Russian Novel Nuclear Weapons and War-Fighting Capabilities

Spenser A. Warren
©2025 Spenser A. Warren

ABSTRACT: This article argues that Russia’s novel nuclear-capable weapons will have a minor but real impact on Russian war-fighting capabilities in Eastern Europe. Using publicly available assessments, it evaluates the weapons’ characteristics individually and when taken together to determine their possible impact on war fighting, deterrence, and arms control. Additionally, it analyzes Russian war-fighting concepts to project how Russian strategists think about their use and how they might integrate them into Russian war-fighting concepts. The study’s conclusions will assist military strategists and policy practitioners as they plan for a potential regional war on NATO’s eastern flank.

Keywords: nuclear strategy, Eastern Europe, hypersonic weapons, Russian strategy, European security

Russian President Vladimir Putin announced five novel nuclear delivery systems during his annual address to the Russian Federal Assembly in 2018. At the time of his speech, only one system—the Kh-47Ms2 Kinzhal hypersonic aeroballistic cruise missile—was reportedly in service. Russia deployed three of the five systems in 2023 and claimed to have completed testing on the remaining two by the end of 2023. To date, the Russian military has used two of these novel weapons—the Kinzhal and the 3M22 Tsirkon hypersonic cruise missile—as part of its war in Ukraine.¹

How will these novel weapons affect Russia’s war-fighting capabilities in Europe? I argue that these nuclear-capable weapons will enhance Moscow’s war-fighting capabilities—to a limited degree. While novel weapons are technically revolutionary, they only provide a minor evolution in Russian capabilities. Hypersonic weapons could increase the speed of Russian attacks, and Russian leaders allege they improve precision abilities. Both may complicate air and missile defense efforts, potentially undermining Allied deterrence by denial strategies along NATO’s eastern flank.

Additionally, their performance may not match Russian claims. The Kinzhal and Tsirkon have proven more effective than older weapons at overcoming rudimentary Ukrainian air and missile defense systems in Ukraine. Neither has met Russian expectations, and both remain vulnerable to advanced American-made defense systems such as the Patriot missile. This performance could indicate that Russia’s novel weapons are not as advanced as claimed and that their current impacts may be strategically unimportant. Nevertheless, Russia could learn from these setbacks and improve weapons technologies and use in future conflicts.

In this article, I consider five novel systems: the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle, the 9M730 Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile, the Kinzhal hypersonic aeroballistic missile, the Poseidon unmanned underwater vehicle, and the Tsirkon hypersonic cruise missile. Each system has a nuclear-armed variant, and several are also confirmed to have a conventionally armed version. Russia claims that each system has some novel characteristic—either hypersonic velocity or nuclear power—that makes it impervious to missile defenses. The performance of the Kinzhal and the Tsirkon, however, suggests that Russian claims about their invulnerability are either intentional disinformation or misperceptions of their own capabilities. It is likely that some element of disinformation or misperception is also present in Russian comments about the Avangard, Burevestnik, or Poseidon, even if it is not guaranteed that such comments are as disingenuous or inaccurate as those regarding the Kinzhal and the Tsirkon.

The first section of this article provides background information about the five novel weapons. The second section discusses how Russia has used the Kinzhal and Tsirkon missiles in Ukraine. The third section explores how Russia may use these weapons in a regional war with NATO—including for escalation management, aerospace defense, naval warfare, or limited nuclear use for battlefield purposes. A broader theoretical discussion about why these weapons will neither dramatically alter how Russia wages war nor impact the regional balance of power follows. The article concludes with recommendations for US and Allied policy.

Russia’s Novel Nuclear Weapons

Russia has deployed or is developing five novel nuclear weapons systems as part of its recent nuclear modernization efforts. The primary drivers of this modernization are maintaining Russia’s nuclear deterrent, attaining international status aspirations, and promoting the interests of domestic actors. Nevertheless, Russia may use these weapons for reasons other than their initial intended use, including war fighting.²

The Avangard is a hypersonic-boost glide vehicle launched by a missile to an altitude of approximately 100 kilometers. The glide vehicle then separates from the missile and maneuvers through the atmosphere toward its target along an erratic trajectory. Avangard reportedly travels at speeds of up to Mach 20 during the glide phase. The maneuverability of Avangard may make it difficult to track and intercept.³

