China’s Role in a Future Korean War

Jake Rinaldi

ABSTRACT: This article argues that China’s intervention in a Korean conflict will hinge more on North Korea’s ability to hold territory than on bilateral ties. Rather than treat Chinese intervention as a yes-or-no proposition, this study models three scenarios—full intervention, sustained support, and limited support—based on North Korean resilience. Using Chinese-language sources and scenario-based analysis, it assesses how each model would shape key functional areas such as ISR, cyber, materiel, and force posture. The findings offer US defense planners a framework for anticipating variable People’s Liberation Army involvement in a future Korea contingency.

Keywords: China, North Korea, weapons of mass destruction, Korean Peninsula, cyber

Despite ongoing debates about the relevance of the China–North Korea alliance, strategic considerations would likely compel China to support North Korea in a future military conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Several well-documented high-risk, low-probability scenarios drive China’s strategic concerns. These scenarios include fear of US or South Korean troops on the Chinese border, anxieties about North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the potential for a refugee crisis complicated by the significant Korean ethnic minority population in Northeast China. Consequently, US military planners need to assess the operational dynamics and strategic consequences of a Chinese intervention in a war on the Korean Peninsula.

Current scholarship about North Korea overlooks the strategic needs of US policymakers by focusing narrowly on Beijing’s responses to a standalone North Korean regime collapse. This approach correctly highlights China’s immediate interests, such as preventing US troops from reaching its border, but overestimates the likelihood of a regime collapse in North Korea occurring independently of a war. The present analysis fills this gap by examining how China’s strategic concerns shape China’s options and capabilities in a Korea contingency.

Ultimately, Beijing’s interests and risks concerning North Korea are largely driven by geographic proximity and strategic considerations, irrespective of the state of the bilateral relationship. This article examines the enduring strategic drivers of China’s North Korea policy, with a focus on efforts to prevent high-risk, low-probability scenarios, and analyzes how these concerns may shape its intervention in Korean Peninsula contingencies.

Strategic Drivers of Chinese Policy

Beijing is just 497 miles from the North Korean border, and China shares an 840-mile boundary with North Korea. The neighboring Chinese provinces, Jilin and Liaoning, have estimated populations of 24 million and 41 million, respectively. These statistics underscore the immense stakes for China in the event of any high-risk, low-probability crises in North Korea. People’s Republic of China interests and risks regarding North Korea are driven by geographic proximity and are likely strategic rather than based on the state of the bilateral relationship. In essence, China would be deeply involved in securing its own interests in the event of a future military conflict on the Korean Peninsula. This section outlines China’s strategic interests in North Korea, focusing on preventing high-risk, low-probability events, to lay the foundation for the core analysis of the article, which examines how Beijing’s self-interested strategic aims would influence Chinese intervention in an operational context.

The first strategic driver behind PRC support of North Korea is to prevent Korean reunification under the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the subsequent deployment of US troops near the Chinese border. The same strategic fear that drove China to intervene in the Korean War is still embedded within the Chinese government today. Zhang Shuang of the PRC Ministry of Commerce emphasizes the Korean Peninsula “will continue to be a critical strategic region for China to check and balance US hegemony.” Similarly, Wang Zhengda from the Chinese Communist Party Central Party School describes the Korean Peninsula as “not only an important springboard for maritime powers to attack land powers, but also an important strategic barrier for land powers to resist the attack of maritime powers,” implicitly referencing the defense of China against the United States. This entrenched perspective underscores China’s imperative to deny access to North Korea as a means of securing its security interests.¹

The nuclear risks associated with North Korea represent another strategic concern for China. Many North Korean nuclear facilities are situated in the northern part of the country close to China. The major complex at Yongbyon is just 80 miles from the Chinese border. North Korea’s Yongdoktong warhead storage facility at Kuson is 40 miles from Dandong. The environmental and health risks of North Korea’s nuclear tests are a source of anxiety for Chinese civilians. In 2017, a Jilin provincial newspaper issued guidance about how to handle a nuclear emergency. China has reinforced its border with North Korea by constructing bunkers fortified against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. PRC analysts have raised concerns about smoke plumes, radiation exposure, and social panic. Authors also warn that nuclear materials could fall into the hands of terrorists or that accidents at nuclear facilities could have severe cross-border implications.²

Beijing also fears the potential for a nuclear conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Li Wangping from Jilin University warns that Korea could become the site of the world’s first “asymmetric quasi-nuclear war” (“非对称的’准核战争’ ”). Meanwhile, Chinese scholars closely monitor North Korean nuclear developments. This sustained focus demonstrates Beijing’s concerns about nuclear escalation in Korea.³

