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June 18, 2025

The Next National Defense Strategy: Mission-Based Force Planning

Frank G. Hoffman
©2025 Frank G. Hoffman

ABSTRACT: The Pentagon needs to embrace a new methodology called mission-based planning to size and shape the defense enterprise properly. This article summarizes and critiques several proposals for reestablishing the long-standing two major theater war construct in the face of ongoing shifts in the strategic environment, including the nation’s $36 trillion debt and prospects of annual interest payments beyond $1 trillion. Drawing upon four decades of experience in strategy/force planning at the service, the department, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense levels, the author presents a mission priority alternative that provides more strategic prioritization and is more in line with the new administration. Strategic-level service planners and students of Joint professional military education / top-level schools will benefit from the article and better understand the strategic context and key parameters of the internal debate at the Pentagon about the upcoming National Defense Strategy.

Keywords: defense planning, National Defense Strategy, China, Russia, budget

 

The United States faces a defense planning crisis. The costs of its preferred ends are rising more than the means the nation appears willing to allocate to its security interests. Strategic insolvency is generating more risks than can be covered. Something must change—either an infusion of resources to meet a growing “Axis of Upheaval” or a reduction in commitments. The thrust of the current administration’s foreign policy is unclear, an admixture of neo-isolationism and Jacksonian rhetoric. This change could reduce obligations and increase security risks as the administration downscales discretionary government expenses, possibly including the defense budget.1

The next National Defense Strategy (NDS) has much to consider, including the purpose, size, and shape of the US armed forces. The last two defense strategies were criticized for their force sizing and shaping frameworks. The critics noted the force planning constructs in the 2018 and 2022 National Defense Strategy did not provide for a military sized to defeat two major powers simultaneously. Some European allied countries share this assessment and fear the US pivot to the Indo-Pacific region to compete against China puts them at risk.2

To provide context, this article first captures the changes in the security environment that have occurred since 2016. The analysis examines the significant changes in the security environment the Trump administration faces. After exploring the inherited strategic context the administration must deal with, the article discusses the utility and history of force sizing/shaping constructs and concludes that a new approach is needed for the National Defense Strategy due in 2026. This mission-based approach offers advantages for Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and his policy team to focus on the Department of Defense’s adaptation and assist in allocating constrained resources.3

The Inheritance

Several factors combine to further expand an ends/means gap, including the increased cooperation among adversaries; the changing character of warfare, including new competitive domains; and the perilous state of the US federal budget.

Collaborating Threats

The first of these threats is the so-called “Axis of Upheaval.” The group’s collaboration marks “a fundamental shift in the strategic environment” since US adversaries are “willing to come to the direct military aid of one another.” This shift could upend how Washington thinks about its defense plans. Yet, the so-called “Axis” is not an alliance as much as a collection of autocracies with common interests. Nor are the various components faring well. Russia has suffered staggering losses in Ukraine and damaged its long-term potential. It has depleted its conventional ground force, and Russia’s economy is stagnant at best.4

Iran has been pummeled all over the Middle East for the past year. Tehran and its proxies are on their back foot. Iran is weaker and more vulnerable than it has been in decades. Iran remains more degraded now that its proxies have taken major losses and expended a large portion of their missile inventories. America should expect, however, that Iran will continue to support militant proxies as part of its overall strategy.5

The hermit kingdom, North Korea, remains a prison state with dangerous missiles. It has a new security pact with Russia that includes mutual security clauses. Pyongyang’s troops in Ukraine and Russia are gaining combat experience but at a steep price. More worrisome are the defense technological gains North Korea may accrue.6

Overall, the purported axis is not yet a collective threat, as the autocracies are acting bilaterally, largely in support of Putin. Cooperation should not be confused with alignment and alliances. Yet, the putative “Axis” is acting inimically to Western interests and could evolve into a more insidious threat.7

The Pacing Threat Is Outpacing the Pentagon

China, the acclaimed pacing competitor, is investing significantly in its military power. The new administration will likely focus on a critical contingency—precluding a fait accompli against Taiwan. The solution to Taiwan’s defense is well understood and does not seem difficult if Taiwan would accelerate needed reforms. The United States will also need to adapt. A series of war games addressing the Taiwan Strait revealed the United States would likely run out of critical precision munitions in less than one week.8

Munitions are not the only shortfall in deterring China. Thanks to its global leadership in shipbuilding capacity, the People’s Liberation Army Navy expanded from 271 to 328 ships from 2012 to 2024. The US Navy’s grew from 284 to 289 ships during the same time frame (see figure 1). China’s fleet includes major surface combatants, including a third carrier, submarines, and amphibious ships.9

Naval comparison of People’s Liberation Army and US Navy battle force ships
Figure 1. Naval comparison of People’s Liberation Army and US Navy battle force ships
(Source: Taps Coogan, “Chart: Chinese Navy vs US Navy,” The Sounding Line, April 10, 2022, https://thesoundingline.com/chart-chinese-navy-vs-us-navy/.)

The US Navy is largely static in total ship numbers, while China is gaining, and nearly all the Chinese ships are operating in the Pacific Ocean while the US Navy is globally deployed. See figure 1 for trends and forecasted totals. Chinese ships operate under the cover of land-based missile systems and close to their supporting bases and supplies. While the US Navy and Chinese Navy field roughly the same number of ships with vertical launch system batteries, the US Navy fields larger ships with greater capacity. Beijing’s fleet is closing the gap and now deploys half as many missiles as America’s fleet. Designing and resourcing a war-winning navy will be a top priority for the Pentagon, and it will be expensive.10

Bryan Clark and Michael Roberts estimate that the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) shipbuilding capacity is 200 times greater than that of the United States, which is demonstrated by China’s ship production in 2023, when the country launched 689 large commercial and 30 navy ships. In contrast, American shipyards produced no large commercial vessels and only nine gray-hulled ships for the US Navy. The US Congress must consider a shipbuilding revolution to offset two decades of complacency and underinvestment.

