Book Reviews

  Strategy

Next War: Reimagining How We Fight

by John Antal
Reviewed by Colonel Jeffrey Caton (US Air Force, retired), president, Kepler Strategies LLC, and Parameters editorial board member
©2025 Jeffrey Caton

John Antal is a 30-year US Army veteran and author of various military-related publications. His latest book, Next War: Reimagining How We Fight, can best be described as historical military fiction interweaved with informed conjecture of how future battles may be fought. More than one-quarter of the book is dedicated to 13 whimsical accounts of tactical engagements ranging from the American Revolution to the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War. The author states that “The main aim of this book is to draw lessons and conclusions from the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, the Israeli-Hamas War, and the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War” (xii). Antal pursues this goal through a paradigm of nine disrupters that he claims are changing the methods of modern warfare: a transparent battlespace; first-strike advantage; artificial intelligence (AI) and the tempo of war; top attack; fully autonomous weapons; super swarming; kill webs; battlespace visualization; and decision dominance (11).

After an introductory chapter, the next nine chapters of Next War each address one of the disrupters in a manner that emphasizes descriptions and illustrations at the cost of the analysis of these substantial topics. Simply put, Antal addresses too much scope with too little substance. Not counting photographs and scenarios, Antal spends five pages each on the topics of “Top Attack” and “The Transition to Fully Autonomous Weapons.” While the disrupters framework is easy to follow in concept, the content of individual chapters suffer from avoidable overlap and duplication.

The next five chapters of Next War are an eclectic mix of topics presented like the previous nine. The first muses about the contributions of Elon Musk’s Starlink satellite communication system to future battles. Second is a brief view of “Preparing for the Next City Fight” and is primarily limited to the roles of tanks and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms. This overview is followed by a short discussion of “The Big Blue Blanket—Light Tactical Aircraft for Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems Combat,” whereby Antal suggests that the US Air Force should consider procuring propeller-driven piloted aircraft to counter unmanned aerial systems that threaten ground forces. Antal then shifts to the topics of developing a hybrid human-robotic force and command post rules. These intricate issues receive about 10 pages each and thus offer little depth of insight.

The final chapter presents his concept of battleshock as the “rapid convergence of key disrupters in the battlespace” that occurs “when the tempo of operations is so fast, and the multidomain means so overwhelming, that the enemy cannot think, decide, and act in time” (219). This concept is reminiscent of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s “shock and awe” aspiration for Operation Iraqi Freedom, which Antal does not mention. Despite the technology fetish of the previous 15 chapters, Antal focuses his final 12 pages on the “determined human warfighter fighting as a member of a team” and the need to “lead, design, train, fight, and support to win” (188). While Antal offers copious homilies about future tactical military engagements, he does so in a context void of a strategic view of war that embraces all elements of national power.

While Next War includes satisfactory end notes and a bibliography, it falls short of being authoritative in at least two ways. First, Antal offers a monologue of the future supported by facts that buoy his vision; there is little consideration of prudent opposing concepts. His technological solutions are evocative of the Army’s Future Combat System that attempted to incorporate many of the disrupter notions, but Antal fails to mention this failed project. Second, Antal does not discuss how future military battlespace machinations contribute to future war among nations. This omission is evident in his platitude to “focus on winning wars rapidly and decisively, as we did in Desert Storm in 1991” (198). He neglects to relate how the poor termination of this conflict contributed to the need for Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. Further, Antal offers the May 2021 Israeli-Hamas fight as a triumph for AI programs that “dramatically reduces Israeli casualties and ended the war in 11 days” as evidence of clean future wars (81). The October 2023 Hamas invasion of Israel and the ensuing international quagmire of death and destruction clearly temper these prognostications.

Antal asserts that “If Next War sparks your imagination, raises your awareness, and impels you to enter a dialogue with others about the changing methods of war, then it has accomplished its mission” (xii). Certainly, Next War does appeal to some audiences in this context. If one removes the fictional scenarios, the pictures, and the banality of Next War, however, little original content remains for senior members of the defense community to consider.

