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Nov. 21, 2024

Allies, Partners, or Puppets?: American and Chilean Armies, 1961–69

Hugo Harvey-Valdés
©2024 Hugo Harvey-Valdés

ABSTRACT: This article examines the multifaceted exchanges between the American and Chilean armies from 1961 to 1969, asserting that they were strictly professional, devoid of political indoctrination, and aligned with both nations’ foreign policy interests. Utilizing declassified diplomatic and military documents, this research diverges from prior works by integrating an in-depth understanding of military codes and culture with global, regional, and national contexts. It challenges the politicized narratives of the Cold War in Latin America, especially in Chile. This research offers insights into the actual impacts of international military policies on future military exchange programs.

Keywords: Cold War, United States–Chile military relations, foreign policy, political indoctrination, declassified documents

 

During the Cold War, all continents became battlegrounds for the two superpowers. Following World War II, the United States initially focused on opposing communism in Europe, but following the Cuban Revolution, US foreign policy pivoted to combat communism in Latin America. While US policies usually concentrated on providing military and economic support, covert operations sometimes complemented these efforts. Consequently, many scholars have argued that US military influence led to the politicization of the Chilean military through their professional exchanges. This notion is due to a shortage of military training, structures, logic, and culture knowledge, so an approach that connects these elements with the countries’ foreign policies is required.

This article examines the professional exchanges of the American and Chilean militaries using recently declassified official documents from both countries from 1961 to 1969, a time frame chosen to preclude the politicization of the Chilean military, which escalated post-1969 with the 1973 coup. During this time, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson oversaw a shift in US foreign policy toward Latin America. Their administrations tried increasing professional military training through US Army schools, inter-American colleges, or conferences.1

Three foundational assumptions guide this inquiry.

  1. The Chilean military underwent doctrinal transformations due to the weapon systems training the US Army provided.
  2. This influence did not extend to strategic or institutional war planning.
  3. The Chilean army’s journal Memorial del Ejército reveals Chilean military thought.2

This study uncovers a complex interplay between political purposes and military initiatives woven within the broader geopolitical and ideological context of the Cold War and demonstrates that while US strategic objectives influenced these military exchanges, they were not merely tools of political indoctrination but also acts of deliberate professional cooperation guided by Chile’s policies and military professionalism. Extending military history beyond battles and strategies can make it a valuable tool for informed decision making and strategic advice. This article scrutinizes the implications and interpretations of policies in recipient countries and challenges prevailing misconceptions.

After presenting different perspectives on Chilean military training in the United States, the article will briefly depict changes in US foreign policy during the early 1960s. Subsequently, the analysis will focus on the direct relations between both armies and within the inter-American context, considering the political orientations toward the Inter-American Defense College and the School of the Americas (SOA). Finally, data on the participation of Chilean officers in controversial courses such as intelligence, counter-resistance, counter-guerrilla, internal security, and special forces will be provided.

Divergent Views on Chilean Military Training in the United States

This section focuses on the debate over whether US training acted as a channel for political indoctrination or constituted a professional exchange within broader defense cooperation efforts. This problem is one of the many features and dynamics of the Cold War, when earlier American efforts focused on Europe, since the communist threat to Latin America was not severe. Nevertheless, after the Cuban Revolution and its potential expansion, the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations attempted to diminish the communist risk with operations in Guatemala (1954), the Bay of Pigs (1961), and the Dominican Republic (1965).3

For more distant nations, however, there was a strategic preference for economic aid and military support, complemented, if necessary, by covert operations. Chile exemplified this approach, intertwining academic and political narratives and overlapping with these three domains, proclaiming that through professional exchanges, the United States succeeded in politicizing commissioned officers of the Chilean army. This politicization is posited as a contributing factor to the 1973 coup or pronouncement. Due to space constraints, this section reveals only the most representative examples of the debate.

First and foremost, Lesley Gill has been the harshest critic, accusing the US government of facilitating international terrorist networks and sidelining democracy, primarily through the School of the Americas, introducing Latin American armies to methods of assassination against compatriots. She artificially connects the military exchanges and training with covert CIA operations intended to contain communism and eventually overthrow Salvador Allende. Gill argues that the Chilean military’s increased presence at the School of the Americas from the 1950s through the 1970s had an evident impact, claiming that most Chilean officers who deposed Allende had trained at a US military service school, largely the School of the Americas.4

Unlike Gill, any military studies specialist would point out that, rather than an SOA combat course, command and general staff courses represent more reasonable avenues for politicizing officers, due to the rigorous interdisciplinary coursework designed to challenge their assumptions and promote critical thinking on emerging politics and defense topics. Nonetheless, the indoctrination of Chilean students would be improbable because the few who were sent had completed the three-year Chilean command and general staff course satisfactorily and had served at least 20 years. For comparison, Adam Yarmolinsky observed that the US Department of Defense decided to include civilians in war college courses during the 1960s to clarify military positions and perspectives on public policies, not to promote military initiatives or spread political discourse. Given Yarmolinsky’s observation and foreign officers’ enrollment in the same classes as civilians and US military officers, the US military likely did not intend for classes to be political indoctrination tools. Indeed, both militaries shared an aversion to political influence. Yarmolinsky further notes that the US military ethos resists political indoctrination as a moral foundation. This value equally applies to the Chilean Army, albeit with an aversion to internal and external political influences.5