The US Air Force is equally challenged in the region. The former Secretary of the Air Force noted, “China’s massive investment in air-, land-, and sea-launched medium-range systems and systems that reach the so-called second island chain and beyond have already put traditional Air Force systems and operating concepts at risk.”11

Some officials suggest US Army force reductions in Europe to support strategic priorities and the reallocation of resources to these strategic priorities.12

Defending the Homeland

American policymakers realize this is a higher priority challenge today and more complex than in past generations. The American defense strategy noted that China or Russia could use an array of tools to hinder US military preparation and response in a conflict, particularly one targeting American critical infrastructure. Most defense analysts recognize that the continental United States is not a sanctuary in future conflicts, however, few consider the resource impacts.13

In any contest with a major power, the United States will have to defend itself and devote more resources to ensure ports and transportation assets are secure as it sustains deployed forces overseas. Adversaries will target critical infrastructure and attempt computer network hacks. Purported penetration of US telecommunications by Chinese hackers is troublesome in this regard. According to US and industry security officials, the Chinese military is ramping up its ability to disrupt key American infrastructure, including power and water utilities and communications and transportation systems. For anyone worried about needing a two-front capacity, this potential infrastructure disruption should be considered the second front.14

Missile defenses are another part of this principal mission. Costs will be significant, but one report recommends an additional $4 billion to $5 billion per year above the $3 billion allocated for homeland missile defense within the US Missile Defense Agency budget. Building an American “Iron Dome” system has attracted the president’s attention, given the success that Israel had when attacked by Iran. The reference to “Iron Dome” is generic, not to be confused with Israel’s short-range tactical defense system. The recently signed executive order intends a more comprehensive system for “a next-generation missile defense shield for the United States against ballistic, hypersonic, advanced cruise missiles, and other next-generation aerial attacks.” Yet, numerous experts do not believe a comprehensive missile defense of the United States could be cost-effective for the foreseeable future. Strategy is interactive and competitive, and the obvious counteractions of one’s opponents must be considered, or this costly initiative will be a recipe for an arms race that confers no strategic benefit. How this initiative will address the cruise missile threat remains to be unveiled.15

Strategic Deterrent

An aging nuclear enterprise is another consideration. This component of the defense budget needs a rigorous risk assessment to inform resourcing. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that US plans for nuclear forces and their modernization will cost $756 billion from 2023–32, roughly $75 billion a year. That total includes $305 billion to operate America’s nuclear forces and $247 billion to modernize nuclear delivery systems and their weapons. This significant cost could rise. The US Air Force disclosed that the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile program is delayed at least two years, with costs up 37 percent. The US Navy is experiencing similar delays in its ballistic missile submarine program, the USS Columbia-class boat. This program will cost an estimated $132 billion to buy 12 submarines, with a lifecycle cost estimated at $347 billion.16

Some experts recommend the new administration accelerate the strategic arsenal’s modernization. This will be a crucial investment decision, given the enterprise’s decaying status. Much of the strategic deterrent force was built in the last century. The bomber force was built in the 1960s, the US intercontinental ballistic missiles were constructed in the 1970s, and the “boomer” nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) were built in the 1980s and 1990s. Modernization is overdue, but preserving all three legs of the delivery triad (bombers, missiles, and submarines) needs to be reconsidered for affordability.17

New Domains: Space and Cyber Warfare

The status of space as an increasingly critical domain presents opportunities and vulnerabilities. In the past, space was an important enabler for conventional combat operations. Now, it is part of a crowded battlespace. Former Secretary of the US Air Force Dr. Frank Kendall noted, “space isn’t just a warfighting domain, it is the warfighting domain.” Along these lines, the United States Space Force Commander, General George Saltzman, described the space domain as “more contested than at any other point in history.” A recent Council on Foreign Relations task force report claims space is a strategic imperative and finds US space assets increasingly vulnerable to attacks—particularly by China and Russia since they have developed the means to divert, disable, or destroy them. The methods include direct-ascent anti-satellite missiles, space-based weapons, and jamming. The task force also found that while the United States remains the leading space power, China is emerging as a peer competitor.18

American economic and security interests will require resources to underwrite space capabilities and fill the gaps in the traditional air, sea, and land domains. The complexities of strategy in this domain are rife. The American Intelligence Community assesses that China will probably achieve world-class status in all but a few space areas by 2030. Russia is less ambitious and more asymmetric.

Cybersecurity is another deficiency in homeland security. Experts have concluded that “the homeland has never been less secure, and America’s greatest vulnerability is not a physical attack from non-state actors and terrorists. . . . Rather, the greatest vulnerability is the threat of cyberattacks and long-range missile strikes by China and Russia.” China’s state-sponsored cyber group, “Volt Typhoon,” penetration allows PRC hackers to await inside critical infrastructure systems poised to disrupt US systems at the time of Beijing’s choosing during a crisis. The compromised critical infrastructure systems include ports, energy, water utilities, and telecommunications. A military strategist labeled China’s actions as “operational preparation of the battlefield” in anticipation of a future conflict.19

US Government Spending

Years of deficit spending and post-pandemic economic stimulation has generated a $36 trillion federal debt, with associated increases in interest payments. As shown in figure 2, spending on social security and Medicare has risen measurably as the American population ages. Interest payments have also risen significantly.

US federal spending 2014–34 (US $ billions)
Figure 2. US federal spending 2014–34 (US $ billions)
(Source: Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, https://www.crfb.org/blogs/top-13-fiscal-charts-2024)

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects the fiscal year (FY) 2025 projected budget deficit at $1.9 trillion. Interest on the debt is the fastest growing part of the budget, more than doubling from $345 billion in FY 2020 to $870 billion at the end of FY 2024. Interest payments on the mounting debt in FY 2024 exceeded the entire defense budget. Interest payments are projected to grow further and reach $1.8 trillion in 2035. Net interest payments will total $13.8 trillion over the next decade.20

The Department of Government Efficiency may reduce that total. It remains to be seen how Congress will address the proposed extension of the tax reductions implemented in the initial Trump presidency. Extending that legislation is estimated to cost $4.6 trillion.21

As the national debt grows, experts claim that we become more beholden to global creditors and that access to capital in the private sector becomes diminished and, thus, growth is limited. It increases interest rates to attract enough buyers for the additive US debt. If the long-term imbalance between spending and revenue is not resolved, the US government could have less fiscal agility during the next banking crisis, pandemic, or war.22

Economic historian Niall Ferguson has warned that when great powers reach the crossover point when debt payments exceed defense spending, their decline is marked. Using numerous historical cases, he shows it is “very rare but not unprecedented” for a great power to recover from the centripetal forces of excessive debt. To security planners, the debt and related interest payments means the nation will have less funding to invest in its strength and security.23

All in all, the inheritance is daunting. With large deficits and the lack of a bipartisan consensus on US foreign policy, Washington will find it difficult to play its historical role as a leader and guarantor of a stable global system. Without budget relief, critical trade-offs will be needed.

Defense Strategies and Force Planning Constructs

The force planning construct (FPC) is a key component of a defense strategy. It is too often a shorthand bumper sticker, disconnected from resource availability, and can become rigid, so much so that it retards strategic adaptation. It may reflect short-term, conventional war-fighting capacity at the risk of long-term threats or foundational capabilities like strategic lift or intelligence. Defense planning is a complicated art form requiring the prioritization of threats, identification of missions and defense objectives, and the disciplined allocation of resources over time.24

Defense strategists and force designers must wrestle with several variables when selecting the purpose and method for their force sizing and shaping construct. It is not just about how many Army divisions or aircraft carriers are fielded and maintained. There are numerous considerations to consider when selecting a method for framing and assessing a force design and for assessing strategic and operational risk over time. The variables include (not exclusively):

  • Active versus reserve forces;
  • Overseas posture: forward-based, rotational deployments or periodic presence;
  • Prioritization of domain capabilities (that is, maritime versus continental);
  • Conventional versus unconventional forces; and
  • Allied and partner contributions.

