Strategic Narratives to Counter Global Threats

Jerry E. Landrum, Chase Metcalf, and Michael M. Posey

ABSTRACT: This article argues that the current National Security Strategy lacks the necessary coherence and fidelity to mobilize collective action against the emerging Russia-China axis. It merges multiple theoretical concepts to assert that the “rules-based order” theme is insufficient for mobilizing public support. This article uses textual analysis of the strategy compared with publicly available polling to determine levels of popular resonance and finds that the “rules-based order emphasis” does not resonate. This study’s conclusions will assist practitioners as they develop an updated National Security Strategy with the advent of the new presidential administration.

Keywords: strategic narrative, mobilization, Russia, China, public opinion

In the 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS), President Joe Biden stressed that the world is at an “inflection point.” This term, adapted from mathematics, is “a point on a curve at which the sign of the curvature (concavity) changes.” Thus, US strategic leaders believe, as expressed in the document, that the international order may curve toward democracy or in the opposite direction toward autocracy. Furthermore, the document asserts that the United States has an “enduring role” in defending the current “rules-based order,” which is “free, open, prosperous, and secure” but challenged by China and Russia. The strategy identifies support for the UN charter, human rights, the environment, and territorial integrity as key aspects of this rules-based order. Unfortunately, the international rules-based order narrative does not resonate with the American public.¹

We argue that the strategy establishes narrative themes legitimizing collective action. For example, the commitment of public resources for national security objectives. To be sure, few Americans read the strategy to form their opinions on foreign policy prioritization. Nonetheless, the lexicon of the document manifests in public pronouncements from senior leaders about America’s national security threats. For example, then–Secretary of State Antony Blinken asserted in a May 2022 speech at George Washington University that China was “the most serious long-term challenge to the international order.” This speech effectively communicated the March 2021 Interim National Security Strategy’s emphasis on the rules-based international order concept. As our analysis demonstrates, the rules-based order concept of the interim strategy was carried forward and amplified in the October 2022 NSS. Thus, in a February 2023 interview with Jeffrey Goldberg of The Atlantic posted on the Department of State website, then–Secretary Blinken argued for “a rules-based order, an order that functions on the premise of international law.” Similarly, in a 2024 speech at Georgetown University, retired General Mark Milley stressed that China threatened the “so-called rules-based international order,” which are the rules that “have kept great power peace.”²

Speeches and NSS formulation are an iterative process. We are not arguing for a linear relationship between the publication of the strategy and the circulation of the themes therein. Indeed, the document does not cause public pronouncements, nor do pronouncements necessarily need to be antecedent to the document. Both are mutually informing and reflect each other. The more important point is that the document is a narrative artifact that directly and indirectly enters public discourse. The puzzle is why the rules-based order theme falls short in mobilizing the public toward a common threat. The strategy’s themes were widely propagated in speeches and interviews in various media outlets. These themes made the public case for the importance of maintaining the international rules-based order, but the concept’s lack of coherence and fidelity decreased its resonance with ordinary Americans. Our analysis suggests there is a misalignment between the themes of national security leaders and what Americans prioritize, and this misalignment hinders the marshaling of finite public resources to deter and, if necessary, defeat Russian and Chinese aggression. Elinor Ostrom’s work identifying common-pool resources, private goods, public goods, and toll goods are indispensable in studying collective action problems. Our definition draws heavily on her distinction of national defense as a public good.³

The National Security Strategy is one artifact informing public discourse on national security (others include the state of the union, congressional speeches, political ads, and such). We could focus on any or all these artifacts to demonstrate the problems of the international rules-based order as a narrative theme. Given the advent of a new presidential administration, however, an updated strategy will soon be emerging, and we hope to offer a modest contribution to professional discourse on this topic.

Despite the lack of resonance in the current NSS, China and Russia remain national security threats requiring collective action. The bipartisan Commission on the National Defense Strategy recently concluded that “China is outpacing the United States and has largely negated the US military advantage in the Western Pacific through two decades of focused military investment.” The Commission further concluded that the Russian threat is “chronic— ongoing and persistent.” In fact, the report notes that the Kremlin has increased its Army by 15 percent since the start of the Russia-Ukraine War and established cooperative security ties with China, Iran, and North Korea. To meet this threat, the Commission argues for mobilizing public support behind increased defense spending from the current levels of 3 percent of GDP to Cold War levels, which ranged from 4.9 to 16.9 percent. This proposed increase in public spending would fund significant defense modernization, investments in force structure to support a “multiple theater force construct,” and support for “increased levels of public and civic service” as part of a “national mobilization for military service.” The cost of competing with China and Russia will only increase in the coming years, especially as these two powers cooperate to challenge the United States. In 2024, for example, the US Indo-Pacific Command asked for a budget of $26.5 billion, over $11 billion more than the previous year.⁴

The Commission identified domestic constraints as the biggest challenge for achieving collective action for this type of significant mobilization. Decreasing popular support for a strong military, alliance participation, and engagement in international affairs indicates a general lack of understanding about the nature of the threat. “US leaders,” the Commission points out, “must make the case publicly why these challenges matter and why the United States remains the indispensable nation to maintain peace, stability, and a flourishing economy” because success is impossible without popular support. This support is lacking because the public is unaware of “the costs (financial and otherwise) required to adequately prepare. They do not appreciate the strength of China and its partnerships or the ramifications to daily life if a conflict were to erupt.”⁵

In line with the Commission’s claim that strategic leaders have failed to communicate the emerging threat, we introduce the importance of the National Security Strategy as a narrative tool for articulating threats and a vision to the American public. Then, we will briefly cover narrative theory, our analysis of the current strategy and how it relates to polls of the American public, discuss problems of coherence and fidelity in the strategic narrative, and note the trend toward US isolationism. We recommend that the next strategy emphasizes a free, open, prosperous, and secure world and its importance to American security and prosperity while de-emphasizing international rules- based order themes. The NSS should explain why national mobilization—not the international rules-based order—is necessary to protect the American homeland and other vital interests.