Similarly, Chilean nonmilitant historiography has concluded that US foreign policy did not decisively impact the domestic political context. Illustrating this consensus, two prominent Chilean historians with divergent political opinions are cited. Joaquín Fermandois, aligned with the right-wing spectrum, characterizes Chile as a “field of forces that was not easily manipulated by the will of the great, should they wish to act as puppeteers,” illustrating that Chilean domestic dynamics progressed naturally during the Cold War. Likewise, Olga Ulianova, a leftist sympathizer, observes that the interventionist practices of the powers “did not alter the trends of Chilean political development.”6

Despite the consensus among apolitical Chilean historians, the 50th anniversary of the 1973 institutional breakdown catalyzed a revisionist movement that polarized Chilean society throughout 2023. Consequently, US involvement and foreign policy became focal points in the debate. Surprisingly, during a visit to the United States, the Chilean president began these discussions, stating that his country would not forget American actions, thereby urging a reflection on America’s global conduct. This action likely prompted the Department of State to declassify and release segments of the President’s Daily Briefs dated September 8, 1973, and September 11, 1973. Although these documents did not unveil new information, they indicated the Department of State’s dedication to transparency.7

Furthermore, the revisionist wave affected General Ricardo Martínez-Menanteau (2018–22), former commander-in-chief of the Chilean Army (Chilean Army Chief), who published a controversial essay on the Chilean Army’s past 50 years. This piece, initially a document on the institutional website, did not receive the full support of the generals and was later removed by his successor. Martínez argues that Chile’s alignment with the United States following World War II pushed the Chilean Army toward the Western nations, prompting reforms through local officers trained at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He claims that, by the 1960s, political behavior caused a shift in the “military essence.” He then contradicts himself, mentioning that leftist rhetoric and efforts to undermine national armies inclined the military toward counter-subversion, fostering a distinct national security perspective.8

By overlooking military exchanges between Chile and the United States, Martínez-Menanteau does not answer the questions of whether political indoctrination occurred, what the source of anti-guerrilla training was, or what degraded Chilean military ethos. The historical evidence does not reflect Martínez-Menanteau’s belief that the origins of doctrinal renewal following World War II reflected US political beliefs enforced by the Chilean government. Many of the reforms faced resistance, mainly due to the Prussian doctrine and from officers of German descent. The journal Memorial del Ejército documents this antagonism and became a platform for intellectual debates on strategies, operations, tactics, and weapon quality between pro-American and pro-German officers.9

In contrast, General Juan Emilio Cheyre, another former Chilean Army Chief (2002–6), who began his career in 1962, discusses the leftist extremist groups in Chile during the 1960s in his memoirs. He asserts that his primary concern as a lieutenant was field instruction and combat training, rendering him unaware of political tendencies among officers. Nevertheless, he did perceive discontent regarding the allocation of resources for military activities.10 Cheyre also touches upon military training in the United States, stating that he never

. . . believed the widespread myth of the “tremendous” influence that the School of the Americas had on national security thinking in Chile and its anti-Communist position. [It] did not exist in the officers because we always had a critical approach [ . . . ]. School of the Americas had no influence at all as an indoctrinator of military techniques to overthrow governments or attack human rights; nor did it succeed in generating a National Security doctrine in Chile. It was a military training school with high standards and considerable resources in combat techniques within the scope of classic and regular warfare.11

A third perspective is the unique viewpoint of former Chilean Army Chief General Carlos Prats (1970–73), who remained loyal to Allende, having served as his minister of the interior and later minister of defense before retiring in August 1973, paving the way for General Augusto Pinochet. Prats’s view holds significance as a middle ground between political indoctrination and professional training. He does not allege the imposition of ideologies by the US Army. Instead, he observes an affinity of the Chilean military toward American values:

I do not intend to affirm that this reality necessarily meant a “specifically anti-communist indoctrination.” […] [T]he influence of the American way of life contributed to fostering an emotional awareness against the “communist enemy.” [For] those who received special training as “commandos,” the “physical” enemy was the “Marxist guerrilla.”12

Changes in US Foreign Policy in the Early 1960s

The transformation of the communist threat and its growing proximity in the early 1960s forced American specialists to reassess their approach toward their southern neighbors. Against this backdrop and with the arrival of President Kennedy to the White House, a paradigm shift unfolded in US foreign policy toward Latin America. Kennedy championed increased economic assistance to the region, endeavoring to balance social and military aid. The CIA counseled Kennedy on how to counteract Castro’s communist initiatives and provide military assistance to Latin America. Notably, it recommended that the Kennedy administration employ preemptive measures against guerrilla and subversive activities and forestall arms transactions from bloc nations.13

The assessment analysis should be supplemented with executive orders to delineate the rationale of decision-making processes and the resulting decrees. In the context of the “Military Assistance for the ’60s” document, a shift in threats redirects US foreign policy toward Latin America, laying the groundwork for the Alliance for Progress. The Cuban influence diminished while general dissatisfaction fueled communism, leaving Latin America under the “threat of internal aggression” by political unrest of fragmented communities prone to strife. Fundamental issues arose from tribal and communal divisions, traditional barriers, economic inconsistencies, cultural upheavals, anxieties, population dynamics, and modern communications to inflame mass movements.14

That scenario led to a holistic foreign policy approach, integrating military assistance, diplomatic efforts, cultural and informational initiatives, economic development support, and other vital activities to engage critical sectors within societies. Similarly, it established respect for the classic functions of the armed forces, showing reluctance to impose any ideological charge. The document emphasized that support for local forces in combating internal aggression must preserve “the identity of the forces involved, avoiding the fallacy of assuming that it is a substitution of police for troops.”15

