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June 18, 2025

A More Perfect Peace: Can the Russia-Ukraine War End Justly?

Nathaniel B. Davis and Marlon A. Thomas
©2025 Nathaniel B. Davis and Marlon A. Thomas

ABSTRACT: This article argues that thinking creatively about war termination, both philosophically and politically, utilizing jus post bellum principles and counterintuitive political trade-offs, reveals an opportunity to achieve a sustainable peace that approximates justice. The article surveys how war aims among belligerents have changed, indicating that further change is possible, particularly at the point of war termination. Next, the article examines jus post bellum principles and their application to the Russia-Ukraine War. Finally, the article contends that Ukraine relinquishing Crimea and the Donbas in exchange for NATO membership might be the key to achieving a durable peace that addresses long-term security.

Keywords: Ukraine, war termination, just war, jus post bellum, Russia, NATO

 

With the change of presidential administrations in the United States, the war in Ukraine has entered a new phase. Under the previous administration, Ukraine enjoyed relatively consistent support from the United States and its European allies, which allowed it to continue the war effort. The election of President Donald Trump, who has consistently advocated for a swift end to the war, has changed the nature of American financial and materiel support, and it is unclear whether Europe is willing or able to make up the difference. On the battlefield, neither Ukraine nor Russia has proven capable of achieving a decisive military victory. Ukraine’s attempts at a meaningful counteroffensive failed in summer 2023, and fighting devolved into attrition warfare. Russia has since made steady tactical gains across a broad front, which, if not halted, could eventually translate into operational gains, but at such a cost that they are likely unsustainable. Meanwhile, Ukraine has demonstrated its ability to achieve operational effects through its short-lived incursion into Russia’s Kursk region and its sustained asymmetrical campaign to neutralize Russian sea power in the Black Sea, but it has proven unable to achieve strategic effects sufficient to achieve its war aims.1

This situation has given rise to considerable speculation about the war transitioning into a frozen conflict. Proposals from Trump’s advisers have heightened speculation of a turn toward frozen conflict: the proposals seek a combination of freezing the front line, continuing to arm Ukraine as non-nuclear deterrence, maintaining Ukrainian neutrality, and tabling Ukraine’s accession to NATO. Nonetheless, frozen conflicts are not settled conflicts and incur long-term resource costs, delay justice, perhaps indefinitely, and contain latent escalatory potential. As the prospect of negotiations emerges, opportunities may arise to achieve better outcomes for all parties than those offered by a frozen conflict.2

British military theorist B. H. Liddell Hart wrote that the paradoxical purpose of war is the establishment of “a more perfect peace” and that it is thus “essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire.” If a more perfect peace is to be achieved and the war is to end sustainably, it must end justly. The settlement must satisfactorily resolve the underlying issues that precipitated the conflict, or it must sufficiently deter future Russian aggression to ensure that the war does not reignite.3

This article argues that thinking creatively about war termination both philosophically and politically, using the jus post bellum principles of the just war ethic and counterintuitive political trade-offs centered on national interests, reveals an opportunity to achieve Liddell Hart’s elusive “more perfect peace” and better address the long-term security interests of the belligerents and deter future aggression. First, the paper surveys the evolution of war aims among the belligerents, demonstrating that, like other conflicts, war aims have adjusted as conditions have changed on the battlefield, on the domestic home front, and within the international community, indicating that further change is possible, particularly at the point of war termination. Next, we examine the jus post bellum—or justice in concluding war—principles of the just war ethic, outlining and articulating how these principles might manifest when applied to the Russia-Ukraine War. Finding that current war aims are misaligned with the jus post bellum principles, particularly in the Russian case, the principles can inform how the war is fought and what might be negotiated to get to a point that Russian war aims again become more malleable. Finally, the article argues counterintuitively that relinquishing Crimea and the Donbas may be in Ukraine’s interests, while Ukraine joining NATO is in Russia’s interests. This argument reveals how evolved war aims and an approximation of the jus post bellum principles could help Russia and Ukraine sustainably achieve war’s paradoxical purpose, “a more perfect peace.”

The future of the war is uncertain, but the current state requires hard thinking about whether a better peace is possible and how the war may be conducted or concluded to achieve such a peace. Thinking creatively about war termination is necessary to achieve an outcome more worthy of the sacrifices of the Ukrainian people than an interminable frozen conflict, potentially passed on for generations or reignited into new horrors.

Evolving Goals

As the conflict has progressed, the goals of the major parties have evolved. For the Russians, the war was a war of choice. Determining Russian goals at any point can be difficult, as they are often ill-defined and communicated in an information space rife with Russian disinformation efforts. Observers are left to divine Russian goals from careful analysis of often-contradictory statements and actions, remembering that not every statement is reliable and not every action is intentional.

