and can be coupled with some of the same weapon platforms as the Vityaz DT-30PM, up to 37 tons. The Vityaz DT-10PM can serve other operational applications, such as command and control, communications, mobile medevac, mobile maintenance, and combat-kitchen configurations.11
  • The GAZ-3344-20 is an 11-ton all-terrain, articulated cab-and-trailer, tracked vehicle capable of handling up to 2.5 tons of cargo and equipment, with a rear module that can be configured for mission-specific purposes.12
  • The tracked ATV Ruslan TTM-4902PS-10 can handle up to 4.4 tons. The GAZ-3344-20 and the ATV Ruslan TTM-4902PS-10 can handle the same terrain as the DT- family and would be the main personnel- and gear-transport vehicles for Russian Arctic forces.13
  • The Trekol-39294 six-by-six AWD, three-ton wheeled vehicle has proven capable of navigating on terrain like that of the Arctic and has found a prominent role as an Arctic scout vehicle. In real-world expeditionary tests, the Trekol-39294 led convoy formations and sent vital ground and sea-ice (thickness) information to the rest of the vehicles in real time.14

Other vehicles can be expected to help fill different operational combat and support roles, but this list includes the main parts of the fleet that have undergone testing in extreme environments and are likely ready to conduct weapons exercises.15

The Russia-Ukraine War has constrained Moscow’s resources, stagnating the Arctic fleet. Nonetheless, Western Arctic nations and allies should expect the Russian military to pick up where it left off, heeding Russia’s advancements in Arctic combat and combined-arms warfare capabilities and the land-force war-fighting functions of movement and maneuver and fires. The US Army, the US Marine Corps, and US allies must consider the time necessary to develop defense-related capabilities, requirements, and resourcing. Whereas Arctic warfare may seem unlikely and the resources may seem unnecessary, the World War II Petsamo-Kirkenes operation is a key precedent for the development of Arctic forces. The October 1944 operation was fought in Arctic Finland and Norway between the 97,000-man Soviet 14th Army and the 56,000-man German XIX Mountain Corps. The Soviet victory was complete.16

The deployment of Arctic-capable units to Ukraine has depleted Russia’s current capabilities and disrupted the decades of institutional knowledge and operational experience needed to employ complex systems in extreme conditions. This predicament helps explain why Russia is economizing its remaining Arctic assets even as it draws down other specialized units in Ukraine. Moreover, significant doctrinal and force reforms are expected in the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. The current era of Russian military doctrine began in the 1980s, and recent Russian military practices have differed significantly from the doctrine as written. After the end of the Russia-Ukraine War, Russia will likely transform its land-force doctrine and resourcing, and Moscow’s recent Arctic advances are potential indicators of the changes to come.

Updated Regional Strategic Implications and Critical Context

The recent admission of Finland and Sweden into NATO has had a decided impact on three geographic areas to Russia’s north in the Baltic Sea and Arctic regions. Before Finland and Sweden became members, NATO’s only land approach to St. Petersburg was across Estonia’s swampy terrain and considerable distances across Latvia, which would position NATO forces too close to Moscow’s advancing forces for Russia to execute an operational-level maneuver defense. Sustaining such an offensive would be difficult for NATO. A Baltic Sea approach directly into St. Petersburg would be a high-risk operation for NATO navies. A combined land and sea advance from Estonia and the Baltic Sea would invite delay and atrophy, as a defeat or stalemate on one axis would clearly affect the other. Because the bulk of Finland’s and Sweden’s populations sits on roughly the same latitude as St. Petersburg—and command adjacent Baltic Sea lanes—their NATO memberships forced Russia to revive the MMD and LMD and dissolve the Northern Fleet Military District. Consequently, the Russian military has focused on the defense of the Baltic region. Forces, with the primary mission of defending St. Petersburg, will increase and require funding for expanded basing, additional weapons and equipment, increased logistics support, increased maintenance facilities and military housing, and base support. Regional Russian National Guard (full-time internal security) units may be added, as well as Federal Security Service border control and coast guard units.

Until joining the 32-nation NATO alliance, Finland and Sweden had sole command of their militaries and sole responsibility for their nations’ defenses, with limited dependence on and cooperation with other nations. The Alliance has fielded forces and cooperated in two major events—the occupation and breakup of Yugoslavia and the occupation and pacification of Afghanistan. Despite NATO’s integrated command and the required NATO standardization agreements about how NATO forces should train and fight, member countries did not appear fully interoperable during either of the two major NATO events. The member countries have different histories, geographies, allegiances, and social systems, which impede a common approach to operations.