In concluding this analysis, it is imperative to highlight the concerted efforts to preserve the traditional roles of the armed forces, avoiding ideological impositions, particularly during the initial period reviewed. The document underscores the necessity of aiding local military forces in addressing internal aggression while maintaining their identity. It warns against the erroneous approach of replacing police functions with military operations, emphasizing the critical distinction between these two roles.16

Bilateral Relations Between the US and Chilean Armies, 1961–69

The US foreign policy shift in 1961 toward countering the communist threat necessitated a comprehensive approach integrating diplomatic, economic, and military instruments. Consequently, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations facilitated bilateral military engagements between the United States and Chile. Nonetheless, civilian authorities controlled every exchange. This period revealed the intricacies of aligning diplomatic negotiations with military cooperation, showcasing the unique nature of their interactions within the context of the Cold War’s evolving geopolitical landscape.

The initial outreach in this era stemmed from General Lyman Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, inviting Chilean Army Chief Óscar Izurieta Molina to witness weapons demonstrations between February 19, 1961, and March 1, 1961. Lemnitzer also extended the invitation to “the institutional heads of all the member countries of the Organization of American States (OAS), except Cuba and the Dominican Republic.” The exercise reflected a strategic blend of military demonstration and diplomatic intent promoting regional solidarity and cohesion against communism. Kennedy showcased US capabilities, readiness, and willingness to intervene in the region, as evidenced in the Bay of Pigs invasion shortly thereafter.17

Consequently, the event surpassed the traditional “exhibition of materiel.” Upon arriving at Ramey Air Force Base, Puerto Rico, delegations embarked on a journey aboard an aircraft carrier to observe “fire demonstration exercises and operational maneuvers of the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps” near the island. Following these exercises, the delegations moved to the Canal Zone to monitor “D-Day maneuvers within the framework of Operation Solidarity.”18

Izurieta Molina could not attend the maneuvers, prompting him to propose that the minister of defense appoint General Horacio Arce, Chief of Staff of the National Defense, and send him instead. He supported accepting the invitation, emphasizing that “the representation of the Army is deemed of significant interest” due to its origin and purpose. This instance highlights several key aspects of Chile’s relationship with the United States during this time frame:

  1. The Chilean Army attributed importance to its exchange programs with the United States.
  2. Developments in Cuba were not perceived as an immediate threat to Chile but as a concern for hemispheric security.
  3. Decisions regarding the Chilean military’s international relations were made under civilian control.19

Later in 1962, the United States, possibly overestimating these points, maintained a firm belief in Chile’s unwavering and unconditional support. This perspective is evident in the analysis of military relations regarding the visit of the Chilean president to Washington:

Under the terms of a military assistance pact signed in 1952, the U.S. is supplying Chile with a limited amount of military equipment designed to increase the capabilities of its armed forces to carry out agreed hemispheric defense responsibilities. U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force missions assist in training the Chilean armed forces.20

To ensure Chilean commitments, the United States requested the Chilean Armed Forces’ support for implementing military measures against Cuba in response to the 1962 Cuban missile crisis in light of the OAS resolution invoking the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance to activate the security-system mechanisms against extra-continental interference. The president of Chile declined, indicating that such action required the critical involvement of the senate and the Chamber of Deputies beyond his sole purview.21

One might infer that the American government accepted Chile’s posture and the conditions of the military assistance, considering the Chilean president’s official visit to the United States in December 1962. The discussions between the two presidents focused on border issues with Bolivia and military aid, omitting hemispheric defense considerations. Analysis of the documents revealed no punitive actions against Chile. Interactions between the two armies were suspended until the end of 1964, however, coinciding with the transition to Chilean President Eduardo Frei Montalva and the American initiative to support his “Revolution in Liberty,” which viewed Chile as a laboratory for the Alliance for Progress.22

Therefore, direct invitations to army commanders resumed only in early 1965. Bernardino Parada-Moreno, the newly appointed Chilean Army Chief, was invited to “visit US Army installations and observe military activities” from April 2 to April 18, 1965. The minister of defense approved his participation, highlighting the “programming of the Military Aid to the Chilean Army and other matters related to the Continental Defense” as critical reasons for the visit. Nonetheless, the journey was postponed due to the earthquake on March 28 that year.23

One month later, the United States again requested Chile’s political and military backing to establish the Inter-American Peace Force, conditioning the continuity of Alliance for Progress on the response. This appeal arose from the US military intervention in the Dominican Republic to quell an internal revolt on April 28, 1965. Despite pressure, the Chilean government condemned the unilateral action and brought it to the Consultation Meeting under the OAS Charter. This significant incident led to a rift between the governments. Interactions between the two armies surged, however, reaffirming the adaptability of US foreign policy.24

Therefore, the invitation to visit US Army installations was renewed for July 15, 1965. Notably, Parada-Moreno omitted the term “continental defense” in his request to attend, and this reasoning for military exchanges did not reappear throughout this period. Paradoxically, the minister of defense’s authorization decree did mention this concept. This subtle detail suggests the Chilean Army Chief embraced Frei’s foreign policy direction and intent, demonstrating a commitment to alignment and subordination.25

Later, in 1967, the Chilean Army Chief requested permission to visit the armies of Israel and West Germany, pointing to the latter as “one of the most advanced in terms of technique, elements, and combat procedures.” This request demonstrated the Chilean Army’s intent to diversify doctrinal sources and avoid dependence on the United States.26

Exchanges Within the Inter-American Defense System

In the time frame under consideration, fluctuations in bilateral diplomatic relations also influenced the US-Chilean army exchanges within the Inter-American Defense System. The United States intermittently engaged Chile in inter-American military activities, while the Chilean military exhibited a cautious approach toward participation in such initiatives.