The National Security Strategy, Public Opinion, and Military Mobilization

The first formal National Security Strategy was published in 1987 following the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, which significantly reformed the Defense enterprise. Since then, administrations have published 17 strategies that, to varying degrees, played important roles in identifying and prioritizing US interests, threats to those interests, and objectives that advance those interests. All these documents contributed to a national strategic narrative. As the military invests in modernization for the Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC) to win in competition and prevail in armed conflict, national leadership must communicate a coherent strategic narrative to legitimize those investments.⁶

The language used in articulating those interests is vital as it impacts public opinion, which sets the boundaries of legitimacy for military leaders. Collective public opinion represents constituent preferences for legislators who make budget appropriations. As political scientists Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro have persuasively argued, public policy preferences are real, knowable, consistent, and predictably adjusted to changing circumstances. These policy preferences enable tangible outcomes such as “when to use US military force abroad” and “what kinds of assistance to provide which allies.”⁷

The difficulty in getting a Ukrainian aid package through Congress, for example, is understandable when a 2023 CNN poll revealed that 55 percent of the American public was against sending more aid to Ukraine, which is a 30 percent increase since 2022. This level of support was down from a 2022 poll where 62 percent believed the United States should be doing more to help Ukraine. Weak public support for a national security policy allows representatives to link the issue to rival policy preferences to gain leverage for preferred outcomes. For example, Senator John Barrasso of Wyoming explained his opposition to providing Ukraine military assistance, saying he could not vote for a “national security bill that neglects the security of our nation” while the “southern border remains wide open to terrorists and criminals who wish to do us harm.” Essentially, the American people did not have a coherent narrative linking American security interests to the defense of Ukraine, which weakened public support and left an opening for policymakers to transition from Ukraine to security matters with greater perceived support— such as the southern border. We argue that this linkage would be less likely if the policy of supporting Ukraine had broader public support. A strong strategic narrative, informed by the National Security Strategy, should explain national security threats within the context of public preferences to gain public support.⁸

Public shifts in foreign policy preferences are predictable in that they are related to an interpretation of objects, facts, and events worldwide. William Inboden has suggested that the current neo-isolationist trend might be related to disillusionment from events such as the 2008 financial crisis, the failure of the engagement strategy with China, and the troubled wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The exact reason for the trend toward isolationism is less critical than accepting its reality and engaging the public according to its preferences. The American public might not see the utility of upholding an international rules-based order without an explicit connection to national interests. Indeed, the recently concluded 2024 Commission on National Defense Strategy suggested that “bipartisan support for a strong military, preservation of alliances, and engagement in international affairs is waning.” We deduce that the strategic narrative surrounding the international rules-based order as reflected in the current National Security Strategy lacks coherence and fidelity, thereby diminishing the US government’s ability to mobilize collective action.⁹

Strategic Narrative

Walter Fisher’s theory of “narrative paradigm” highlights the importance of coherence and fidelity in creating effective communication. He defines a coherent story around the concept of “narrative probability,” which is the idea that stories must make logical and causal sense. To be sure, the hearing audience is engaged in the “constant habit of testing narrative fidelity, whether the stories they experience ring true with the stories they know to be true in their lives.” Fisher’s interpretation of narrative is nested with Jurgen Habermas’ theory of the communicative act in which speakers use language to interpret objects and facts in the world as speaker and hearer to coordinate the actions of individual agents. This understanding is especially important when marshaling support for public goods such as national security. A coherent narrative helps the public make sense of requests for increased resources.¹⁰

Indeed, narratologists suggest that rational thought is impossible without narrative because objects and facts do not speak for themselves. The world only makes sense when objects and facts are filtered through a structurally sound narrative that resonates with the receiver and illuminates why public good is more important than narrow self-interest. In terms of strategic narrative, Ronald Krebs argues that a compelling strategic narrative “does not abolish political differences or render exchange trivial,” but it does “legitimate . . . preferred policies.” Thus, an effective strategic narrative today must legitimate policies that enable the mobilization of public resources to defend against a Russian and Chinese threat. To this end, a chosen strategic narrative must have coherence in that listeners can derive “a linear structure of cause and effect” and fidelity in that the actions of the United States are in line with the narrative. Thus, coherence and fidelity are essential if the strategy to provide context for collective action against national security threats.¹¹

While seemingly esoteric concepts, Fisher and Habermas’ communicative theories align well with Information in Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-04, which suggests that the Joint Force uses narrative to generate understanding about the “purpose of military operations” and how they “link military activities with the activities of the other [United States Government] departments and agencies, and reflect policy objectives.” To be sure these policy objectives are broadly outlined in the strategy. Thus, when national security professionals argue for mobilization of public resources to defend against threats, the ideas align in a way that matches the preferences of the public. A close examination of the current National Security Strategy reveals a stark misalignment with public preferences.¹²