Although NATO may not be the monolith Russia portrays it to be, the Kremlin still regards the Alliance as hostile and aggressive. The newly recreated LMD is thus focused on three main issues: the defense of St. Petersburg, the security of the primary rail lines running parallel to the Finnish border from St. Petersburg to Arkhangelskaya and Murmansk, and the continued defense of the Arctic military region centered around Murmansk and facing Norway and Finland. The 1,448-kilometer, broad-gauge Kirov Railway links Murmansk and St. Petersburg and parallels the Finnish border; the railroad was completed in 1917 to circumvent the German blockade of the Russian Empire. When World War I ended, French, British, and American forces defended the Murmansk and Arkhangelskaya regions and the northern railroad lines against the revolutionary Red Army. The viability of the rail line again became vital in the Russo-Finnish War of 1939–40. Since Finnish forces did not cut the rail line, the Russian railroad artillery battalions, with long-range 180mm guns, effectively executed long-range fires against Finnish cities and strongpoints near Ladoga and Onega. During World War II, Finnish forces cooperated with Germany to cut the main line between Svir and Petrozavodsk from 1941 to 1943. Nonetheless, rail feeder lines around Svir and Petrozavodsk provided a path for lend-lease materials to the Soviet Union. Today, the line gives Russia access to critical natural resources.17

Defending the far-northern Arctic region is difficult, but the Soviets and Russians developed their Arctic defenses over a long time. The Northern Fleet is Russia’s strongest, even after it split its strategic submarine force with the Pacific Fleet. The Northern Fleet has an amphibious ground force: the 14th Army Corps, which is garrisoned in the Murmansk region but has expanded and reoccupied other military-critical sites along the NSR and the Baltic Sea. The 14th Army Corps has three ground-forces brigades: the 80th Motorized Rifle Brigade, the 200th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade, and the 61st Naval Infantry Brigade, which have all experienced heavy fighting in Ukraine and have refitted and retrained throughout the conflict. Russia announced plans to convert the brigades into larger divisions and combine the divisions into northern ground forces or an amphibious army.

On or around June 14, 2025, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation guard formation, the 200th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade, became the 71st Guards Motor Rifle Division (GMRD), within the 14th Army Corps, under the LMD. Currently, the Russian Federation guard formation, the 71st GMRD, fights under the Russian Federation Western Group of Forces, attacking through Chasiv Yar. No motorized-rifle-regiment designations for the Russian Federation guard formation, the 71st GMRD, have been announced. When not deployed, the 71st GMRD is a garrison headquartered in Pechenga, above the Arctic Circle, 110 kilometers northwest of Murmansk and about 10 kilometers from the Norwegian border. The new division will likely retain an Arctic status, though Russia has provided no indication either way. The division’s retention of an Arctic status would provide more evidence that Arctic capabilities will continue to be stretched thin to support Russia’s non-Arctic military priorities.18

Fighting in the Arctic has its own military challenges. Russia enjoys a distinct advantage over NATO regarding ice-class vessels and icebreakers. Many of Russia’s major rivers flow into the Arctic Ocean. The Arctic city of Norilsk produces much of Russia’s mineral wealth; thus, Arctic riverine exercises are part of larger unit training in the Russian Arctic. Amphibious landings and inland exercises are part of Russia’s annual training. Airborne forces regularly jump into the Arctic Ocean or accompany riverine training, including jumps at the North Pole. When the Russia-Ukraine War settles, Arctic naval and ground exercises will likely increase as a warning to Finland, Norway, and Sweden.19

Russian Military-District Reform

In December 2022, at a collegium of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation attended by President Vladimir Putin, Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, and Defense Minister General Sergei Shoigu, Russia announced it would recreate the MMD and LMD. These military districts were abolished in 2008 during the New Look reforms, when they were merged into the Western Military District (WMD). When the New Look reforms began in 2008, the nature of the military districts also changed. Previously, the military districts were primarily administrative—dealing with training, equipping, and (most importantly) conscripting—but they did not operationally control most military forces in their territories. The New Look reforms gave the military districts operational control of most forces in their respective territories via a new joint strategic command (OSK), which is technically subordinate to the military district and is commanded by the military-district commander. The forces controlled by the military districts include naval assets, which the Russian navy previously controlled directly.20

Throughout the 2010s, the growing importance of the Arctic caused Russia to split the northern portion of the WMD’s OSK into a new OSK: the Northern Fleet OSK, headquartered by the Russian navy’s Northern Fleet. The new OSK had operational control of most forces in its territory, but the administrative functions of the Northern Fleet remained with the WMD until 2021, when the command was designated a military district. In December 2023, in response to Finland’s accession to NATO, Putin stated: “We had the friendliest, most cordial relations. There were no problems. Now there will be, because now we are going to create the Leningrad Military District and concentrate certain military units there.”21

On February 26, 2024, Putin signed a decree to reestablish the MMD and LMD, effective March 1, 2024. This reform recreated the MMD and LMD—splitting the assets of the WMD between the two new military districts—and disbanded the Northern Fleet OSK, or military district, folding its assets and responsibilities into the LMD. The new LMD includes Karelia, Komi, Arkhangelskaya, Vologda Oblast, Kaliningrad Oblast, Leningradskaya Oblast, Murmansk, Novgorod Oblast, Pskov Oblast, the city of St. Petersburg, and Yamalo-Nenets (see figure 1). In conjunction with the creation, dissolution, and reorganization of the military district’s boundaries, Russia announced another major change to the military-district system and a step back from the New Look reforms: The Russian navy would control the four fleets and one flotilla, rather than the respective military districts of fleets’ and flotilla’s.22