These engagements were initiated by an invitation from Major General Theodore F. Bogart, the US Army Caribbean commander, to the Chilean Army Chief and two officers to attend the Second Inter-American Military Conference in the Canal Zone from July 10 to 15, 1961. This action again underscores the evolving American foreign policy strategy, relying on the Department of the Army to brief “Latin American guests on plans related to various topics of mutual interest.” The Chilean Army Chief asked permission to attend, stating that “matters related to Continental Defense and its derivatives” would be covered. This rationale echoed in the following years as invitations for these conferences continued. Nonetheless, Chile did not request to participate in the 1965 gathering, depicting the military alignment with foreign policy directives from political authorities.27

Consequently, the Chilean Army did not reengage in inter-American initiatives until 1968, though only those of lesser prominence. Authorization for attendance was granted after the Chief of Staff of the US Army invited two officers to participate in the Communications Conference of American Armies, from August 11 to 17, 1968, at Fort Bragg (now Fort Liberty), North Carolina.28

Inter-American Defense College

The Inter-American Defense College (IADC) derives its significance from its comprehensive curriculum, educational methods, and extensive range of subjects and disciplines, spanning political, economic, and social spheres. These attributes could influence junior officers more effectively than brief exchanges, visits, or conference participation, but the lieutenant colonels or full colonels selected to attend were less likely to be indoctrinated after having completed a command and staff course within their home nation.

The college was established on October 9, 1962, by an initiative from the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), without an OAS endorsement or US support. As the military board predates the political institution, this context encompassed another disagreement between both organizations, due to their overlapping interests and authority disputes. This setback led Chile’s OAS representative to express:

The U.S. has doubts about the competence of the Inter-American Defense Board to resolve on its own, without the prior agreement of the OAS Council, the establishment of a new body within the Inter-American system. The haste in presenting the draft budget for the Inter-American Defense College has been the work of a group of countries that would not include Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, which have their own high-level military, naval, and air academies and recognized traditions of efficiency.29

The report from Chile unveils several facts.

  1. The United States did not create the IADC to influence Latin American officers politically, nor was there a perceived need for an additional inter-American military entity.
  2. It implied the United States recognized the legitimacy of the OAS’s political mechanisms.
  3. Not all nations and military forces had identical objectives in their engagements with their American counterparts—specifically, Central American and Caribbean nations instrumental in the IADC’s inception pursued interests beyond purely professional realms.
  4. Chilean military representatives regarded the command and staff training at their war colleges as superior, dissenting from the IADB’s collective resolution.

Despite America’s initial indifference to the IADC mere months after the board’s initiative, its establishment had, according to the Chilean ambassador to the United States, “become one of its most cherished wishes.”30 This appraisal was evident in Kennedy’s statement on the IADB’s 20th anniversary:

. . . the kind of aggression and subversion which threatens [demands] the most sophisticated, informed judgments, requires knowledge far beyond [ . . . ] our military studies, requires the knowledge of political, social, and economic conditions [ . . . ] the past as well as the future [ . . . ]. [W]e are putting great emphasis on the Inter-American Defense College [ . . . ] giving strong support to and which I think can serve as an admirable center for a study of the methods by which the new aggression can be countered.31

This explicit and sudden US support for the IADC aroused Latin American suspicions about military interventions in political, economic, and social matters, potentially undermining their government structures. Nevertheless, Chile voted in favor of the IADC in the OAS, explaining to the assembly that it did not share these concerns over undue US influence due to its strong military trajectory, institutional tradition, and focus on professional activities. Therefore, Chile approved that year’s budget, stipulating that the institute’s activities, guidance, and pertinence would be permanently observed.32

Regardless of Chile’s position, the then US Secretary of State Dean Rusk’s speech at the IADC’s inauguration further hardened Latin American reservations, as it expanded the military focus many member states expected:

. . . the Inter-American Defense System recognizes that our common purpose [ . . . ] is not only a military problem but also political, economic and social, so it is as vital for the military to understand these other essential elements of the defense of freedom as it is for civilians to understand the vital role of the military.33

Following the establishment of the IADC, Chile’s marginal influence in opposing its inauguration, alongside various developments, prompted the Chilean Army Chief to put forth a strategic proposal in 1963. This initiative elevated the status of Chile’s delegate to the IADB by nominating Chief of Staff of National Defense Major General Rodolfo Otto-Müller. The justification was to undertake “studies of the logistical organization of the armed forces in relation to National Security” over nine months.34

As a consequence of Chile’s indifference to the Inter-American Defense College added to their estrangement over America’s handling of the Dominican Republic in 1965, no officers were sent to the college until 1967. Amid a severe economic crisis in Chile, the minister of defense decided to send only one lieutenant colonel from the army, with which the Chilean Army Chief agreed since “Chile should be represented in this school, with priority over others.” In the subsequent two years, a colonel was selected to enroll in each of IADC courses. This policy change and the number of Chilean officers attending the IADC suggest that, rather than a need for training, there was a political decision consistent with Frei’s foreign policy of favoring Latin American integration over Chile’s relationship with the United States.35