Likewise, China is concerned about the potential for a large-scale refugee crisis resulting from a military conflict in North Korea. Indeed, one of the first steps China is likely to take in a future wartime contingency is fortify the PRC-DPRK border, deploying additional assets to the area and increasing inspections and surveillance. Li Zhenhua from the People’s Public Security University of China and Zhang Jian, an inspector from the Changbai Mountain Border Management Brigade, write that a war would “cause a large-scale influx of North Korean refugees in PRC-DPRK border areas.” According to Richard Bush, former national intelligence officer for East Asia, the Chinese government is preparing to manage approximately 300,000 refugees by establishing camps near Ryanggang and North Hamgyeong provinces. More recently, People’s Armed Police forces from the Heilongjiang Border Defense Corps Mudanjiang Detachment (黑龙江边防总队牡丹江边防支队) and Jilin Border Defense Corps Yanbian Detachment (吉林边防总队延边边防支队) performed 10 drills covering combat support, unmanned aerial vehicle reconnaissance, field medicine, and port-based emergency drills.⁴

These strategic concerns defined by high-risk, low-probability events drive China’s policy toward North Korea, which historically was intended to sustain the North Korean regime. For instance, China plays a critical role as a major oil supplier to North Korea. Despite UN restrictions that cap crude oil exports at 520,000 tons annually, estimates suggest actual deliveries through the “PRC-DPRK Friendship Oil Pipeline” are closer to 600,000 tons. Meanwhile, China reported a modest 13,176 tons for 2022. The PRC has also supplied electricity to the DPRK through its power grid.⁵

China accounts for 95 percent of the world’s reported merchandise trade with North Korea. Even while the COVID-19 pandemic temporarily disrupted trade, certain Chinese exports—including vehicles and agricultural machinery—increased. Moreover, China–North Korea bilateral trade has steadily approached pre-pandemic levels. In July 2023, according to the Chinese General Administration of Customs (GAC), China imported goods worth $18 million from North Korea, while Chinese exports to North Korea exceeded $156 million during the same period. Officially, the top PRC export items were soybean oil, rubber tires, granulated sugar, tobacco, and medicines. China has also historically been reluctant to impose economic restrictions on North Korea, aiding DPRK evasion of sanctions on energy exports and luxury goods.⁶

A military conflict involving North Korea would pose significant risks to Chinese national security. Therefore, China would intervene in a military conflict on the Korean Peninsula to protect its vital interests served by the continued existence of North Korea. This fact has been demonstrated in recent history even after the Korean War. For example, China made significant war preparations during the 1993–94 North Korea nuclear crisis. As President William J. Clinton considered US military options, then–PRC Defense Minister Chi Haotian oversaw planning in the Shenyang Military Region. To bolster its strategic position, China established two new military subdistricts near the PRC-DPRK border. At the peak of the crisis in June 1994, China committed to deploying approximately 85,000 troops to North Korea if conflict erupted, demonstrating PRC intent to intervene in a military conflict on the Korean Peninsula to safeguard its critical interests. During heightened US–North Korea tensions in 2017, Chinese experts again signaled potential PLA preparations for intervention in a Korean contingency. A professor at Renmin University advised the military to act swiftly to “secure important facilities and locations, prevent a refugee crisis and nuclear proliferation, and ensure a good position in the follow-up international settlement.” Lieutenant General Wang Hongguang went further, warning that “war on the Korean Peninsula might break out anytime,” urging Beijing to be “psychologically prepared” and to mobilize Northeast China for potential conflict.⁷

Models of PRC Intervention

A military conflict on the Korean Peninsula, independent of a North Korean regime collapse (though potentially resulting in one), could arise in several different scenarios. A North Korean provocation or attack might escalate uncontrollably if perceived as an act of war by South Korea or the United States. The United States or the Republic of Korea could launch a preventive war against North Korea. Conflict could also arise from lateral escalation of another regional conflict, such as one over Taiwan or elsewhere in Northeast Asia. For instance, North Korea might take advantage of US involvement in a Taiwan contingency to attack South Korea. In such a scenario, however, China’s and North Korea’s strategic interests might diverge. Chinese writings about a Taiwan scenario indicate a strong preference for avoiding lateral escalation and chain reaction warfare, viewing these as negative outcomes.⁸

China’s strategic interest in avoiding high-risk, low-probability events underscores that, irrespective of the state of bilateral ties or the relevance of the defense treaty, China’s close proximity would compel Beijing to intervene in a conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Hence, the high-risk environment, the renewal of the PRC-DPRK treaty, and the low level of institutionalization in the bilateral military relationship suggest that a closer examination of Chinese wartime intervention scenarios is warranted.

This exploratory analysis presents models of Chinese intervention based on North Korean resilience and the resulting impact in functional areas related to PLA capabilities and options in a contingency. In this study, resilience is defined by the extent of territory North Korea can defend and occupy during a conflict. This focused definition stems from the fact that US-ROK forces advancing into North Korean territory are a significant trigger for Chinese intervention. Such US-ROK gains would make the aforementioned high-risk, low-probability events more likely and bring South Korean long-range missiles, paired with radar and ISR capabilities, within striking distance of more Chinese cities and installations. Beijing’s strong reaction to the deployment of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea underscores its sensitivity to these escalation risks and highlights the critical thresholds that could prompt direct Chinese military involvement. Concurrently, the CCP will be incentivized to de-escalate any conflict that breaks out on the Korean Peninsula to prevent nuclear or refugee crises that could result from a wider war.