Russian military districts
Figure 1. Russian military districts (Key: MD = military district, L = Leningrad, M = Moscow, S = southern, C = central, and E = eastern)
(Source: Created by the authors)

Russian commentators continue to expand the discussions about the two revitalized OSKs, noting the exact purposes of the new military districts. According to Denis Korkodinov, the head of the International Center for Political Analysis and Forecasting, the MMD will be responsible for fending off threats from Europe and Ukraine, whereas the LMD will repel threats from the Baltic countries, Finland, and Scandinavia. Korkodinov’s views align with other statements emanating from the Kremlin and the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, which portray the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO as an offensive move, with NATO’s overall intentions being offensive in nature. Similarly, Russian leadership used NATO’s expansion to justify the effort and cost of increasing Russia’s military force structure from one million uniformed personnel in the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation (before the special military operation) to 1.5 million.23

The Leningrad Military District

Although the Kremlin activated the LMD on March 1, 2024, questions remain about what assets it controls, as the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are going through a major expansion, and no ukaz, or presidential decree, was issued, stating how the assets of the WMD would be split between the two new districts. Recent media reports provide few details about the assets of the LMD, but the Northern Fleet will not become part of the LMD, as it lost its military-district or OSK status and is assigned to the Russian navy.24

The LMD is headquartered in St. Petersburg, in the former headquarters of the WMD: a position critical to assessing future Western posture options. The major subordinate ground operational-level commands are the 6th Combined Arms Army, which currently has two motorized rifle brigades (the 138th and the 25th) and the 14th Army Corps, located in Murmansk—above the Arctic Circle. The 14th Army Corps includes two motorized rifle brigades (the 200th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade and the 80th Motorized Rifle Brigade), both garrisoned above the Arctic Circle close to Kirkenes, Norway, and northeast Finland. The Russian General Staff considered establishing a combined-arms army in the Arctic, which could be accomplished by upgrading the 14th Army Corps with enablers (such as an artillery brigade; missile brigade; nuclear, biological, and chemical regiment; or logistics [mission-type order] brigade). Additionally, Russia plans to establish a third ground operational-level command in Karelia (near the border of Finland), possibly named the 44th Army Corps and headquartered in Petrozavodsk. A new brigade, the 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (which Russia reportedly intends to garrison in Sortavala), will be the first of the maneuver units subordinated to the 44th Army Corps. All three ground operational-level commands will likely have existing maneuver brigades upgraded to divisions and may receive new brigades or divisions.25

A significant challenge for the LMD’s new or elevated operational-level commands and maneuver units is how they will be manned. Karelia and the subjects (oblasts or provinces) in the Arctic are sparsely populated, which is problematic, as Russia prefers personnel to serve in the regions from which they were conscripted or recruited. The Russian Arctic has traditionally featured mainly naval forces, and service in the Northern Fleet is considered more prestigious and safer than service in the ground forces—though many Northern Fleet sailors were reassigned in the early days of the Russia-Ukraine War to compensate for manpower shortages. To rebuild the Arctic formations, the military must bring in personnel from elsewhere. These personnel will likely be from St. Petersburg, but the military may also increase its recruitment of immigrants (likely from Central Asia) to meet recruiting goals.26

In terms of air and strategic air defense assets, each military district or OSK has one air and air defense army (AADA)—usually colocated with the parent military district or OSK headquarters—to manage strategic air and air defense. Whereas the 6th AADA was assigned to the WMD, in St. Petersburg, some have speculated the 6th AADA headquarters designation will be transferred to the MMD, and the AADA headquarters assigned to the LMD will receive a different designation. Despite name changes, little will likely change in the command and control of air and air defense assets. The Kremlin will likely split all assets in the former WMD, the MMD, and the LMD, based on their respective locations. Russia’s growing concern about threats in the Arctic has led to discussions about increasing its force structure for monitoring and controlling, including creating long-range unmanned aerial vehicle units to monitor the remote Far East and the NSR.27

Although primarily a response to NATO expansion, the recreation of the LMD also reveals Moscow’s evolving assessment of Arctic defense priorities. By folding the Northern Fleet’s military-district status into the larger Leningrad command, Russia appears to be moving away from treating the Arctic as a distinct strategic theater and toward viewing the Arctic as one component of a broader northwestern strategic direction. This shift has significant implications for how Russia may distribute its remaining Arctic-capable forces and equipment between competing requirements for Arctic operations and conventional deterrence against NATO’s Nordic members. Russia’s shifting Arctic priorities may also have implications for the Baltic states.