Model for Textual Analysis

Our textual analysis measures resonance by comparing NSS major themes with public opinion polls that indicate public preferences for foreign policy prioritization. Political scientists Anja Durovic and Tinette Schnatterer suggest that polls are important to democratic legislators for a couple of reasons. They help determine which election promises politicians should prioritize (promissory representation) and illuminate future voter preferences (anticipatory representation). Some criticize an emphasis on public polling because of the fickle nature of the polity; however, Shapiro and Page empirically demonstrate that “Americans’ policy preferences do not in fact change in a capricious, whimsical, or evanescent fashion.” Public opinion about foreign policy changes predictably with sudden events such as the Tet Offensive in 1968, which drastically influenced public opinion on the Vietnam War. We use established legal scholarship to define resonance according to the logic of “majority rule” in that consent of the governed provides “a sense of legitimacy” for collective action, and it also indicates the power of a preferred military option to resist challenges from congressional opposition groups.¹³

To operationalize our textual analysis, we identified seven general themes of the 2022 National Security Strategy: 1) strategic competition between the United States, China, and Russia; 2) global leadership of the United States and strengthening alliances; 3) defending democracy at home and abroad; 4) addressing global challenges such as pandemics, and economic instability; 5) economic and technological leadership through critical investments; 6) military modernization to maintain deterrence of China and Russia; and 7) maintaining and promoting a rules-based order. Each theme was associated with related “word markers” that further defined the scope of our analysis.

Our textual analysis uses a Pew Research Center poll of 3,600 randomly selected individuals who prioritized 22 foreign policy priorities to determine resonance around these seven themes and word markers. Although word markers are an imperfect tool to gauge policy emphasis, they help in grouping the “rhetorical importance” of themes around a generalized lexicon, which amplifies certain textual consistencies. Drawing on the logic of the majority rule mentioned above, we defined polling data below 50 percent of survey participants as low resonance and susceptible to challenge in the legislature. Poll numbers ranging from 50 to 64 percent of survey participants were low-moderate resonance, which are strong but sometimes contested. Poll numbers ranging from 65 to 80 percent were high-moderate resonance and very resistant to challenge. Anything above 80 percent in polling represents high resonance levels and is unlikely to be contested. Finally, we correlated the measured resonance with a word count search of the strategy to determine what themes the document emphasized. Based on this model, we assess that the international rules-based order narrative does not resonate with an American public that seems to prioritize domestically focused foreign policy issues.¹⁴

Analytical Findings

Table 1 demonstrates that six of the seven national security strategy themes resonated with the American public at low levels. The exception to this trend was modernizing the military force, mentioned 65 times, which resonated at a low-moderate level. The Pew Research Center poll results indicate ambivalence about prioritizing strategic competition, which was mentioned 136 times, with the American public identifying Russia at 50 percent and China at 49 percent as high priorities. These numbers sit on the boundary between low and low-moderate resonance. The data suggests that America is weary of its “enduring role” as a global leader, especially in terms of supporting organizations associated with maintaining an international rules-based order. For example, the National Security Strategy highly emphasizes working with allies, with 244 mentions in the document, but the Pew poll shows that only 27 percent of the public prioritize supporting NATO. The United Nations fared little better with 31 percent. These two organizations are important for maintaining a rules-based order, and the lack of prioritization from the American public is telling. Despite the National Security Strategy’s commitment to protecting democracy and human rights norms with 58 mentions, the public shows little appetite for investment in this type of activity, with only 31 percent of Americans prioritizing the defense of democracy.

Table 1. Low-resonating priorities
(Source: Created by authors)

It is worth noting that the only significantly moderating theme in table 1 was military modernization, which highlights a sense of domestic concern about defending the homeland and brings to the forefront how the national security strategy is misaligned. This misalignment of security priorities is especially stark compared to the issues that resonate highly with the American public depicted in table 2 but are mentioned less often in the National Security Strategy. As is demonstrated, the highest resonating priorities are related to more domestically focused issues, such as defending against terrorism, which resonates at a high-moderate level but is only mentioned 24 times in the strategy. Countering illicit drug trafficking was mentioned only seven times in the strategy but resonates at low-moderate levels with the American public. Weapons of mass destruction and controlling infectious disease are only mentioned 39 and 18 times, respectively, in the strategy but resonate at low-moderate levels with the American public.

Table 2. High-resonating priorities
(Source: Created by authors)

One explanation for the misalignment between narrative and public perception is that Americans are trending toward isolationism. A 2023 Chicago Council on Foreign Affairs survey shows that 57 percent of Americans feel that the United States should take an active role in world affairs, one of the lowest numbers since the survey started in 1974. The polling numbers support Kori Schake’s claim in Foreign Affairs that Americans today “do not respond well to abstract appeals about preserving the ‘international order.’ ” Nonetheless, we assert that they understand that China places American businesses at a disadvantage and could leave historical allies vulnerable to aggression. The public seems to understand that China and Russia pose some kind of threat to America, but the international rules-based narrative does not provide a coherent rationale that prompts them toward collective action as the low-level resonance indicates.¹⁵

Problems of Coherency and Fidelity in the NSS

Scholars have noted that strategic narrative legitimizes collective action supporting national security priorities. For example, Michael Barnett and Stuart Kaufman have argued that narratives are essential to understanding the ongoing nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is tempting to view this conflict as merely a territorial dispute, but this explanation falls short unless one considers the narrative of both sides. How can Israeli security concerns be fully understood without an understanding of displacement, the Temple Mount, the Pale of the Settlement, and the Holocaust? From their perspective, securing the territory is necessary as there is no place in the world left for Jews to retreat. Conversely, the Palestinians have their own post-1967 story of displacement from what they consider sacred lands. The humiliation of refugee camps, loss of property, lack of recognition, and general marginalization shape their narrative. The disputed territory is a story about honor, respect, and injustice. In the historical tragedy of the Middle East, how each community frames this story provides legitimacy for forms of collective action ranging from occupation to terrorism.