The Tsirkon, a ship-based hypersonic nuclear-capable cruise missile first tested in February 2020, became operational in January 2023. Land and underwater tests have also occurred. Like the Kinzhal, Russia has used the Tsirkon in Ukraine, though its use has been more and Ukrainian forces have not reported the same level of success intercepting them. The maneuverability of the Tsirkon likely makes it more effective than the Kinzhal, which relies on speed alone to overcome air and missile defenses. The Admiral Gorshkov–class frigate and the smaller Buyan-M and Karakut-class corvettes can carry the Tsirkon, while Russia has used land-based launchers to strike targets in Ukraine.⁴

Russia claims that the Kinzhal is a hypersonic aeroballistic missile. The Kinzhal can reportedly carry a nuclear or conventional payload. Currently, deployed missiles are conventional. The MiG-31K or variants of the Tupolev Tu-160 can fire Kinzhal in theory. The Kinzhal was the first of these weapons that Russia used in combat, striking targets in Ukraine. The Kinzhal may not be a true hypersonic because it lacks the maneuverability of the Tsirkon and the Avangard—which some analysts state is a defining feature of a hypersonic weapon—and because its speed may drop below the hypersonic threshold of Mach 5 during flight.⁵

The Burevestnik is a planned nuclear-powered cruise missile. Nuclear propulsion is intended to increase the missile’s range. The Burevestnik could have a range of 10,000 to 20,000 kilometers, allowing it to be fired from anywhere within the Russian Federation to hit any point in the continental United States. The Burevestnik’s propulsion system consists of a miniaturized nuclear reactor. Significant testing problems have plagued the development of the Burevestnik. In early tests of the Burevestnik, which Putin lauded as significant national accomplishments, the missiles reportedly missed their targets and crashed in the Arctic Ocean off Novaya Zemlya. An accident that occurred while working on the missile’s propulsion system at the Nenoksa naval missile testing site in the Russian Arctic killed five Rosatom staff members and injured three others. Roshydromet, the Russian Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring, recorded a cloud of radioactive fallout over the Arkhangelsk region in the Russian far north associated with the accident.⁶

Under development, the Poseidon is a nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered unmanned underwater vehicle with a speed of approximately 100 miles per hour. The Poseidon is often referred to as a “doomsday weapon” in Western and Russian sources. The unmanned underwater vehicle would not strike the target if used in a conflict. Instead, it would detonate some distance offshore. Instead of creating a nuclear explosion over a population center or military target, the Poseidon produces a devastating radioactive wave. Russia produced the first batch of Poseidon unmanned underwater vehicles by early January 2023, and Russian media reports that the Russian Navy will field a group of Poseidon-armed Belgorod nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) with the Pacific Fleet by 2025.⁷

Kinzhal and Tsirkon Use in Ukraine

Russia has used the Kinzhal and the Tsirkon as part of its war in Ukraine. Russia reportedly first used the Kinzhal in Ukraine in March 2022, though some non-Russian sources question the validity of these claims. Moscow launched its largest Kinzhal salvo in March 2023, striking several military and civilian targets across Ukraine. Despite Russian claims of high-precision abilities, the Kinzhal has struggled with accuracy. Most Russian uses were against larger military or civilian targets, such as fuel depots or apartment blocks, where precision is less important. The Kinzhal produced significant kinetic damage, though not more significant than other Russian weapons with similar payloads. While Ukraine’s air and missile defenses were unable to counter Kinzhal, this failure is not significantly different from the impact of other ballistic missiles Russia has used throughout the war.⁸

The deployment of Patriot batteries in the spring of 2023 significantly reduced the Kinzhal’s effectiveness. The Kinzhal likely slows during its descent, making it vulnerable to Patriot missiles. Patriot batteries destroyed five of six Kinzhal missiles that Russia fired at Kyiv during the batteries’ first engagements with the Kinzhal. The sixth Kinzhal damaged a Patriot battery. Contrary to Russian reports that the Kinzhal destroyed it, the Patriot battery was operational shortly after the engagement. The Patriot batteries damaged or destroyed additional Kinzhals in later engagements. Russia has also used the Kinzhal to strike targets away from Patriot protection, where it has had similar success rates to earlier uses. In August 2023, Russia attempted to strike targets in and around Kyiv with three Kinzhals, one of which was intercepted by a Patriot battery, while an additional strike beyond the range of Patriot killed an 8-year-old boy in the Western region of Ivano-Frankivsk.⁹

Russian and Ukrainian officials also claim that Russia has used the Tsirkon in the war. Putin referenced previous Tsirkon use in late February 2024, which is consistent with Ukrainian reports that Russia used the Tsirkon in early February 2024. According to these reports, Russia used the missile to strike residential buildings and energy infrastructure. Earlier use is possible. Some analysts claim wreckage from a December 2023 attack suggests potential Tsirkon use, but neither Russian nor Ukrainian officials have made similar claims.¹⁰

