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Nov. 21, 2024

Korea, Germany, and the Arsenal of Democracy

Michael Fitzpatrick
©2024 Michael Fitzpatrick

ABSTRACT: In the 1970s, the United States and West Germany developed a vital transatlantic partnership focused on new military doctrines and technology that met the challenges of the late Cold War. Due to domestic politics and strategic concerns, the United States never recreated this type of relationship with countries in the Indo-Pacific region—specifically with South Korea. Using a unique synthesis of American, German, and Korean sources, this article argues that another partnership is required in Asia today. Rather than fall back on European partners, Washington should collaborate with Seoul to develop a new generation of doctrine and technology.

Keywords: post–Cold War, Federal Republic of Germany, South Korea, partnerships, defense industry

 

This past March, South Korea launched an observation satellite into orbit to provide intelligence on Pyongyang’s nuclear program. Following the launch, the South Korean AeroSpace Administration announced plans to foster a top-five global space program. In Daejeon, a new “Defense AI Center” was recently established. The KF-21 stealth fighter project also continues to move forward, suggesting South Korea will soon produce its fifth-generation aircraft. These stories highlight two key truths regarding defense acquisitions in the twenty-first century. First, many capabilities that had long been the exclusive purview of the great powers are now available to any nation with sufficient industrial capacity. Where the United States has dominated in space, stealth, and cyber warfare for decades, other powers are now closing the gap. Second, Seoul, has become a major player in the global defense industry. While South Korea possesses 10 percent of the GDP of the United States, two-thirds of the GDP per capita, and 10 percent of the defense spending in absolute terms, the South Korean military continues to develop novel capabilities and unique systems. Consequently, the Korean military-industrial complex is one of the strongest in the world today, boasting a tremendous capacity for innovative research and the ability to partner with allies in the region and beyond and scale production to a level not seen in many other countries.1

The evolution of the Korean military mirrors that of the West German (Federal Republic of Germany / FRG) Bundeswehr during the Cold War. Between 1954 and 1960, the Bundeswehr evolved from a figment of Western planners’ imaginations into a carbon copy of the US military. In the 1960s, that force and the West German army stepped out of America’s shadow and, by 1976, became an equal partner in the Western Defense establishment. Today, we see the transition toward a more equal partnership with South Korea. Washington should recognize this ongoing process and nurture this increasingly vital transpacific relationship, especially given North Korea’s nuclear arsenal and the increasingly tense situation between China and Taiwan.

The Russia-Ukraine War has strained the logistics of Western militaries and exposed gaps in capabilities between Western militaries and the threat Russia presents. Rather than frame South Korean industries as junior partners in Western defense, or worse, as jealous rivals competing for sales with American companies, Washington should embrace and support the growth of Korean defense industries. Partnering with South Korean researchers and producers would improve the quality of systems while reducing costs to both militaries. The West German / American model of the 1970s exemplifies the utility—and pitfalls—of establishing a collaborative, rather than competitive, approach to collective security.

Founding the German and Korean Armies

It is perhaps a historic irony that the reestablishment of the FRG’s military resulted from the Korean War. In June 1950, the North Korean army crossed the 38th parallel and ignited a war that threatened to upend the balance of the Cold War. Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson later claimed that where others saw the ongoing crisis in Korea, he saw a future crisis over a divided Germany. Indeed, many Americans feared the war in Korea was the first shot in a larger reckoning with the Communist bloc. The prewar Korean army had been heavily influenced by advisers and trainers from the American Korean Military Assistance Group. By 1950, American combat forces and most of the military assistance group had withdrawn, but the Korean army was equipped with a broad selection of American materiel and had experience fighting in several counterinsurgency campaigns.2

The initial invasion nearly shattered the South Korean army, though Alan R. Millett’s history of the initial invasion pushes scholars to examine vital battles fought in the first days of the war that derailed the northern offensive and enabled the subsequent retreat. By 1951, the Korean army had become a phoenix, revived by the remnants of the force that staggered into Busan. For the next two years, the Korean army was rebuilt to meet frontline needs. As a result, long-term planning took a back seat, and the field force was infused with US military aid.3

Europe, too, was spurred to action by the Korean War. During the hot summer of 1950, members of the year-old NATO Alliance agreed on the necessity of rebuilding a West German military contingent. As with all things, the devil lay in the details. As the war dragged on, it became clear that the North’s invasion was not the first shot in a third world war, thus shattering the rationale for rapid rearmament. The intractability of France, a frequent victim of German militarism with much to fear from a resurgent Germany, further complicated negotiations, which stretched past the end of the war. Even without this pressure, West German rearmament had an inherent logic. The Soviet Union’s overwhelming numerical advantage worried Western allies still torn between European deterrence and wars in those disintegrating empires. The largest pool of untapped manpower in Europe remained in West Germany, which had no empire and would be on the front lines of any future war. These reasons sustained the momentum of the diplomatic project until its completion in 1954.4