The Cold War provides another illustration of the power of strategic narrative. During the Cold War, US leaders demonstrated considerable competence when developing a coherent strategic narrative for collective action. Although it waxed and waned over the years, the Cold War consensus displayed the significance of a resonating strategic narrative in mobilizing resources for competition. For example, Harry Truman’s 1947 speech to Congress outlined America’s unique role in confronting Soviet aggression, resulting in a $400 million congressional appropriation to support Greece and Turkey (now Türkiye). Known as the Truman Doctrine, this speech for decades served as the foundation of the Cold War policy of containment. In the years following World War II, a Gallup poll revealed that three-quarters of Americans believed the Russians sought world domination. After a period of détente with the Soviets, Ronald Reagan successfully employed a mobilizing narrative in a 1983 speech that contrasted “America’s greatness and genius” with the Soviet Union as an “evil empire.” At the time, more than 60 percent of Americans polled believed that the Soviet Union was a very serious or serious threat. Reagan’s exhortation in that speech to achieve “peace through strength” enabled the operationalization of AirLand Battle with expensive investments in the early 1980s for the “Big Five” weapons platforms. The resilience of this narrative was so strong that a 1990 Chicago Council Survey revealed that 58 percent of the public viewed containment of the Soviets as “very important,” even though the Cold War was rapidly winding down. Strategic leaders today must find a similar narrative that resonates with the American public.¹⁶

For strategic leaders in the United States, framing a linguistically coherent strategic narrative to legitimize collective action for mobilization against China and Russia today is just as essential as it was for Harry Truman in 1947 and Ronald Reagan in 1983. The current foundational concept of international order lacks coherence because there is no consensus on America’s role in maintaining international order. G. John Ikenberry, one of the top scholars of the liberal international order, describes three “varieties of order:” balance of power, hegemony, or constitutionalism. A balance of power order is one in which anarchy reigns and states join alliances and bandwagon to counterbalance the power of strong states. A hegemonic order is hierarchical and maintained by the most powerful state. Balance of power and hegemonic orders rely on relative power distribution. In constitutional orders, state power is restrained with tightly bound international institutions and regimes administering agreed upon rules.¹⁷

The National Security Strategy lacks coherency for how to maintain international order. On one level, it takes a constitutionalist approach in its appeal to strengthening the United Nations and “basic laws and principles governing relations among nations.” Thus, the United States must uphold its international commitments to support agreed-upon rules and norms. On a different level, however, the strategy appeals to the balance of power notions of order with its appeal to alliances and partnerships as “our most important strategic asset and indispensable element contributing to international peace and security.” Finally, the strategy resorts to hegemonic appeals in which America has an “enduring role” to “compete with major autocratic powers to shape the international order.” The incoherent notions of order communicated in the strategy decrease its effectiveness in directing collective action. Their emergence in the NSS creates contradictions that are difficult to explain to the American public. Professor Patrick Porter, an international security fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, captured the challenge well when he suggested that coming to terms with an idea of international order is like “wrestling with the fog” because the concept is “amorphous, a belief system without a stable shape.” Nonetheless, the lack of fidelity in the international rules-based order is arguably its most damaging indictment in terms of generating motivation for collective action.¹⁸

While the National Security Strategy sometimes invokes liberal notions of a rules-based order backed by international law, critics sometimes highlight a lack of fidelity to its propositions. For instance, distinguished international lawyer John Dugard highlighted how the United States is selective in the rules it follows. The United States is not a party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. Also, the United States has disregarded legal arguments claiming that military campaigns in the Balkans (1999), Iraq (2002), and Libya (2011) were illegal, and there is widespread legal consensus that targeted killings with unmanned drones are a significant violation of international human rights law. So, while the strategy ostensibly claims a commitment to the concepts of a rules-based international order connected to international law, the actions of US do not maintain fidelity to the strategic narrative, and critics claim that US commitment to an international rules-based order is only a manifestation of US interests at a given time.¹⁹

This lack of coherence and fidelity contributes to a partisan divide about the role of the United States in world affairs. According to the Chicago Survey Council, only 57 percent of Americans believe the United States should actively participate in world affairs. Although 57 percent does constitute a clear majority of the US population, it is among the lowest numbers since 1974. The divide between Democratic and Republican support is even more concerning, with only 54 percent of Republicans and 68 percent of Democrats supporting US involvement in world affairs. Although there are internal divisions about the role of America, the threats from China and Russia remain constant, as highlighted by the bipartisan Commission on the National Defense Strategy. Critically, these divisions embolden our adversaries and make it increasingly difficult for national security leaders to garner the necessary support to deter Chinese and Russian aggression. Thus, it is vitally important that national security leaders develop a strategic narrative that inspires the public to invest in defense.²⁰