Maneuverability and higher speed make the Tsirkon more sophisticated than the Kinzhal. Ukrainian officials have claimed the ability to intercept the Tsirkon, though such claims are suspect. Specifically, Ukrainian Air Force spokesman Ilya Yevlash claims that Ukrainian Sol-Air Moyenne-Portee / Terrestre (SAMP/T) and Patriot systems can degrade or destroy Tsirkon. There are unverified reports of a possible Tsirkon interception by Ukrainian air defense in March 2024.¹¹

Potential Uses of Novel Nuclear Weapons in War Fighting

Russia’s novel nuclear systems could play a role in Russian war fighting, as the Kinzhal and the Tsirkon already have. The dual-capable nature of these systems allows Russia to use them as conventional or nuclear war-fighting tools. Beyond continued use of the Kinzhal and the Tsirkon in Ukraine, Russia may choose one or more of these weapons in a regional war, using strategic non-nuclear weapons—including conventional variants of the Kinzhal, the Tsirkon, or the Avangard—or limited nuclear strikes if a local conflict inadvertently escalates, Russia misperceives the resolve of the United States to defend NATO allies, or an irrational leader decides to wage a war despite the anticipated costs of US or NATO involvement. Some systems could also be used in a local conflict if Russian leaders believe the systems to be useful tactically with no expected direct American or Allied response. This section explores how Russia may integrate these systems into escalation management strikes, naval warfare, aerospace defense, and limited nuclear warfare.

Russian Nuclear Modernization and Escalation Management

Due to the symbolic nature of novel weapons and their perceived ability to counter missile defenses, Russian strategists may consider their use for escalation management. Should American or Russian deterrence fail and a regional war between Russia and NATO break out, Moscow is likely to pursue actions intended to end the conflict, prevent the spread of the conflict to other regions, or limit escalation. Russia’s escalation management theories have generated significant discussion within Russia’s strategic community and academic and policy circles abroad. Some analysts tie escalation management to an escalate–to–de-escalate strategy, arguing that Russia will likely use limited nuclear strikes to de-escalate regional conflicts before they threaten Russian regime survival. Others have argued that no Russian policy exists and Russian military thought has moved away from considering nonstrategic nuclear weapons as tools for de-escalation. Others argue that nuclear use is possible but not guaranteed and that while Russia accepts the role of nonstrategic nuclear strikes in regional conflicts, the use of strategic non-nuclear weapons is more likely. Recent statements by Putin suggest that a revised Russian doctrine may explicitly include escalation management as a reason for nuclear use.¹²

Whether by conventional or nuclear means, Russian escalation management has four primary goals:

1. to deter direct aggression against Russia,
2. to prevent the expansion of a lower-level conflict,
3. to prevent the use of capabilities that could jeopardize state or regime survival, and
4. to terminate a conflict in a manner that Russia finds acceptable.

Russia is likely to target critical military and economic infrastructure (including military weak spots, transportation nodes, or energy facilities) in an attempt to deter further aggression against Russia. Strikes with strategic non-nuclear weapons or nonstrategic nuclear weapons, both which may include the novel nuclear weapons covered here, may also target capabilities Russian leaders perceive as threats to regime or state survival, such as forward-deployed nuclear weapons in NATO European countries.¹³

Some novel weapons may significantly impact escalation management. Russia could use weapons that improve precision-strike capabilities and that are more challenging for missile defenses to counter in a strike against missile defense sites, improving Moscow’s ability to launch rocket attacks against US allies in Eastern or Central Europe. While this ability would not erode the conventional retaliatory capability of the United States in the region, Russian leaders may perceive that it negates the ability of missile defenses to deny operational success, thus eroding deterrence-by-denial capabilities. This ability would require the weapons to work as advertised, an outcome called into question by Russia’s experience in Ukraine. Additionally, these systems are unnecessary to erode deterrence-by-denial capabilities. Russia could employ several options instead, including overwhelming systems with numbers, deploying special forces, or using existing precision-strike capabilities.