At the beginning of the conflict, Russia’s stated objectives included the disarmament and “de-nazification” of Ukraine, guarantees of Ukrainian neutrality, and recognition of Russian sovereignty over Crimea and the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk. Russia’s real objectives likely included the defeat of the Ukrainian military, and regime change to dispense with the pro–Western Ukrainian government and install a pro-Russian regime. Putin’s revisionist assertions that “Russians and Ukrainians were one people,” combined with indicators such as the staging of amphibious warships for a potential assault on the western port city of Odesa, which likely never materialized due to setbacks elsewhere, suggest a more maximalist intent.4

At the outset of the war, the Russians intended to conduct a fait accompli, in which rapid forcible action in the form of a successful invasion would have been immediately consolidated through deterrence by convincing any potential interveners that reversing the invasion would be impossible or require unacceptable losses. Russia’s plan was intended as one more in a long line of successful faits accomplis, fast and effective military operations, supported by disinformation campaigns, aimed at reestablishing a Russian sphere of influence and curtailing the further expansion of NATO, as it had in Georgia in 2008, and Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014. This time, however, Ukraine foiled the fait accompli.5

The attack on the Hostomel Airport, outside of Kyiv, by Russian airborne forces was temporarily repelled by a mechanized Ukrainian counterattack. The linchpin of Russian efforts to seize the capital quickly, this counterattack disrupted the tempo of the operation and left the airfield unusable for follow-on forces. The main armored thrust of the invasion stalled north of Kyiv due to a combination of poor execution, insufficient logistics, and Ukrainian efforts to delay the advance by destroying bridges along the route, resulting in a long column vulnerable to small groups of Ukrainian fighters armed with anti-tank weapons. Despite early Russian military success in the south of Ukraine, the siege of Mariupol arrested Russian momentum. Ukrainians united against the invasion and spontaneously mobilized to fight, motivated in the early hours by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s refusal to leave Kyiv, posting evidence on social media, and his reported refusal of an American offer of evacuation with the retort, “The fight is here; I need ammunition, not a ride.” Tales of the defenders of Snake Island’s colorful rebuke of the Russian cruiser Moskva and the apocryphal fighter ace, “The Ghost of Kyiv,” also bolstered Ukraine’s will to fight.”6

As the war progressed, and parts of the Russian front collapsed, with Ukraine liberating Kharkiv and Kherson in fall 2022, Russian objectives appeared to become more limited for a time. In an attempt to claim victory and retain what it had taken, Russia initiated a partial military mobilization, annexed portions of Ukrainian territory, threatened the use of tactical nuclear weapons to try to freeze the battlefield, and offered negotiations. At the outset of the war, Putin claimed no territorial ambitions, which might have remained the case had the operation resulted in a pro-Russian government in Kyiv. When this plan failed, territorial objectives emerged. Despite Putin’s attempt to claim a half victory, Zelensky would not let him have it. Russia had decided to initiate the war, but the decision to begin the war was the point beyond which Putin ceded control, and the Ukrainians could choose to keep fighting.7

Russian rhetoric reverted to maximalist claims as more Russian forces arrived at the front following mobilization. Nevertheless, the battlefield results of a relatively static front line and high casualty rates brought the credibility of these stated objectives into question. In December 2023, Putin reiterated, “There will be peace when we achieve our goals, which . . . have not changed . . . denazification, demilitarisation, and a neutral status for Ukraine.” Russia now hopes to carve out a victory by leveraging Russian advantages in population and resources while maintaining its will to fight longer than Ukraine can sustain its war effort or the West is willing to maintain its support for Ukraine. As late as April 2024, the Russians suggested that a Russian proposal from 2022, made in the wake of the invasion, could serve as a starting point for negotiations. This proposal called for Ukraine to give up claims to Russian-occupied territory, reduce the size of its military to a token force, forgo future weapons research, and guarantee future neutrality, leaving it perpetually vulnerable to Russian aggression. No Ukrainian government could agree to such a proposal.8

More recently, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has responded negatively to reports of proposals championed by Trump’s advisers. He specifically criticized calls for European peacekeepers and the potential for eventual, if delayed, NATO membership for Ukraine. He added that Russia “would refuse to accept Ukraine’s NATO membership regardless of the territorial factor.” Lavrov further rejected proposals that would essentially freeze the conflict, instead calling for “reliable and legally binding agreements that would eliminate the root causes of the conflict and seal a mechanism precluding the possibility of their violation.” Such maximalist rhetoric is likely posturing for negotiations, and it is possible that Russian war aims will again become more malleable as negotiations progress.9

For Ukrainians, the war was thrust upon them. Initially, the Ukrainian goal was survival. In the opening days of the war, there was much uncertainty over whether Ukraine could survive, whether it would carry on a guerilla struggle if fully occupied, or whether Ukraine might stabilize a front line somewhere west of Kyiv and fight on as a rump state. Spurred on by Zelensky ’s defiance and the spontaneous mobilization of Ukrainian society, and bolstered by intelligence and materiel support from the West, initial Ukrainian successes were followed by the late 2022 counteroffensive that liberated the cities of Kharkiv and Kherson and, with battlefield successes and significant support from NATO member states, Ukrainian war aims grew more ambitious.

