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Sept. 16, 2025

Coercive Deterrence: Adapting Deterrence for Strategic Competition with China

Therese F. Tracy

ABSTRACT: This article proposes coercive deterrence as a core strategic concept to enable a whole-of-US-government approach to counter China through hybrid operations. For more than 80 years, deterrence theory has been characterized by the use of threats and force. In contrast, the article argues that deterrence can be achieved without either. A nation can exercise deterrence by choice—proactively shaping the environment to constrain the adversary to choices that do not threaten. The article examines deterrence theory, Chinese strategy, and case studies to offer practitioners a theory of victory in hybrid environments, synchronizing US interagency strategies through coercive deterrence.

Keywords: strategic competition, China, deterrence, coercion, compellence, diplomacy, hybrid warfare, MIDFIELD

 

The 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) and 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) inaugurated the era of “competition” by redefining the relationship between the United States and China. The 2017 NSS introduced the concept of “competition” and named China a “strategic competitor.” The 2018 NDS used the term “strategic competition.” When the same term appeared in the 2022 NSS and NDS, it was testimony to a rare consensus in the US government. The debate then turned to defining “strategic competition.” For this article, strategic competition is an enduring challenge to gain an advantage over an adversary in the defense and advancement of a nation’s critical interests.

The geopolitical paradigm shift, from inevitable globalization to intense competition, rejuvenated the debate over American grand strategy. Whereas the need to compete is clear, the nature of a grand strategy to compete is more complicated.1

The Cold War described the context of US-Soviet relations, whereas “containment” described the American grand strategy. Similarly, “strategic competition” describes context, but it is not a strategy. It is a start, however. In geopolitics, as concepts and theories find acceptance, they become platforms for strategic thinking. Practice often inspires concepts, which eventually converge to become a grand strategy.

Containment’s history proved that grand strategies do not spontaneously manifest. They are works in progress that reveal themselves as they generate the capacity to synchronize instruments of national power. Containment was the invention of countless practitioners and theorists over decades. This fact runs contrary to foreign policy lore that diplomat George F. Kennan authored America’s grand strategy in his 1947 article “X article.”2

Today’s strategists are meeting the challenge for this era and revisiting classic concepts. The rising “fifth wave of deterrence theory” offers a promising platform for strategic thinking on twenty-first-century hybrid threats and hybrid warfare. To contribute to this dialogue, I offer a strategic concept specific to the United States’ strategic competition with China. This article will define “coercive deterrence,” trace the history of deterrence theory, examine China’s use of coercion, and propose a means to operationalize coercive deterrence.3

Taiwan: Won without Fighting

A Chinese invasion of Taiwan is a common scenario for the start of a war in the Indo-Pacific, but consider an alternative Taiwan contingency, without amphibious landings or blockades. Instead, over the course of several years, Beijing targets the population with sustained disinformation campaigns. The People’s Liberation Army, Navy, and Air Force surround Taiwan with increasingly aggressive military drills. China grooms influential sympathizers who propose a referendum, “Unite with China.” In the run-up to voting day, businesses and governments in Taiwan are subjected to a series of scattered cyberattacks, including the entity managing the referendum process. What if the results of the referendum favor unification with China? How should the United States counter this type of Taiwan contingency?

Define Victory

If leaders in the United States and China determine decisive victory and domination through war are neither desirable nor possible, then strategists must adapt. What is the definition of victory in a rivalry that must remain below the level of armed conflict? In 2002, Colin S. Gray argued for replacing the binary illusion of victory and defeat. He offered the concept of victory as a sliding scale to include “strategic advantage” and “strategic success.” The Joint Concept for Competing came to a similar conclusion: “Because strategic competitions are protracted and often generational, the aim is to achieve strategic objectives by gaining or maintaining a position of competitive advantage, as the struggle evolves over extended time.” By necessity, the definition of victory in strategic competition must be elastic. If victory cannot be decisive domination, then the United States must pursue “strategic advantage.”4

Coercive Deterrence

A nation employs coercive deterrence to shape a strategic landscape proactively to constrain the adversary to choices that do not threaten the nation’s interests. In contrast to traditional deterrent measures, which are reactive, this concept puts deterrence on offense. A nation reduces risks by cultivating habits of compliance in the adversary.

Coercive deterrence operates as a flanking maneuver at a strategic level. It functions under the same principle as the “coercion-deterrence dynamic” Antulio J. Echevarria II identifies in Operating in the Gray Zone, “Rather than domination through decisive operations, as per the current model, the alternative paradigm would have the goal of out-positioning rival powers in economic, diplomatic, informational, and military dimensions. This goal could apply to peacetime and wartime situations, as well as those between them.”5

Consequently, in a strategy of coercive deterrence, victory is a strategic advantage gained by constraining the adversary to a circle of choice.