One of the most salient factors is expected resources. Strategy involves more than articulating aspirational aims; it is the focused application of limited resources to desired policy aims. Strategists and defense planners must deal with reality when it comes to anticipated funding, not a chimera of hope.

Too often, this force-sizing exercise becomes a shorthand rubric for strategy. One frequently hears the mistaken phrase, “we need to have a two-war strategy.” These comments are understandable but inane, as US strategy is not designed to promote multiple wars but to deter them. What advocates of the two-war model seek is the capacity to deter multiple threats and preclude opportunistic aggression from a malign actor who takes advantage of US involvement in another conflict. That concern is real and strategically relevant.25

Some commentators appear to operate under the notion that articulating a multi-war framework is automatically operative and generates a fully funded and larger conventional military. This is naive at best. A multi-war construct has a magical appeal to this school of thought and assumes a compliant Congress automatically appropriates the resources for recruiting, training, equipping, and sustaining this force. That is not realistic or historically accurate. More likely, what would flow from such benign assumptions is a large force that can only afford 70 percent of the manpower it needs and 70 percent of the modernized equipment to fight those two wars. Equally likely, some critical enablers or foundational capabilities would be slighted. The result would be a hollow force. This situation could produce a military that is underprepared for either contingency, which might be labeled as a “lose-lose” design.

A force-sizing construct is not a strategy, and it is not a set of handcuffs. A defense strategy that builds, shapes, and postures the armed forces for one big and long war does not preclude the US president from using the military to conduct two simultaneous regional conflicts, such as operations in the Red Sea or in the Persian Gulf. Presidents want options, not shackles or excuses, during a crisis. That said, the force planning concept needs to provide the range and breadth of forces to generate those options and other contingencies. Over time, the character of those contingencies may evolve.

Historical Force Planning Constructs

During the post–Cold War era, US defense policy has had to adapt its strategy and force planning mechanisms continuously to define the size of the force needed to execute our strategy better and to determine what kinds of forces were best suited for an evolving security environment. Both the overall size of the force and its shape (types of forces) are important outputs of defense policy. Force planners speak of the capabilities (the kind of force used in terms of air, space, naval, or land power) America can bring to bear, and the overall capacity (how much) of each. Policymakers employ force planning constructs, which traditionally center on the number and scale of conflicts (major regional wars or lesser contingencies) that plausibly could be expected, to assess the risk involved in force design. They must also make assumptions and estimates about the length of such wars and whether they might occur simultaneously.

Such constructs became the critical building blocks of any defense strategy going back to the base force designed by General Colin Powell after Operation Desert Storm and the subsequent Bottom-Up Review of the early Clinton administration. As shown in table 1, each new administration refined the components of the force planning construct to match its strategy and resources.26

The consensus on framing the ability to fight two nearly simultaneous conflicts eroded in the post–Cold War era. The “two-war” metric was criticized for emphasizing maintaining force capacity without consideration of a larger strategy to prevent wars. Criticism of this metric motivated Congress to establish a commission in 1997 to assess post–Cold War defense planning. This commission criticized the two-war yardstick, observing, “We are concerned that this construct may have become a force-protection mechanism—a means of justifying the current force structure” tied to Cold War–era thinking.27

Around the same time, the Hart-Rudman Commission (also known as the US Commission on National Security / 21st Century) criticized the two-war construct for “not producing the capabilities needed for the varied and complex contingencies now occurring and likely to increase in the years ahead.” With some prescience, in 2001, it called for forces for stability operations and homeland security, different from those designed for major theater war. The events of September 11, 2001, and subsequent campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan reflect the anticipated demands of that two-year-long commission.28

Table 1. Past Department of Defense strategic force planning constructs
(Source: Created by author)

Guidance Document Force Sizing Construct Context
Bottom-Up Review (1993) Defeat two regional threats nearly simultaneously First post–Cold War guidance
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 1997 Defeat large-scale aggression in two theaters Size for both major regional conflicts and small-scale scenarios
QDR 2001 Swiftly defeat two threats and one decisively (regime change) One regime change
Accept risk in second theater
QDR 2006 Win two conventional conflicts or one conventional and one irregular campaign Responds to protracted counterinsurgency/counterterrorism
QDR 2010 Win two large land campaigns or one large air/naval campaign and a second theater conflict Explores shaping for longer-term threats
QDR 2014 Defeat one regional adversary in a large-scale campaign and deny the objectives of—or impose unacceptable costs on—a second aggressor Pushes for innovative but smaller force, able to cover full spectrum vice focus on stabilization operations
2018 NDS Deter in three regions: win one great-power war, shift resources to deter in theater to deter in third theater Great-power war, resource limits
2022 NDS Adapted a version of 2018 NDS framework Far more sophisticated scenario testing

With the National Defense Panel and Hart-Rudman Commission report in mind, this author offered a compromise employing a two-war force model with one major war with the current force and a second major theater war titled future force. This compromise was intended to create dedicated forces for experimenting with advanced operational concepts and incentivize the military to adapt. The incoming George W. Bush administration leaned into defense transformation and sought to “skip a generation” of military technology to secure a decisive advantage. The administration wanted to pursue change but ultimately engaged in two extended counterinsurgency/stabilization missions. Yet, its force construct tasked the Department of Defense (DoD) to build a force able to “swiftly defeat” two opponents at roughly the same time. In the brief unipolar moment, American military leaders could conceive of two short-term campaigns and expect success. As Brands and Montgomery noted, those halcyon days are over due to larger competitors and the possibility of protracted and higher intensity fighting.29

2018 National Defense Strategy

Great-power competition and the scale of potential military conflict were the principal drivers in the 2018 NDS construct. The resource context was another driver, including the constraints of the prior years of the Budget Control Act and forecasted defense spending. Defense leaders had to recognize the Pentagon’s budgetary picture in the prior five-year era of sequestration and the poor readiness and procurement budgets that resulted from legislated constraints. The 2018 NDS reflected some innovations in force planning. It defined a steady state force based around missions while also providing simultaneity guidance for wartime priorities. The shorthand label for this construct for those habituated to wars as the ultimate measure of a strategy would be “Deter in three regions, defeat one great power, deter opportunistic aggression in a second region.” See table 2.30

Table 2: 2018 NDS force sizing/shaping and simultaneity guidance
(Source: Created by author)

Day-to-Day Competition Wartime Full Mobilization
Defend the homeland Defend the homeland
Deter nuclear and strategic attack Deter nuclear and strategic attack
Deter aggression in three theaters Defeat aggression by a great-power adversary
Degrade terrorism and weapons of mass destruction threats
Defend US interests below armed conflict Deter opportunistic aggression in second theater/disrupt terrorism and weapons of mass destruction threats