Toward Coherency and Fidelity as a National Security Imperative

Given the problems and pitfalls of communicating a strategic narrative based on the concept of a rules-based international order, future iterations of the National Security Strategy should de-emphasize (note eliminate) references to this concept. This narrative approach is merely an acknowledgment of the polling data indicating that Americans are less interested in international engagement that is not directly linked to national interests. We do not make a normative claim about the value of the rules-based international order. The idea of an American-led rules-based order is valid, but strategic leaders must communicate its value in ways that resonate with ordinary Americans. As former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice recently suggested, “generating support for an internationalist foreign policy requires a president to paint a vivid picture of what the world would look like without an active United States” in ways that an “unemployed coal miner and steelworker” understand. To craft a strategy that communicates the vision and threat in a way that resonates with ordinary Americans, we make the following four thematic recommendations.²¹

Clearly Identify the Nature of the Threat

Reagan’s 1983 speech serves as an exemplar of national security clarity. He urged the audience not to “ignore the facts of history and the aggressive impulses of an evil empire.”²² The emerging Chinese, Iranian, North Korean, and Russian threats present a similar challenge today:

China and Russia’s ‘no-limits’ partnership . . . has only deepened and broadened to include a military and economic partnership with Iran and North Korea, each of which presents a significant threat to US interests. This new alignment of nations opposed to US interests creates a real risk, if not likelihood, that conflict anywhere could become a multi-theater or global war.²³

Australia’s chief intelligence officer, Andrew Shearer, recently echoed this concern, suggesting that the “emerging axis” between China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia is “a profoundly concerning strategic development.” Indeed, Chinese economic assistance, Iranian drones, and North Korean missiles are creating an autocratic alliance of convenience. The National Security Strategy should clearly articulate the need to counter this axis, and it should, in the spirit of Reagan’s communication in 1983, highlight that the American-led democratic side is on the right side of history.²⁴

Communicate America’s Unique Role

In his 1947 speech to Congress, Truman clearly articulated Greece’s precarious situation as it confronted communist insurgents seeking to depose the government. Britain lacked the fiscal capability to continue its support of the Greek government, which was poorly equipped and in dire circumstances: “There is no other country to which democratic Greece can turn. No other nation is willing and able to provide the necessary support for a democratic Greek government.” Similarly, the United States is the only country that can successfully lead the necessary international coalition to counter the axis. Small countries such as Australia, the Baltic States, the Philippines, Poland, Malaysia, and Singapore count on the United States to support them. As Hedley Bull proposed in his book The Anarchical Society, great powers such as the United States are responsible for using their preponderance of force to preserve a balance of power, manage crises, contain wars, and work with other powers to protect international commerce. America is a great power, which comes with global responsibilities. Just as Truman demonstrated the need for America to ensure its allies’ safety from the Soviet Union, so too must the next strategy remind Americans of America’s unique role. The current National Security Strategy rightly articulates a unique role for America, but the concept gets lost within the language of a rules-based order. The next strategy should amplify the special role of the United States and de-emphasize the theme of a rules-based order.²⁵

Connect Themes with American Prosperity

The current National Security Strategy stresses the need to protect the rules-based order that has evolved since World War II. It also rightly acknowledges Chinese and Russian ambitions to subvert America’s leadership role. Instead of linking American leadership to protecting this rules-based order, the next version should highlight how America is acting to protect its prosperity. It should talk in plainer terms about the benefits of the dollar as the global currency reserve, which allows the United States to borrow money at cheaper rates, fueling employment and prosperity. International demand for the dollar increases its purchasing power, making daily life cheaper for Americans and enabling investments in military modernization efforts that maintain America’s position. Finally, the United States uses its economic power to gain diplomatic leverage to achieve its political ends.²⁶

Be Honest About the Need for Sacrifice

Days after forming a government and in the early stages of the Nazi threat, Winston Churchill addressed parliament with only a promise of “blood, toil, tears, and sweat.” While not yet as dire as that time, deterring the “emerging axis” threatening America and its allies will require significant investment from the American public. The future national security strategy should explicitly communicate that investments to maintain America’s prosperous position are necessary. It is up to Congress and beyond the scope of this article to identify where savings should be secured. The Commission on the National Defense Strategy does an excellent job explaining the costs to inform appropriation decisions, and the national security strategy should communicate the nature of those costs effectively. It will take more than a strategic document to communicate these themes, but the National Security Strategy is an excellent place to begin reframing the argument. The plain language of Truman, Reagan, and Churchill are examples of clear communication to influence this ongoing national security discourse.²⁷

Addressing Counterarguments

There will inevitably be criticism of any suggestion to downplay the term rules-based international order and increase the emphasis on the United States’ national interests and the growing threat posed by key adversaries. These criticisms revolve around three arguments against dropping international rules-based order in the NSS: 1) weakening of global governance, 2) erosion of American legitimacy and soft power, and 3) potential for misperception by our adversaries leading to conflict. These legitimate concerns should be considered and addressed.