Casemate Publishers, 2023 ▪ 240 pages ▪ $24.95

Keywords: transparent battlespace, first strike advantage, AI, super swarm, kill web

  Technology and War

Unit X: How the Pentagon and Silicon Valley Are Transforming the Future of War

by Raj M. Shah and Christopher Kirchhoff
Reviewed by Robert D. Bradford III, associate professor of defense and Joint processes, US Army War College

How can the US military take advantage of the technological revolution happening around us and provide links to the best innovation ecosystem in the world? Unit X: How the Pentagon and Silicon Valley Are Transforming the Future of War provides part of the answer. The book tells the story of the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx) and how it connects the Department of Defense (DoD) to Silicon Valley’s innovation infrastructure. Authors Raj M. Shah and Christopher Kirchhoff, two former DIUx leaders, tell insider stories of how this important organization overcame bureaucratic inertia and struggled to connect two distinct approaches to putting improved capabilities in the hands of soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and guardians.

The book describes the challenges the DIU (Secretary of Defense General James Mattis dropped the x in 2017) experienced linking two disparate perspectives. In Silicon Valley, tech solves problems, dreams are big, money flows toward teams with promising ideas, developers fail fast and then quickly pivot to new implementations that succeed, and capabilities are swiftly delivered into the hands of users to exploit advantages and learn. It is a place with its own language and its own assumptions. The Department of Defense, on the other hand, is the world’s largest bureaucracy. Its acquisition system evolved to minimize the risk of failure, money moves deliberately and according to the long-term plan that is the future year’s defense program, and people are trained to adhere to bureaucratic processes that minimize variability and decrease speed of delivery. In 2015, Army Acquisition Executive Heidi Shyu famously described the DoD acquisition system as a bus where all the passengers have steering wheels and brakes but no gas pedal, as everyone seeks compliance to the many rules. How could the Department of Defense connect these two disparate perspectives to bring cutting-edge technologies and capabilities into the hands of the military? To facilitate this interaction, then–Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter stood up an organization located in Silicon Valley—the DIU—that remains an important connector of two distinct approaches focused on delivery of capability to the war fighter.

This accessible and entertaining book is full of insider stories about important players and a small team creatively using authorities to deliver innovative technology to war fighters. It describes DIU clashes with the complex bureaucracy that is the Department of Defense; its engagement with small, agile start-ups determined to provide capabilities but lacking cash flow; the large incumbent defense primes who saw Silicon Valley as a threat rather than a partner; and interactions with the legislative branch (both members and professional staff) who could put up barriers or tear them down for the DIU. Shah and Kirchhoff describe how the original instantiation of DIUx (DIUx 1.0) failed and how they were tapped to resurrect DIUx into a 2.0 version based on their understanding of Silicon Valley (Shah was a start-up leader and a fighter pilot in the United States Air Force Reserve) and the policy system (Kirchhoff led the science and technology portfolio on the then President Barack Obama’s national security staff). Even with their uniquely relevant backgrounds and the Secretary of Defense as a champion, the DIUx’s struggle with the Pentagon bureaucracy to overcome obstacles and provide important defense capabilities is a compelling story.

Unit X is a tale of organizational change in the largest bureaucracy in the world. The authors’ experiences highlight the importance of having a formidable team and a powerful champion—and of achieving quick wins. The book talks about how the organization, championed by one administration, survived changes in leadership and evolved over time to continue today.

This book is relevant to senior DoD leaders, with many lessons about how to change the bureaucracy to speed capability to the force. The assumptions and expectations that the DIU has had to overcome still exist, and battles will continue into the future.