Coercive deterrence primarily relies on nonmilitary means without threat or use of force. Therefore, the traditional military framework that denotes the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) instruments of national power is insufficient. Evolving that traditional framework to include technological, military, informational, diplomatic, financial, economic, legal, and developmental instruments of national power (T+MIDFIELD) enables strategists to have a better understanding of their nation’s capabilities to bring to the fight.6

Although the military remains integral to coercive deterrent strategies, its role lies mainly in identifying threats and supporting agencies. A coercive deterrent strategy can be nonconfrontational and may even appear to be a form of cooperation. Trade offers an example of how an economic instrument can be turned into a tool of coercive deterrence.

Nation A encourages trade to strengthen its ties with nation B. Gradually, nation A takes various deliberate steps, such as underpricing, to become the sole supplier of a certain product to nation B. The product producers in nation B shut down, forced out of the market by the exports from nation A. One day, nation A refuses to export the product to nation B unless it meets nation A’s demands. Nation B is left with limited alternatives, as nation A has taken gradual measures to nurture a trade dependency, cut off competitors exporting the product to nation B, and erode nation B’s manufacturing base for the product. Nation B accedes to nation A’s demands, having willingly walked into a trap of trade dependency.7

Some see integration through trade as an advantage, but when a state has comprehensive control over its economy, that state can exercise trade as a coercive political tool. In a trade-dependency strategy, nation B had choices but was unaware of how nation A was pre-positioning itself to gain an advantage. When nations A and B had a confrontation and nation A weaponized trade to compel or deter nation B, nation B found its choices limited. Creating a trade dependency is a coercive deterrent strategy.

Ideally, a sustained campaign of coercive deterrence cultivates habits of compliance and weaponizes the adversary’s power of choice to work against them.

A Brief History of Waves

Strategists Robert J. Art and Kelly M. Greenhill explain, “Coercion comes in two basic forms: deterrence and compellence. Deterrence is a coercive strategy based on the threat of retaliation that is designed to prevent a target from changing its behavior. Compellence, on the other hand, is a coercive strategy based on hurting a target (or threatening to do so) that is designed to get a target to change its behavior.” Despite the distinction between them, “deterrence” and “compellence” share an unusual genealogy. “Coercion” is the parent concept, but. discussions about coercion and compellence take place within the framework of deterrence theory.8

Histories of transatlantic deterrence theory often begin in the aftermath of World War II. The Cold War generated three waves of thought. In the first wave, Bernard Brodie was the definitive figure who originated strategic thinking on “nuclear deterrence.” He recognized nuclear weapons were an indisputable element of future warfare. Brodie created a rational framework to prevent brutal destruction by nuclear weapons yet produce the strategic effects militaries sought. Whereas Brodie’s writings concentrated on nuclear weapons, he established deterrence as the overarching concept that steered the Cold War’s strategic discourse.9

The second wave of thought, from the 1950s to the 1960s, was wide-ranging. The giant of this age was Nobel Prize winner Thomas C. Schelling. In Arms and Influence, Schelling introduced the conceptual framework of “coercion” with “deterrence” and “compellence” being the framework’s main components. In the same era, strategists developed categories such as “deterrence by denial,” “deterrence by punishment,” “general deterrence,” and “immediate deterrence.” An economist by training, Schelling exported game theory to international relations. The intent was to provide policymakers with tools to frame their decisions and understand the consequences. The weapons of the Cold War era possessed an unprecedented “power to hurt” that demanded the presence of rational actors to prevent catastrophe.10

The third wave, beginning in the 1970s, considered deterrence theories’ histories of successes and failures through case studies. The growing field of statistics offered a means of measurement and evaluation. The study of crisis management introduced the psychological context. The towering figure was Alexander L. George, who delved into Schelling’s term “coercive diplomacy.”11

George viewed “coercive diplomacy” as a bargaining strategy and opened the doors of compellence and deterrence to the increased use of nonmilitary instruments of power. In coercive diplomacy, military power is in the background, but not too far back. For George, violence could enhance a coercive-diplomatic strategy if applied with “just enough force of an appropriate kind to demonstrate resolution to protect one’s interests and to establish the credibility of one’s determination to use more force if necessary.”12

Post–Cold War thought has yet to receive recognition as a “wave,” but its concepts made their way in later. The unipolar world inspired strategists to look more closely at compellence, which was eclipsed by deterrence during the Cold War. The defining conflicts of the post–Cold War period were the Persian Gulf War, the Bosnian War, the Somali civil war, the Rwandan Civil War, and the Russian wars in Chechnya. Concepts of asymmetric compellence explained how a greater power could fail to impose its will on lesser powers. The global US military drawdown demanded strategies achieve maximal strategic effects with the limited use of force. In Bombing to Win, Robert Pape advocated the use of air coercion for its ability to project force rapidly, with less risk, and while signaling with diplomacy. Lawrence D. Freedman’s edited volume, Strategic Coercion, inspired by Schelling and George, offered historical case studies to examine the ways threats could influence strategic choices.13