The Role of Russian Arctic Land Forces and the Northern Sea Route

The post-2022 expansion of NATO, especially the accession of Finland and Sweden, has seemingly vindicated Moscow’s fear of encirclement and its investment in its Arctic land forces. Ground formations such as coastal missile brigades, artillery battalions, and naval infantry now anchor defensive strongpoints along the NSR to counter enhanced NATO air, surface, and subsurface operations. Russia’s heightened sense of vulnerability drives the Kremlin to reinforce land-force deployments, fortifying choke points and ground lines of communication across the Kola Peninsula and beyond. As environmental changes open new waterways, Russia increasingly depends on land units to assert control over its Arctic approaches and deter an Allied presence. Following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, statements about the possibility of NATO rushing into the Arctic, or even militarizing it, became common.28

Russia’s reallocation of ground and aerospace forces to Ukraine, alongside the revival of the MMD and LMD, opened a transient yet exploitable gap in Russia’s Arctic posture. Meanwhile, the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO adds 1,300 kilometers of Alliance frontage on the Northern Fleet’s rear, overstretching Russian logistics and air defenses. Together, these shocks give the United States and its Allies a narrow window in which to modernize critical Arctic domain awareness, mobility, and long-range fires.29

With vulnerability comes a heightened confrontational stance, which Russia uses to justify furthering its regional military deployments. Russia’s discourse about the Arctic is increasingly securitized and includes aggressive and escalatory posturing about protecting perceived sovereign interests. The Kremlin also updated the Russian foreign policy concept in 2023 and removed indications of the importance of multilateral, cooperative formats in the Arctic. Regardless of the rationale, Russia’s Arctic land forces have assumed primary responsibility for defending the newly exposed northern border created by receding NSR ice, replacing the sea-ice barrier with fortified coastal strongpoints and overland defensive lines. Enhanced coastal missile brigades, artillery battalions, and naval infantry now man upgraded dual-use infrastructure; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance radars; and Main Missile and Artillery Directorate (GRAU) sensors at critical choke points—the Kara Sea gate, the Vilkitsky Strait, the Laptev Sea passage and Proliv Sannikova, Wrangel Island, and the Bering Strait—to ensure uninterrupted surveillance and rapid response capabilities. These ground formations also enforce Russia’s tightened regulatory regime along the NSR, which includes checkpoints for mandatory icebreaker escorts, advance transit notifications, and onboard Russian operators. In enforcing Russia’s regulatory regime, ground formations provide the hard-power foundation for Moscow’s claim to exclusive control over the NSR and its vital, central-Arctic approaches.30

Policy and Doctrinal Takeaways and Recommendations

Russia’s Arctic land forces form the core of Moscow’s NSR security and broader Arctic defense posture. By emplacing fixed and mobile anti-ship missile batteries (for example, the K-300P BastionP or 3K60 Bal/Kh35 systems) alongside dedicated artillery units at strategic choke points, Russian land forces create a layered denial zone that complicates any adversary’s attempts to penetrate northern approaches. Western and US planners should recognize these ground elements are not simply static coastal defenders but highly mobile formations capable of rapid redeployment to reinforce threatened sectors, conduct counter-landing operations, and support submarine bastion operations under seasonal ice cover. To align Western Arctic planning with Russia’s land-force posture, US and Allied commands should map key Russian capabilities onto the six US Army war-fighting functions and develop countermeasures accordingly. The following brief examples represent areas in need of more research.

North of the Arctic Circle, conducting effective maneuvers demands synchronizing maritime, air, and overland axes across glaciated choke points while operating in temperatures as low as -40° Fahrenheit and near-zero visibility. American and allied forces must develop joint training that integrates cold-weather infantry, precision fires, and amphibious capabilities to challenge Russia’s defenses and counter integrated Russian joint fires and maneuvers in the Arctic. In combined-arms warfare scenarios, Russian land forces in the Arctic are integrated with naval and air assets through resilient overland and shore-based command networks. The land forces’ intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and missile-guided fire-control systems lock onto maritime and aerial targets, coordinating joint strikes that can sever logistical lines along the NSR. American and Allied forces must, therefore, disrupt this sensor-shooter linkage by investing in expeditionary electronic-warfare units, specialized cold-weather infantry capable of seizing or neutralizing coastal strongpoints, and Arctic-qualified engineering detachments to traverse difficult terrain and rapidly emplace counterbattery assets.

For homeland defense, Western authorities should simulate asymmetric land-sea raids against Russia’s northern bastion defenses, testing multidomain task forces to secure beachheads, disable missile batteries, and establish footholds for rotatable strike packages. Equally important is the development of Arctic-adapted joint doctrine that integrates US Marine–oriented littoral operations, airborne insertions on sea ice, and combined-arms teams that marry US Army cold-weather brigades with Navy and Marine Corps assets. Such exercises will reveal gaps in sustainment, logistics, and command interoperability—areas where Russia currently leverages its ground-based infrastructure and storied experience operating under polar conditions.

On the force projection side, US defense planners must anticipate Russia’s northern land forces will serve as a shield for the NSR bastion, enabling the secure transit of SSBNs and surface task groups into the North Atlantic Ocean. Counter-bastion concepts should emphasize executing decapitation strikes against coastal missile brigades before they can mass fires and conducting clandestine special operations forces missions to undermine Russian perimeter sensors. Fires in the high north must bridge 3,000-kilometer distances and polar orbital gaps, making long-range, cross-domain precision effects the decisive enabler. In some cases, Arctic targets may be sparse yet strategically vital, requiring fires doctrine to pivot from mass to precision, relying on hypersonic, space-enabled, and under-ice strike capabilities. Simultaneously, Western powers should bolster their Arctic garrisons—rotational light-infantry units equipped with precision-guided artillery and anti-armor systems—to demonstrate deterrent resolve and complicate Russian calculus for gaining control of Arctic lines of communication through the gray zone or hybrid forces.