We are not advocating the abandonment of a rules-based order in practice. We are suggesting a change in narrative emphasis that engages the American people in collective action against the Russian and Chinese threats. To that end, our proposed narrative stresses the need to engage in the global arena, which implicitly includes international and regional security organizations, but there are challenges to this approach. For instance, Gallup polling shows that Americans are ambivalent about the United Nations, with support fluctuating from 54 percent in 1990 to 33 percent in 2024. A separate Pew Research Center poll in April 2024 showed that American support for strengthening the United Nations declined from 39 percent in 2018 to 31 percent in 2024. Both polls indicate that using the United Nations as a proxy for engaging in the global arena might not be a stable long-term alternative to direct action. Nonetheless, the US Congress has continued to fund US obligations to the United Nations, which equates to less than 1 percent of the US federal budget. While Americans are increasingly skeptical of the rules-based order, continued funding of the United Nations indicates an implicit commitment to international order, but the United Nations should not take this commitment for granted, as public opinion always has the final say in liberal democracies. To ensure continued support from political leaders, the narrative themes of the National Security Strategy must better communicate the linkage between global cooperation and the increased well-being of regular Americans.²⁸

The second major argument critics will make is that a shift in US messaging that emphasizes US interests will undermine US legitimacy and soft power. Again, this is a valid critique. Polling by the Pew Research Center shows that favorability ratings of the United States declined in 26 of 33 countries between 2002 and 2007. This example highlights the cost of acting in ways others see as outside the norms of a rules-based order. The United States can mitigate the risks of emphasizing US interests by crafting a narrative demonstrating how allies and partners share those interests and, where possible, highlighting how partner aid can decrease costs and magnify benefits. For example, cooperating with Australia and the United Kingdom in AUKUS shows how pursuing shared interests can enhance soft power with select audiences. Such mitigation requires careful messaging and selective cooperation but should be possible in a world where US allies and partners increasingly see China and Russia as potential military and economic threats.²⁹

Finally, there is the potential that China and Russia will perceive US retrenchment from an international rules-based order as an opportunity to act in pursuit of their national objectives. Consequently, the US strategic narrative needs to state clearly that the United States will act to defend its interests and those of its allies and partners. In doing so, strategic leaders should be more explicit about how allies and partners strengthen America and deter war. The Commission on National Defense Strategy makes a case for strength through allies—which national security professionals should take seriously given its analysis and the bipartisan nature of its findings. There is risk in adapting the strategic narrative as described above. The greater risk might be a lack of collective action that leaves the country unprepared for competition and, if necessary, war.³⁰

Conclusion

This article argues that the National Security Strategy is an important narrative tool for informing public opinion about national security interests. Using polling data and word count textual analysis, we demonstrated that the current National Security Strategy’s emphasis on an international rules-based order as the impetus behind national security lacks resonance with the American public. The national mood trends toward an isolationist perspective and demands a security strategy closely linked to tangible homeland issues such as secure borders, reduced domestic terrorism, and illegal drugs. While these domestic issues matter, Russia and China remain an international threat to American prosperity.

Indeed, the United States truly is at a strategic inflection point, and the next National Security Strategy should emphasize the international threat in terms directly tied to US domestic security and the economic prosperity of ordinary citizens. The current administration’s strategy should communicate without jargon to the American people. During the Cold War, Truman and Reagan exemplified how to communicate the global struggle of democracies versus authoritarian governments in a way that Americans could understand. Now, in the era of great-power competition, some aspects of the Cold War are resurfacing, albeit in a different, much more interconnected world. Therefore, national security narrative themes must remind the public of America’s great-power responsibilities, a position beneficial to every citizen. If an updated narrative commits to coherence and fidelity around the central idea of American prosperity, the historical record suggests that the public will support increased investments in national security.

Jerry E. Landrum
Colonel Jerry E. Landrum, US Army, is an assistant professor and chair of the Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations at the US Army War College. He holds a bachelor of arts degree from the University of North Georgia, a master of military art and science degree from the School of Advanced Military Studies, and a PhD from Kansas State University.

Chase Metcalf
Colonel Chase Metcalf, US Army, is an assistant professor and active-duty Army strategist assigned as the director, campaign planning in the Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations at the US Army War College. He was a US Army War College Fellow at Yale University for the class of 2020.

Michael M. Posey
Commander Michael M. Posey, US Navy, is an assistant professor and active-duty naval flight officer assigned to the Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations at the US Army War College. He holds a subspecialty in information systems and operations.