The war on terrorism marked the fourth wave of deterrence. The existential question after the September 11 attacks was: How can a state deter a suicide bomber? One option was to identify terrorist networks. A state could utilize its tools for tracking, deterring, and analyzing the patterns of a larger entity. Gradually, the state adjusted the civil-military relationships to collaborate on the psychological and cultural dimensions that would deter members of society from joining a terrorist cause. In a world of asymmetric threats, deterrence proved its continued relevance.14

A rising fifth wave of deterrence theory is adapting classic concepts of deterrence to 21st century hybrid threats and hybrid warfare. The dialogue is still taking shape, but trends are visible. The revival of “cross-domain deterrence” examines the interactions between traditional and emergent battlefields (artificial intelligence and cyber). “Tailored deterrence,” understanding the adversary’s strategic culture, remains valuable for state and nonstate actors. In the multidimensional world of hybrid threats, “deterrence by denial” is reincarnated in “resilience.” “Hybrid deterrence” focuses governments on safeguarding the homeland (for example, electoral systems, media, and critical infrastructure) against attack and manipulation.15

Throughout these waves of deterrence theory, none replaced the others. They coexist, overlap, echo, and revive. An enduring trend is a reverence for the classics. This article offers the concept of coercive deterrence in the same spirit.

Comparing Coercive Deterrence

The major coercive strategies of compellence, deterrence, coercive diplomacy, and strategic coercion rely on the threat of military force or threat and limited use of military force. In contrast to other major coercive strategies, coercive deterrence does not rely on threats or violence.

The timelines on which threats and force take place are varied. Schelling’s concept of compellence demands a deadline for the threat of “brute force.” Schelling writes, “Compellence has to be definite: We move, and you must get out of the way. By when? There has to be a deadline, otherwise tomorrow never comes.”16

Freedman explains his fusion of compellence and coercive diplomacy into “strategic coercion” as “the deliberate and purposive use of overt threats to influence another’s strategic choices.” The amount of time that elapses between the threat and the use of force varies but is definite. George, the advocate of coercive diplomacy, endorses a timely threat with the option to use limited force in a “bargain” (offering possible rewards) if the adversary accedes to demands.17

Freedman observes deterrence is ultimately a threat to convince the adversary it will fail, due to resistance that denies the adversary success or promises punishment if it persists. The timeline for deterrence is indefinite. Schelling writes, “Deterrence involves setting the stage.” Coercive deterrence also pre-positions nations to take initiative. In George’s Forceful Persuasion, coercive diplomacy operates on the adversary’s timeline as a “response to an opponent’s encroachment or aggressive action.” Coercive deterrence has an indefinite timeline but is not reactive. Using George’s language, coercive deterrence is proactive, forceful persuasion.18

The nature of compellence and strategic coercion is offensive, with a timeline for the threat of force. The nature of deterrence is defensive, with an indefinite timeline for the threat of force. The nature of coercive diplomacy is dual. Coercive diplomacy is defensive, since it responds to an adversary’s action. Coercive diplomacy is also offensive, requiring a timely response to compel the adversary with threat or the limited use of force before the adversary escalates the conflict. The nature of coercive deterrence is offensive, with an indefinite timeline, and without the threat or use of force. In short, coercive deterrence is deterrence on offense.

Four Advisers

To bring together the comparisons of various forms of coercion, imagine a scenario of four advisers providing counsel to policymakers. Strategic advisor Schelling suggests communicating to the adversary: “Do A within two weeks, or we will do X.” Recognizing deterrence has failed, senior adviser Freedman recommends policymakers threaten: “Do B, or we will do X.” Finally, the policymakers turn to George, who advocates waiting to confirm the adversary is taking hostile action. After receiving confirmation, George recommends sending a carrier through a disputed waterway followed by the US ambassador meeting with the minister of foreign affairs. In that encounter, the ambassador delivers a message instructing the adversary to “do C.” The adversary understands the wrong choice will result in the carrier acting, and the right choice will be rewarded.

The fourth adviser, who advocates a coercive deterrent approach, recommends widening the acceptable outcomes to encompass options A, B, and C. The increase in potential outcomes offers the practitioners maneuverability and offers the adversary choices. The fourth adviser also identifies the best position for the pieces, to pressure the adversary into a circle of choice. The decisionmakers must also consider whether to confront the adversary, work through allies acting as third parties, or run an information campaign that will influence the adversary’s decision.19

Deterrence by Choice

Every coercive strategy’s vulnerability is the power of choice, since the adversary may still decide to accept risk and pain. But in coercive deterrence, the adversary’s power of choice is leveraged and weaponized.

When the adversary chooses one of the options the practitioner has engineered, that choice places the adversary at a disadvantage. If the practitioner can engineer that circle of choice to create dilemmas for the adversary, where there are already known rifts among decisionmakers, the practitioner gains an additional advantage of disruption.