Zelensky’s stated goal became the liberation of all Ukrainian territory to the 2014 borders, a goal that Ukraine had never relinquished but, for a time, seemed possible. In fall 2022, Zelensky offered a series of peace proposals that included:

  • The withdrawal of Russian troops and the cessation of hostilities
  • Punishment for aggression in the form of sanctions, reparations, and tribunals
  • Support for Ukraine in the form of arms and financial support
  • An end to Russian nuclear threats
  • The release of all Ukrainian prisoners and deportees
  • Safeguarding Ukrainian grain exports
  • Price controls on Russian energy exports
  • Restoring Ukraine’s territorial integrity
  • Security guarantees
  • A formal and documented end to the conflict

By framing the need to restore Ukraine’s territorial integrity, he directly related his immediate goal to broader Western goals of maintaining international rule sets, stating at the United Nations General Assembly, “When one country tries to steal the territory of another state, it puts all world nations under attack,” and at the G20 Summit that “the UN Charter cannot be applied partially, selectively or at will . . . It is not up to negotiations.” Ukraine’s war aims grew from the minimalist goal of national survival to a more expansive vision of what it could achieve in a war of self-defense, a vision very much in line with the principles of jus post bellum.10

Lavrov responded that “It is obvious that Kyiv is not ready for dialogue,” rejecting “the withdrawal of our troops from the Russian territory of Donbas, Crimea, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson region, the payment of reparations by Russia, and the surrender of international tribunals.” He concluded, “Of course, we will not talk to anyone on such conditions.”11

In October 2024, in a speech before the Verkhovna Rada, Zelensky outlined a five-point “victory plan,” which included an immediate invitation to NATO membership and eventual integration into the European Union, and economic development. He further advocated for strengthening Ukrainian defense, a “comprehensive non-nuclear strategic deterrence package,” and integration of Ukraine into European security, potentially allowing for reductions in US forces in Europe and reducing European reliance on the United States for security. Of these, Zelensky placed special emphasis on NATO membership; “For us, determination on the NATO issue for Ukraine also means the inevitability of European integration . . . and the fact that there is no alternative to democracy in Ukraine. And that is why this is the initial point of the Victory Plan. The first and very important.” He also spoke of a just peace, stating, “We hear the word ‘negotiations’ from some of our partners, and the word ‘justice’ is much less pronounced. Ukraine . . . is open to diplomacy, but to honest diplomacy in a strong position . . . a guarantee of negotiations without forcing Ukraine into injustice. Ukrainians deserve a decent peace.” Since the US election, and emphasizing the need for a durable peace, Zelensky has underscored that Ukraine needs a “just and robust peace, that Russians will not destroy within a few years.”12

The West, broadly, came to Ukraine’s aid with diplomatic, informational, military, and economic support that has been key to Ukraine’s ability to maintain the war effort. The West’s most expansive interest lies in maintaining international rule sets, particularly the prohibition on aggressive war and the protections of state sovereignty and territorial integrity. When Russia violated Ukraine’s territorial integrity by invading Crimea and parts of the Donbas in 2014, the West did not intervene; however, it stepped in more forcefully when Russia challenged Ukraine’s sovereignty and existence in 2022. Central to the goal of maintaining international rule sets is ensuring that Russia is not allowed to be seen by other potential aggressors to “win” from its aggression or to achieve its war aims by force.13

The West has also reaped security benefits from the conflict, including weakening Russia’s ability to make war and revitalizing the NATO alliance. As then–Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin stated at the time, “We want to see Russia weakened to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine.” An unforeseen consequence of Russian aggression has been the revitalization of NATO. Before the war, the alliance was plagued by questions of unequal contributions and relevance. Russia clearly expected weakness and disunity from NATO, but initial Ukrainian resistance provided time for NATO to recognize the Russian threat and unite in support of Ukraine. Russia’s aggression made NATO’s continued relevance and utility plain, resulting in the addition of Sweden and Finland to the alliance, lengthening Russia’s border with NATO by hundreds of miles, and Ukraine formally applying to join the alliance. Additionally, only six member states met the agreed-upon 2 percent of GDP for defense spending threshold prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; today, 23 of 32 member states meet the threshold. This result was the opposite of Russia’s raison d’être for the war. Despite these benefits, there remains a lack of clarity among NATO leaders regarding how and when the war should end.14

Since the advent of the second Trump administration, the United States has not proposed a comprehensive peace plan to end the war and neither belligerent has presented a meaningfully different set of war aims. Instead, the belligerents have reiterated some of their more maximalist positions, while the United States has sought, through a carrot-and-stick approach, to bring the parties to the negotiation table. This dynamic is to be expected as the conflict enters a period of maximalist posturing in anticipation of the bargaining that will be required during negotiations. By posturing toward maximalist demands, the parties have room to concede points that would still allow them to come to an acceptable peace. As the belligerents draw rhetorical redlines, the administration has been attempting to leave all options on the table to create diplomatic trade space for negotiations. For example, when Zelensky stated that “Ukraine will not legally recognize the occupation of Crimea,” Trump retorted on social media “This statement is very harmful to the Peace Negotiations with Russia . . . It’s inflammatory statements like Zelenskyy’s that makes it so difficult to settle this War . . .The statement made by Zelenskyy today will do nothing but prolong the ‘killing field.’ ” Similarly, when Trump was asked about potential Russian concessions, he stated “from long before Putin, they said you cannot have Ukraine going in, in any way, into NATO. And I start from that standpoint. I think everybody knew that. Now, if a better deal can be negotiated, if they were able to make a deal where they can do that, that’s fine with me . . . The negotiation really hasn’t started,” indicating that while skeptical, Ukrainian entry into NATO is not off the table. Most recently, the Trump administration threatened to abandon the peace process unless progress was made, Putin offered negotiations in Istanbul, Zelensky agreed to attend if Putin attended, Putin declined to attend personally, and Zelensky then followed suit. Nevertheless, on May 16, 2025, the first direct talks between Ukraine and Russia since 2022 were held. While these talks did not arrive at peace, they did result in an agreement to conduct a confidence-building prisoner exchange and to continue contacts. Negotiation must start somewhere.15

It is clear that the war aims of all parties have evolved since the war began, signaling that the aims of the belligerents could shift again before the war ends.