Scribner, 2024 ▪ 336 pages ▪ $30.00

Keywords: Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx), acquisition, capability development, Pentagon, Silicon Valley

Co-Intelligence: Living and Working with AI

by Ethan Mollick
Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Zachary E. Griffiths, special assistant to the Chief of Staff of the Army
©2025 Zachary E. Griffiths

We are all swimming in the US Army’s artificial intelligence (AI) acronym soup. The Artificial Intelligence Integration Center (AI2C) sets policy and trains AI experts. Army Futures Command’s Software Factory (ASF) trains soldiers to develop code. New skill identifiers like 4K, 2U, 2V, 2W, D3, and D4 let the Army track AI talent. These are great resources, but only for a small number of people. Where should the rest of us turn? Ethan Mollick’s Co-Intelligence: Living and Working with AI offers a great place to start.

In a concise, readable volume, Mollick effectively takes readers on a tour of AI as an important new thing in the world (xix). As a professor of innovation at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School of Business, Mollick has led experimentation on today’s frontier large language model with partners like Boston Consulting Group and other researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University.

Co-Intelligence treads new and practical ground in books on AI. While books like Human + Machine: Reimagining Work in the Age of AI by Paul R. Daugherty and H. James Wilson explore AI’s role in transforming industries and workforces, Co-Intelligence emphasizes AI as a tool for personal and creative empowerment. Co-Intelligence also differs from military books like Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War by Paul Scharre that explore the implications of AI in military settings. Instead, Co-Intelligence offers a user’s guide to large language models.

Mollick offers four rules for those who want to learn AI. First, always invite AI to the table. The best way to learn to work with AI is to experiment with different models on as many tasks as possible. Second, be the human in the loop. While it can be tempting to fire and forget with AI, the best results come from iteration and thoughtful prompting. Third, prompting works best if you treat the AI as a person but also tell it who you want it to be. For example, Mollick explains how he revised Co-Intelligence with the help of three different AI personas. Fourth, he reminds readers that AI is rapidly advancing, meaning that today’s AI is the “worst AI you will ever use” (61).

He develops these ideas over Co-Intelligence’s two parts. The shorter first section introduces the history of artificial intelligence, how we got to today’s large language models, the ethical and legal concerns arising from these models, and Mollick’s four rules. The second part focuses on six ways to “invite AI to the table” (46). Ranging from coworker to creative to coach, Mollick explores how AI can augment your work.

Fortunately for Army officers, Co-Intelligence is aimed squarely at lay readers who want to understand how to use AI. The second section focuses on six ways to integrate AI and offers practical guidance on incorporating it into everyone’s work. For example, summarizing or screening large amounts of text is a common challenge for action officers. Mollick’s example on page 112 shows how AI successfully screened The Great Gatsby. By instantly identifying the three sci-fi references he added to the text—and the surprising size of Gatsby’s estate on Long Island—Mollick demonstrates how action officers might adopt AI. Beyond the helpful guides, Mollick also effectively explains terms like hallucinations, sparks, prompt engineering, and other ideas that one might have heard of but may not fully understand.

Despite these strengths, Co-Intelligence has a few weak spots. For example, for an organization like the Army, Mollick’s encouragement for individuals to experiment with AI may run afoul of real security concerns. Nonetheless, the productivity leveling aspects of artificial intelligence mean that the Army should not ban them. Co-Intelligence would be stronger if it provided guidance for organizations struggling with adoption beyond encouraging experimentation. Moreover, the book is light on ethical considerations. While the second chapter focuses on legal and ethical issues, the ebullient second half and quick conclusion overshadow these important questions. Finally, the book ends with four highly speculative views of the future, ranging from little change to the status quo to the destruction of mankind. While I appreciate Mollick’s honesty in painting the range of potential outcomes, the conclusion is certainly the least useful part of the book. If Mollick had provided indicators to watch for, the book might have at least provided a framework for understanding AI as it evolves toward these potential outcomes.

All Army officers should flip through this quick read. AI is a general intelligence tool that will improve the Army’s productivity—and change warfare’s conduct. The US Army War College’s data literacy program would do well to incorporate Co-Intelligence as an accessible introductory text. Likewise, faculty at Army schools seeking to integrate AI into their curriculum should draw lessons from Mollick’s approach to incorporating AI in his classroom. Accessible and informative, everyone should read Co-Intelligence.