This section first introduces three models of Chinese intervention then applies each model to assess how it would shape functional areas like the decision to intervene, ISR, cyber, materiel support, force posture, and the establishment of command relationships. The models and functional areas are not exhaustive but broad constructs of PRC intervention based on North Korean resilience. The first scenario, “Full Intervention,” assumes low North Korean resilience paralleling the Korean War, leading to rapid losses against a US-ROK force. In this case, if early indirect support from China, including logistics support, ammunition supply, intelligence sharing, and cyber coordination, fails to stem North Korean losses, China could be compelled to transition to long-range strike capabilities (presumably on ROK units rather than US targets at first), combined operations, or, if North Korea is entirely overwhelmed, directly intervening with ground and special operations forces to secure North Korean territory and stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction. Evidence suggests the PLA is particularly concerned about the Korean People’s Army’s (KPA) weaknesses in a protracted war. Chang Yikun from the PLA Information Engineering University writes, “Although North Korea has the ability to launch preemptive attacks, its logistics and sustainment capabilities remain critical limiting factors in its ability to sustain operations in a prolonged war.”⁹

The second scenario, “Sustained Support,” assumes medium North Korean competence in sustainment capabilities, resulting in a stalemate on the battlefield. Here, Chinese intervention would focus on indirect support to North Korean forces, with potential concerns about future direct intervention and avoiding escalation to WMD use. The support China would provide to North Korea in this scenario most closely resembles US assistance to Ukraine in the Russia-Ukraine War. Chinese support would be crucial for North Korean resilience, but PLA forces would not directly engage in the war while North Korea is able to manage the conflict. Moreover, Beijing could delay any decision on direct intervention as North Korea sustains operations and meets strategic objectives in the short- and medium-term.

The third scenario, “Limited Support,” assumes a high level of North Korean resilience in war-fighting functions with China providing only indirect support, including diplomatic and economic assistance, without the expectation of Chinese forces entering the Korean Peninsula. The matrix in table 1 succinctly introduces these scenarios based on North Korean resilience.

The article operates under several key assumptions. First, it assumes that the crisis is triggered by an outbreak of war rather than a regime collapse or coup. Second, it assumes China will support the North Korean regime that is in power at the time of conflict. China’s preference for stability suggests it would back the current regime. Assuming otherwise would imply China’s willingness to confront the KPA, which is highly unlikely. Moreover, US policymakers and defense planners should adopt this assumption to strengthen deterrence against large-scale Chinese intervention. Third, it assumes that the form of China’s intervention will largely depend on North Korean resilience. Consequently, the necessity to address the specific challenges posed by North Korean military performance, rather than a proactive desire to engage, will dictate the nature and extent of Chinese intervention.

Table 1. PRC intervention types based on North Korean resilience
(Source: Created by author)

The following analysis draws on historical precedents, particularly the Korean War, due to its relevance in understanding China’s operational considerations. As Wang Zhijun and Wang Lipeng from the PRC National Defense University observe: “With expanding national interests and the increasing likelihood of future overseas combined operations with foreign military forces, systematically reviewing Mao Zedong’s guidance on combined operations during the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea is not only valuable for deepening research on Mao Zedong’s military thought but also holds significant contemporary relevance.”¹⁰

Decision to Intervene

The initial step in any PRC intervention is the political decision to act, requiring high-level assessments of the strategic environment and the costs of different plans of action. The PLA understands this will be significant. According to the 2020 Science of Military Strategy, the decision will consider whether “the risk of non-intervention is obviously greater than the risk of intervention,” whether it “does not cause serious damage to the core interests of related parties,” and whether it “can bear the uncertain consequences that may be brought about by the intervention of the crisis.” Common problems facing PRC national security institutions, such as restricted information flow and limited access to key decision-making channels, will probably hinder strategic planning for a period of time after a conflict breaks out. The Korean War shows that this decision-making process can be lengthy. In 1950, China’s decision to intervene took nearly three weeks amid significant internal debate and shifting assessments. Concurrently, the political leadership ordered multiple intelligence assessments to evaluate the situation on the ground.¹¹

One advantage in the decision-making process is China’s centralized power structure. This centralization allows for extended time horizons, free from the constraints of electoral cycles or legislative accountability. Additionally, China’s controlled media environment enables the state to manage the narrative, while North Korea’s restricted Internet access mitigates the impact of casualty reporting on public opinion. Reports from Western media would be widely dismissed as fake news and propaganda by Chinese, North Korean, Russian, and other aligned media sources.