Jus Post Bellum Considerations

Any discussion of the ethics of war termination revolves around the doctrines of jus ex bello—or justice in determining whether a war should be ended, and jus post bellum—or justice in concluding war. First, a note on jus ex bello, first outlined by German philosopher and just war theorist Darrel Moellendorf. Jus ex bello asks, “whether a war, once begun, should be continued or terminated.” To these ends, jus ex bello relies on the principle of just cause—that the war must seek to remedy an injustice that existed when the war began, emerged during the war, or would likely occur if the war were concluded prematurely, the principle of likelihood of success—that “a remedy . . . is likely to succeed,” the principle of proportionality—that the “war must be a proportional remedy to the injustice,” and the principle of the pursuit of diplomatic remedies, a jus ex bello corollary to the jus ad bellum principle of last resort—that “requires not merely watching for such remedies but taking initiative to create them when the circumstances seem right.” In January 2023, Moellendorf wrote on the continued justice of Ukraine’s war of self-defense. Nonetheless, much has changed in that time, including the failure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in summer 2023, the emergence of attrition warfare on the battlefield, and questions about the continued support of the United States.16

These events combine to warrant a reexamination of the principle of the likelihood of success. Additionally, the preference for diplomacy expressed by the Trump administration and tentative openness to negotiations by the Ukrainians and Russians suggests that the principle of the pursuit of diplomatic remedies might require at least the consideration of current diplomatic alternatives to continued fighting. In any case, a full jus ex bello examination is beyond the scope of this article, which takes no position on whether a continuation or cessation of hostilities is just under current conditions. Instead, this article recognizes the political reality that an attempt at negotiations to end the war is in progress and considers whether an approximation of justice might be negotiated, now or under similar conditions, informed by the jus post bellum principles.17

The jus post bellum principles of the just war ethic aid the transition from war to peace and help shape a just peace. Ideally, they shape the end of a just war, and Ukraine’s self-defense and the West’s support for Ukraine as extended collective security meet the standard of a just war. Canadian philosopher and just war theorist Brian Orend first outlined jus post bellum and, as a relatively recent innovation to the just war ethic, it is among the more contestable parts of the theory. Despite ongoing development, his original principles—just cause for termination, right intention, public declaration and legitimate authority, discrimination, and proportionality—form the core of subsequent innovations in the theory and apply well to examining the Russia-Ukraine War. The utility of the jus post bellum principles, in this case, is that they can inform war aims as the war progresses toward a conclusion. It is important to note that the doctrine of jus post bellum, like all applied ethics, provides a vision of a normative ideal in a flawed empirical world, meaning that while the ideal may never be achieved in practice, justice may be achieved in degrees by its pursuit.18

The principle of just cause for termination requires “reasonable vindication” of the rights that were violated at the initiation of the war and that “most, if not all, unjust gains from aggression” are reversed and “victims’ rights . . . reasonably restored.” In the Russia-Ukraine War, Russia challenged Ukraine’s sovereignty and violated its territorial integrity, which remains disputed on the battlefield. In this case, justice would mean the restoration of territorial integrity, guarantees of Ukrainian sovereignty, and the security and basic human rights of Ukrainians. Significantly, the language Orend uses is not absolute and leaves room for something less but approximating the territorial status quo ante bellum. The principle of just cause for termination also requires that “the aggressor is now willing to accept terms . . . that include not only the cessation of hostilities and its renouncing the gains of aggression but also its submission to reasonable principles of punishment, including compensation” and war crimes tribunals.19

To adhere to the principle of just cause for termination, Russian policy would have to shift to sustainably cease hostilities or to one in which Russia is sufficiently and sustainably deterred from continuing or renewing hostilities. Russia would have to accept the loss of “most, if not all” of its territorial spoils of war, territory that it has annexed and still controls, at least in part. Adherence to this principle would also require a mechanism for reparations for the costs of the war imposed unjustly on Ukraine. Finally, embracing this principle would mean the submission of national leaders to jus ad bellum— or justice in resorting to war—war crimes tribunals. The International Criminal Court would likely charge them with crimes of aggression and crimes against humanity, in addition to the unlawful deportation of the population, with which the court has already charged Putin. Military personnel would be subject to jus in bello—or justice in the conduct of war—war crimes trials.20

The principle of right intention requires that a “state must intend to carry out the process of war termination only in terms of . . . jus post bellum rules” and that “the just state . . . must commit itself to symmetry and equal application with regard to the investigation and prosecution of any jus in bello war crimes.” In this case, applying the principle of right intention means that both states must be committed to terminating the war consistent with the jus post bellum principles. The second clause will be the hardest for Ukraine. As the just state, Ukraine will have to investigate fully and prosecute the jus in bello war crimes committed by its forces. This requirement will be politically difficult but necessary to maintain Ukraine’s moral high ground and an image compatible with closer alignment with the West and the international community, which will be vital to Ukraine’s future security and economic well-being. Ukraine will not face jus ad bellum war crimes tribunals as its war was a war of self-defense.21