Orientation Courses at the School of the Americas

As highlighted at the outset of this article, the School of the Americas is often cited as a prime example of political indoctrination of the Latin American military. Chile’s 1968 request to the School of the Americas to create an orientation course for its newly commissioned officers is a notable counterpoint to this argument. Not only did the commander of the Chilean Military Academy’s Students Battalion arrange this program, which was tailored to meet specific Chilean requirements, but the Chilean Army leadership and the minister of defense also both endorsed the course planning. Consequently, Chile sent 89 second lieutenants to the Canal Zone for the first time for a one-month orientation course.36

The outcomes or experiences derived from this first course for Chile remain undocumented. Nevertheless, during the Council of Generals on August 2, 1968, Chilean Army Chief General Sergio Castillo-Aránguiz, amid discussions on budgetary constraints affecting personnel deployments, sought insights on extending SOA orientation training. Consequently, 60 officers were dispatched for training in Panama the subsequent year.37

Intelligence, Counter-resistance, Counterguerrilla, Internal Security, and Special Forces

This section delves into one of the most controversial aspects of military training, which remains a subject of intense debate among certain political factions. The specialized training programs in intelligence, counter-resistance, counter-guerrilla, internal security, and special forces underscore the limited participation of Chilean military personnel from 1961 to 1969. It highlights the relatively small number of officers involved and provides a clearer understanding by contrasting popular beliefs with factual data and figures.

It is relevant to underline that from 1961 to 1969, only 18 officers attended such trainings, including participation in inter-American forums. These officers represent 2.5 percent of the 718 military personnel and civilians who traveled to the Canal Zone or the United States for various professional purposes. When the analysis is refined to include only the officers who undertook studies or observational visits at the School of the Americas or US Army units, this percentage increases to 4.6 percent of 393 individuals. These figures underscore the need for a nuanced understanding of these courses from a military perspective.

To address this matter initially, the first officers selected for these specialized courses within the period under review were two majors. They enrolled in the Military Intelligence Course, which lasted from January 1 to March 31, 1961.38

Subsequently, the Chilean Army was invited to participate in the Orientation and Regular Counter-Resistance Operations Courses. The underlying principles of these courses are heavily influenced by the notion of an extra-continental threat, a concept rooted in the Eisenhower era:

Recent experiences in Algeria, Laos, Vietnam, Cuba, and other nations clearly indicate the growing importance of guerrilla and subversion-type operations in Sino-Soviet attempts at world domination and of the increasing efforts of the Free World, and especially of the United States, to counter these operations by developing appropriate programs.39

The Chilean Army refrained from designating officers for the course. This decision might have stemmed from the perception that the United States intended to influence the country’s decisions through the prerequisites set for the students, which included the requirement to appoint officers who were “among the most capable and promising” and who would “occupy key positions, and consequently . . . influence the direction of counter-guerrilla activities.” A month later, however, two captains engaged in the eight-week Counter Guerrilla Tactics and Operations Course. The Chilean Army Chief accepted this invitation, recognizing that “the characteristics conflicts have manifested in recent times underscore the significance of Guerrilla Operations, attributable to their political-military relevance.”40

Afterward, in response to new threats delineated by US officials, attributed to regional internal conditions perceived as conducive to communism, two internal security courses were created, the two-week Orientation Course and the 10-week Regular Course. Chile’s military leaders justified their participation in the course to the minister of defense by explaining that covered guerrilla and subversion operations had relevance for Latin America, not just the global stage.41

One month after the internal security courses, the Chilean Army received an invitation to participate in the Intelligence Course for Senior Foreign Officers at the US Army Intelligence School. This program intended to deliver “practical knowledge of the organizational and operational standards necessary to fully leverage the intelligence capabilities of armed forces, thereby enhancing national security.” Consequently, one colonel was selected, with a justification for his attendance aligned with the national security concerns cited in the government decree.42

The final course of 1961—and for an extended period until 1968—in which Chilean officers participated was the Military Information Course for Officers conducted at the United States Army Caribbean School (the precursor to the SOA). This course lasted from September 25 to December 1, 1961, with two majors in attendance. No causal association was identified between Chilean foreign policy during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, US intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, and the decreased Chilean engagement in these training programs. However, the Chilean Army received again invitations for such courses just in April 1968.43

Training restarted with the Chilean Army appointing a major to attend the O-11 Military Intelligence Course from May 3 to August 23, 1968. The following invitation marked the end of such activities between 1961 and 1969, including the Intelligence Course and the Irregular Warfare Operations Course, to be held during the first half of 1969 and attended by a major and a captain, respectively.44

In addition to the courses, other forms of intelligence exchanges were implemented, such as month-long intelligence orientation visits, to which the Chilean Army sent two majors in 1961 and a lieutenant colonel in 1962. These interactions were discontinued until 1967, probably for the political reasons already indicated, resuming with the invitation to the Chilean chiefs of intelligence from the armed forces to acquaint themselves with US intelligence units from November 15 to December 2, 1967. The Chilean Army appointed a colonel instead of a general to represent it, perhaps due to years of estrangement.45

In the meantime, the Chilean Army, aligned with Frei’s political initiatives toward Latin American integration, joined the Fifth Conference of the Chiefs of Intelligence of American armies held in Colombia in May 1967, represented by a colonel and a lieutenant colonel. The Chilean Army Chief deemed this participation “advantageous from all perspectives for the Chilean Army to be represented in these activities.”46

A post-course analysis of the official documents and of attendees’ reports and experiences unveils nuanced details primarily accessible to those well-versed in military culture. It is thus crucial to articulate them clearly for all readers.