The scale of a possibly global war against a peer competitor was a major influence on this strategy. This challenge is a far higher and riskier that the Department of Defense has faced in the last two generations. Consistent with other commissions, the two-war model was seen as privileging the current conventional force against the strategy’s priorities.31

Given the threat picture and the resources available, the senior leadership decided that defense resources needed to focus on modernization investments (capabilities) instead of force structure capacity increases. The key driver was an assessment that the Joint Force’s residual hardware and capacity could deter in the near term, and that risk could be accepted in the near term to buy down long-term modernization risk in the outyears. Brands and Montgomery labeled this a bureaucratic consideration, but it is a strategic judgment about risk across a defined temporal continuum. Leadership deemed the risk of a second war in the near term acceptable to buy down the risk of being undercapitalized with advanced capabilities in the latter years of the administration.32

Defense leaders were satisfied that, given the size and capacity of friendly and adversary foes, two conflicts could be conducted but, like World War II, the conflicts would be perforce longer and more costly. Hence, leadership focused resources on research and development to pursue new capabilities, including command and control, space, and autonomous systems. The administration acknowledged and accepted the risk of deterrence failure in a second contingency for the period FY 2018–22. The DoD’s senior leadership recognized multiple risks and adopted a force structure, posture, and investment portfolio consistent with its strategy.33

The Biden-Harris administration bought into the same logic, and it made more progress and focused investments in emerging technologies. It also more explicitly defined China as the pacing threat. The Biden defense strategy drew the same criticisms as the first Trump administration defense strategy; it accepted rosy assumptions and excessive risk—especially from simultaneous crises.34

Critics of the 2018 and 2022 strategies acknowledge the resource constraints on the Pentagon’s strategy but still fault it for leaving the United States “strategically exposed, militarily overextended, or much more reliant on highly escalatory options that lack credibility.” The real problem, however, is that the critics’ strategy of primacy expands resource demands beyond what Congress provides and overextends the armed forces.35

Scholars are concerned about opportunistic aggression but, historically, this has not been born out. The United States made extensive commitments in Korea and Vietnam during the Cold War without the Soviet Union taking advantage in Europe. When the West made substantial contributions to protracted missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, neither Beijing nor Moscow made precipitous moves until Moscow seized Crimea in 2014.

National Defense Strategy Commission Proposal

A panel that quadrennially offers the US Congress an independent assessment produced more criticism of the Pentagon’s strategy and force planning. Given the breadth of experience amongst the panel members, their work bears serious consideration. They proposed what they term a “multiple theater construct.”36 The Joint Force should be sized and structured to conduct the following tasks simultaneously:

  1. Defend the homeland, maintain strategic deterrence, prevent mass-casualty terrorist attacks, maintain global posture, and respond to small-scale, short duration crises;
  2. Lead the effort, with meaningful allied contribution, to deter China from territorial aggression in the Western Pacific—and fight and win if needed;
  3. Lead NATO planning and force structure to deter and, if necessary, defeat Russian aggression; and
  4. Sustain capabilities, along with US partners in the Middle East, to defend against Iranian malign activities.37

This list resembles the 2018 NDS and 2022 NDS with respect to providing for forward presence in three theaters, but it goes further with respect to a second theater war. In the Pentagon’s vernacular, this approach is a “deter in three, defeat 2” model. This example is comprehensive, and the recognition of the need to consider “meaningful allied contribution” is useful. Yet, what it offers is a not-very-eloquent list with questionable priorities if everything in the first category is considered. Under more detailed examination, the priorities seem askew. Is responding to short crises more important than deterring the People’s Republic of China? Is “maintaining global posture” redundant or more expansive than the regional deterrence missions? Preventing mass casualty terrorist attacks is difficult to justify as a top priority for the Pentagon, but it could be a mission.

Overall, the National Defense Strategy Commission is comprehensive, but it is based on a strategy of deep engagement at odds with the current administration’s policy and Washington’s fiscal situation.

2026 National Defense Strategy

What strategy and force planning construct meets today’s requirements? The Trump administration is required to develop a new national defense strategy by early 2026. Several conditions in the evolving strategic environment suggest that a revised strategy and budget are required to advance US strategic interests. This requirement is especially true if “peace through strength” is to be a guiding principle. If it is just a rhetorical charade as America retreats to the chimera of Fortress America, then no change is required except for fiscal reductions. But, if it is a guiding principle, the administration must deal with its inheritance and generate a coherent strategy.

The world is not in the same place today as it was in 2017, and a different strategy is required. Defense modernization has not yet delivered the requisite capabilities anticipated for this era. Congress never supported the 3 to 5 percent real growth needed to grow a larger force, modernize that force, and sustain the industrial base needed to sharpen America’s competitive edge. Some serious pruning and measured investment are necessary.

A comprehensive strategy that addresses the DoD’s missions will help the administration in “right sizing” and “right shaping” the armed forces and hopefully regain American credibility. The next defense strategy should recognize the breadth of missions assigned to the Department of Defense and prioritize them to apply resources strategically. The Pentagon should develop capabilities to address the greatest challenger with less risk. It is not quite a lost decade, but not enough progress has been made to deflect China’s assertive foreign policy. Today, the People’s Liberation Army is improving its command and control, reach, and lethality.38

Scholars contend that the one-war standard is “a recipe for disaster,” as it leaves the force insufficiently muscular to meet “existing global commitments.” These commitments are defined as allies and partners in three regions: Europe, the Indo-Pacific, and the Middle East. These regions are not America’s only commitments or obligations. One should not overlook how dangerous it is to leave the homeland at risk, accept a less-than-modern force, remain vulnerable in the space and cyber theaters, and perpetuate a defense innovation ecosystem that cannot sustain the Joint Force in protracted warfare. What scholars agree on is the need for more resources and that now is a time for choosing.39

Ultimately, it comes down to hard decisions about where to take risk. Policymakers must decide where and how to manage risk in several areas. How much risk to the homeland, including missile defense, is acceptable? An antiquated and less credible strategic deterrent? An under-modernized military that remains poorly equipped for twenty-first-century warfare? A precarious defense industrial base that is woefully underprepared to sustain the armed forces in protracted and high-intensity warfare? Forward postured forces to prevent a fait accompli against an ally or crucial partner? Are the vulnerabilities in space that might cripple military employment and the economy okay? The defense secretary will have to assess those questions in the next National Defense Strategy.

The proposed strategy and mission planning framework below seeks to balance near-term and long-term goals and capacity versus capability. While critics fear the US government is generating a force too small for coming storms, today’s Pentagon planners fear a hollow and under-modernized force of legacy platforms only able to refight Operation Desert Storm. Between these two extremes lies an option for a modernized force capable of deterring aggression in multiple theaters and conducting multiple modes of conflict. That force design will have to live with available resources.