The Barents Sea represents the most fiercely contested operational sector of the Arctic, where Russia’s Kola Peninsula bastion directly buffers growing NATO maritime and aerial patrols. Here, Russian coastal missile brigades are emplaced within Murmansk and on key islands to deny adversaries surface access and to protect SSBN strongholds. Complementing these fires, naval infantry and artillery battalions maintain overland defense lines and can rapidly project combat power to vulnerable littoral zones or forward operating sites, reinforcing the Northern Fleet’s ability to push into the North Atlantic. In any Arctic confrontation, these land-based units will underpin hard-power deterrence and surge operations, enabling Russia to mass forces ashore, interdict allied reinforcements, and sustain a layered defense that challenges Western force-projection efforts in the Barents Sea theater. Moreover, the bear gap—between the Svalbard archipelago and mainland Norway, with Ytre Norskøya halfway across—is now the point of contact between NATO and Russia on the Barents Sea side of the Arctic. This regional choke point is likely to see increased potential for escalation in the coming months. Therefore, US planners should develop joint countermobility concepts—through Norway’s military leadership and experience with the area—that degrade Russian hybrid-force control nodes before Arctic escalation occurs.31

Finally, the expanding navigable season will heighten the strategic value of land forces in shaping the Arctic battlespace. The United States and NATO must integrate high-altitude intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms; under-ice detection sensors; and long-range fires to contest Russia’s layered defenses. By fully accounting for the centrality of ground troops in Russia’s Arctic strategy—both as guardians of sovereign claims and enablers of blue-water force projection—Western defense authorities can craft multidomain response options that blunt Moscow’s assertions of uncontested control and secure lines of communication vital to northern supply chains and allied freedom of maneuver.

Conclusion

Before the Russia-Ukraine War started in February 2022, Russia was on a clear path to become the dominant force in the Arctic. Experts continue to assess the extent to which Russia’s position has changed as hostilities continue, but the war has negatively impacted Russia’s Arctic and NSR defense and force-projection capabilities. Besides significant shifts enacted by the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, the reallocation of programmatic resources away from the NSR and the unprecedented response from the international community have disrupted the Kremlin’s strategic development goals for the Arctic and the NSR. Russia previously positioned itself in an optimal hard-power situation complementary to and more considerable than its soft-power endeavors. The West’s partial inhibitions about Arctic military developments were based on not provoking Moscow. Such sensitivities no longer exist.

The West and NATO now consider military development and presence in the Arctic a critical requirement. The United States can also close some critical land-force capability gaps and should pursue this action urgently before Russia decides to reawaken its Arctic war-fighting capabilities. Whereas public and institutional motivation in the West are limited, that reality can change rapidly—as has occurred in the past when Russia took an offensive stance. In some ways, Russia has also been careful not to provoke NATO member countries. Russia has limited its Arctic force projections to demonstrating capabilities, often through the lens of defense rather than offense, to keep Western politicians less enthusiastic about proactive spending. Operationally, such circumstances typically favor the party that is better prepared. Another chance will not arise to change the limited public appetite for Arctic defense spending. Russia’s restrained behavior in the Arctic since its 2022 invasion of Ukraine should not deter NATO from conducting visible force-projection exercises in the region. Creative vision and foresight must lead today’s military thinking because the alternative is unacceptable.32

 
 

Troy J. Bouffard
Troy J. Bouffard, US Army (retired), has a master’s degree in Arctic policy and a PhD in Arctic defense and security from the University of Alaska Fairbanks, where he is an assistant professor of Arctic security. He is the director of the University of Alaska Fairbanks Center for Arctic Security and Resilience and a research fellow with the United States Military Academy’s Modern War Institute. He is also the former Arctic adviser to US Senator Lisa Murkowski, serving as a congressional fellow. Bouffard’s experience includes serving as a defense contractor with United States Northern Command and United States Alaskan Command, and he continues to lead projects for the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. Bouffard continues to support various Arctic Council activities.

Lester W. Grau
Lester W. Grau (colonel, US Army, retired) specializes in Russian military studies and is a senior analyst for the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. His career spans more than 50 years, including service in Vietnam, Europe, South Korea, the Soviet Union, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Grau has written numerous books and articles on tactical, operational, and geopolitical subjects, particularly focusing on Russia and Afghanistan.

Charles K. Bartles
Lieutenant Colonel Charles K. Bartles is an Army reservist assigned to United States Northern Command. His experience includes deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq and prior service as a security assistance officer at embassies in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. Bartles has a bachelor of arts degree in Russian from the University of Nebraska–Lincoln, a master of arts degree in Russian and Eastern European studies from the University of Kansas, and a PhD from the University of Missouri at Kansas City. As a civilian, Bartles is employed as an analyst and a Russian linguist at the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Mathieu Boulègue
Mathieu Boulègue is a freelance researcher and consultant in international conflict and security affairs, with a focus on the former Soviet Union and Arctic security issues. He is a consulting fellow with the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House and a nonresident senior fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security program at the Center for European Policy Analysis. In his research, Boulègue focuses on military-security issues in the Arctic, Russian foreign policy and military affairs, Ukraine, Russia-NATO relations and transatlantic security, and Sino-Russian defense and security relations.