In this environment, the Chinese state would also likely suppress reports about decisions under consideration, simultaneously flooding the information space with propaganda aimed at delegitimizing US actions and controlled messaging to US decisionmakers. This approach would grant the CCP central leadership ample time to deliberate without the pressure of public opinion, ensuring the Party is unified around a course of action before rallying public support. As a result, Chinese leaders are less likely to face domestic pressures akin to those experienced by the United States during the Vietnam War.¹²

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

In a sustained or limited support scenario, China will likely offer intelligence-sharing assistance to North Korea, leveraging its superior satellite constellations and ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) capabilities. According to the 2020 Science of Military Strategy, the military must “strengthen the joint awareness of participating forces” to ensure “coordination, support, cooperation, and sharing.” In a full intervention, ISR support would pose targeting challenges for US forces, as some PLA dual-capable systems are not distinguishable between the conventional and nuclear arsenals. Chinese ISR could enhance North Korea’s use of precision-guided munitions by providing targeting data and advanced situational awareness. China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology already provides global positioning, navigation, and tracking services to Belt and Road Initiative partners for civil and military applications. In 2014, North Korean engineers trained at the National Remote Sensing Center of China (NRSCC), which specializes in advancing geographic navigation and positioning capabilities. In June and July 2018, North Korean trainees attended a satellite operations course in Beijing. While it is unclear if North Korea can receive electronic data from China in near real time, these instances underscore China’s potential role as a key provider of sophisticated ISR support to North Korea in a conflict.¹³

Cyber Operations

China and North Korea may coordinate cyber operations in any of the intervention models. Indeed, North Korea already has cyberwarfare forces operating from China. North Korea uses these forces to carry out cyberattacks on other nations and organizations. In 2018, the US Justice Department unsealed charges against the North Korean hacker Park Jin Hyok, accusing him of carrying out major cyberattacks from China, including the WannaCry ransomware virus that befell the United Kingdom National Health Service. The US government also released an advisory stating “hundreds of DPRK IT workers subordinate to MID were operating in China in 2019 and 2020” that “contributed to its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs.”¹⁴

The presence of North Korean cyber operatives in China indicates that KPA forces can maintain operational continuity from outside their country, which would be crucial if North Korea’s internal systems were compromised during wartime. In limited and sustained support scenarios, it is plausible that China, while not directly conducting offensive cyber operations, could ensure North Korean operations continue. In a full intervention, this support could shift into coordination with North Korean cyber operators as part of a broader wartime contingency.

Parts and Ammunition

China may supply North Korea with parts and ammunition during limited or sustained support scenarios, while equipment compatibility would be crucial in a full intervention scenario. Since Chinese and North Korean armored vehicles are primarily Soviet-derived, there is likely organic compatibility between the systems. For instance, the North Korean ground forces mainly use old Soviet-era T-55 tanks, which increases compatibility with PLA tanks also based on Soviet designs. Additionally, China still has a stock of Type 59 tanks in the Northern Theater Command. This similarity allows for the logistics and supply of universal and generally interchangeable parts like nuts, bolts, and hoses. Moreover, ammunition such as 120mm and 125mm mortar and tank rounds can be used by both forces. Finally, China’s potential supply of ammunition (as one of the world’s largest exporters of small arms) to North Korea under sustained or limited support models would be crucial for US planners to account for in a future conflict.¹⁵

Equipment compatibility becomes more complex in a full intervention. For example, the PLA uses a unique 5.8mm round for its infantry rifles, which is not exported and is exclusive to Chinese forces. This round is incompatible with the North Korean Type 58 assault rifle, which uses a 7.62mm round, necessitating separate packaging and storage, and possibly a separate logistics train for distinct ammunition and parts. A parallel supply chain would complicate coordination and reduce efficiency in a full intervention.

Paradoxically, recent PLA advances in informationization and now intelligentization would exacerbate the challenges posed by incompatible equipment and communications systems, particularly given the rudimentary state of North Korean technology. For instance, the KPA has less communications equipment than most militaries of its size. Moreover, North Korea’s maintenance of ground lines of communication is poor, and they lack advanced technologies such as burst communications equipment and sophisticated signal-processing tools. While PLA advances in digitization can potentially enhance operational speed and decisiveness, these benefits would be negated in combined operations with North Korean forces. Notably, recent bilateral defense technology agreements between North Korea and Russia, however, indicate that some technological gaps may not be permanent.¹⁶

Force Posture

In China’s military posture, the PLA Northern Theater Command (NTC) includes the 78th, 79th, and 80th Group Armies, with an estimated combined strength of 90,000 to 150,000 personnel. Additional forces would likely be deployed from the other theater commands. However, deploying additional active-duty troops or mobilizing PLA reserves could take weeks, posing challenges in responding to a sudden need for a full intervention, but possibly becoming a part of Chinese planning for a transition from sustained support or limited support to a full intervention. The presence of high-mobility units in the 78th Group Army would facilitate a swift initial operational response. Moreover, People’s Liberation Army Air Force Airborne Corps are available along with special forces units under each service for fast insertions into North Korea. One PLA source reported in 2012 that the “PLA can reach Pyongyang in two hours” in a conflict scenario.¹⁷