Portfolio | Penguin, 2024 ▪ 256 pages ▪ $30.00

Keywords: artificial intelligence (AI), productivity, prompts, data literacy, large language models (LLMs)

  Military History

Knife Fights: A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice

by John A. Nagl
Reviewed by Major Brennan Deveraux, national security researcher, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College
©2025 Brennan Deveraux

Counterinsurgency operations defined a generation of war fighters; today’s commanders walked the streets of Iraq and Afghanistan as young officers, employing emerging doctrine and leading a force in transition. During this pivotal time for the US Army, the service transformed mid-conflict, driven by the bottom-up refinement of many who lived through the chaos. John Nagl, a US Army War College professor, was one of those voices.

In his book Knife Fights: A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice, Nagl shares his personal experiences from his time as a young lieutenant in Operation Desert Storm through the rollout and application of the Army’s counterinsurgency manual at the twilight of his military career. It is a historical piece, “a book about counterinsurgency and its journey from the far periphery of US military doctrine to its center, for better and, some would argue, for worse” (1). At the same time, it is Nagl’s autobiography, “an intellectual coming-of-age story” (1). Nagl argues throughout the book that the United States must be, and remain, prepared to conduct counterinsurgency operations. He contends this often-ignored aspect of warfare will remain a significant mission for the US Army, whether or not the service wishes to prepare for it.

Knife Fights begins as a standard war memoir. As a newly commissioned Army officer at the onset of the first Persian Gulf War, Nagl is thrust into the conflict and forced to navigate the challenges of leading a small unit into battle. He uses Operation Desert Storm and his subsequent post-deployment training, however, to understand the Army’s post–Cold War assumptions about warfare, dominated by a vision of future tank-on-tank battles in open terrain. Nagl quickly discovers the Army’s vision is lacking and begins his crusade to bring a different aspect of warfare to the forefront of the Army’s vision for future war.

While the book continues as Nagl’s personal story, including his unit’s deployment back to Iraq in 2004, it shifts away from the soldier on the ground to the concept of counterinsurgency. Although Nagl highlights the significant works on the topic, including his own, he does not detail competing theories or address some of the inherent challenges of counterinsurgency. Instead, he provides a firsthand account of the rise of counterinsurgency as a US Army priority. The book is authoritative on this front, introducing readers to the individuals across the force who made the publication of the counterinsurgency manual possible, and he candidly details the process’s inner workings.

Nagl wrote Knife Fights when the futures of Iraq and Afghanistan still hung in the balance. A decade ago, this book would have been relevant to senior members of the defense community—one man’s plea not to ignore hard-earned counterinsurgency lessons. So, why review it now, 10 years later? Because the impact and meaning are relevant now in a different way, and in this reviewer’s humble opinion, the audience has shifted to a much more junior group.

The Army once again finds itself in transition, preparing for an ambiguous future war. With Chief of Staff of the Army General Randy A. George calling on the force to engage in professional discourse, Knife Fights provides a tangible example of the impact junior leaders can have on the service. In this context, Nagl’s story contributes as much to the field of professional writing as to the field of counterinsurgency.

The next fight for many who wear the uniform will not be on the battlefield; instead, soldiers will fight battles on the pages of the Army’s professional journals, in the offices of the Pentagon, and in professional military education classrooms. Regardless, they will be fights. Some are undoubtedly ongoing. These personal battles to change the status quo can make or break careers, but those with the courage to take that risk will, if successful, help shape the force for the next battle. These are the knife fights Nagl writes about, which is why this book remains relevant today.

Penguin Press, 2014 ▪ 269 pages ▪ $24.00

Keywords: counterinsurgency, Persian Gulf War, professional writing, Iraq, Afghanistan

The World Will Never See the Like: The Gettysburg Reunion of 1913

by John L. Hopkins
Reviewed by Reverend Dr. Wylie W. Johnson, chaplain (retired), US Army War College class of 2010
©2025 Wylie W. Johnson

Regardless of the accuracy of the assertion that the Battle of Gettysburg was the “high water mark of the Confederacy,” the Gettysburg Reunion of 1913 is surely the pinnacle of the (all but forgotten) American reconciliation movement. The Gettysburg Reunion was the culminating event bringing large numbers of aging combatants together for the last time.