In coercive deterrence, allowing for limited choices can have a stabilizing effect, providing off-ramps and de-escalation opportunities. The anticipated humiliation of submitting to a compellent strategy can motivate the adversary to resist. As a result, Schelling argues compellence can be self-defeating. Coercive deterrence mitigates this vulnerability of compellence by offering choices.20

Coercion with Chinese Characteristics

Invoking Sun Tzu, “to win without fighting” is a common occurrence in discussions about strategic competition. While that may ring true, many other aspects of Chinese strategic culture deserve understanding. It is impossible to delve into that deep subject in this article, but for the sake of providing real-world context for strategic competition, this section will briefly venture into Chinese coercive tactics. The synchronized use of economic and political coercion has defined China’s global engagement for the last 15 years. China’s aggressive claims in the South China Sea represent merely a regional theater in which its coercive tactics have played out. China’s new political-economic model of authoritarian capitalism is a global theater.21

In 2003, China codified its approach to compellence and deterrence in the Political Work Guidelines of the People’s Liberation Army. The Chinese Communist Party defined the “Three Warfares” as a conceptual framework that lays out the civil-military partnership in China’s global engagement. The party divided the warfares into (1) the “Exploitation of National and International Legal Systems,” (2) “Strategic Psychological Operations,” and (3) “Overt and Covert Media Manipulations.” The three warfares, to which this article adds a fourth, outline the systematic application of hybrid threats.22

Rivaling Mao Zedong as a historic figure, President Xi Jinping has created a new form of nationalism. Since 2012, Xi’s vision has driven a state-controlled economy to serve a geopolitical purpose and has solidified his hold on the Chinese Communist Party. When weaponized, Xi’s use of economic statecraft in China’s global engagement is unprecedented in its scale and precise execution. Often referred to as Chinese economic coercion, Xi’s statecraft merits a doctrinal name—fourth warfare.23

Accompanying China’s economic statecraft, the United Front Work Department (Xi’s “magic weapon”) works on the political front. Today’s United Front Work Department is considerably more sophisticated than the United Front that distributed Chairman Mao Zedong’s “Little Red Book.” With the capabilities necessary to engage in all three warfares, the United Front Work Department executes initiatives that veer from overt, soft-power cultural projects to covert disinformation campaigns, foreign intervention, espionage activities, and more.24

The Chinese Communist Party’s mission to ensure the “absence of threat to the party’s ability to govern” is a view Beijing translates to foreign affairs. The state-controlled economy is China’s most powerful tool of influence. When Beijing unleashes the fourth warfare, nations discover how soft-power economic ties can be weaponized for political or military aims. The relations between Norway and China offer an example.25

In 2010, the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace to Liu Xiaobo, a Chinese human rights activist. Xiaobo was in a Chinese prison and Chinese leadership furiously condemned the choice. At the Nobel Prize ceremony, the image of an empty chair on the stage gained worldwide media attention.26

Beijing’s protests had failed. The next step was retaliation. The swift imposition of informal trade sanctions on Norwegian salmon left it rotting in warehouses. For years, China refused high-level diplomatic engagements and canceled trade talks. After four years of plummeting salmon exports, the message was clear. When the 1989 Nobel Prize winner, the Dalai Lama, visited Norway in 2014, the government declined to meet with him. The Norwegian government understood that meeting with someone China considered a “dissident” would damage its salmon industry.27

In 2017, the government of Norway released a statement explaining it “fully respects China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, attaches high importance to China’s core interests and major concerns, will not support actions that undermine them, and will do its best to avoid any future damage to the bilateral relations.” Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi appreciatively remarked, “Norway deeply reflected upon the reasons bilateral mutual trust was harmed, and had conscientious, solemn consultations with China about how to improve bilateral relations.”28

Beijing’s seven-year campaign offered a cautionary tale to the world. After relations warmed, salmon imports increased and, by 2022, nearly 48 percent of China’s salmon imports came from Norway. As a major world economy and an oil-rich nation with global trading partners, Norway had alternatives. Instead of taking a more offensive posture to protect Norway’s leadership as an advocate for a global human rights agenda, the government made choices that Beijing had engineered. China’s gradual, deliberate, and constant imposition of costs affected Norway’s decision making. Those seven years demonstrated China’s power to compel and deter, an example China made clear to Norway and other nations.29

American Primacy through Collective Coercive Deterrence

Primacy is a nation’s ability to influence international actors more than any other government. Only two years after the end of the Cold War, without a near-peer rival in sight, Samuel P. Huntington identified “primacy” as the United States’ strategic objective. Huntington explained, “States pursue primacy in order to be able to insure their security, promote their interests, and shape the international environment in ways that will reflect their interests and values. Primacy is desirable not primarily to achieve victory in war but to achieve the state’s goals without recourse to war. Primacy is thus an alternative to war.”30

Primacy offers strategic advantages. Consider the defense industry as an element in the economic, political, technological, and military battlespace of strategic competition. Between 2019 and 2023, the United States was responsible for 42 percent of global arms exports, whereas China exported 5.8 percent of arms globally in the same period. A closer look shows China is focusing on a few key regions for its arms exports: Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa. China has been shaping the strategic landscape to gain geopolitical influence in subregions through targeted arms sales of low-cost defense articles. China’s objective in arms sales is not to achieve high numbers in sales. China is after arms and influence. Beijing sees a multidimensional battlespace, chooses priorities, and brings the necessary capabilities to compete.31

A nation cannot be complacent when it achieves primacy. Influence is fleeting. Diplomatic, economic, legal, and military are among those instruments of national power that can secure influence through purpose-built coalitions. The issue is not competition for the highest number of arms sales. The larger strategic landscape orients toward politics, economics, technology, and security. Once that is understood, then a collective coercive deterrent strategy for arms could enable the United States to challenge China across several domains.