Since the Kinzhal’s vulnerability to advanced air and missile defenses has been confirmed in Ukraine, the Avangard and the Tsirkon may prove more advanced and effective but unlikely to alter the strategic status quo between Russia and the United States. Russia claims the Tsirkon’s speed makes it impossible to counter. While the Tsirkon may be more difficult to counter, speed alone has not given other Russian systems—such as the Kinzhal—similar capabilities. The Tsirkon’s range also limits its use in a strike against American intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). A ship carrying the missile would need to be within a few miles of the US coast to reach the western edge of American ICBM fields. Additionally, Russian claims regarding the speed of other novel systems have proven exaggerated, casting suspicion on claims of the Tsirkon’s speed. The Avangard would likely pose significant challenges for missile defense systems, as its speed and novel maneuvering trajectory would make it difficult to track and intercept.

Russian Nuclear Modernization and Naval War Fighting

Novel nuclear-capable weapons may provide the greatest benefit for Russian naval war fighting. The Tsirkon could notably improve Russian capabilities if Russian claims about its abilities are accurate. Conventional and nuclear variants of these weapons may play a role in naval war fighting. The primary purpose of the Tsirkon is to eliminate an adversary’s surface ships that are equipped with air and missile defense systems. The destruction of these capabilities would reduce an adversary’s ability to launch a disarming first strike or intercept a retaliatory Russian strike. The Tsirkon’s ability to fly exclusively at high altitudes reduces the effectiveness of air and missile defense systems countering the weapon. Carrier groups could be another target of the Tsirkon or the Poseidon. Russian strategists are concerned that existing capabilities would be insufficient to counter American carrier groups, making new and advanced weapons such as the Tsirkon tempting war-fighting tools. Sea-based intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and command-and-control systems could also be key targets for precision-guided capabilities.¹⁴

The Tsirkon is the most obvious choice for counter sea-based threats due to its successful tests against sea-based targets and Russian plans to deploy the weapon on a series of surface ships and, potentially, submarines. The Tsirkon, like the Kinzhal and maybe the Avangard, has nuclear and conventional variants. Russia could use a conventionally armed Tsirkon with its precision and missile defense evasion capabilities to strike critical naval targets without crossing the nuclear threshold. The Kinzhal may have similar uses, but its underperformance in Ukraine suggests its unreliability for striking carrier groups protected by advanced air and missile defenses. The Poseidon unmanned underwater vehicle could provide Russia with another naval nuclear war-fighting option. While the Poseidon’s most likely use is as a second-strike weapon, it could also target aircraft carriers or carrier groups. Russia is less likely to use the unmanned underwater vehicle than the Tsirkon as it may be challenging to strike moving targets without the Belgorod getting close to the carrier group, potentially placing it in danger of American antisubmarine warfare capabilities.¹⁵

Russian Nuclear Modernization and Aerospace Defense

Beyond escalation management and naval war fighting, Russia may incorporate novel nuclear-capable weapons into its aerospace defense. Russia is far more likely to use conventional variants of these systems than nuclear variants for aerospace defense. While the use of a nuclear weapon cannot be ruled out completely, the likelihood of conflict escalation, the depletion of useful second-strike capabilities, and the threat of radioactive fallout to the Russian environment and population incentivize the use of non-nuclear capabilities.

Conventionally armed novel weapons could be used for a preemptive strike against an adversary’s forces. Dmitry Adamsky argues that the best Russian aerospace defense in many circumstances would be an effective offensive strike against enemy air capabilities while they remain on the ground. The Avangard, the Kinzhal, and the Tsirkon could be used to eliminate critical targets that require a high-precision strike to defeat. This strategy suffers from drawbacks, including an ambiguity problem and the cost of depleting useful retaliatory weapons.¹⁶

Russian Nuclear Modernization and Limited Nuclear Strikes

While Russia is unlikely to use nuclear weapons for battlefield purposes beyond escalation management and aerospace defense, such use is not impossible. The Russian military could use limited strikes with low-yield weapons if leaders believed it would provide significant battlefield benefits and would not draw an unacceptable response from outside actors. Russia’s novel nuclear weapons could carry smaller payloads, making them options for a limited nuclear strike.

The ability of several of these systems to evade and penetrate missile defenses, combined with their precision, may incentivize Russia to use them to deliver a single low-yield nuclear strike for battlefield purposes. If they exist in practice, these abilities would make the weapons more reliable than rudimentary options. Evading missile defenses would allow Russia to conduct a strike with a single weapon and limit the broader damage that using multiple weapons to strike a target could cause. In theory, limiting damage would reduce the risk of vertical and horizontal escalation in a war. Additionally, Russia would not need to launch a large missile salvo that confuses US and Allied missile defenses to ensure a single nuclear-armed missile hits its target, reducing the risk of the United States and nuclear-armed NATO members misperceiving the strike as a more significant theater-wide nuclear strike.