Even with these forces, Beijing does not predict a quick conclusion to a future Korea contingency. Instead, analysts assert a conflict on the Korean Peninsula might require a whole-of-nation approach. The chief of staff for the Jilin Military Region wrote such a war would “involve military, political, economic, and diplomatic aspects, and their space for action will be carried out at the frontline, shallow depth, and the interior of the border at the same time. Therefore, various forces such as military, police, and civilian forces must be used to participate in the battle at the same time.” Beijing is thus likely prepared to mobilize reserve and militia forces as well as other state actors like state-owned enterprises for a future conflict. In January 2015, China launched a civilian-military defense system in Yanbian where militia units were organized to enhance border security. Local residents formed 24-hour surveillance teams, with every 10 households responsible for monitoring a segment of the border. As one villager emphasized in 2006, “each house is a sentry post, and each person a guard.” Such efforts highlight how militia forces could reinforce PLA operations in a Korea contingency.¹⁸

Command Relationships

A key step in a full intervention scenario is establishing command relationships. For Chinese forces, the forward command structure is largely in place through the Northern Theater Joint Operations Command Center (JOCC, 战区联合作战指挥中心). As seen in the Korean War, however, North Korea is likely to resist Chinese command, or a “Chinese officer as the commanding officer, North Koreans as the deputy” (中正朝副). Historically, Soviet arbitration was crucial in resolving command disputes during the Korean War. A month after the start of Chinese intervention, with no joint headquarters established, Stalin expressed “full agreement with the unified command by the Chinese comrades” on November 16, 1950. On December 1, Kim Il-Sung reluctantly supported Chinese command, acknowledging that “the supreme commander should undoubtedly be a Chinese.” This agreement was crucial for achieving a unified command structure, demonstrating how Soviet mediation was key in facilitating combined operations. These historical dynamics underscore that similar issues of command and authority could arise in a future PRC intervention. Given the strategic alignment among China, North Korea, and Russia, and depending on the extent of Russian involvement in a conflict on the Korean Peninsula, Russia might play a role similar to that of the Soviet Union in mediating disputes related to command relationships.¹⁹

Direct interference from the political leadership in either country would also hamper the establishment of command relationships. Despite considerable experience working with their respective militaries, neither Xi Jinping nor Kim Jong-Un has served as a senior military leader during wartime. This inexperience makes civil-military challenges more likely in a crisis, especially if both leaders exert tight control over military decisions and leave little room for experienced military commanders to take the lead. This problem was evident during the Korean War, when Peng Dehuai had to persuade Kim Il-Sung not to “interfere directly with command” (干预指挥). This experience might also result in a clash of personalities between the two leaders or lead to China pressuring North Korea, as the junior partner, to adopt their systems and operational art. Given the significant power disparity between the two states, China may prefer to assign North Korean forces limited roles, potentially relegating them to high-risk operations with substantial attrition rates. Thus, authoritarian political dynamic may influence the conduct of PLA-KPA combined operations in a future contingency.²⁰

Chinese scholars give no indication of the structure of PLA-KPA bilateral command in a full intervention scenario. Drawing from the Korean War and the modern PLA command architecture, however, joint command of Chinese forces would likely be directed by the NTC Joint Operations Command Center (JOCC). Orders would be issued from this joint command to the domain subcenters and then to respective operational groups. These entities would then command tactical units (brigades and below) as assigned, under the direct guidance of the Central Military Commission JOCC and the oversight of CCP central leadership throughout the process.

Depending on the specifics of the bilateral command relationship, major strategic-operational KPA units might be subordinated to the NTC JOCC, potentially with a liaison officer team or sub-command center attached for KPA coordination. PLA exercises suggest that China is more prepared to absorb foreign forces into its command structure compared to alternative structures. For instance, during the 2016 China-Russia “Joint Sea” naval exercises, both sides “jointly used the command information system” (指挥信息系统), referring to command and control, reconnaissance and early warning, and other support systems. In 2021, the multilateral peacekeeping exercise in Henan “Shared Destiny” involved Chinese, Mongolian, Pakistani, and Thai troops working in “mixed training” (混编联训) groups, utilizing Chinese equipment and weapon systems. Chinese officers commanded these foreign forces’ “force formations” and “operational flow,” spanning infantry, high-mobility forces, helicopters, engineers, transportation, and medical teams. Nevertheless, the exact arrangement in a future full intervention scenario remains unknown and would be much more demanding.²¹

Conclusion

To conclude, modeling PRC intervention in a Korea military contingency based on North Korean resilience aligns with China’s strategic priorities, independent of the state of bilateral ties. This article teased out three possible intervention scenarios. In “sustained” and “limited” support scenarios, the capacity of the PRC to supply parts and ammunition could partially offset North Korean sustainment constraints. Beijing’s advanced ISR capabilities could enhance North Korea’s precision-guided munitions and situational awareness. Bilateral cyber coordination could more effectively disrupt US-ROK operations, communications, and logistics in a conflict. Therefore, the possibility of North Korean operational proficiency coupled with Chinese support presents important considerations for US military planning. American planners must account for the potential increase in North Korean operational endurance resulting from PRC support. The United States must also consider nuanced approaches to counteract “sustained” or “limited” support, including monitoring and disrupting supply chains and cyber operations, without directly engaging China.