An American collective coercive deterrent strategy for arms begins with expanding coproduction with allies (see figures 1 and 2). The United Kingdom and the EU have drafted industrial defense strategies in the last five years. The United States can pursue strategic advantage by persuading its allies in arms to become business partners in arms and more. Through defense coproduction with NATO Allies, the United States could build supply chains to reduce the American defense industry’s dependence on Chinese supply chains. Through investment, research, and manufacturing, a collective coercive deterrent strategy for arms would reinforce political and security alliances through critical economic ties—not just any economic ties.32

Coproduction would also motivate Allies to meet their commitment to NATO defense expenditures. Coproduction involves the development of alternate supply lines to offer increased resilience against Chinese economic coercion. As Allies build their capabilities, they can defend themselves. This resilience would allow the United States to focus on its priorities in the Indo-Pacific. Coproduction would improve interoperability, motivate complementary investments, and introduce competitive pricing that would offer savings to the US government and expand the American job market in manufacturing and more.33

Collective efforts are particularly effective if the target is the Chinese Communist Party. Haunted by centuries of invasions and currently bordered by 14 countries, Chinese leadership has a visceral fear of encirclement. Paranoia sets in and the perception of a collective organized to counter China has the potential to disrupt the leadership’s decision making.34

As the coproduction initiative matured, China would witness the growth of a coalition of American allies focused on building their armed forces and attaining superior levels of interoperability. An American collective coercive deterrent strategy would work toward the strategic advantage beyond arms sales to arms and influence.

America’s threat perception should include Beijing’s overtures to its allies and partners. The United States will lose some, but it must be deliberate in prioritizing and preserving the most vital alliances and partnerships. If the United States does not work with its allies, they will become tools for Beijing. That isolation will result in a loss of markets and investors and more. Isolation would threaten US military bases abroad, intelligence sharing, secure supply chains, and more. Broken alliances signal weakness and invite further aggression from China and other adversaries.

Coercive deterrence
Figure 1. Coercive deterrence
(Source: Created by Trisha Kneightly, Brooklyn Print Design)
Collective coercive deterrence
Figure 2. Collective coercive deterrence
(Source: Created by Trisha Kneightly, Brooklyn Print Design)

The Limits of Coercive Deterrence

Four separate issues put coercive deterrent strategies at risk. The first issue is the adversary’s agency, and the second issue is capitalism. The third risk is a fixation on “countering” China, and the last issue is the state of US interagency coordination.

The first risk of any coercive deterrent strategy is the nature of coercion and deterrence. Adversaries have agency despite practitioners’ efforts to limit their maneuverability.

The free market poses the second risk. The United States is disadvantaged in exercising coercive deterrence through economic instruments of power. American companies are more attracted to securing China’s market of 1.4 billion citizens, cheap supply chains, and low labor costs than US national security.35

The third risk is that a focus on limiting the adversary’s strategic choices can distract the practitioner from establishing their priorities, some of which may be completely irrelevant to their competition. Instead of pacing itself, a nation may begin to define success according to the adversary’s failure. The goal is not to “beat China” but to advance and defend America’s critical interests.

Finally, the lack of high-functioning, US interagency coordination is profound. Of the four risks, however, this one can be managed.

Interagency Interoperability

Agile and productive interagency coordination—interagency interoperability—would enable the United States to engage across domains. As a participant in interagency processes for nearly 20 years, I have witnessed excellent and chaotic coordination. The lack of effective coordination is a vulnerability adversaries exploit. Nadia Schadlow, the primary author of the 2017 NSS, remarked, “. . . the United States vacates the space between war and peace” due to limited linkages between military operations and policy, which makes adversaries view this space as a desirable area in which to operate.36

The 2018 Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning acknowledged US military power was insufficient to achieve US objectives in strategic competition, and the United States had “limited means to achieve integration across the instruments of national power.” The Joint Concept for Competing went on to endorse this observation and offer recommendations to address the challenge.37

Cynical individuals blame territorialism for the lack of effective coordination among government agencies, but often the problem is poor communication and the scale of the need. Coercive deterrence and many fifth-wave deterrence concepts demand a whole-of-government approach. Gray argued for a “strategy bridge” between policymakers and the armed forces, built with communication and planning, as the key to the effective development and execution of strategy. Interagency interoperability would be that “strategy bridge.”38