 
 

Disclaimer: Articles, reviews and replies, review essays, and book reviews published in Parameters are unofficial expressions of opinion. The views and opinions expressed in Parameters are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of War, the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. The appearance of external hyperlinks does not constitute endorsement by the Department of War of the linked websites or the information, products, or services contained therein. The Department of War does not exercise any editorial, security, or other control over the information readers may find at these locations.

 
 

Endnotes

  1. Pavel Luzin, “Russia Reorganizes Military Districts,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 21, no. 32 (2024), https://jamestown.org/program/russia-reorganizes-military-districts/. Return to text.
  2. Jonas Kjellén, “The Russian Northern Fleet and the (Re)militarisation of the Arctic,” Arctic Review on Law and Politics 13 (2022), https://arcticreview.no/index.php/arctic/article/view/3338/6318. Return to text.
  3. Luzin, “Russia Reorganizes Military Districts.” Return to text.
  4. Lester W. Grau and Charles K. Bartles, The Russian Way of War (Training and Doctrine Command, Foreign Military Studies Office, 2016). Return to text.
  5. Troy J. Bouffard, “U.S. Northern Military Competition: Closing Arctic Operational Capabilities Gaps,” Norwich Blogs (blog), April 1, 2024, https://www.norwich.edu/topic/all-blog-posts/us-northern-military-competition-closing-arctic-operational-capabilities-gaps; and Mason Clark and Karolina Hird, Russian Regular Ground Forces Order of Battle (Institute for the Study of War, October 2023). Return to text.
  6. “The Military in the Arctic – Part 1: ATVs Put to the Frozen Test in Blizzards & Ice,” RT Documentary Channel, TV-Novosti, https://rtd.rt.com/series/combat-approved-series/the-military-in-the-arctic/. Return to text.
  7. “The Military in the Arctic.” Return to text.
  8. “Arctic Divisions Will Receive a MLRS ‘Tornado-G’ on the Chassis DT-30PM,” Военное обозрение, updated February 9, 2021, https://en.topwar.ru/179804-arkticheskie-podrazdelenija-poluchat-rszo-tornado-g-na-shassi-dt-30pm.html. Return to text.
  9. “Russia Showcases New Arctic Tor and Pantsir Systems at Military Parade in Moscow,” Sputnik International, updated May 9, 2017, https://sputnikglobe.com/20170509/russia-arctic-defense-systems-to-pantsir-1053409405.html. Return to text.
  10. “Russian Army to Receive Pantsir-SA Systems Designed for Arctic in 2016,” Sputnik International, updated August 20, 2016, https://sputnikglobe.com/20160820/russia-pantsir-aerospace-forces-1044470100.html. Return to text.
  11. Александр Карпов and Алёна Медведева, “«Уникальная установка»: на что будет способна российская арктическая артиллерийская самоходка «Магнолия»” [“Unique installation”: What the Russian arctic artillery self-propelled vehicle “Magnolia” will be able to do], RT, February 14, 2021, https://russian.rt.com/russia/article/831989-rossiya-armiya-arktika-magnoliya. Return to text.
  12. Samuel Cranny-Evans, “Russia’s GAZ-3344-20 Aleut ATV Enters Service,” Janes, March 18, 2020, https://www.janes.com/osint-insights/defence-news/russias-gaz-3344-20-aleut-atv-enters-service. Return to text.
  13. “New TTM-4902PS-10 All-Terrain Vehicle Tested during Amphibious Operation by Russian Navy Troops 12408152,” Army Recognition, August 24, 2015, https://armyrecognition.com/weapons_defence_industry_military_technology_uk/new_ttm-4902ps-10_all-terrain_vehicle_tested_during_amphibious_operation_by_russian_navy_troops_12408152.html. Return to text.
  14. “Military in the Arctic.” Return to text.
  15. “Арктика России это системы владения ледяным миром” [“Russia’s Arctic Is a System of Ice World Ownership”], Dzen, January 6, 2022, https://dzen.ru/a/YddND2TwMmnUzx8z; “Military in the Arctic.” Return to text.
  16. James F. Gebhardt, The Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation: Soviet Breakthrough and Pursuit in the Arctic, October 1944, Leavenworth Papers no. 17 (Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1990), https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p16040coll3/id/120; and James F. Gebhardt, Arctic Naval Combat in Support of Ground Operations: Soviet Naval Support of the Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation, October 1944 (in Print), ed. Lester W. Grau and Charles K. Bartles (University of Alaska Press, 2025). Return to text.