Given the challenges of the minimally institutionalized PRC-DPRK military relationship, China would face significant difficulties conducting combined operations with the KPA in a “full intervention” scenario. Although interoperability would likely improve over time in a protracted conflict, the PLA is not preparing to fight alongside North Korean forces. Recent relevant exercises with foreign militaries are also limited. For example, the 2021 China-Russia “Zapad/Interaction” exercise established a joint headquarters (联合指挥部), deploying troops in mixed formations (混合编组) utilizing the same platform (同台合练) to conduct reconnaissance and early warning (联合侦搜预警), electronic information attacks (电子信息攻击), and joint assault and suppression (联合打击清剿). The US and allies must monitor the scope of future exercises, particularly those involving NTC personnel, to understand what China is prepared to accomplish in a future war.²²

Looking forward, improved US-China relations could fundamentally reshape China’s perception of the high-risk, low-probability scenarios driving PRCsupport of North Korea. In 2017, despite increased competition, the United States and China reportedly engaged in joint planning about North Korean WMD elimination. Building on this precedent, bilateral coordination would increase Beijing’s confidence that North Korean WMD stockpiles could be controlled in a crisis, thereby reducing its incentive to support the North Korean regime in a conflict. A US commitment to not deploy troops to a reunified Korea would address Beijing’s concerns about a US-aligned state on its border. This approach could lower the perceived threat of a unified Korea, decreasing China’s inclination to support North Korea in a future conflict.²³

This article underscores the critical need for strategic planning and diplomatic engagement to manage potential military conflicts on the Korean Peninsula. Chinese intervention in a future conflict remains likely, even during downturns in China–North Korea relations. Strengthening US alliances and capabilities, while also engaging with Beijing to reduce perceived security risks, will prove vital to preventing great-power war on the Korean Peninsula.

Jake Rinaldi
Dr. Jake Rinaldi is a defense analyst in the China Landpower Studies Center within the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College. He holds a PhD and master’s of philosophy degree from the University of Cambridge, where his doctoral dissertation examined China-North Korea military relations, and his master’s degree focused on China’s nuclear forces.