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Endnotes

1. Joe Biden, National Security Strategy (The White House: October 2022): 6-10, https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/8-November-Combined-PDF-for-Upload.pdf; and Eric W. Weisstein, “Inflection Point,” Wolfram Math World, n.d., accessed August 8, 2022, https://mathworld.wolfram.com/InflectionPoint.html. Return to text.
2. Antony Blinken, “The Administration’s Approach to the People’s Republic of China” (speech, The George Washington University, May 26, 2022), https://au.usembassy.gov/secretary-blinken-speech-the-administrations-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/; “Interview: Secretary Antony J. Blinken with The Atlantic’s Jeffrey Goldberg at The Atlantic Festival,” September 28, 2023, U.S. Department of State, https://2021-2025.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-with-the-atlantics-jeffrey-goldberg-at-the-atlantic-festival/; and Aamir Jamil, “Jurist Lecture: Retired General Milley Warns of Foreign, Domestic Challenges,” The Hoya, April 5, 2024, https://thehoya.com/news/jurist-lecture-retired-general-milley-warns-of-foreign-domestic-challenges/. Return to text.
3. Walter Fisher, Human Communication as Narration: Toward a Philosophy of Reason (University of South Carolina Press, 1989), 105–24; Frederick W. Mayer, Narrative and Collective Action: Stories and Collective Action (Oxford University Press, 2014), 14–16; and Elinor Ostrom “Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems” (Nobel Prize Lecture, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University Bloomington and Arizona State University, December 8, 2009), 412–14, https://www.nobelprize.org/uploads/2018/06/ostrom_lecture.pdf. Return to text.
4. Jane Harman et al., Commission on the National Defense Strategy (RAND National Security Research Division, July 2024), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/misc/MSA3057-4/RAND_MSA3057-4.pdf, v, vii, x, 7; and Noah Robertson, “Pacific Leaders Say They Need More Funding to Compete with China,” Defense News, March 14, 2024, https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2024/03/14/pacific-leaders-say-they-need-more-funding-to-compete-with-china/. Return to text.
5. Harman et al., Commission, 20, viii. Return to text.
6. Paul Lettow, “U.S. National Security Strategy: Lessons Learned,” Texas National Security Review 4, no. 2 (Spring 2021), https://tnsr.org/2021/04/u-s-national-security-strategy-lessons-learned/; Nick Blas, “Beyond Storytelling: Strategic Narratives in Military Strategy,” ÆTHER: A Journal of Strategic Airpower & Spacepower 2, no. 1 (Spring 2023): 46-57; Jason Phillips, “Partnership and Narrative in National Security Strategy,” The Strategy Bridge, April 27, 2021, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2021/4/27/partnership-and-narrative-in-national-security-strategy; and Mark A. Milley, “Strategic Inflection Point: The Most Historically Significant and Fundamental Change in the Character of War Is Happening Now— While the Future Is Clouded in Mist and Uncertainty,” Joint Forces Quarterly 110, no. 3 (July 7, 2023), https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-110/jfq-110_6-15_Milley.pdf. Return to text.
7. Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans’ Policy Preferences (The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 384. Return to text.
8. Jennifer Agiesta, “CNN Poll: Majority of Americans Oppose More US Aid for Ukraine in War with Russia,” CNN, August 4, 2023, https://www.cnn.com/2023/08/04/politics/cnn-poll-ukraine/index.html; Nicholas Riccardi, “How Stalled U.S. Aid for Ukraine Exemplified GOP’s Softening Stance on Russia,” PBS, February 19, 2024, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/how-stalled-u-s-aid-for-ukraine-exemplifies-gops-softening-stance-on-russia; and Leo Wolfson “Wyoming Delegation United in Saying No to $61 Billion for Ukraine War,” Cowboy State Daily, April 25, 2024, https://cowboystatedaily.com/2024/04/25/wyoming-delegation-united-in-saying-no-to-61-billion-for-ukraine-war/. Return to text.
9. Harman, et al., Commission, 20. Return to text.
10. Walter R. Fisher, “Narration as a Human Communication Paradigm: The Case of Public Moral Argument,” Communication Monographs 51, no.1 (March 1984): 7–9; and James Gordon Finalyson, Habermas: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2005), 33–35. Return to text.
11. Ronald R. Krebs, “How Dominant Narratives Rise and Fall: Military Conflict, Politics, and the Cold War Consensus,” International Organization 69, no. 4 (Fall 2015): 809–15; Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked (Brooking Institution Press, 2016); Ronald R. Krebs, Narrative and the Making of US National Security (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 33; and H. Porter Abbott, The Cambridge Introduction to Narrative, 3rd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2021), 60. Return to text.
12. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication (JP) 1 (JCS, 2023); and Information in Joint Operations, Joint Publication (JP) 3-04 (JCS, 2022), II 5-6. Return to text.
13. Page and Shapiro, The Rational Public, 386; Anja Durovic and Tinette Schnatterer, “Why Governments Want to Learn about Citizens’ Preferences: Explaining the Representational Logic Behind Government Polling,” European Journal of Political Research (September 23, 2024): 1–5; Page and Shapiro, Rational Public, 56; and Rebecca L. Brown, “The Logic of Majority Rule,” Journal of Constitutional Law 9, no. 1 (October 2006): 24, https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1228&context=jcl. Return to text.
14. Jacob Poushter and Laura Clancy, “What Are Americans’ Top Foreign Policy Priorities?,” Pew Research Center, April 23, 2024, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2024/04/23/what-are-americans-top-foreign-policy-priorities/; and John J. Chin et al., “Understanding National Security Strategies through Time,” Texas National Security Review 6, no. 4 (Fall 2023), https://tnsr.org/2023/09/understanding-national-security-strategies-through-time/. Return to text.