Mission-Based Planning

Rather than focus on conventional war fighting as a simplistic “yardstick,” the Department of Defense should examine mission-based planning. This methodology promotes a balanced approach to meeting multiple security missions over time. This alternative should help the Secretary of Defense and his staff with the allocation of forces to satisfy mission priorities identified in the strategy. There are several advantages derived from this approach. It accounts for the growing threats to missions—like defending the homeland—that expeditionary or overseas offensive campaigns overlook. Second, it identifies strategic deterrence as a distinctive category to force tradeoff decisions with conventional forces. It acknowledges unconventional warfare taskings and the fact that despite the Pentagon’s misgivings, support to domestic security and emergency response requests can be anticipated. Finally, it helps the Pentagon present clear linkages between missions and resources, which should benefit Congress in its oversight and budget deliberations. A clearer crosswalk between strategies and resources is consistent with the recommendations of the Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Reform.40

A mission-based construct provides a solid foundation for building and assessing tomorrow’s Joint Force and its enablers across the conflict spectrum. This proposal includes several aspects that the National Defense Strategy Commission properly noted. This list presents the set of missions in priority order:

  1. Defend the homeland;
  2. Deter aggression in Asia with allies and partners;
  3. Provide a modernized strategic deterrent;
  4. Conduct unconventional warfare missions, including counterterrorism and security assistance;
  5. Deter aggression in Europe in coordination with allies; and
  6. Enhance space security.

This approach focuses defense leaders on sizing and shaping forces and enablers on implementing their strategies. It is not based on worst-case scenarios, though prudent planners might explore contingencies that could occur as a risk assessment exercise. The mission-based methodology affords a realistic tool for risk management by policymakers.41

Overall, this mission planning framework seems more comprehensive and logical than sizing the US armed forces for two wars. Such a dual scenario would occur when the national strategy and US deterrence have failed—not once but twice. The US strategy is not to win two wars but to deter aggression in the first place and fulfill other missions. Determining what is necessary to defeat opponents—with allied support—provides a useful risk exercise and an input, but it is not the only criteria for shaping and sizing the DoD operational forces or funding its future recapitalization portfolio.

A large and protracted scenario for the Indo-Pacific region makes sense. Investments should impose more costs on the adversary than on American taxpayers. Some expensive strike systems, however, will remain necessary. The United States should pursue a high-low mix to ensure that its operations in a protracted conflict do not exhaust munitions stocks.42

Per the National Defense Strategy Commission, the mission set should include a NATO scenario with contributions from US forces. This priority does not preclude reductions in US forces assigned to Europe, but the United States should sustain key enablers (command and control, intelligence, integrated air defense, space, and such). These enablers will be difficult for NATO members to replicate.43

United States interests in a peaceful and prosperous Europe are too significant to ignore. Russia retains potent capabilities in air and naval power and will reconstitute its combat forces, perhaps reforming into a better operational force. Including this element should satisfy Brand’s and Montgomery’s comments for a regional conflict scenario (a 1.5-war concept). Including this element ensures unique war-fighting competencies for sustained land warfare (armor and anti-armor systems) are not ignored and that Allied capitals are reassured. Projected Russian reconstitution rates (5 to 7 years) dictate the prioritization of the second theater, which assumes NATO’s sustained progress in enhancing its posture.44

Including this mission resolves any concern about a single-war framework, with a force tightly shaped by the unique nature of the basic scenario. A military optimized for a particular contingency may lack capabilities to address a plausible crisis elsewhere. To be specific, a force designed to ensure success in a Taiwan conflict may weigh heavily on maritime and aerospace forces ill-suited for other crises. Given America’s track record for picking the location and character of future warfare, a prudent design would build adaptability into the force design. A contingency supporting NATO hedges against overspecialization.45

This proposal lowers the priority for strategic deterrence and reconsiders the costly triad of delivery platforms. If missile defense systems become the priority for homeland defense, the triad’s pricey modernization could be the bill payer as the nation shifts to a strategy of denial.

The United States must do more to respond to irregular and unconventional threats that corrode US and allied security, as intended in the designated unconventional/counterterrorism mission. The 2018 National Defense Strategy and the National Defense Strategy Commission identified this element, which should be useful in framing assets for US Special Operations Command. This mission could include dealing with state-sponsored proxy forces. Well-armed proxy forces are likely forms of great-power confrontation, including between China and the United States.46

The last priority reflects the importance of space, which is critical to homeland security, the efficacy of missile defense, and the conduct of Joint operations, as a contested domain.

Risk Assessment

The central question in any defense strategy involves risks—plural. Defense policy leaders assessed the variety of risks the Department of Defense faced, including the near-term risks of a second contingency as it related to other risks. Planners have many considerations to factor into their risk assessments. Is opportunistic aggression likely? If so, how likely and how consequential is it? Is it greater than the risk to the homeland, to ongoing counterterrorism and counter-subversion missions, or to the possibility of a strategic deterrent failure? The answer in late 2017 was “no.” Was there greater risk in falling further behind in emergent capabilities, failing to pursue new concepts, and investing in new capabilities to address great-power competition adequately? The answer was “yes” to the Secretary of Defense and the National Defense Strategy Task Force. While realizing the near-term risk, the strategy sought to gain lost ground beyond the Pentagon’s five-year plan. A multi-war construct would end up with the services funding manpower, readiness, and operations/maintenance accounts at the expense of research and development. In short, a “two-war” framework could undercut the strategy by misaligning resources and starving modernization programs.47

The answer today, however, is more complicated. Overall, the risk equation is different. China’s military growth has ramped up the risk for the primary scenario. Threats to the homeland are greater, and the strategic deterrent is increasingly challenged by age and multiple threat actors. Defense resources to cover these risks remain constrained by legislative caps and continuing resolutions that delay critical new starts and the pace of American efforts to transform the force for the twenty-first century. The industrial base remains unresponsive in critical areas. American forces have not been modernized with the urgency and scale that the 2018 strategy argued was crucial. The United States faces the prospects of great-power competition with a technological peer, with an unprepared force and a fragile industrial base.48

Strategy is about deciding what is important and focusing resources and actions on those critical objectives. Disciplined trade-offs are what makes strategy hard. Most institutions fail to create focused strategies; instead, they promulgate laundry lists and declare unattainable goals. The next National Defense Strategy needs to be a coherent strategy and balance desired ambitions with finite means. It will be difficult to meet future security challenges without a larger Pentagon budget. Even with additional budget resources, though, defense policymakers would still have to accept risks. To succeed at advancing US security interests, the White House must prioritize and understand risk in all its forms.49

Conclusion

No simple formulation exists to solve the defense dilemma in the near term. Strategic planning for the Department of Defense requires clear priorities, trade-offs, disciplined planning, and risk management. The United States should address its growing strategic insolvency, prune some tasks, and apply greater strategic discipline to foreign interventions.