The use of these systems is not guaranteed in the event of a limited nuclear strike, as Russia has plenty of other limited nuclear options not covered in this article. The primary role of these systems is to give Russia a tactical nuclear capability, whereas the main purpose of Russia’s novel nuclear systems is to deter American nuclear aggression at the strategic level. Given the limited number of Avangard hypersonic glide vehicles and the primarily naval role of the Tsirkon, Russia is more likely to use these other land-, air-, or sea-based systems for battlefield purposes. The Kinzhal may be the most likely option among the novel nuclear systems for delivering a limited nuclear strike during a conflict, given its conventional use in Ukraine and questions about its ability to deliver a strategic nuclear strike due to its underperformance against Patriot batteries.

Burevestnik: A Poor Tool for War Fighting

Russia’s hypersonic weapons are potential war-fighting tools. The Poseidon may also have some naval warfare uses. The Burevestnik, however, would provide more limited options for realistic use if developed. The system would combine a near-unlimited range with the ability to evade most current US missile defense systems if Russia can develop the weapon and its capabilities meet the Kremlin’s expectations. The Burevestnik could use this range to reach targets in the United States while circumventing most US radar sites, potentially allowing it to strike with little to no warning. The missile would also emit dangerous radioactive isotopes along its flight path, irradiating a broad swath of enemy territory before reaching its target and adding to its destructive potential.

These capabilities make the Burevestnik a strong option for a nuclear second strike. It can reach countervalue targets in the United States or Europe, penetrate missile defenses, and produce additional damage to territory and population centers along its flight path but outside its blast radius and potentially beyond the area contaminated with fallout from its detonation. Nonetheless, it also makes the missile a poor choice for first strike, escalation management, or war-fighting purposes.

The extra damage may produce a greater response from the United States and, contrary to the goals of escalation management, increase the risk that a limited nuclear war becomes a total nuclear war. Additionally, radiation would fall along the entire flight path, not only the part of the path that takes the missile over enemy territory. Since the missile would be launched from Russia, Russian territory and population centers would be irradiated. While this issue may not impose significant additional costs in a second-strike scenario—when an American nuclear strike would have already irradiated much of that territory, and the survival of the state is on the line—it would be costly in any other scenario, as Russia would need to deal with the ecological damage, public health crisis, and political resistance that would follow from choosing to irradiate part of its territory when other options were available.

Recommendations

While novel nuclear weapons are deterrence tools and status symbols, Russia may use them for war-fighting purposes. Russia could use the nuclear or conventional variants of dual-capable weapons in a regional war in Eastern Europe; Moscow could also use the three hypersonic systems—the Atvangard, the Kinzhal, and the Tsirkon—for escalation management and aerospace defense. Nonetheless, the weapons are unlikely to be game changers, given that other Russian capabilities can accomplish these tasks with similar effectiveness.

Deploying Patriot batteries, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), or other advanced defense systems to protect critical assets could diminish the threats posed by the Kinzhal and Tsirkon systems already in use. The primary thrust of American efforts to deter their use should focus on signaling resolve to respond to Russian aggression. Preparations to defeat a Russian escalation if that deterrence fails should continue to focus on establishing and maintaining local conventional superiority. As such, strategies to counter potential Russian use of hypersonic weapons for escalation management should not be fundamentally different than current efforts to maintain conventional deterrence and win regional wars if deterrence fails.

The United States and NATO should consider a range of deterrence-strengthening measures. NATO could bolster conventional forces on its eastern flank, while the United States could increase the number of forward-deployed nuclear weapons. Alternatively, additional countries (such as Poland) could host these weapons, possibly signaling American resolve to defend Eastern European allies. Each option could enhance regional deterrence. Each also comes with risks that American and Allied leaders should consider.

The Tsirkon may meaningfully improve Russian anti-ship capabilities, potentially increasing its ability to destroy American carrier groups. These capabilities may jeopardize the lives of American sailors, decrease American power projection, and erode American regional deterrence and compellence. The United States should invest in ways to offset these risks by expanding or improving naval missile defenses and learning from Ukraine’s experience countering Tsirkon strikes. Should Ukrainian claims that the SAMP/T and the Patriot can down the Tsirkon be true, the United States and its NATO Allies should place such systems (or more advanced ones such as the THAAD) where they could potentially intercept land-based missiles before they strike critical naval assets.