The principle of public declaration and legitimate authority requires that the “terms of the peace must be publicly proclaimed by a legitimate authority.” Ideally, then, the governments of Russia and Ukraine would formally sign and ratify a durable peace treaty. Given that the Russians did not act in accordance with the spirit of the previous Minsk agreements between 2014 and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, it is doubtful whether they could be trusted under the principle of right intention to implement any future peace treaty fully. Therefore, any treaty would likely require some measure of deterrence, delivered through military support and security guarantees, to cement the agreement. A worse case would be a frozen conflict with Russian forces on Ukrainian soil, maintained through military stalemate alone. That outcome would likely prevent the security guarantees needed by Ukraine and could potentially mean a continued state of lower-intensity conflict, as existed in the east of Ukraine from 2014–22, and a persistent latent risk of escalation.22

The principle of discrimination requires that “the terms of the peace . . . differentiate between the political and military leaders, the soldiers and the civilian population within the aggressor regime.” In this case, the political and military elites of the Putin regime would be held to account for their jus ad bellum crimes and would remain sanctioned by the international community for as long as they avoid justice. Individual soldiers would stand trial for specific jus in bello crimes. Orend also contends that “Undue and unfair hardship is not to be brought upon the civilian population in particular: punitive measures are to be focused upon those elites most responsible for the aggression.” Accordingly, Russian civilians would be largely spared the harshest effects of punitive measures. This dynamic creates a tension between the principle of discrimination and the requirement for reparations inherent in the principle of just cause for termination. Although not defeated, Russia is the clear aggressor. While reparations from Russia to Ukraine may be in order, care must be taken to limit the hardship on Russian civilians to avoid the destabilizing effects of a Versailles peace. The balance between justice and peace is achieved through the principle of proportionality.23

The principle of proportionality requires that the “terms of peace must be proportional to the end of reasonable rights vindication,” and it prescribes that the “people of the . . . aggressor regime never forfeit their human rights.” No peace is perfect, nor can it fully align with all the jus post bellum principles, as some are set in deliberate tension, like the call for reparations to be paid by the aggressor and the need to shield the civilian population of the aggressor from undue hardship. Proportionality allows for ethical pluralism and is the fulcrum upon which competing ethical principles, derived from disparate ethical systems and perspectives, are weighed in pursuit of a durable peace and a broad conception of justice. Accordingly, in this case, the jus post bellum principles must be balanced, to the greatest extent possible, to allow for a sufficiently just peace that sustainably ends the conflict and its attendant human suffering.24

At present, Russia’s unjust war aims and the facts on the ground do not allow for a traditionally just outcome. Given the attrition of the Russian military, in personnel and materiel and the decimation of its professional officer corps, it is unlikely that Russia could mount the dynamic offensive operations necessary to win the war decisively. Russia’s will to continue the war will have to be reduced, either through negotiated trade-offs or continued military operations, to the point at which its war aims become more malleable to allow for an approximation of a just peace. If the current state persists, it will allow aggression to stand and weaken the international rule sets prohibiting aggressive war.25

Ukraine is also unlikely to achieve a just outcome through a decisive military victory. Since Ukraine’s unsuccessful counteroffensive in the summer of 2023—upon which hopes for a decisive Ukrainian military victory rested— prognostications of a frozen conflict have grown. Nevertheless, a frozen conflict is a dangerous outcome, leaving the war unresolved and creating a persistent escalatory threat as the belligerents rearm. As Prussian strategic theorist Carl von Clausewitz noted, “the ultimate outcome of a war is not always to be regarded as final,” and states that did not achieve their objectives “often considered the outcome merely a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found.” There is great danger and instability inherent in a premature and incomplete peace.26

A frozen conflict would mean that Russia would have successfully challenged the international rules-based order prohibiting aggression and guaranteeing territorial integrity. Although paying a heavy price and achieving less than it initially aimed to achieve, it would have at least partially succeeded in the challenge, keeping some of the fruits of its aggression and leaving Ukraine a perpetually threatened state. Such an outcome would encourage future bad behavior by Russia or other would-be aggressors.

Rational Interests and Counterintuitive Trade-offs

The fact that a decisive Ukrainian military victory and a traditional just outcome may be beyond reach does not preclude the possibility of an approximation of justice and a more perfect peace than existed before the war. In fact, in later writings, Orend contends that “we should not aim for the literal restoration of the status quo ante bellum . . . because that situation was precisely what led to the war in the first place . . . the just goal of a just war . . . must be a more secure and more just state of affairs than existed prior to the war.” Any durable peace will require trade-offs. The most intractable questions for any potential peace settlement include the final status of Crimea and whether Ukraine accedes to NATO. Counterintuitively, Crimea and the Donbas becoming part of Russia may be in Ukraine’s interests, while, at this point, Ukraine joining NATO may be in Russia’s interests.27

Crimea and the Donbas

The Crimean Peninsula has been a political, military, and cultural focus of Russia since its annexation by Catherine the Great in 1783, and it remains intertwined with Russia’s strategic preoccupation with a warm water port. The history of the Crimean Peninsula is littered with imperial wars and population transfers to secure this strategic location, including the nineteenth century “Great Game” and Crimean War, and Soviet premier Joseph Stalin’s deportation of Crimean Tatars and resettlement of ethnic Russians to Crimea in 1944. Of the 242 years since the first Russian invasion in 1783, Russia has controlled Crimea for 168 of those years, with an additional 37 years under Soviet Ukraine. While the Soviet Union transferred Crimea from Russia to Ukraine in 1954, an immediate concern of post-Soviet Russia was negotiating a long-term lease of the naval base at Sevastopol for the Black Sea Fleet. Despite having no current legitimate legal claim to Crimea, Russia views Crimea as a vital national interest, has fought to secure Crimea before, is fighting to secure it now, and will fight to secure it in the future.28