A prominent observation is that the academic performance of Chilean students in the highlighted intelligence courses scored between 948.75 and 964.2 out of 1,000. These results highlight the rigorous selection process based on the officers’ aptitudes and professional achievements, compelling diligent fulfillment of their academic obligations and roles as representatives of the Chilean Army. Furthermore, it suggests that officers trained at American institutes who achieved high ranks in their military careers did so due to their prior and subsequent professional skills, rather than due to the knowledge received from these courses. Upon returning to Chile, the officers sought official validation of the Chilean Military Intelligence Course by drawing a parallel between the curricula of the course received in the US Army and its own. This request indicates a personal desire to enhance their professional credentials and financial benefits.47

These appeals also suggest coherence between the study plans offered in the United States and Chile, indicating that the Chilean Army sent officers not merely for training needs but also based on government authorities’ political orientations to improve relations between both countries. Likewise, it dispels any suspicion of secrecy that some scholars attach to this type of course. Moreover, it provides evidence that the officers attended these lectures without prior specialization in the field, challenging the narrative that individual intelligence specialists were scrupulously selected to learn new techniques and capabilities that would later be used in political matters.

Conclusion

This analysis underscores Chile’s strategic autonomy and military prowess, dispelling the notion propagated by certain political sides that the Chilean Army was a passive recipient of American ideological exports. Instead, Chile actively sought US training when aligned with its strategic needs. This dynamic interaction reveals that Chilean authorities exercised significant discretion over their military involvement in US training programs, showcasing a complex decision-making process rather than a simple case of subordination.

All these interchanges were consistently conducted under foreign policy guidelines from civilian authorities and within broader national policies. Extended delays in military relations often occurred when there were discrepancies between governments, particularly when Chilean presidents Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez and Frei declined US requests for troop support during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and the 1965 Dominican Republic intervention, respectively. These refusals, even at the risk of jeopardizing continued economic and military assistance, underscore their capacity for independent policy making, challenging US expectations.

Since the early 1960s, there have been indictments of American initiatives to influence the Chilean military ideologically through SOA courses. The evidence, however, establishes that the Chilean Army only began enrolling a considerable number of students in 1968, sending 89 recent graduates to attend a month-long orientation course tailored to Chile’s requirements, distinct from those for other forces. Although it is impossible to verify any ideological indoctrination, it is hard to assume that one month would be sufficient to achieve such an effect. Furthermore, considering that in 1973 these officers were lieutenants commanding sections or platoons, it is also challenging to attribute any influence from the SOA in the coup d’état that overthrew Allende.

The data reveal that few Chilean military personnel experienced controversial programs, dispelling common assumptions of a profound and direct impact on Chile’s military or political landscapes. Between 1961 and 1969, only 18 officers underwent training in intelligence, counter-resistance, counter-guerrilla, internal security, and special forces, representing 2.5 percent of all military and civilian personnel sent to US Army institutes for various professional purposes. These figures underscore the selective participation in these programs and suggests a genuine military interest in modern combat techniques to counter new threats, rather than an ideological basis.

Chilean opposition to establishing the IADC in 1962 is also noteworthy. Records from the IADB reveal that the initiative stemmed not from the United States but from Central American and Caribbean representatives. In valuing their existing Command and General Staff Course as superior, Chilean military delegates rejected the installation of the IADC, a stance civil authorities supported. Chile only participated in 1967, sending a single officer who had already completed training at the Chilean Army War College, indicating a preference to engage with the inter-American system rather than a training necessity.

In conclusion, this study refines the understanding of American-Chilean military relations during a critical era of the Cold War. It highlights the complexities of these interactions, where strategic interests, national sovereignty, and individual agency played significant roles. The findings contribute to a more balanced historiography of Chile during the Cold War, emphasizing nuanced realities over simplified narratives of US domination. This nuanced understanding enriches our historical perspective and informs contemporary military training and international cooperation discussions.

 
 

Hugo Harvey-Valdés
Dr. Hugo Harvey-Valdés, full professor and researcher at the University of Las Américas, Santiago, held a variety of field and academic positions during 27 years of active-duty military service before retiring in December 2020. Harvey holds a PhD in international studies and is a graduate of the Chilean Army War College. He also completed a research fellowship at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. His involvement with the US Army includes roles as a student and an instructor at the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC), participation in the Artillery Captain Career Course, Panamax exercises, and representation of the Chilean Army in staff talks with United States Army South.