Additionally, the United States could deploy improved sea-based missile defenses (such as the newer variants of the SM-6) to counter the Tsirkon threat. These variants can intercept hypersonic weapons and reduce the effect of hypersonic attacks. The United States may also benefit from the continued development of an advanced Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS) to detect and track hypersonic weapons and increase the effectiveness of ground and sea-based missile defenses. The United States launched two satellites as part of a prototype HBTSS in February 2024.¹⁷

Multiple systems may be used for limited nuclear strikes beyond escalation management, aerospace defense, and naval war fighting. Countering such strikes will likely rely on continued deterrence by communicating American resolve to respond to them. The Burevestnik, however, is a poor choice for limited nuclear strikes or other war-fighting purposes. As such, American and Allied leaders should not consider threats to use the Burevestnik as credible unless they believe Russian leadership is irrational. Rather, leadership should consider threats centering on hypersonic weapons as more serious.

Conclusion

Russia has developed several new nuclear-capable weapons to maintain its nuclear deterrent and to provide the country with recognizable symbols of international prestige. The Russian military, however, may employ these weapons for uses other than their initially intended purposes, including conventional, or possibly nuclear, variants for regional war fighting. Russia has already used two systems—the Kinzhal and the Tsirkon—in its war against Ukraine.

These capabilities are not strategically revolutionary. Some may be evolutionary, providing benefits to the speed, precision, or reliability of a Russian attack. The United States and its NATO Allies must overcome these threats, especially in the Arctic region or on the Alliance’s eastern flank. Investments in missile defense improvements and continued signaling of regional resolve and ability should be attainable. The underperformance of the Kinzhal and the Tsirkon, the limited deployment of the Avangard, and the Burevestnik and the Poseidon remaining in development grant the United States and NATO time to respond. This time is not infinite.

Responding to Russia’s novel nuclear-capable weapons will not require drastic new action. Instead, the United States should increase investment in capabilities it is already pursuing and work with allies to strengthen regional deterrence in Eastern and Northern Europe. For example, during this limited time, the United States should consider deployments of advanced regional missile defenses, further develop Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensors, and determine what actions best improve regional deterrence while limiting risks.

Improving regional missile defenses and hypersonic tracking abilities would mitigate the threats posed by Russia’s novel weapons. Doing so would reduce the damage such a strike would cause. Additionally, these improvements may improve deterrence-by-denial abilities, making Russian leaders less likely to think such a strike could succeed and, therefore, reduce the chance they would consider a strike in the first place.

Expanding defenses, developing sensors, and improving regional deterrence will cost money and require extensive planning. The requisite brainpower and financial resources are not finite. Nevertheless, the United States must consider these now investments to reduce the likelihood of a Russian strike and blunt the effectiveness of a strike should deterrence fail. The importance of addressing this threat continues to rise, as Russia’s expansionist war against Ukraine, its frequent use of information warfare against American and European targets, and its employment of hawkish rhetoric point to an increasing risk of a Russia-NATO conflict.

Spenser A. Warren
Dr. Spenser A. Warren is a postdoctoral fellow in technology and international security at the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation.