The wars of the future are here—ready or not. Thus, instead of defining a two-war capacity as the sine qua non of America’s superpower status, the United States should base its claim on its global power projection and competitive edge in key military competitions, especially space, undersea warfare, long-range strike, and advanced autonomous systems. The US military can and must seize the high ground in advanced technologies and extend the range, precision, and lethality of the Joint Force. America needs a prudent strategy and a clear framework for prioritizing missions and matching them to resources. Developing a compelling strategy and a clear rubric will be a crucial output for the new defense team.50

In the end, the leadership of the Department of Defense must be brutally honest with the near- and long-term risks the United States faces. The best advice to US policymakers in such an era—remain humble about predicting the future, set clear priorities, and avoid wishful thinking.51

 
 

Frank G. Hoffman
Dr. Frank G. Hoffman recently retired from the federal government after more than 46 years of service as a Marine, civil servant, and senior Pentagon official. His last post was at the Institute for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. He published Mars Adapting: Military Change during Wartime (Naval Institute Press, 2021), and his latest book about military adoption of technology is titled Mars Unbound.

 
 

Disclaimer: Articles, reviews and replies, review essays, and book reviews published in Parameters are unofficial expressions of opinion. The views and opinions expressed in Parameters are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. The appearance of external hyperlinks does not constitute endorsement by the Department of Defense of the linked websites or the information, products, or services contained therein. The Department of Defense does not exercise any editorial, security, or other control over the information you may find at these locations.

 
 