 
 

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Endnotes

  1. “Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon,” October 21, 1969, document 20 in Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1969–1976, vol. 21, Chile 1969–1973, ed. James McElveen and James Siekmeier (United States Government Printing Office [GPO], 2014), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d20. Return to text.
  2. Alberto González Martin, La última influencia: Efectos de la ayuda militar norteamericana en el Ejército de Chile después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial (Ejército de Chile, Departamento Comunicacional, 2006); Guillermo Castro, “La influencia predominante en el pensamiento estratégico institucional (1952–2007)” (master’s thesis, Chilean Army War College, 2014); and Alejandro San Francisco and Ángel Soto, Un siglo de pensamiento militar en Chile: el Memorial del Ejército 1906–2006 (Ediciones Centro de Estudios Bicentenario, 2006). Return to text.
  3. “The Secretary of State to Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics,” June 21, 1948, document 161 in FRUS, 1948, vol. 9, The Western Hemisphere, ed. Almon R. Wright, Velma Hastings Cassidy, and David H. Stauffer (GPO, 1972), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v09/d161; and Adam Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment: Its Impacts on American Society (Harper & Row, 1971), 119. Return to text.
  4. Lesley Gill, The School of the Americas: Military Training and Political Violence in the Americas (Duke University Press, 2004), 2, 79. Return to text.
  5. Yarmolinsky, Military Establishment, 230, 222. Return to text.
  6. Joaquín Fermandois, “¿Peón o actor? Chile en la Guerra Fría (1962–1973),” Estudios Públicos no. 72 (Spring 1998): 151, https://www.estudiospublicos.cl/index.php/cep/article/view/1000; and Olga Ulianova, “Algunas Reflexiones Sobre la Guerra Fría,” in Ampliando miradas: Chile y su historia en un tiempo global, ed. Fernando Purcell and Alfredo Riquelme (RIL editores, Instituto de Historia PUC, 2009), 255. Return to text.
  7. Gabriel Boric, interview by Christiane Amanpour, Amanpour, CNN (website), September 22, 2022, 8:05–8:32, https://edition.cnn.com/videos/tv/2022/09/26/amanpour-gabriel-boric-chile-democracy-constitution.cnn; and Office of the Spokesperson, “Media Note: U.S. Government Declassifies the President’s Daily Briefs Related to Chile from September 8, 1973 and September 11, 1973,” U.S. Department of State (DOS) (website), August 25, 2023, https://www.state.gov/u-s-government-declassifies-the-presidents-daily-briefs-related-to-chile-from-september-8-1973-and-september-11-1973/. Return to text.
  8. Ricardo Martínez Menanteau, Un Ejército de Todos (JC Sáez Editor, 2023), 43, 48, 50. Return to text.
  9. San Francisco and Soto, Un siglo, 65–77. Return to text.
  10. Juan Emilio Cheyre and Alejandro San Francisco, Para que nunca más (Planeta Chile, 2023), 34. Return to text.
  11. Cheyre and San Francisco, Nunca más, 45–46. Return to text.
  12. Carlos Prats González, Memorias: testimonio de un soldado (Editorial Pehuén, 1985), 564. Return to text.
  13. William P. Bundy, “Military Assistance Program: General, Volume 1 (JFKNSF-298-001),” February 25, 1961, 22, Papers of John F. Kennedy, Presidential Papers (PJFK.PP), National Security Files, https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/jfknsf-298-001#?image_identifier=JFKNSF-298-001-p0019. Return to text.
  14. For an overview of the decision-making process on this document, see “Memorandum of Conversation,” February 25, 1961, document 93 in FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. 9, Foreign Economic Policy (GPO, 1995), ed. Evans Gerakas et al., https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v09/d93; “Letter from Secretary of State Rusk to Secretary of Defense McNamara,” March 15, 1961, document 96 in FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. 9, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v09/d96; “Memorandum of Conversation,” May 26, 1961, document 112 in FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. 9, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v09/d112; and Charles B. Marshall, “Report Prepared by Charles Burton Marshall,” May 17, 1961, document 109 in FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. 9, 8, PJFK.PP, National Security Files, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v09/d109. Return to text.
  15. Marshall, “Military Assistance,” 10, 13. Return to text.
  16. Marshall, “Military Assistance,” 12, 13. Return to text.
  17. United States Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJSC) to Commander in Chief of the Chilean Army (Chilean Army Chief), confidential letter, January 24, 1961, Historical Archive of the Ministry of Defence (HA-MD). Return to text.
  18. CJSC to Chilean Army Chief, January 24, 1961. Return to text.
  19. Chilean Army Chief to Minister of Defense (MinDef), restricted memorandum, February 7, 1961, Secc. I N° 328, HA-MD. Return to text.
  20. “Chile: Alessandri Visit, December 1962 (JKPOF-113a-013),” November 28, 1962, 9, PJFK.PP, President’s Office Files, https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/jfkpof-113a-013#?image_identifier=JFKPOF-113a-013-p0039. Return to text.
  21. Official statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 23, 1962, General Historical Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (GHA-MFA); and the president of Chile to the president of the United States, confidential letter, October 27, 1962, GHA-MFA. Return to text.