  17. An excellent account of the American side of this Allied intervention is provided in E. M. Halliday, When Hell Froze Over: The Secret War between the U.S. and Russia at the Top of the World (Simon and Schuster, 2010). See also Edward Ames, “A Century of Russian Railroad Construction: 1837–1936,” The American Slavic and East European Review 6, no. 3/4 (December 1947): 64–65; and Carl Van Dyke, The Soviet Invasion of Finland, 1939–40 (Routledge, 2013), 78. Return to text.
  18. “Russia’s 200th Brigade Becomes the 71st Motor Rifle Division: Implications for Ukraine and the West,” Defense Express, June 18, 2025, https://en.defence-ua.com/news/russias_200th_brigade_becomes_the_71st_motor_rifle_division_implications_for_ukraine_and_the_west-14883.html. Return to text.
  19. Lester W. Grau, “Arctic Riverine Operations,” Marine Corps Gazette (November 2019); and Lester W. Grau and Charles K. Bartles, “Russian Battalion Tactical Group Mission Training in the Arctic,” Infantry 112, no. 1 (Spring 2023). Return to text.
  20. “Изменение призывного возраста и увеличение армии” [“Changing the Conscription Age and Increasing the Size of the Army”], TASS, December 21, 2022, https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/16655079; James Hackett et al., “If New Looks Could Kill: Russia’s Military Capability in 2022,” Military Balance Blog (blog), February 15, 2022, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2022/02/if-new-looks-could-kill-russias-military-capability-in-2022/; and Charles K. Bartles, “Defense Reforms of Russian Defense Minister Anatolii Serdyukov,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 24, no. 1 (2011): 55–80. Return to text.
  21. “Russia’s Defense Ministry Establishes Arctic Strategic Command,” TASS, December 1, 2014, https://tass.com/russia/764428; “Северный флот станет «пятым военным округом» России с 2021 года” [The Northern Fleet Will Become Russia’s “Fifth Military District” from 2021], Известия, June 6, 2020, https://ria.ru/20200606/1572550063.html; and “Finland’s Accession to NATO Leads to Creation of Leningrad Military District—Putin,” TASS, December 17, 2023, https://tass.com/politics/1722431. Return to text.
  22. “Putin Re-Establishes Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts—Decree,” TASS, February 26, 2024, https://tass.com/politics/1751693; and “Russia Completes Re-Subordination of Fleets to Navy Commander-in-Chief,” TASS, November 21, 2023, https://tass.com/defense/1709345. Return to text.
  23. Fahim al-Surani, “Почему Россия решила воссоздать Московский и Ленинградский военные округа?” [“Why did Russia decide to recreate the Moscow and Leningrad military districts?”], InoSMI, March 4, 2024, https://inosmi.ru/20240304/rossiya-268101379.html; and “Defense Minister–Chaired Meeting Discusses Buildup of Russian Army to 1.5 Million,” TASS, January 17, 2023, https://tass.com/defense/1563227. Return to text.
  24. “Four Fleets Re-Subordinated Directly to Navy’s Commander-in-Chief—Source,” TASS, December 1, 2023, https://tass.com/defense/1714927; and “Russia’s Northern Fleet Loses Status of Strategic Multi-Service Formation—Decree,” TASS, February 26, 2024, https://tass.com/defense/1751711. Return to text.
  25. Russians define “maneuver units” as motorized rifle (infantry) and tank units. “Армейский корпус в Карелии создадут на базе инфраструктуры 6-й армии” [“The Army Corps in Karelia Will Be Created on the Basis of the Infrastructure of the 6th Army”], Деловой Петербург, January 18, 2023, https://www.dp.ru/a/2023/01/18/Armejskij_korpus_v_Kareli; and Роман Крецул et al., “Отмести угрозу: Санкт-Петербург защитят новые мотострелковые дивизии” [“Dismiss the Threat: St. Petersburg Will Be Protected by New Motorized Rifle Divisions”], Известия, January 30, 2024, https://iz.ru/1641702/roman-kretcul-aleksei-mikhailov-iuliia-leonova/otmesti-ugrozu-sankt-peterburg-zashchitiat-novymi-diviziiami. Return to text.
  26. “Migrants Reportedly Being Forced to Sign Contracts with Defense Ministry to Obtain Russian Citizenship,” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, August 28, 2023, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-central-asia-migrants-military-recruitment-ukraine/32567862.html. Return to text.
  27. Валентин Логинов and Любовь Лежнева, “Холодный просчет: почему США выгодна милитаризация Арктики” [“Cold Miscalculation: Why the United States Benefits from the Militarization of the Arctic”], Известия, March 18, 2024, https://iz.ru/1665908/valentin-loginov-liubov-lezhneva/kholodnyi-proschet-pochemu-ssha-vygodna-militarizatciia-arktiki; and Алексей Михайлов et al., “Поставили «Форпост»: за Камчаткой и Севморпутем присмотрят беспилотники” [“Putting up a ‘Forpost’: Drones Will Watch over Kamchatka and the Northern Sea Route”], Известия, April 12, 2024, https://iz.ru/1680779/aleksei-mikhailov-andrei-fedorov-vladimir-matveev/postavili-forpost-za-kamchatkoi-i-sevmorputem-prismotriat-bespilotniki. Return to text.