The first few decades of the modern Ukrainian state saw an electorate split between support for the West and European integration and support for closer alignment with Russia. This dynamic played out in Ukrainian politics, with Ukraine’s orientation shifting with each election and color revolution and culminated with pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the European Union–Ukraine Association Agreement, which would eventually bring Ukrainian policies more in line with European policies, a key step toward membership in the European Union. Months of protests led to the Revolution of Dignity, during which Yanukovych fled to Russia, and Ukraine made a decisive turn toward Europe.29

With the loss of a reliable Kremlin ally in Kyiv and fearing that Ukraine’s turn toward Europe would eventually imperil Russia’s access to its naval base at Sevastopol, Russia invaded and then annexed Crimea. In solving one problem—from the Russian perspective—Putin created another. The Crimean population was generally pro-Russian. By removing the Crimean population, Putin permanently altered the previously split Ukrainian electorate, ensuring a more consistent European orientation that could eventually lead to European Union and NATO membership. Putin then stoked separatist tensions in the pro-Russian provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk, followed by direct intervention, thereby ensuring that even if Ukraine ceded Crimea, it would have an ongoing territorial dispute with Russian intervention, preventing its accession to NATO.30

While Ukraine maintains that its goal is the full restoration of its territorial integrity to its 2014 borders, including Crimea, Zelensky has recently conceded that some of Ukraine may remain occupied and that the future of these territories may have to be resolved through diplomacy. Ceding Crimea, and perhaps the even more pro-Russian Donbas, to Russia, may be in Ukraine’s interest. Given the electoral demographics of Ukraine absent Crimea and the Donbas and the tumultuous bipolar domestic politics that preceded Crimea’s invasion, a Western-oriented Ukrainian state with a consistent foreign policy may be more stable and governable without Crimea and the Donbas. Given Russia’s enduring vital national interest in a warm-water port, the prospect of recurrent conflict would remain a persistent specter as long as Ukraine retains its claim to Crimea. Meanwhile, Ukraine has proven its ability to neutralize the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol through its asymmetric naval campaign. Ultimately, a decision of what is in Ukraine’s long-term interests will have to be made by Ukrainians, informed by what is possible and what they are willing to risk.31

NATO Accession

Equally counterintuitive, Ukraine joining NATO is in Russia’s interests. This strategic situation is similar to the one that emerged during the reunification of Germany and the debate over its membership in NATO from 1989–91. During the negotiations for reunification, the Soviet Union and the West initially disagreed on the final status of a reunified Germany. At first, the Soviet Union advocated for a neutral Germany as part of a barrier of neutrals between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, extending from Germany, through Switzerland and Austria, to Yugoslavia. A neutral Germany, situated between two alliance blocs, however, would have been obliged to be an armed neutral state and may have been incentivized to develop a nuclear deterrent to guarantee its sovereignty. Conversely, the West called for a reunified Germany to be incorporated into NATO, reasoning that Germany’s inclusion in NATO would constrain it under the Alliance’s foreign policies and that with the security provided by NATO’s nuclear umbrella, Germany would not need to develop a nuclear program.32

At this point in the conflict, Russia will not be able to disarm Ukraine. Consequently, it will be unable to force a regime change and install a more favorable government or physically occupy all of Ukraine. Accordingly, at the conclusion of the conflict, Russia will neighbor a Ukrainian state that will be cautious, if not bitter, for decades. A neutral Ukraine, bordering Russia, would have to be an armed neutral. Ukraine, which possesses the expertise and facilities to develop nuclear weapons and has been the recipient of recent Russian nuclear threats, would be incentivized to develop a nuclear deterrent to guarantee the survival of the state and deter another Russian invasion. Ukraine’s membership in NATO would constrain Ukraine within the alliance’s bureaucracy and command structure and obligate it to observe the collective foreign policies of the Alliance. Furthermore, Ukraine would not need to develop its own nuclear weapons. Thus, barring total battlefield success, it is arguably in Russia’s long-term interests for Ukraine to join NATO at the conclusion of the conflict. To be sure, to admit a new member to NATO requires the approval of all 32 member states, and a handful of members are currently opposed to Ukrainian accession, but it must also be acknowledged that some member states were initially opposed to the accession of Finland and Sweden to the Alliance until agreement was gained through diplomacy. Accordingly, opposition today may become acquiescence tomorrow as the process unfolds.33

Western Interests

Western interests in upholding the international norms of territorial integrity, sovereignty, and the prohibition on aggressive war may also be served, albeit imperfectly, by such a settlement. Certainly, Russia would retain some of its territorial gains, but it will be seen to withdraw from much of those gains as well. Russia also attacked Ukrainian sovereignty by attempting to dictate Ukraine’s perpetual neutrality. If NATO extended membership to Ukraine, it would perpetually guarantee Ukraine’s sovereignty and deny Russian designs on this point.

If forced to choose between sovereignty and territorial integrity, sovereignty is clearly the superior norm, for there is no territorial integrity without sovereignty. Some have criticized the inclusion of any territorial concessions in an eventual peace as tantamount to appeasement and an encouragement of future Russian aggression. If Ukraine traded territory alone for peace, it would likely lead to further Russian aggression in the future. By pairing limited concessions with NATO membership, however, Ukraine benefits from NATO’s 75-year history of successfully deterring aggression against member states, Russia attains its narrow security interest in Crimea, the West preserves its rule sets, and all parties benefit from greater stability in the region.