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Endnotes

1. Yu-Hua Chen, “Lips and Teeth: China’s Buffer Thinking toward North Korea,” Journal of Contemporary China 33, no. 149 (2024), 843–44; and Zhang Shuang, “On the Necessity of the Extension of China-Russia-Mongolia Economic Corridor to Korean Peninsula [中蒙俄经济走廊向朝鲜半岛延伸的必要性],” Northeast Asia Economic Research 2 (2019). Return to text.
2. “A Satellite View of North Korea’s Nuclear Site,” Nikkei Asia, https://asia.nikkei.com/static/vdata/northkorea-nuclear/newsgraphics/north-korea-nuclear/; Jeffrey Lewis, “New Construction at Yondoktong,” Arms Control Wonk, March 2, 2021, https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1211166/new-construction-at-yondoktong/; Li Wangping, “Missing of Nuclear Security and the Reform of Supply Channels in Northeast Asia: From the Perspective of International Public Good [东北亚核安全缺失与供给模式改进],” Northeast Asia Forum 1, no. 153 (2021): 62–128; Liang Chenyu, “Chinese Newspaper’s Nuclear War Survival Guide Alarms Readers,” Sixth Tone: Fresh Voices from Today’s China, December 6, 2017, https://www.sixthtone.com/news/1001345; Roundtable on China’s Role in North Korea Contingencies, Roundtable before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 115th Cong. (2018) (statements of Carla Freeman, Oriana Skylar Mastro, and Yun Sun), https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/transcripts/Hearing%20Transcript%20-%20April%2012%2C%202018.pdf; Dong Rongqiang [董荣强],“Thoughts on the Protective Countermeasures of Nuclear Hazards Caused by the Nuclear Crisis” [“朝核危机引发核危害的防护对策思考”], Civil Defence Realm [民防苑], 2007; and Shen Tongqiang [沈同强] and Zhang Wenyu [张文宇], “Recognize the Current Nuclear Security Threat Situation and Enhance the Military’s Nuclear Emergency Response Capability” [“认清当前核安全威胁形势, 提升军队核应急处置能力”], Nuclear Safety [核安全], June 2018. Return to text.
3. Li Wangping, “Missing,” 62–128; and Lü Chunyan, “The Basic Framework and Effectiveness of U.S. Policy towards the DPRK under the Biden Administration [美国拜登政府对朝政策的 基本框架与成效预测], Journal of Northeast Asia Studies 2, no. 61 (2022): 83–150. Chinese experts are also reportedly concerned that the United States would give ROK forces stewardship of North Korean weapons of mass destruction, posing a proliferation risk. See also Oriana Skylar Mastro, “Conflict and Chaos on the Korean Peninsula: Can China’s Military Help Secure North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons,” International Security 43, no. 2 (Fall 2018): 100. Return to text.
4. Li Zhenhua and Zhang Jian, “Research on Police Emergency Response in the China–North Korea Border Areas” [中朝边境地区应急警务管理研究], Journal of the Armed Police Academy 37, no. 5 (2021): 5–9; Richard C. Bush, “China’s Response to Collapse in North Korea,” Brookings, January 23, 2014, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/chinas-response-to-collapse-in-north-korea/; and Roundtable; and “Border Defense Troops from the Northeast Logistics Emergency and Collaboration Zone Launches First Transregional, Live-Soldier Drill [边防部队东北协作区开展首次跨区域实兵演练],” Xinhua [新华社] (attributed to China National Radio), August 31, 2017, http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2017-08/31/c_129693319.htm. Return to text.
5. United Nations (UN), Supply, Sale or Transfer of All Refined Petroleum Products to the DPRK (UN, 2017), https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/supply-sale-or-transfer-of-all-refined-petroleum; Chen Aizhu, “How North Korea Gets Its Oil from China: Lifeline in Question at U.N. Meeting,” Reuters, April 28, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-usa-oil-idUSKBN17U1I1; William Brown, “For Real Change, Beijing Should Stop Giving Crude Oil to a Volatile Kim Jong Un,” Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), https://www.csis.org/analysis/real-change-beijing-should-stop-giving-crude-oil-volatile-kim-jong-un; and “North Korea,” US Energy Information Administration (EIA), last updated June 2018, https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/PRK. Return to text.
6. Daniel Wertz, “China-North Korea Trade: Parsing the Data,” 38 North, February 25, 2020, https://www.38north.org/2020/02/dwertz022520/; Li Shenghua and Li Qi, “International Sanctions versus the Changes and Prospects of North Korea’s Foreign Trade” [国际制裁背景下朝鲜对外贸易变化及今后展望], Journal of Yanbian University 54, no. 5 (2021): 14–22; General Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China, “Online Query Platform,” accessed June 25, 2023, http://stats.customs.gov.cn/; General Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China, “Online Query”; and Catherine Jones, “China’s Interests, Actors, and the Implementation of Sanctions against North Korea,” in Gilbert Rozman and Sergey Radchenko, International Relations and Asia’s Northern Tier: Sino-Russian Relations, North Korea, and Mongolia (Asan-Palgrave Macmillan Series, 2018). Return to text.
7. Yu-Hua Chen, “Lips and Teeth,” 848; Liu Zhen and Laura Zhou, “What If Worst Comes to Worst with North Korea? China ‘Must Be Ready’ for War on the Peninsula,” South China Morning Post, September 27, 2017, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2112620/what-if-worst-comes-worst-north-korea-china-must-be; and Reuben F. Johnson, “PLA, Chinese Foreign Policy Experts Advocate Preparations for War on Korean Peninsula,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, December 21, 2017. Return to text.
8. “Perry: U.S. Planned for War during 1994 Nuclear Crisis, but Understood ‘War Involves Many Casualties,’ ” National Security Archive, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/korea/2017-12-08/engaging-north-korea-ii-evidence-clinton-administration; and Markus Garlauskas, “The U.S. Must Prepare to Fight China and North Korea at the Same Time,” Foreign Policy, August 6, 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/08/06/war-north-korea-china-taiwan-kim-xi-prepare-pentagon-defense/; and In Their Own Words: Science of Military Strategy 2020 (China Aerospace Studies Institute, 2022), 251, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GOVPUB-D301-PURL-gpo195080/pdf/GOVPUB-D301-PURL-gpo195080.pdf. Return to text.