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Endnotes

1. Brad Lendon, “Russia Used an Advanced Hypersonic Missile for the First Time in Recent Strike, Ukraine Claims,” CNN, February 13, 2024, https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/13/europe/ukraine-russia-zircon-hypersonic-missile-intl-hnk-ml/index.html; Peter Mitchell, “Hypersonic Hype? Russia’s Kinzhal Missiles and the Lessons for Air Defense,” Modern War Institute, May 23, 2023, https://mwi.westpoint.edu/hypersonic-hype-russias-kinzhal-missiles-and-the-lessons-for-air-defense/. Besides these five novel systems, Vladimir Putin announced a sixth new delivery system, the Sarmat ICBM, and another system—the Peresvet—an anti-air or anti-satellite weapon. I excluded these weapons as the Peresvet is not a nuclear delivery system, and Russia does not claim that the Sarmat is a novel weapon type. Return to text.
2. Spenser A. Warren, “Security, Power, and Prestige: Understanding the Determinants or Russian Strategic Nuclear Modernization Under Since 1999” (PhD diss., Indiana University Bloomington, 2023), https://www.proquest.com/docview/2828598325?pq-origsite=gscholar&fromopenview=true&sourcetype= Dissertations%20&%20Theses. Return to text.
3. James M. Acton, “Hypersonic Boost-Glide Weapons,” Science & Global Security 23 (2015): 191–219, https://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs23acton.pdf; and “Avangard,” Missile Threat Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Missile Defense Project, (July 31, 2021), https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/avangard/. Return to text.
4. Andrei Arkad’yev, “Nazvany sroki polucheniia VMF Rossii fregatov s giperzvukovym oruzhiem [Deadlines for the Russian Navy to Receive Frigates with Hypersonic Weapons Have Been Named],” TV Zvezda, July 23, 2020, https://tvzvezda.ru/news/2020723113-n6aMi.html; and Konstantin Sivkov, “Neparadaniyye miysli na glavnom paradye VMF [Uncharacteristic Thoughts on the Main Parade of the Russian Fleet],” Military-Industrial Courier, August 3, 2021, https://vpk-news.ru/articles/63225. Return to text.
5. “Kh-47M2 Kinzhal,” Missile Threat CSIS Missile Defense Project, updated April 23, 2024, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kinzhal/. Return to text.
6. Douglas Barrie and Henry Boyd, “Burevestnik: US Intelligence and Russia’s ‘Unique’ Cruise Missile,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, February 5, 2021, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2021/02/burevestnik-russia-cruise-missile; Thomas Nilsen, “Nuclear-Powered Missile Crashed in Barents Sea, Intelligence Report Allegedly Claims,” The Barents Observer, August 22, 2018, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2018/08/nuclear-powered-missile-crashed-barents-sea-intelligence-report-allegedly-claims; and Aleksandr Baklanov, “CNN soobshchil o podgotovke Rossii k zapusku krylatoĭ rakety ‘Burevestnik’. Proshlye ispytaniia priveli k vybrosu radioaktivnykh veshchestv [CNN Reported on Russia’s Preparations for the Launch of the Cruise Missile ‘Burevestnik.’ Past Tests Have Led to the Release of Radioactive Substances.],” Meduza, August 19, 2021, https://meduza.io/feature/2021/08/19/cnn-soobschil-o-podgotovke-rossii-k-zapusku-krylatoy-rakety-burevestnik-proshlye-ispytaniya-priveli-k-vybrosu-radioaktivnyh-veschestv. Return to text.
7. Dmitri Boltenkov, “Mera sil: Zachem Rossii nuzhna samia dlinnaia v mire submarina [Measure of Strength: Why Russia Needs the World’s Longest Submarine],” Izvestiya, February 13, 2021; Kyle Mizokami, “Russia Launches Belgorod, the World’s Longest Submarine,” Popular Mechanics, April 24, 2019, https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/navy-ships/a27243915/russia-launches-belgorod-the-worlds-longest-submarine/; “First Batch of Nuclear-Armed Drones Poseidon Manufactured for Special-Purpose Sub Belgorod,” TASS, January 15, 2023, https://tass.com/emergencies/1562553; and “Submarine Force Armed with Poseidon Torpedoes to Come into Operation in Kamchatka in 2025,” TASS, April 3, 2023, https://tass.com/defense/1598329. Return to text.
8. Vikram Mittal, “Is Russia’s Hypersonic Missile Vulnerable? Perhaps the Right Question Is Whether It’s Really Hypersonic,” IEEE Spectrum, June 17, 2023, https://spectrum.ieee.org/russia-hypersonic; and Scott Neuman, “Russia Is Firing Hypersonic Missiles into Ukraine That Are Nearly Impossible to Stop,” NPR, March 9, 2023, https://www.npr.org/2023/03/09/1162185287/hypersonic-missiles-ukraine-russia. Return to text.
9. David Wright, “Ukraine’s Kinzhal Intercepts Should Cool Hypersonic Hype,” C4ISRNet, May 26, 2023, https://www.c4isrnet.com/opinion/2023/05/26/ukraines-kinzhal-intercepts-should-cool-hypersonic-hype/; Mittal, “Russia’s Hypersonic Missile;” and Veronika Melkozerova, “Russia Strikes Ukraine with Kinzhal Missiles, Damaging Hospital in Kyiv,” Politico, August 11, 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-attacks-ukraine-four-kinzhal-hypersonic-missiles-hospital-kyiv-ivano-frankivsk-region/. Return to text.