  22. “Memorandum of Conversation, December 11, Among President Allessandri, President Kennedy, and Other Officials,” December 11, 1962, document 36 in FRUS, 1961–1963, vols. 10, 11, 12, American Republics, Cuba 1961–1962, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Microfiche Supplement, ed. Edward C. Keefer, Louis J. Smith, and Charles S. Sampson (GPO, 2021), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10-12mSupp/d36; and US Senate Select Committee, Covert Action in Chile, 1963–1973: Staff Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (GPO, 1975). Return to text.
  23. MinDef, restricted decree, March 9, 1965, MINDEF S.I. N° 64, HA-MD. Return to text.
  24. Ambassador of Chile to the United States to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Telex EMBACHILE N°125, May 11, 1965, GHA-MFA; and Annual Report (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, 1965), 134–38. Return to text.
  25. Chilean Army Chief to MinDef, restricted memorandum, June 21, 1965, Secc. I N° 193, HA-MD; and MinDef, restricted decree, June 25, 1965, MINDEF S.I. N° 169, HA-MD. Return to text.
  26. Chilean Army Chief to MinDef, restricted memorandum, April 7, 1967, Secc. I N° 64/5, HA-MD. Return to text.
  27. Commander of the US Army Caribbean to Chilean Army Chief, May 3, 1961, HA-MD; Chilean Army Chief to MinDef, restricted memorandum, June 17, 1961, Secc. I N° 1383, HA-MD; Chilean Army Chief to MinDef, restricted memorandum, June 12, 1962, Secc. I N° 1267; Chilean Army Chief to MinDef, restricted memorandum, July 5, 1963, Secc. I N° 158; and Chilean Army Chief to MinDef, restricted memorandum, July 22, 1964, Secc. I N° 163, HA-MD. Return to text.
  28. MinDef, restricted decree, August 3, 1968, Dir. Pers. Depto. III N° 228, HA-MD. Return to text.
  29. Delegation of Chile to the Organization of American States (OAS) to Minister of Foreign Affairs, confidential report, January 30, 1962, N° 28/2, GHA-MFA. Return to text.
  30. Ambassador of Chile to the United States to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, memorandum, October 12, 1962, EMBACHILE N° 2039/621, GHA-MFA. Return to text.
  31. John F. Kennedy, “Remarks on the 20th Anniversary of the Inter-American Defense Board, 29 March 1962,” JFKWHA-083-002, March 29, 1962, JFK Presidential Library and Museum, White House Audio Collection, http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKWHA-083-002.aspx. Return to text.
  32. Minister of Foreign Affairs to the United States to the Delegation of Chile to the OAS, memorandum, June 2, 1962, Cable N°119, GHA-MFA. Return to text.
  33. Ambassador of Chile to the United States to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, memorandum, October 12, 1962, EMBACHILE N° 2039/621, GHA-MFA. Return to text.
  34. Chilean Army Chief to MinDef, restricted memorandum, June 21, 1963, CJE N° 201, HA-MD; MinDef, restricted decree, June 22, 1963, MINDEF S.1 N° 150, HA-MD. Return to text.
  35. MinDef, restricted decree, June 6, 1967, EMDN Depto. III-b N° 114, HA-MD; Chilean Army Chief to MinDef, restricted memorandum, June 16, 1967, Secc. I N° 817/4, HA-MD; and MinDef, restricted decree, January 5, 1968, Dir. Pers. Depto. III N° 10, HA-MD; MinDef, restricted decree, December 26, 1968, Dir. Pers. Depto. III N° 326, HA-MD. Return to text.
  36. Chilean Army Chief to MinDef, restricted memorandum, December 1, 1967, Secc. I N° 451/6, HA-MD; MinDef, restricted decree, December 5, 1967, Dir. Pers. Depto. II N° 194; and MinDef, restricted decree, January 9, 1968, Dir. Pers. Depto. II N° 16, HA-MD. Return to text.
  37. Council of Generals of the Chilean Army, Minute Book, Record N° 1, August 2, 1968, Army Historical Archive. Return to text.
  38. MinDef, restricted decree, December 23, 1960, Dir. Pers. Depto. II N° 266, HA-MD. Return to text.
  39. Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) to Chile to National Defense Chief of Staff, memorandum, May 10, 1961, N° 58-61, HA-MD. Return to text.
  40. Chief of the MAAG to Chile to National Defense Chief of Staff, memorandum, May 10, 1961; and Chilean Army Chief to MinDef, restricted memorandum, June 8, 1961, Secc. I N° 1318, HA-MD. Return to text.
  41. Chilean Army Chief to MinDef, restricted memorandum, June 14, 1961, Secc. I N° 1370, HA-MD. Return to text.
  42. Chief of the U.S. Army Mission to Chile to Chilean Army Chief, memorandum, July 19, 1961, N° 105-61, HA-MD; and MinDef, restricted decree, August 9, 1961, Dir. Pers. Depto. II N° 175, HA-MD. Return to text.
  43. Major Sergio Fernández Rojas to the Chilean Army Chief, request, enclosing Student’s Report signed by Lieutenant Colonel Marvin Nolte, July 10, 1962, US Army, HA-MD; Major Washington Carrasco Fernández to the Chilean Army Chief, request, enclosing Student’s Report signed by Major M. J. del Vecchio, July 5, 1962, US Army, HA-MD. Return to text.
  44. MinDef, restricted decree, April 25, 1968, Dir. Pers. Depto. III N° 131, HA-MD; and MinDef, restricted decree, December 26, 1968, Dir. Pers. Depto. III N° 324, HA-MD. Return to text.
  45. Chilean Army Chief to MinDef, restricted memorandum, May 17, 1961, Secc. I N° 1130; MinDef, restricted decree, June 23, 1962, Dir. Pers. Depto. II N° 171, HA-MD; and MinDef, restricted decree, November 2, 1967, Dir. Pers. Depto. II N° 177, HA-MD. Return to text.
  46. Chilean Army Chief to MinDef, restricted memorandum, May 8, 1967, Secc. I N° 264/4, HA-MD. Return to text.
  47. Rojas to Chilean Army Chief, request, July 10, 1962; and Fernández to Chilean Army Chief, request, July 5, 1962. Return to text.