Endnotes

  1. Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Richard Fontaine, “The Axis of Upheaval: How America’s Adversaries Are Uniting to Overturn the Global Order,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2024), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/axis-upheaval-russia-iran-north-korea-taylor-fontaine; Walter Russell Mead, “America’s Jacksonian Turn,” The Wall Street Journal, July 14, 2024, https://www.wsj.com/opinion/americas-jacksonian-turn-presidential-election-history-9e684333; and Susan B. Glasser, “The Man Who Put Andrew Jackson in Trump’s Oval Office,” Politico Magazine, January 22, 2018, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/01/22/andrew-jackson-donald-trump-216493/. Return to text.
  2. Hal Brands and Evan Braden Montgomery, “One War Is Not Enough: Strategy and Force Planning for Great-Power Competition,” Texas National Security Review 3, no. 2 (Spring 2020): 80–92, https://tnsr.org/2020/03/one-war-is-not-enough-strategy-and-force-planning-for-great-power-competition/; David J. Trachtenberg, “The Demise of the ‘Two-War Strategy’ and Its Impact on Extended Deterrence and Assurance,” National Institute for Public Policy, Occasional Paper 4, no. 6 ( June 2024), https://www.nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Vol.-4-No.-6.pdf; Mark Gunzinger and Lukas Autenried, Building a Force That Wins: Recommendations for the 2022 National Defense Strategy (Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, 2021), https://www.mitchellaerospacepower.org/events/building-a-force-that-wins-recommendations-for-the-2022-national-defense-strategy/; Markus Garlauskas, “The United States and Its Allies Must Be Ready to Deter a Two-Front War and Nuclear Attacks in East Asia,” Atlantic Council, August 16, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/the-united-states-and-its-allies-must-be-ready-to-deter-a-two-front-war-and-nuclear-attacks-in-east-asia/; and Luis Simón et al., “Two Fronts, One Goal: Euro-Atlantic Security in the Indo-Pacific Age,” Brussels School of Governance Centre for Security Diplomacy and Strategy, August 28, 2023, https://csds.vub.be/publication/two-fronts-one-goal-euro-atlantic-security-in-the-indo-pacific-age/. Return to text.
  3. F. G. Hoffman, “Shaping the 21st Century Military,” Orbis 61, no. 1 (Winter 2017): 43–63, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2016.12.015. This proposal found no traction from the Pentagon’s leadership, all veterans of two decades of coalition warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan. Return to text.
  4. Raphael S. Cohen, “China and North Korea Throw U.S. War Plans Out the Window,” Foreign Policy, December 2, 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/12/02/us-military-defense-strategy-china-russia-north-korea-war-geopolitics/. Return to text.
  5. Richard Haass, “The Iran Opportunity: What America Needs to Do to Achieve a Breakthrough,” Foreign Affairs, January 6, 2025, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/iran-opportunity-richard-haass; and Afshon Ostovar, “The Grand Strategy of Militant Clients: Iran’s Way of War,” Security Studies 28, no. 1 (2019): 159–88. Return to text.
  6. Victor Cha and Ellen Kim, “The New Russia-North Korea Security Alliance,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), June 20, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/new-russia-north-korea-security-alliance; and Kim Soo-yeon, “(6th LD) Russia, N. Korea Ink Partnership Treaty Calling for Mutual Assistance if Either Is Attacked,” Yonhap News Agency, June 19, 2024, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240619001856315. Return to text.
  7. Eugene Rumer, “The United States and the ‘Axis’ of Its Enemies: Myths vs. Reality,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 25, 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/11/the-united-states-and-the-axis-of-its-enemies-myths-vs-reality?center=russia-eurasia&lang=en; Michael Kofman, “The Emperors League: Understanding Sino-Russian Defense Cooperation,” War on the Rocks, August 6, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/08/the-emperors-league-understanding-sino-russian-defense-cooperation/; Oriana Skylar Mastro, “Sino-Russian Military Alignment and Its Implications for Global Security,” Security Studies 33, no. 2 (2024): 254–90; and Hal Brands, “The New Autocratic Alliances: They Don’t Look Like America’s—but They’re Still Dangerous,” Foreign Affairs, March 29, 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/new-autocratic-alliances. Return to text.
  8. US Department of Defense (DoD), Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (DoD, December 2024), 44–71, https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2024.PDF; Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders, China’s Quest for Military Supremacy (Polity Books, 2025); and Scott Savitz,“How to Succeed in Deterring an Invasion of Taiwan without Really Trying (Hard),” RAND, December 20, 2024, https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2024/12/how-to-succeed-in-deterring-an-invasion-of-taiwan-without.html. For additional recommendations see Matt Pottinger, ed., The Boiling Moat: Urgent Steps to Defend Taiwan (Hoover Institution, 2024); and Mark Cancian et al., The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan (CSIS, January 2023), https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/230109_Cancian_FirstBattle_NextWar.pdf?V ersionId=XlDrfCUHet8OZSOYW_9PWx3xtc0ScGHn/. Return to text.
  9. Ronald O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities,” Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report RL33153 (CRS, August 16, 2024), 9. Return to text.
  10. Johannes R. Fischbach, “Closing the Gap: China Homes in on US Navy VLS Advantage,” Military Balance Blog, International Institute for Strategic Studies, December 20, 2024, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2024/12/closing-the-gap-china-homes-in-on-us-navy-vls-advantage/; and Kori Schake, “The National Security Imperative of the Trump Presidency: How His Administration Can Shore Up the Foundations of American Power,” Foreign Affairs, November 8, 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/national-security-imperative-trump-presidency-kori-schake. Return to text.
  11. Bryan Clark and Michael Roberts, “How America Can Rebuild Its Fleet to Counter China’s Maritime Dominance,” The Hill, January 14, 2025, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/5083704-how-america-can-rebuild-its-fleet-to-counter-chinas-maritime-dominance/; and Frank Kendall, The Department of the Air Force in 2050, Congressional Report, Department of the Air Force, Public Law 118-31, Section 923, (Department of the Air Force, December 30, 2024), 6, https://www.af.mil/Portals/1/AirForcePriorities/DAF_2050_Final_30_Dec.pdf. Return to text.
  12. Austin Dahmer, “Resourcing the Strategy of Denial: Optimizing the Defense Budget in Three Alternative Futures,” Marathon Initiative, February 1, 2023, https://themarathoninitiative.org/2023/02/resourcing-the-strategy-of-denial-optimizing-the-defense-budget-in-three-alternative-futures/. Return to text.
  13. US Defense Department (DoD), National Defense Strategy (DoD, 2022), 5; An exception being William Kim and Elbridge A. Colby, “No Sanctuary: The PLA’s Kinetic Threat to the Homeland,” Marathon Initiative, December 1, 2023, 7, 11, https://themarathoninitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/TMI-No-Sanctuary-Kim-Colby-FINAL.pdf. Return to text.
  14. Adam Segal, “China Has Raised the Cyber Stakes: The ‘Salt Typhoon’ Hack Revealed America’s Profound Vulnerability,” Foreign Affairs, January 21, 2025, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/china-has-raised-cyber-stakes; “People’s Republic of China State-Sponsored Cyber Actor Living off the Land to Evade Detection,” May 24, 2023, Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency, https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-144a; and Ellen Nakashima and Joseph Menn, “China’s Cyber Army Is Invading Critical U.S. Services,” The Washington Post, December 11, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2023/12/11/china-hacking-hawaii-pacific-taiwan-conflict/. Return to text.
  15. Robert Soofer et al., “ ‘First, We Will Defend the Homeland’: The Case for Homeland Missile Defense,” Atlantic Council, January 4, 2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/first-we-will-defend-the-homeland-the-case-for-homeland-missile-defense/; “President Donald J. Trump Directs the Building of the Iron Dome Missile Defense Shield for America” (The White House, January 27, 2025), https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/01/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-directs-the-building-of-the-iron-dome-missile-defense-shield-for-america/; Todd Harrison, “How Much Would a Space-Based Missile Interceptor System Cost and Does It Make Sense,” American Enterprise Institute, January 29, 2025, https://www.aei.org/foreign-and-defense-policy/how-much-would-a-space-based-missile-interceptor-system-cost-and-does-it-make-sense/; Aaron Stein, “The Future of Space Militarization,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, February 2025, https://fpriinsights.substack.com/p/07f2c4de-a3ec-4896-89e5-8ba74a14ab5f; Congressional Budget Office (CBO), National Cruise Missile Defense: Issues and Alternatives, CBO Paper (CBO, February, 2021), 1–2, https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56950; and Tom Karako et al., North America is a Region, Too, (CSIS, July 14, 2022), 58, https://www.csis.org/analysis/north-america-region-too. Return to text.
  16. CBO, Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2023 to 2042, CBO Paper, (CBO, July 2023), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/59365. Return to text.
  17. Madelyn Creedon and Franklin Miller, “Deterring the Nuclear Dictators: To Confront China, Russia, and North Korea, Trump Should Forgo a Review and Speed Up the Arsenal’s Modernization,” Foreign Affairs, November 20, 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/deterring-nuclear-dictators?utm_medium=newsletters&utm_source=fatoday&utm_campaign=How%20Tariffs%20Can%20Help%20America&utm_content=20241227&utm_term=EDZZZ003ZX; Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise (Heritage Foundation, 2024), 123–25, https://static.heritage.org/project2025/2025_MandateForLeadership_FULL.pdf; Charles Richard, “U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Space Command SASC Testimony” (speech, US Strategic Command, 2022), https://www.stratcom.mil/Media/Speeches/Article/2960836/us-strategic-command-and-us-space-command-sasc-testimony/; and Madelyn Creedon et al., America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, Congressional Commission, October 2023, vii. Return to text.