10. “Hypersonic Missile Tsirkon Was Used in Special Operation—Putin,” TASS, February 29, 2024, https://tass.com/defense/1753657; and Thomas Newdick, “Is Russia Really Using Zircon Hypersonic Cruise Missiles in Ukraine?,” The Warzone, February 13, 2024, https://www.twz.com/air/is-russia-really-using-zircon-hypersonic-cruise-missiles-in-ukraine. Return to text.
11. “Ukraine Can Shoot Down Tsirkon Missiles with SAMP/T, Patriot Systems – Air Force Spox,” Ukrinform, March 27, 2024, https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3845273-ukraine-can-shoot-down-tsirkon-missiles-with-sampt-patriot-systems-air-force-spox.html; and Thomas Newdick, “Ukraine Situation Report: Claims Swirl Around Strikes on Landing Ships in Crimea,” The Warzone, last updated March 25, 2024, https://www.twz.com/news-features/ukraine-situation-report-claims-swirl-around-strikes-on-landing-ships-in-crimea. Return to text.
12. Katarzyna Zysk, “Escalation and Nuclear Weapons in Russia’s Military Strategy,” RUSI Journal 163, no. 2 (2018): 4–15; Olga Oliker and Andrey Baklitskiy, “The Nuclear Posture Review and Russian ‘De-Escalation:’ A Dangerous Solution to a Nonexistent Problem,” War on the Rocks, February 20, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/02/nuclear-posture-review-russian-de-escalation-dangerous-solution-nonexistent-problem/; Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, “The Myth of Russia’s Lowered Nuclear Threshold,” War on the Rocks, September 22, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/09/the-myth-of-russias-lowered-nuclear-threshold/; Dima Adamsky “Cross-Domain Coercion: The Current Russian Art of Strategy,” IFRI: Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Proliferation Papers, No. 54, November 2015, https://policycommons.net/artifacts/1406700/cross-domain-coercion/2020962/; Michael Kofman and Anya Loukianova Fink, “Escalation Management and Nuclear Employment in Russian Military Strategy,” War on the Rocks, June 23, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/escalation-management-and-nuclear-employment-in-russian-military-strategy/; Jay Ross, “Time to Terminate Escalate to De-Escalate—It’s Escalation Control,” War on the Rocks, April 24, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/time-to-terminate-escalate-to-de-escalateits-escalation-control/; and Agence France-Presse, “Putin Proposes Broader Criteria for Using Nuclear Arms,” The Moscow Times, September 25, 2024, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/09/25/putin-proposes-broader-criteria-for-using-nuclear-arms-a86478. Return to text.
13. Kofman and Fink, “Escalation Management;” V. M. Burenok and O. B. Achasov, “Non-Nuclear Deterrence,” Military Thought 17, no. 1 (2008): 1– 6; and Anya Loukianova Fink, “The Evolving Russian Concept of Strategic Deterrence: Risks and Responses,” Arms Control Today, July 1, 2017, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2017-07/features/evolving-russian-concept-strategic-deterrence-risks-responses. Return to text.
14. Spenser A. Warren, “Avangard and Transatlantic Security,” CSIS, September 23, 2020, https://www.csis.org/blogs/post-soviet-post/avangard-and-transatlantic-security; Based on Tsirkon’s claimed range of 1,000 kilometers, see Jeremy Chin, “Russia Confirms Development of Tsirkon Hypersonic Cruise Missile,” CSIS, February 22, 2019, https://missilethreat.csis.org/russia-confirms-development-of-tsirkon-hypersonic-cruise-missile/. Return to text.
15. Acton, “Hypersonic Boost-Glide Weapons,”; Orlov, “Passons for ‘Tsirkon’ ”; Vitalii Orlov, “Strasti po ‘Tsirkonu’ [Passions for ‘Tsirkon’],” Military-Industrial Courier, May 25, 2021, https://vpk.name/news/510567_strasti_po_cirkonu.html; and Michael Kofman et al., “Russian Military Strategy: Core Tenets and Operational Concepts,” Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), October 19, 2021, https://www.cna.org/reports/2021/08/Russian-Military-Strategy-Core-Tenets-and-Operational-Concepts.pdf. Return to text.
16. Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky, Moscow’s Aerospace Theory of Victory: Western Assumptions and Russian Reality, (CNA, February 25, 2021), https://www.cna.org/reports/2021/03/IOP-2021-U-029278-Final.pdf. Return to text.
17. David Wright and Cameron L. Tracy, “Drag Race: Hypersonic Threats Are Slow Enough for US Missile Defenses,” C4ISRNet, December 8, 2023, https://www.c4isrnet.com/opinion/2023/12/08/drag-race-hypersonic-threats-are-slow-enough-for-us-missile-defenses/; and Press Release, “MDA, SDA Announce Upcoming Launch of the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor and Tranche 0 Satellites,” U.S. Department of Defense, February 14, 2024, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3676902/mda-sda-announce-upcoming-launch-of-the-hypersonic-and-ballistic-tracking-space/. Return to text.