Go Gray

If the United States wishes to avoid a “shooting war,” then it must turn to all measures short of war. According to Joint Doctrine Note 1-19, strategic competition inhabits the space between war and peace and below armed conflict. That space is often gray. The United States must employ technological, military, informational, diplomatic, financial, economic, legal, and developmental tools to counter hybrid threats with a hybrid approach. Civilian instruments of national power play a major role, but often, civilian actors are fearful and confused by the gray-zone lexicon. Terms such as “irregular warfare,” “political warfare,” “information warfare,” and “economic warfare” alienate them.39

Elizabeth G. Troeder, in A Whole-of-Government Approach to Gray Zone Warfare, offers a way to begin the conversation about these definitions. US diplomat and strategist George F. Kennan offered suggestions in a 1948 memo: “The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare” that is as relevant today as when ti was written. Other read-ahead materials include: Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats, the 2010 Joint Operating Concept; Counter-Unconventional Warfare, the 2014 US Army Special Operations Command white paper; and the 2018 Joint Concept for Operating in the Information Environment (JCOIE). Naturally, China’s three warfares and scholarly works assessing Xi’s fourth warfare should not be excluded.40

Conclusion

In The Avoidable War, Kevin Rudd offered an ominous observation on US-China strategic competition. “The 2020s loom as a decisive decade in the dynamics of the changing balance of power between them. Both Chinese and American strategists know this. For policymakers in Beijing and Washington, as well as in other capitals, the 2020s will be the decade of living dangerously. Beneath the surface, the stakes have never been higher or the contest sharper, whatever diplomats and politicians may say publicly.” Rudd speaks with authority as the former prime minister of Australia and a respected China scholar.41

For more than 30 years, the United States made the rules for its conduct in a unipolar world. The strategic concept of competition has led some to the mistaken belief that success lies in mastering the rules to win the game or avoid a war. In strategic competition, there are no rules, there is no score, only advantage.

Strategic thinking must move beyond the prevalent view that strategic competition can be “managed.” The competition between the United States and China is the constant pursuit of advantage for critical national interests. The United States should look to fifth-wave deterrence as a platform for strategic regeneration and progress toward an American grand strategy.42

Recommendations

For the United States to undertake a coercive deterrent approach, the government must develop cross-domain strategies that call on all instruments of national power. Deliberate steps to enhance interagency interoperability could include:

  • Establishing an interagency task force to engineer a plan to improve interagency interoperability in support of the National Security Council.
  • Tasking agencies with providing case studies of operations, successes, and failures in Sino-American competition, with lessons learned.
  • Creating an interagency corps of strategic planners.
  • Establishing a Department of State–Department of War task force on strategic competition. This task force should recommend high-priority areas of interagency collaboration and recommend issues that provide an optimal environment to conduct collective coercive deterrent efforts with allies.
  • Engaging civilians and the military to define the gray zone, hybrid threats, and hybrid warfare. Use war games, tabletop exercises, workshops, and conferences for networking and broadening experience with the interagency process. Ensure participation from civilian and military subject matter experts.
  • Resourcing civilian agencies to build strategic cultures and planning infrastructure that foster more efficient engagement internally and with the Department of War.
 
 

Acknowledgements: Thanks to Dr. Robert Johnson for his mentorship throughout my fellowship at the University of Oxford. My sincere appreciation to Stanley Brown, Curtis Velasquez, and Gregory Roberts for supporting my research fellowship. I am indebted to Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II for tutorials that enhanced my strategic thinking to go beyond “lessons learned” and include theory. Finally, Jean Preston and Aurelia Baier were invaluable in disciplining my writing with solid advice on logic and structure.

 
 

Terry Tracy
Terry Tracy conducted her research for this article during her fellowship at the University of Oxford. As a visiting research fellow at the Strategy, Statecraft, and Technology – Changing Character of War Centre, she studied US political-military relations, the dynamics of strategic competition, the history of the National Security Council, and war gaming. During her 19 years at the Department of State, she coordinated the development of strategies within the department, with embassies and consulates, as well as with other entities in the US government. Her work with the Department of War has focused on a range of issues relevant to strategic competition.