15. Dina Smeltz et al., A Cost of Conflict: Americans Turn Inward: Results of the 2023 Chicago Council Survey of American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy (Lester Crown Center on US Foreign Policy / The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2024), 7–8, https://globalaffairs.org/sites/default/files/2024-03/Chicago%20Council%20Survey%202023%20Overall%20Report.pdf; Kori Schake, “The Case for Conservative Internationalism: How to Reverse the Inward Turn of Republican Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs (January/February, 2024), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/case-conservative-internationalism; and Alexandra Stevenson, “China Is Full of Risks. So Why Can’t Corporate America Leave?,” The New York Times, September 8, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/08/business/china-us-business.html. Return to text.
16. Krebs, “Dominant Narratives”; Gelb and Betts, Irony of Vietnam; Michael Barnett, “Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change: Israel’s Road to Oslo,” European Journal of International Relations 5, no. 1 (March 1999): 8; Stuart J. Kaufman, “Narratives and Symbols in Violent Mobilization: The Palestinian-Israeli Case,” Security Studies 18, no. 3 (October 2009); Lydia Saad, “Gallup Vault: 70 Years Ago, Five Grievances against Russia,” Gallup, August 3, 2017, https://news.gallup.com/vault/215171/gallup-vault-years-ago-five-grievances-against-russia.aspx; Ronald Reagan, “Evil Empire Speech” (8 March 1983), Voices of Democracy: The U.S. Oratory Project, n.d., accessed February 10, 2025, https://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/reagan-evil-empire-speech-text/; Alvin Richman, “The Polls–Poll Trends: Changing American Attitudes Toward the Soviet Union,” Public Opinion Quarterly 55, no. 1 (Spring 1991): 135–48; Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How they Won the Cold War (Simon & Schuster, 1996), 195–97; Eric J. Wesley and Jon Bates, “To Change an Army—Winning Tomorrow,” Military Review (May-June 2020), https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/May-June-2020/Wesley-WinningTomorrow/; John E. Rielly, ed., American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1991 (The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1991), https://globalaffairs.org/sites/default/files/2020-11/1990-Chicago-Council-Survey-PDF-Report.pdf; and Harry S. Truman, “Address of the President of the United States before a Joint Session of the Senate and the House of Representatives Recommending Assistance to Greece and Turkey,” March 12, 1947, National Archives, transcript, https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/truman-doctrine. Return to text.
17. G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (Princeton University Press, 2001), 21–31. Return to text.
18. Patrick Porter, “Wrestling with Fog: On the Elusiveness of Liberal Order,” War on the Rocks, July 15, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/07/wrestling-with-fog-on-the-elusiveness-of-liberal-order/. Return to text.
19. Joe Biden, National Security Strategy, 7, 11; John Dugard, “The Choice Before Us: International Law or a ‘Rules Based Order’?,” Leiden Journal of International Law 36, no. 2 (February 21, 2023): 223–32, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/leiden-journal-of-international-law/article/choice-before-us-international-law-or-a-rulesbased-international-order/7BEDE2312FDF9D6225E16988FD18BAF0; Peter Beinart, “Opinion – Guest Essay: The Vacuous Phrase at the Core of Biden’s Foreign Policy,” The New York Times, June 22, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/22/opinion/biden-foreign-policy.html; Ruxandra Oana Vlad and John Hardy, “Signature Strikes and the Ethics of Targeted Killing,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 0, no. 0 (2024): 1–29; and Paul Lushenko et al., “Multilateralism and Public Support for Drone Strikes,” Research & Politics 9, no. 2 (April, 2022), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/20531680221093433. Return to text.
20. Dina Smeltz, “American Support for Active US Global Role Not What It Used to Be,” The Chicago Council on Global Affairs Survey, August 22, 2024, https://globalaffairs.org/research/public-opinion-survey/american-support-active-us-global-role-not-what-it-used-be; and Harman et al., Commission, 5–10. Return to text.
21. Condoleezza Rice, “The Perils of Isolationism: The World Still Needs America—and America Still Needs the World,” Foreign Affairs, August 20, 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/perils-isolationism-condoleezza-rice. Return to text.
22. Reagan, “Evil Empire Speech.” Return to text.
23. Commission on the National Defense Strategy of the United States, Report of the Commission of the National Defense Strategy (Commission on the National Defense Strategy, July 2024), vi, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/misc/MSA3057-4/RAND_MSA3057-4.pdf. Return to text.
24. Reagan, “Evil Empire Speech”; Kirsty Needham, “Russia, China ‘Emerging Axis’ Troubling, Says Australia Intelligence Chief,” Reuters, November 5, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-china-emerging-axis-troubling-says-australia-intelligence-chief-2024-11-06/. Return to text.
25. Truman, “Address of the President”; and Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 3rd ed. (Columbia University Press, 2002), 200. Return to text.
26. “The Global Role of the U.S. Dollar,” Council on Foreign Relations / CFR Education, last updated June 18, 2019, video and transcript, https://education.cfr.org/learn/video/global-role-us-dollar?_gl=1%2A1hgttna%2A_gcl_au%2AMTE1NTg5NjUzMy4xNzMzODYxNDM1%2A_ga%2AMjA5MDMyODY1NS4xNzMzODYxNDM1%2A_ga_24W5E70YKH%2AMTczMzg2MTQzNS4xLjAuMTczMzg2MTQzNi41OS4wLjA. Return to text.
27. Winston Churchill, “Blood, Toil, Tears and Sweat,” May 13, 1940, International Churchill Society, https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1940-the-finest-hour/blood-toil-tears-sweat/. Return to text.
28. “United Nations: Do You Think the United Nations Is Doing a Good Job or a Poor Job in Trying to Solve the Problems It Has Had to Face?” Gallup, n.d., accessed February 10, 2025, https://news.gallup.com/poll/116347/united-nations.aspx; Poushter and Clancy, “Top Foreign Policy Priorities?”; and “The Scales of Assessment: Understanding the UN Budget,” Better World Campaign, n.d., accessed February 10, 2025, https://betterworldcampaign.org/us-funding-for-the-un/un-budget-formula. Return to text.
29. “Global Public Opinion in the Bush Years (2001–2008),” Pew Research Center, December 18, 2008, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2008/12/18/global-public-opinion-in-the-bush-years-2001-2008/. Return to text.
30. Harman et al., Commission. Return to text.