  18. Frank Kendall quoted by Aaron Bateman, “The New Struggle for Space,” Engleberg Ideas, December 17, 2024, https://engelsbergideas.com/essays/the-new-struggle-for-space/; and Nina M. Armagno and Jane Harman, Securing Space: A Plan for U.S. Action (Council on Foreign Relations, February 2025). Return to text.
  19. Unconstrained Actors: Assessing Global Cyber Threats to the Homeland, 119th Cong. (2025) (statement of Mark Montgomery to the House Committee on Homeland Security), 1, 2, https://www.fdd.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/01-22-25-Montgomery-Written-Testimony-Final.pdf; See also Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, (ODNI, March 2025), https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-publications/reports-publications-2025/4058-2025-annual-threat-assessment; and The CCP Cyber Threat to the American Homeland and National Security, 118th Cong. (2024) (report issued by Mike Gallagher to House Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, January 31, 2024), https://selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/about/events/hearing-ccp-cyber-threat-american-homeland-and-national-security. Return to text.
  20. CBO, Budget and Economic Outlook, 2025-2035, 1, (CBO, January 2025), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/61172; “Interest Costs Surpass National Defense and Medicare Spending,” US House Committee on the Budget, June 2024, https://budget.house.gov/press-release/interest-costs-surpass-national-defense-and-medicare-spending; and “What is the National Debt Costing Us?,” Peter G. Peterson Foundation, n.d., last updated February 3, 2025, https://www.pgpf.org/article/what-is-the-national-debt-costing-us/. Return to text.
  21. “Extending Trump Tax Cuts Would Add $4.6 Trillion to Deficit CBO Finds,” US Senate Budget Committee, May 8, 2024, https://www.budget.senate.gov/chairman/newsroom/press/extending-trump-tax-cuts-would-add-46-trillion-to-the-deficit-cbo-finds. Return to text.
  22. See the overview “America’s National Debt Challenge” at the Peter G. Peterson Foundation, https://www.pgpf.org/our-national-debt/. Return to text.
  23. See Niall Ferguson, “Ferguson’s Law: Debt Service, Military Spending, and the Fiscal Limits of Power,” Hoover Institution, February 21, 2025, 1, https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/HAHWGWorkingPaper-212502-Ferguson%27s%20Law-Final.pdf; and Niall Ferguson, “Debt Has Always Been the Ruin of Great Powers. Is the U.S. Next?,” The Wall Street Journal, February 21, 2025, https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/debt-has-always-been-the-ruinof-great-powers-is-the-u-s-next-02f16402. Return to text.
  24. Brands and Montgomery, “One War,” 81. Return to text.
  25. On concerns about this risk, see Hal Brands and Evan Braden Montgomery, “Opportunistic Aggression in the Twenty-First Century,” Survival 62, no. 4 (2020): 157–82. Return to text.
  26. For more details, see Mark Gunzinger et al., Force Planning for the Era of Great Power Competition, (Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments [CSBA], 2017), 5–11. Return to text.
  27. Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century, Report of the National Defense Panel, December 1997, 23, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA332664.pdf. Return to text.
  28. Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom, The United States Commission on National Security / 21st Century, April 15, 2000, 14–15, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA395256.pdf. Return to text.
  29. Frank G. Hoffman, “To Shake Up the Status Quo, Review the Two-War Focus,” Defense News, February 12, 2001, 15; Then-candidate Bush made these remarks at a widely cited speech at the South Carolina Military Academy (the Citadel) in 1999; and The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) (Government Printing Office, March 2005). Return to text.
  30. As reflected in Jim Mitre, “A Eulogy for the Two-War Construct,” The Washington Quarterly 41, no. 4 (Winter, 2019): 7–30. Mr. Mitre was a critical contributor to the 2018 NDS Task Force. Return to text.
  31. Brands and Montgomery, “One War,” 82; and Mitre, “Eulogy,” 17, 20. Return to text.
  32. Brands and Montgomery, “One War,” 83. Return to text.
  33. See David A. Ochmanek et al., U.S. Military Capabilities and Forces for a Dangerous World: Rethinking the U.S. Approach to Force Planning, (RAND Corporation, November 28, 2018), 11–16, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1782-1.html. Return to text.
  34. For a critique of the 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, see Senator Roger F. Wicker, 21st Century Peace through Strength: A Generational Investment in the U.S. Military (ranking member brief, US Senate Armed Services Committee, 2024), 6–7, https://permanent.fdlp.gov/gpo230497/PeaceThroughStrength.pdf. Return to text.
  35. Brands and Montgomery, “One War,” 81. Return to text.
  36. Thomas G. Mahnken, “A Three-Theater Defense Strategy: How America Can Prepare for War in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East,” Foreign Affairs, June 5, 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/theater-defense-war-asia-europe-middle-east. Return to text.
  37. The Final Report of the Commission on the National Defense Strategy (Commission on the National Defense Strategy, 2024), 38. This panel was co-chaired by Ambassador Eric Edelman and former Senator Jane Harmon, https://www.ndscommission.senate.gov/. Return to text.
  38. Robert D. Blackwill and Richard Fontaine, Lost Decade: The US Pivot to Asia and the Rise of Chinese Power (Oxford University Press, 2024). On China’s aspirations, see Hal Brands, The Eurasian Century: Hot Wars, Cold Wars, and the Making of the Modern World (W. W. Norton, 2025), 180–87. Return to text.
  39. Brands and Montgomery, “One War,” 91. Return to text.
  40. Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution Reform (CPPBER), Defense Resourcing for the Future (CPPBER), March 6, 2024, 27–66, https://ppbereform.senate.gov/finalreport/. The commission called out the need to improve the alignment of budgets to strategy. Return to text.
  41. Mark Gunzinger should be credited for suggesting the prioritized mission concept. See Mark Gunzinger, Shaping America’s Future Military: Toward a New Force Planning Construct (CSBA, 2013), 30–31, https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/shaping-americas-future-military-toward-a-new-force-planning-construct/. Return to text.
  42. Aaron Stein, “Unmanned Attrition and a New High-Low Mix,” Foreign Policy Research Institute / Behind the Front, October 10, 2024, https://behindthefront.substack.com/p/unmanned-attrition-and-a-new-high; and Stacie Pettyjohn et al., “Build a High-Low Mix to Enhance America’s Warfighting Edge and Deter China,” Center for a New American Security, January 20, 2025, https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/strengthen-indo-pacific-deterrence-by-enhancing-americas-warfighting-edge. Return to text.
  43. Aaron Stein, “The Future of the United States in Euro—A Proposal,” Foreign Policy Research Institute / Behind the Front, February 26, 2025, https://behindthefront.substack.com/p/the-future-of-the-united-states-in. For thoughts on force reductions under different budget levels, see Austin Dahmer, “Resourcing the Strategy.” Return to text.
  44. Michael J. Mazarr, “Why America Still Needs Europe: The False Promise of an ‘Asia First’ Approach,” Foreign Affairs, April 17, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/why-america-still-needs-europe; On the prospects for Russian military restoration, see Dara Massicot with Richard Connolly, Russian Military Reconstitution: 2030 Pathways and Prospects (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September, 2024); and Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Michael Kofman, “Putin’s Point of No Return: How an Unchecked Russia Will Challenge the West,” Foreign Affairs, December 18, 2024, 72–87, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russia/putins-point-no-return. Return to text.
  45. A point stressed by Colin S. Gray, Strategy and Defence Planning (Oxford University Press, 2014), 39, 121. Return to text.
  46. Philip Wasielewski, “The Constant Fight: Intelligence Activities, Irregular Warfare, and Political Warfare,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, June 20, 2023, https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/06/the-constant-fight-intelligence-activities-irregular-warfare-and-political-warfare/. For a specific discussion about China and proxy forces, see Dominic Tierney, “The Future of Sino-U.S. Proxy War,” Texas National Security Review 4, no. 2 (Spring 2021): 49–73, https://tnsr.org/2021/03/the-future-of-sino-u-s-proxy-war/. For a general argument, see the author’s chapter on great-power competition by proxies in Assaf Moghadam et al., eds., Routledge Handbook of Proxy Wars (Routledge, 2023). Return to text.
  47. Mitre, “Eulogy,” 7. Return to text.
  48. John A. Tirpak, “New Defense Industrial Base Strategy Warns of Long Recovery,” Air & Space Forces Magazine, January 12, 2024, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/new-defense-industrial-base-strategy-long-recovery/. Return to text.
  49. Richard Rumelt, Good Strategy, Bad Strategy: The Difference and Why It Matters (Crown Currency, 2011), 20, 90; and John Lewis Gaddis, On Grand Strategy (Penguin Books Limited, 2018), 21. Return to text.
  50. Christian Brose, “The New Revolution in Military Affairs: War’s Sci-Fi Future,” Foreign Affairs 98, no. 3 (May/June 2019); and Mark A. Milley and Eric Schmidt, “America Isn’t Ready for the Wars of the Future: And They’re Already Here,” Foreign Affairs (September/October 2024), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/ai-america-ready-wars-future-ukraine-israel-mark-milley-eric-schmidt. For further detail, see Special Competitive Studies Project, “Memo to the President on Defense: The Path to an Innovative and Lethal Military,” January 24, 2025, https://scsp222.substack.com/p/memo-to-the-president-on-defense. Return to text.
  51. As argued by Philip Zelikow, “Confronting Another Axis? History, Humility, and Wishful Thinking,” Texas National Security Review 7, no. 3 (Summer 2024): 80–99, https://tnsr.org/2024/05/confronting-another-axis-history-humility-and-wishful-thinking/. Return to text.