 
 

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Endnotes

  1. “National Security Strategy Archive,” National Security Strategy Archive, n.d., accessed July 18, 2022, https://nssarchive.us/; Department of Defense (DoD), 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (DoD, October 2022); and “2018 Department of Defense National Defense Strategy,” US Naval Institute, updated January 22, 2018, https://news.usni.org/2018/01/19/2018-department-defense-national-defense-strategy. Return to text.
  2. John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (Oxford University Press, 2005), 24, 53, 87, 125, 162, 197, 235, 272, 307, 342; and George F. Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs, July 1, 1947, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/george-kennan-sources-soviet-conduct. Return to text.
  3. Note: “Hybrid warfare” includes force, which differentiates it from “hybrid threat scenarios.” Johann Schmid observed, “Hybrid warfare represents the ‘all-inclusive package’ of ‘hybrid threats’ in a wider sense.” He explains, “use of force is not only an additional element in a hybrid threat scenario, it changes the entire nature of the conflict and turns it into war.” Johann Schmid, “Introduction to Hybrid Warfare – A Framework for Comprehensive Analysis,” in Hybrid Warfare: Future and Technologies, ed. Ralph Thiele (Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2021), 17; and Sean Monaghan, Deterring Hybrid Threats: Towards a Fifth Wave of Deterrence Theory and Practice, Hybrid CoE Paper 12–4 (European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, March 2022). Return to text.
  4. Colin S. Gray, Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory (Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press, April 2002), https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/823/; Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Concept for Competing (JCS, February 2023), 10; Anthony H. Cordesman, “The U.S. Joint Chiefs New Strategy Paper on Joint Concept for Competing,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 17, 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-joint-chiefs-new-strategy-paper-joint-concept-competing; and Antulio J. Echevarria II, interview by the author, February 21, 2025. Return to text.
  5. Antulio J. Echevarria II, Operating in the Gray Zone: An Alternative Paradigm for U.S. Military Strategy (Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press, April 2016), 19, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/425/. Return to text.
  6. JCS, Strategy, Joint Doctrine Note 1-18 (JCS, April 2018), II5–II9. In my experience, coercion is commonly the counterpart to deterrence among practitioners. In academia, Thomas C. Schelling’s term “compellence” is preferred. Practitioners are the primary audience for compellence; therefore, I choose the adjective “coercive” over “compellent.” Moreover, “coercive deterrence” evokes Alexander L. George’s concept of “coercive diplomacy,” which is also characterized by the leveraging of nonmilitary instruments. Return to text.
  7. Jean Preston, e-mail message to author, March 6, 2025. Return to text.
  8. Robert J. Art and Kelly M. Greenhill, “The Power and Limits of Compellence: A Research Note,” Political Science Quarterly 133, no. 1 (Spring 2018): 79; Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (Yale University Press, 2008), 69–72; and Robert Jervis, “Review: Deterrence Theory Revisited,” World Politics 31, no. 2 (January 1979): 289–324. Return to text.
  9. Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Polity Press, 2004), 11; Jervis, “Deterrence Theory Revisited,” 289; and Bernard Brodie, ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946). Return to text.
  10. Schelling, Arms and Influence, 69–79, 1–34. Return to text.
  11. Jervis, “Deterrence Theory Revisited,” 289–324; and Jack S. Levy, “Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy: The Contributions of Alexander George,” Political Psychology 29, no. 4 (August 2008): 537–52. Return to text.
  12. Schelling, Arms and Influence, 1–34; and Alexander L. George, Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War (United States Institute of Peace, 1992), 5. Return to text.
  13. Kelly M. Greenhill and Peter Krause, Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics (Oxford University Press, 2018), 1–2; Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Cornell University Press, 1996), 55–56; and Lawrence Freedman, ed., Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases (Oxford University Press, 1998), 15. Return to text.
  14. Amir Lupovici, “The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory—Toward a New Research Agenda,” International Studies Quarterly 54, no. 3 (September 2010): 705–32; and Jeffrey W. Knopf, “The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research,” Contemporary Security Policy 31, no. 1 (2010): 1–33. Return to text.
  15. Tim Sweijs and Samuel Zilincik, “The Essence of Cross-Domain Deterrence,” in NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2020, ed. Frans Osinga and Tim Sweijs (TMC Asser Press, 2020), 129; and Monaghan, Deterring Hybrid Threats, 18–33. Return to text.
  16. Schelling, Arms and Influence, 2–3, 72. Return to text.
  17. Freedman, Strategic Coercion, 15; and Alexander L. George, Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy (United States Institute of Peace, 2005), 68. Return to text.
  18. Freedman, Deterrence, 27; Schelling, Arms and Influence, 71–72; and George, Forceful Persuasion, 5. Return to text.
  19. The major coercive strategies identified in this article are: compellence, deterrence, coercive diplomacy, and strategic coercion. Return to text.