Finally, Russia will have waged an aggressive war during which it was punished throughout the conflict in terms of diplomatic isolation, economic disruption, legal repudiation of its leaders, destruction of military materiel, and an unspeakable cost in human lives. Russia will feel the effects of some of these punishments for years after the war. The message will have been sent to potential future aggressors that aggression will not go unchallenged, and that even if the results of such aggression cannot be fully rolled back, they will not be fully achieved and will be pursued at horrendous costs. Thus, the international norms will hold.34

At this stage in the conflict, complete military victory is unlikely for either party, and a frozen conflict is not a settled conflict. It would incur long-term resource costs, delay justice, perhaps indefinitely, and contain latent escalatory potential. Counterintuitively, by securing a Russian warm-water port and guaranteeing long-term Ukrainian security, the core issues of the status of Crimea and Ukraine acceding to NATO may hold the keys to compromise and a durable peace that approximates justice.

A More Perfect Peace

It is unlikely that Russia will accept every aspect of a just peace. Regardless, the jus post bellum principle of proportionality balances justice and peace, to the greatest extent possible, to allow for a sufficiently just peace that sustainably ends the conflict and its human suffering.

For example, at the point of accommodation, Russia may be willing to trade de jure recognition of Russian sovereignty over Crimea and the Donbas for a formal peace treaty and Ukraine’s accession to NATO. Despite Ukraine and Russia declaring these issues red lines, achieving their security interests may become more important than preventing their opponent from achieving their current war aims, leading war aims to once again, as they have before, become more malleable as negotiations progress. A Russian withdrawal from Russian occupied portions of Ukraine not included in a final treaty, such as territory in Kherson, Zaporizhzhya, and Kharkiv, may be sufficient to hold the line on the prohibition on aggressive war, forcing Russia to relinquish some of its hard-fought, but ill-gotten, gains. A formal peace treaty would also open a path toward international normalization, which Russia needs to ensure its economic stability and recovery. While Russia is unlikely to agree to reparations, it may agree to purchase Crimea and the Donbas. The amount may be large enough to account for reasonable reparations, perhaps partially paid in fuel and raw materials over decades, enforced by trigger-based sanctions should Russia renege, but balanced enough to avoid a Versailles peace.

While Russia may be willing to commit to jus in bello war crimes trials for Russia’s worst offenders and the return of some Ukrainian citizens deported to Russia from occupied Ukraine, jus ad bellum war crimes trials are unlikely. While it is unlikely that Putin would stand trial, the charges against Putin would probably persist at the International Criminal Court, limiting his international travel and credibility. Ukrainian accession to NATO would likely be preceded by immediate bilateral security guarantees, as occurred between Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom before they applied for NATO membership, as Ukraine navigates a fast track to EU and NATO membership. These steps may not be the outline of a final settlement, but they provide a window into the kinds of trade-offs that may transpire to achieve a more just and secure peace than that offered by a frozen conflict.35

Nonetheless, Putin gets a vote and could reject such a peace in favor of continuing to fight, in hopes of securing either a military victory or further concessions. If he does reject such an agreement, continuing to provide Ukraine the assistance necessary to pursue a just war toward a just peace can avoid a frozen conflict, possibly attain victory, or at least give war a chance to push the parties to the point of accommodation. Such a course would align with Trump’s stated intent to “secure peace through strength.” As he acknowledged when asked whether he might abandon Ukraine, “I want to reach an agreement, and the only way you’re going to reach an agreement is not to abandon.”36

Ultimately, no peace will be perfect. Liddell Hart inserted an important qualifier into his paradoxical purpose of war when he said, “a more perfect peace,” rather than a perfect peace. Trade-offs will have to be made. While a perfectly just peace may not be possible, an approximation of justice might be. Bounded by what can reasonably be achieved and consistent with the principles of jus post bellum, such a peace would be more just, durable, and perfect than a frozen conflict or continued hostilities. Realizing a more perfect peace and reinforcing the international norms of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the prohibition on aggressive war, albeit imperfectly, will better justify the costs of the war that Ukraine has waged for the world.

 
 

Authors’ Note: This article grew out of a student research project at the US Army War College. An earlier student paper stemming from this research was published by the US Army War College Press as a chapter in an integrated research project as Marlon A. Thomas and Gabriella N. Boyes, “Jus Post Bellum: Creating a Better Peace,” in John A. Nagl and Katie Crombe, A Call to Action: Lessons from Ukraine for the Future Force (US Army War College Press, 2024), https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/968.

 
 

Nathaniel B. Davis
Nathaniel B. Davis is a US Army officer and deputy dean and assistant professor of national security and strategy at the US Army War College. His writings have appeared in The New York Times, The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, the Modern War Institute, and Responsible Statecraft, among others. He is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and a former term member at the Council on Foreign Relations. He holds a PhD in war studies from King’s College London, a master of public administration degree from Harvard University, and a bachelor of arts degree from the University of Michigan.

Marlon A.Thomas
Marlon A. Thomas is a US Army officer assigned to Headquarters, Department of the Army, G-3/5/7. He has served in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. Thomas holds a master of military arts and sciences degree from the School of Advanced Military Studies and a master of strategic studies degree from the US Army War College.