  28. Michael A. Rawlins and Ambarish Karmalkar, “How Warming of the Arctic Affects the Region’s Rivers, and the Rest of the Globe,” PBS News, March 10, 2024, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/science/how-warming-of-the-arctic-affects-the-regions-rivers-and-the-rest-of-the-globe; “В Госдуме заявили о желании НАТО превратить Арктику в зону конфликта” [“The State Duma Has Announced NATO’s Desire to Turn the Arctic into a Conflict Zone”], Известия, October 23, 2023, https://iz.ru/1593802/2023-10-23/v-gosdume-zaiavili-o-zhelanii-nato-prevratit-arktiku-v-zonu-konflikta; Владимир Винокуров, “Арктика: от сотрудничества к экспансии” [“The Arctic: From Cooperation to Expansion”], Звезда, March 30, 2022, https://zvezdaweekly.ru/news/2022527920-Hb3Eo.html; Евгения Чукалина, “«Вызывает озабоченность усиление военной активности НАТО в Заполярье»” [“NATO’s Increased Military Activity in the Arctic Is a Cause for Concern”], Известия, November 21, 2022, https://iz.ru/1427663/evgeniia-chukalina/vyzyvaet-ozabochennost-usilenie-voennoi-aktivnosti-nato-v-zapoliare; Юрий Банько, “НАТО рвёт на Арктику” [“NATO Is Rushing to the Arctic”], Звезда, April 19, 2022, https://zvezdaweekly.ru/news/20224131555-8WoLI.html; “Военный эксперт объяснил цели НАТО по усилению присутствия в Арктике” [“Military Expert Explains NATO’s Goals for Strengthening Its Presence in the Arctic”], Известия, August 29, 2022, https://iz.ru/1386988/2022-08-29/voennyi-ekspert-obiasnil-tceli-nato-po-usileniiu-prisutstviia-v-arktike; Олег Никифоров, “Запад усилил противостояние с Россией в Арктике” [“The West Has Stepped Up Confrontation with Russia in the Arctic”], Независимая, November 12, 2023, https://www.ng.ru/ng_energiya/2023-12-11/13_8899_arctic.html; and “Северный флот увеличит присутствие в Арктическом регионе” [“Northern Fleet to increase presence in Arctic region”] Известия, December 7, 2023, https://iz.ru/1616980/2023-12-07/severnyi-flot-uvelichit-prisutstvie-v-arkticheskom-regione. Return to text.
  29. Heather A. Conley et al., Defending America’s Northern Border and Its Arctic Approaches through Cooperation with Allies and Partners (German Marshall Fund of the United States, August 2023); Mathieu Boulègue, The Militarization of Russian Polar Politics: Addressing the Growing Threat of Tension and Confrontation in the Arctic and Antarctica (Chatham House, June 2022); and Pavel Baev, “Russia’s New Challenges in the Baltic/Northern European Theater,” Russie.Eurasie.Visions No. 130 (French Institute of International Relations, November 2023). Return to text.
  30. Андрей Краснобаев, “Территориальные отводы: Россия закрывает НАТО путь в Арктику” [“Territorial Withdrawals: Russia Closes NATO’s Path to the Arctic”], Новости ВПК, December 12, 2023, https://vpk.name/news/803547_territorialnye_otvody_rossiya_zakryvaet_nato_put_v_arktiku.html; Олег Никифоров, “West Has Stepped Up”; “Northern Fleet to Increase”; Natalia Moen-Larsen and Kristian Lundby Gjerde, Changing or Frozen Narratives? The Arctic in Russian Media and Expert Commentary, 2021– 2022 (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2023); Владимир Путин, “Указоб утверждении Концепции внешней политики Российской Федерации,” Администрация Президента России, March 31, 2023, http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/70811; Dirk Notz, “The Future of Ice Sheets and Sea Ice: Between Reversible Retreat and Unstoppable Loss,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 106, no. 49 (2009): 20590–95; and Troy J. Bouffard, “National Security Interests of Russia’s Northern Sea Route: Additional Elements of Domestic and International Importance,” in Defending NATO’s Northern Flank, ed. Lon Strauss and Njord Wegge (Routledge, 2023), 67–83. Return to text.
  31. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Arctic and Extreme Cold Weather Operations, Army Techniques Publication 3-90.96 (HQDA, February 2025); and Mathieu Boulègue, Russia’s Low Intensity Warfare in the Arctic: Managing the Risk Circumpolar Sub-Threshold Operations and Grey Zone Activities (Chatham House, forthcoming). Return to text.
  32. Jens Stoltenberg, “In the Face of Russian Aggression, NATO Is Beefing Up Arctic Security,” The Globe and Mail, August 24, 2022, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-in-the-face-of-russian-aggression-nato-is-beefing-up-arctic-security/; Bouffard, “U.S. Northern Military Competition”; and Diana Stancy, “US Doesn’t Want to Make Arctic Contested Battlespace, Admiral Says,” Navy Times, April 8, 2024, https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2024/04/08/us-doesnt-want-to-make-arctic-contested-battlespace-admiral-says/. Return to text.