  20. Robert J. Art and Kelly M. Greenhill, “Coercion: An Analytical Overview,” in Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics, ed. Kelly M. Greenhill and Peter Krause (Oxford University Press, 2018), 18; and Schelling, Arms and Influence, 83–84. Return to text.
  21. William Piekos, “Investigating China’s Economic Coercion: The Reach and Role of Chinese Corporate Entities,” Atlantic Council, November 6, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/investigating-chinas-economic-coercion/; and Bethany Allen, Beijing Rules: China’s Quest for Global Influence (John Murray Press, 2023), 5–16. Return to text.
  22. Stefan Halper, China: The Three Warfares (DoD, May 2013), 11–14; and Doug Livermore, “China’s ‘Three Warfares’ in Theory and Practice in the South China Sea,” Georgetown Security Studies Review: The Official Publication of the Georgetown University Center for Security Studies, March 25, 2018, https://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2018/03/25/chinas-three-warfares-in-theory-and-practice-in-the-south-china-sea/. Return to text.
  23. Kevin Rudd, On Xi Jinping (Oxford University Press, 2024), 393–98; Andrew Scobell et al., China’s Grand Strategy: Trends, Trajectories, and Long-Term Competition (RAND Corporation, 2020); and Oriana Skylar Mastro, Upstart: How China Became a Great Power (Oxford University Press, 2024), 140–50. Return to text.
  24. Anne-Marie Brady, “China in Xi’s ‘New Era’: New Zealand and the CCP’s ‘Magic Weapons,’ ” Journal of Democracy 29, no. 2 (April 2018): 68–75; and Alex Joske, The Party Speaks for You, Report No. 32/2020 (Australian Strategic Policy Institute, June 2020). Return to text.
  25. Peter Mattis and Brad Carson, “Jaw-Jaw: Peter Mattis on the Intentions of the Chinese Communist Party,” War on the Rocks, May 28, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/05/jaw-jaw-peter-mattis-on-the-intentions-of-the-chinese-communist-party/. Return to text.
  26. Michael Bristow, “One Year On: Nobel Winner Liu Xiaobo Still in Jail,” BBC, October 7, 2011, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-15195263. Return to text.
  27. Elliott Abrams et al., “Protecting U.S. Allies and Partners from Chinese Economic Coercion,” Council on Foreign Relations, December 2, 2024, https://www.cfr.org/article/protecting-us-allies-and-partners-chinese-economic-coercion; and Mark Lewis, “Norway Shuns Dalai Lama, Hoping to Mend China Ties,” KSL.com, May 7, 2014, https://www.ksl.com/article/29792210/norway-shuns-dalai-lama-hoping-to-mend-china-ties. Return to text.
  28. Tor Kjolberg, “China and Norway Normalize Relations,” Daily Scandinavian, January 17, 2017, https://www.dailyscandinavian.com/china-norway-normalize-relations/. Return to text.
  29. “China,” Norwegian Seafood Council, n.d., accessed February 1, 2025, https://en.seafood.no/countrypages/China/. Return to text.
  30. Samuel P. Huntington, “Why International Primacy Matters,” International Security 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993): 70. Emphasis added. Return to text.
  31. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2024 (Oxford University Press, 2024). Return to text.
  32. See HM Government, Defence and Security Industrial Strategy, CP 410 (HM Government, March 2021); “First-Ever European Defence Industrial Strategy to Enhance Europe’s Readiness and Security,” European Commission, March 5, 2024, https://commission.europa.eu/news-and-media/news/first-ever-european-defence-industrial-strategy-enhance-europes-readiness-and-security-2024-03-05_en; and Sara Scarlett Willson, “Chinese Parts Found in U.S. Fighter Show F-35 Must Be Brought Back to Earth,” Newsweek, January 27, 2023, https://www.newsweek.com/chinese-parts-found-us-fighter-show-f-35-must-brought-back-earth-opinion-1776934. Return to text.
  33. Defense Innovation Board, Optimizing Innovation Cooperation with Allies and Partners (Defense Innovation Board, July 2024). Return to text.
  34. Sulmaan Wasif Khan, Haunted by Chaos (Harvard University Press, 2022), 1–52. Return to text.
  35. “US Companies with Highest Exposure to China,” Reuters, May 14, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/business/us-companies-with-highest-exposure-china-2024-05-14/; and Bill Powell, “How America’s Biggest Companies Made China Great Again,” Newsweek, June 24, 2019, https://www.newsweek.com/how-americas-biggest-companies-made-china-great-again-1445325. Return to text.
  36. Nadia Schadlow, “Peace and War: The Space Between,” War on the Rocks, August 18, 2014, https://warontherocks.com/2014/08/peace-and-war-the-space-between/. Return to text.
  37. JCS, Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning (JCS, March 2018), 4; and JCS, Concept for Competing, 14–17, 29–38, 48–49. Return to text.
  38. King Mallory, New Challenges in Cross-Domain Deterrence (RAND Corporation, April 2018); and Colin S. Gray, The Strategy Bridge (Oxford University Press, 2010). Return to text.
  39. Echevarria II, interview by the author; and JCS, Competition Continuum, Joint Doctrine Note 1-19 (JCS, June 2019). Return to text.
  40. Elizabeth G. Troeder, A Whole-of-Government Approach to Gray Zone Warfare (Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press, May 2019), https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/937/; and George F. Kennan, memorandum, “Policy Planning Staff Memorandum,” May 4, 1948, Washington, DC. Return to text.
  41. Kevin Rudd, The Avoidable War (PublicAffairs, 2022), 2. Return to text.
  42. Kevin Rudd, “Managed Strategic Competition” (speech, Lanting Forum, Beijing, February 22, 2021), https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/managed-strategic-competition. Return to text.