Hopkins’s well-researched book is a marvel of traditional journalism—evenhandedly relating the facts without pounding an ideological drum. He begins the story in spring 1908, when American Civil War veteran Henry Shippen Huidekoper approached then–Pennsylvania Governor Edwin S. Stuart at Philadelphia’s storied Union League about organizing a 50th anniversary commemoration of the battle. The narrative unfolds through subsequent years by retelling anecdotes about personalities, sectional suspicions, penurious legislatures, obstinate leadership, local versus national concerns, politics, logistics, heroic individual actions, and the veterans who fought.

The reunion almost did not happen. Governor John Kinley Tener forced Brigadier General Louis Wagner to resign with less than five months remaining and most key decisions unresolved. Once that impasse was removed, the reunion quickly came together, hosting nearly 55,000 veterans and an equal number of spectators. This assembly held the rapt attention of the entire nation.

Gettysburg residents voiced concerns that their community would be wrecked again. One track rail minimally serviced the community. The 1913 road network was judged marginally adequate. Federal, military, state, local, commercial, and individual resources collaborated to realize the reunion. Even the Boy Scouts enlisted in this effort as guides and assistants to the aged veterans.

Many, but not all, of the state legislatures allotted funds for veterans to travel to Gettysburg. Veterans had to provide documentation (for example, an honorable discharge, a pension certificate, or an affidavit from their post or camp commanders) before receiving credentials to attend.

Veterans found quarters in 6,500 military tents carefully laid out on a grid that encompassed 280 acres, with 47 miles of streets lit by 500 electric lights. Organizers took care to locate state regiments adjacent to one another. Approximately 170 field kitchens staffed by more than 2,000 cooks produced abundant food. The event required 90 field latrines, each boasting 40 seats. A temporary post office, pay phones, water points, hospitals, and aid stations provided essential services. Completing the preparations, an enormous 13,000-person main tent was erected for plenary events during the four-day encampment.

President Woodrow Wilson declined his invitation before reconsidering and making a brief appearance. Most of the generals of 1863 were dead or physically unable to attend. Two luminaries participated—Helen Dortch Longstreet (Lieutenant General James Longstreet’s widow), who was eager to rehabilitate her husband’s reputation, and Union general and New York politician Daniel Edgar Sickles.

Southern veterans, adamant that Black veterans would not participate (very few did), were also offended by the unenforced rule forbidding their Stars and Bars battle flags. By 1913, the prevailing “Lost Cause” rhetoric of why the South lost was generally accepted nationwide. Northerners acknowledged the Southern states’ rights viewpoint, cleansed of the defense of slavery, as a moral equivalent to the Union effort of reunification.

During the celebration, bonhomie prevailed; former foes connected and made new friends. Throughout the event, unit gatherings, formal speeches, and presentations were eclipsed by thousands of aged veterans wandering the battleground and sharing their war stories. Then it was over. In less than one day, all that was left was the cleanup.

What is it about the character of the American soldier that seeks connection with former enemies? In 1913, the assumption prevailed that the nation would never forget this reunion event. Few know of it today—however, the spirit of reconciliation continues to thrive among the nation’s warriors. Consider the American desire to visit the foreign cemeteries of the fallen, to walk the battlefields of Europe and Asia, and to connect with former foes.

This well-researched book documents the reunion’s political wrangling, leadership challenges, and logistical problems—important lessons to bear in mind for future events. The takeaway for senior leaders from this compelling book is the overriding necessity for reconciliation. The American citizen soldier is perhaps unique among the militaries of the world, for when the conflict is done, amends must be made. It is the American way of war.

Savas Beatie, 2024 ▪ 216 pages ▪ $32.95

Keywords: American Civil War, reconciliation, veterans, personal narratives, event management

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