 
 

Disclaimer: Disclaimer: Articles, reviews and replies, review essays, and book reviews published in Parameters are unofficial expressions of opinion. The views and opinions expressed in Parameters are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. The appearance of external hyperlinks does not constitute endorsement by the Department of Defense of the linked websites or the information, products, or services contained therein. The Department of Defense does not exercise any editorial, security, or other control over the information you may find at these locations.

 
 

Endnotes

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  19. Orend, War and International Justice, 269–70. Return to text.
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  21. Orend, War and International Justice, 270. Return to text.
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  24. Orend, War and International Justice, 270. Return to text.
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  29. Olena Sorotsynska, “From ‘Pro-Russian’ to ‘Pro-European’: The Evolution of Ukraine’s Core Candidates Programs in the Past 20 Years (1999–2019),” UkraineWorld, March 27, 2019, https://ukraineworld.org/en/articles/infowatch/pro-russian-pro-european-evolution-ukraines-core-candidates-programs-past-20-years-1999-2019; Maria Danilova and Yuras Karmanau, “Yanukovych: Ukraine Not Ready to Sign Key EU Deal,” AP, November 26, 2013, https://apnews.com/general-news-c40ccfaf181540c9a22390b44eeb3120; and Sam Frizell, “Ukraine Protestors Seize Kiev as President Flees,” TIME, February 22, 2014, https://world.time.com/2014/02/22/ukraines-president-flees-protestors-capture-kiev/. Return to text.
  30. Elizabeth Landau et al., “In Russia’s ‘Low-Key’ Invasion of Crimea, the Fight Is over Information,” CNN, March 3, 2014, https://www.cnn.com/2014/03/03/world/europe/ukraine-crimea/index.html; From 2004–12, Crimea and Sevastopol consistently and overwhelmingly voted for pro-Russian candidates and parties in Ukrainian presidential and legislative elections at a greater rate than any other region outside of the Donbas. See “The Central Election Commission of Ukraine,” Central Election Commission of Ukraine, n.d., accessed December 1, 2024, https://www.cvk.gov.ua/en/index.html. See also “Electoral Geography 2.0,” Electoral Geography, n.d., accessed December 1, 2024, https://www.electoralgeography.com/new/en/category/countries/u/ukraine; and Mykhaylo Shtekel, “Why War-Torn East Ukraine Votes for Pro-Russian Parties,” Atlantic Council, November 4, 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/why-war-torn-east-ukraine-votes-for-pro-russian-parties/. Return to text.
  31. “Zelenskyy Suggests ‘Hot Phase’ of Ukraine War Could End in Return for NATO Membership If Offered—Even If Seized Land Isn’t Returned Immediately,” Sky News, November 29, 2024, https://news.sky.com/story/zelenskyy-suggests-hes-prepared-to-end-ukraine-war-in-return-for-nato-membership-even-if-russia-doesnt-immediately-return-seized-land-13263085; and Shuster, “The Drone Wars.” Return to text.
  32. Dennis Ross, Statecraft: And How to Restore America’s Standing in the World (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007), 29–47. Return to text.
  33. Isabel van Brugen, “Russia Ramps Up Nuclear Threats amid Ukraine’s Counteroffensive Advances,” Newsweek, August 29, 2023, https://www.newsweek.com/russia-nuclear-threats-ukraine-counteroffensive-1823097; Josh Pennington et al., “Medvedev Says Russia Could Use Nuclear Weapon if Ukraine’s Fightback Succeeds in Latest Threat,” CNN, July 31, 2023, https://www.cnn.com/2023/07/31/europe/medvedev-russia-nuclear-weapons-intl-hnk/index.html; Nathaniel B. Davis, “Ukraine in NATO Is in Russia’s Interests,” The Royal Uniformed Services Institute (RUSI) for Defence and Security Studies, July 10, 2024, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/ukraine-nato-russias-interests; The North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949, 34 UNTS 243, section 10, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm; Kateryna Shkarlat, “Zelenskyy Names Countries That Oppose Ukraine’s NATO Membership,” RBC-Ukraine, January 16, 2025, https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/zelenskyy-names-countries-that-oppose-ukraine-1737041714.html; and Phelan Chatterjee, “How Sweden and Finland Went from Neutral to NATO,” BBC News, July 11, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61397478. Return to text.
  34. Michael Rubin, “Op-Ed: Trading Land for Peace Won’t Work in Ukraine,” American Enterprise Institute, November 16, 2024, https://www.aei.org/op-eds/trading-land-for-peace-wont-work-in-ukraine/. Return to text.
  35. Anne Kauranen, “UK Strikes New Security Agreement with Sweden and Finland,” Reuters, May 11, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/uk-strikes-new-security-agreement-with-sweden-finland-2022-05-11/. Return to text.
  36. Edward N. Luttwak, “Give War a Chance,” Foreign Affairs 78, no. 4 (1999): 36; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), “I am very pleased to nominate General Keith Kellogg to serve as Assistant to the President and Special Envoy for Ukraine and Russia,” Truth Social, November 27, 2024, 12:44 PM, https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/113556157032343210; and “Read the Full Transcript of Donald Trump’s 2024 Person of the Year Interview with TIME,” TIME, December 12, 2024, https://time.com/7201565/person-of-the-year-2024-donald-trump-transcript/. Return to text.