9. Chang Yikun, “A Review of North Korea’s Military Strategy,” Military Digest (March 2019), 15–19. Return to text.
10. Wang Zhijun and Wang Lipeng, “Mao Zedong and Sino-Korean Army Joint Operations during War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea [抗美援朝战争中毛泽东推动的中朝军队联合作战],” Military History Research 34, no. 5 (2020): 1. Return to text.
11. In Their Own Words, 124; Tyler Jost, “The Institutional Origins of Miscalculation in China’s International Crises,” International Security 48, no. 1 (Summer 2023): 47–91; and Zhijun and Lipeng, “Mao Zedong,” 24. Return to text.
12. The content of such messaging would likely depend on the progression of the conflict but could include warning Washington about red lines (for example, targeting North Korean weapons of mass destruction or reunifying the entire peninsula) and issuing threats to intervene. Return to text.
13. In Their Own Words, 213; Hearing on China’s Nuclear Forces: Hearing before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 117th Cong. (2021) (statement of Phillip C. Saunders, Director of the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs), https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2021-06/June_10_2021_Hearing_Transcript.pdf; Peter J. Brown, “Is North Korea Using China’s Satellites to Guide Its Missiles?,” The National Interest, May 23, 2017, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/north-korea-using-chinas-satellites-guide-its-missiles-20810; “China Regional Snapshot: Space,” House Committee on Foreign Affairs, November 14, 2022, https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/china-regional-snapshot-space/; Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi, Defense Planning and Readiness of North Korea: Armed to Rule (Routledge, 2021); and “The Seventh International Training Course on the Application of Satellite Products Opened in Beijing on September 3,” Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, September 6, 2013, http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2013-09/06/content_2482610.htm. Return to text.
14. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), North Korean Tactics, Army Techniques Publication 7-100.2 (HQDA, July 2020), https://irp.fas.org/doddir/army/atp7-100-2.pdf; U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), “North Korean Regime-Backed Programmer Charged with Conspiracy to Conduct Multiple Cyber Attacks and Intrusions,” DOJ, September 6, 2018, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/north-korean-regime-backed-programmer-charged-conspiracy-conduct-multiple-cyber-attacks-and; and “Treasury Targets Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Individuals Supporting Weapons of Mass Destruction and Ballistic Missile Programs,” press release, U.S. Department of the Treasury, January 12, 2022, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0555. Return to text.
15. “The 40th Army’s Innovative Tactics: Type 59 Tanks Hit Armored Targets 14 Kilometers Away” [40军创新战法：59式坦克打击14公里外装甲目标], May 24, 2016, guancha.cn, https://www.guancha.cn/military-affairs/2016_05_24_361536.shtml; and U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China: Annual Report to Congress (DoD, 2023), 167. Return to text.
16. HQDA, North Korean Tactics; and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), North Korea Military Power: A Growing Regional and Global Threat (DIA, 2021), https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/North_Korea_Military_Power.pdf; and Anton Sokolin and Shreyas Reddy, “Russia and North Korea Vow to Defend Each Other if Attacked, New Treaty States,” NKNews.org, June 2024, https://www.nknews.org/2024/06/russia-and-north-korea-vow-to-defend-each-other-if-attacked-new-treaty-states/. Return to text.
17. Roundtable; “Ten Years Ago, the PLA Light High-Mobility Synthetic Battalion in the Eyes of Foreign Military Forces [十年前，外军眼中的PLA轻型高机动合成营],” qq.com, April 17, 2024, https://new.qq.com/rain/a/20240417A01ECB00; and Kenji Minemura, “ANALYSIS: Chinese Militaryon Edge after Death of Kim Jong Il,” Asahi Shimbun, February 13, 2013, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/special/PLA/AJ201201230058a. Return to text.
18. Miao Yufeng, “Considerations on Building an Integrated Command and Control System for Border Emergency Operations” [“对构建边境应急行动一体化联合指挥体系的思考”], National Defense, February 2014, 17–20; “China Enlists Citizens to Patrol Border with North Korea – State Media,” Reuters, January 15, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/15/us-china-northkorea-borderidUSKBN0KO08920150115; and Chang Wanquan, “Looking Back over Three Years Participation in Northeast Border Defense Building,” PLA Daily, January 7, 2009, 8. Return to text.
19. Zhijun and Lipeng, “Mao Zedong.” Return to text.
20. Zhijun and Lipeng, “Mao Zedong.” Return to text.
21. The author would like to thank China Landpower Studies Center research professor Rick Gunnell, whose research on training contributed to this section. See also Hirofumi Kiriyama, “Outlook for China-Russia Military Cooperation—Based on an Analysis of China-Russia Joint Exercises,” National Institute for Defense Studies 57 (2017), https://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/commentary/pdf/commentary057e.pdf; Kevin McCauley, “System of Systems Operational Capability: Key Supporting Concepts for Future Joint Operations,” China Brief 12, no. 19 (2012), https://jamestown.org/program/system-of-systems-operational-capability-key-supporting-concepts-for-future-joint-operations/; and “Transcript of the Regular Press Conference, Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China in September 2021” [2021年9月国防部例行记者会文字实录],” PRC Ministry of National Defense, September 30, 2021, http://www.mod.gov.cn/shouye/2021-09/30/content_4895952.htm; and “Transcript.” Return to text.
22. “Transcript.” Return to text.
23. Rex W. Tillerson, “Remarks: On ‘Meeting the Foreign Policy Challenges of 2017 and Beyond,’ ” to 2017 Atlantic Council–Korea Foundation Forum, U.S. Department of State, December 12, 2017, https://2017-2021.state.gov/on-meeting-the-foreign-policy-challenges-of-2017-and-beyond/. Return to text.