The first ground units fielded by the new West German force were a mishmash of equipment and experience. From top to bottom, it blended generations of German armies from the imperial days, the Reichswehr era, and World War II and mixed them with young men who served for the first time in a more democratic military. Germany built the Bundeswehr in the image of the American Army. In the late 1950s, it might have been difficult to distinguish American soldiers from German ones. Infantry soldiers carried M1 Garand rifles and M1919 Browning machine guns and drove Jeeps and Ford trucks. They were supported by Patton tanks and were covered by F-86 Sabers.5

German doctrine likewise mirrored US Army doctrine, which, until 1960, formally enshrined World War II tactics and concepts. The Germans differed most from Americans in their conception of nuclear war. Due to practical and technological issues as well as a moral aversion to arming a nation recently engaged in militarism and genocide, the Bundeswehr did not consider using these ultimate tools of war offensively in a systemic way. Accordingly, the German army avoided the pentomic diversion of trading conventional capabilities for atomic fires that captured the US Army’s attention in the late 1950s.6

Atomic warfare was nevertheless an undeniable reality of modern warfare, and the Soviets were unlikely to restrain themselves, regardless of the German army’s position. German officers thus envisioned a battlefield in which their forces might be subject to an unexpected nuclear attack but that they would have to fight conventionally. In this environment, dispersion and movement would be mandatory. Conceptually, if not always in practice, German doctrine reverted toward the fluid and mobile defense of the 1940s.

The German army’s renewed focus on mobility necessarily resulted in a push to develop weapons better suited to a fluid battlefield. American and British allies, which saw the Bundeswehr as a valuable client that could purchase obsolete equipment at inflated prices, placed additional pressure on the Germans. In one such case, the British scuttled a deal to sell obsolete American M47 Patton tanks to the German army. The sale failed because the British opposed the transfer of obsolete equipment in favor of more modern systems. Nor did the Heer’s preference for the more modern M48 Patton tank weigh on London’s decision making. Instead, the British opposed the deal because it prevented the export of their FV4007 Centurion tanks. The lesson was clear: only West German industry would focus on what was best for the Bundeswehr. New German weapons would have to be tailor-made to the Bundeswehr’s needs. The crowning achievement of this rearmament program was the Leopard I tank, which would replace the American Pattons that were then in service with the Heer.7

The Korean army’s development mirrored that of the German army in the second half of the 1950s. When the Korean War ended in 1953, the Korean army transitioned from a war footing with a short-term focus on the continuing crisis toward a peacetime army capable of sustaining a deployment along the demilitarized zone for many years. In 1954, the same year the Western allies agreed to revive the German army, the United States also signed the Mutual Defense Treaty with Syngman Rhee’s regime securing long-term US basing and materiel support. An important concern was rightsizing the Korean army by transforming active divisions into reserve units, reducing the active Army’s costs and manpower burden. For political reasons, however, substantive change was unpopular with the Rhee dictatorship, which relied on the Korean army as an important backstop to power.8

The democratic government, which came to power in 1960, was too short lived to make substantial changes to the Korean defense establishment before the charismatic general Park Chung-Hee arrived in 1961 and subverted democratic institutions. Defense reforms were initially aimed at reducing the cost and size of the force, while expansion and modernization took a back seat. Seoul’s approach changed significantly in January 1968, when North Korean commandos came within 200 yards of the Blue House (Chong Wa Dae) gate. Days later, the USS Pueblo was seized and its crew taken hostage. Further commando raids and cross-border shelling that year indicated a greater period of Northern aggression. For Park, domestic arms production became a central concern and would ultimately consume much of his second decade in power.9

By 1979, while American equipment and doctrine still dominated the field kit for Korean soldiers, Park secured the domestic production of small arms, a joint tank development project with Chrysler Corporation, and a more secure basis for independent defense. The Park administration’s inability to balance these competing needs led to further decline in the civilian economy and growing discontent within the regime, which eventually led to his dramatic assassination. While the succeeding Chun Doo-Hwan dictatorship did not halt many in-progress development programs, it cut future investments and focused on the following American trends.10

Moving Toward Joint Collaboration

In the 1960s, Germany also began securing its defense industrial base. It designed and produced new systems that would give it the capability to maintain its unique doctrine, all while making the Bundeswehr less dependent on its NATO Allies. At the beginning of the decade, the Kennedy administration spearheaded an attempt to standardize NATO’s diverse equipment by initiating joint US-FRG programs. The cornerstone of these ambitious joint development programs was the MBT-70 tank, which promised to replace the fleet of aging M60 and Leopard 1 tanks. The MBT-70 project also envisioned standardizing procurement and logistics between the United States and West Germany, the two largest armies in NATO. It was an ambitious, but ultimately flawed, attempt.11

Beyond many technological issues, the MBT-70 project foundered on incompatible interests. In terms of requirements, doctrinal changes had produced divergent needs within both armies. Industrial protectionism turned every debate over equipment minutiae into matters of national importance, which were frequently solved through ministerial-level compromises that pleased no one. In the most ludicrous example, the size of bolts and screws became a monthslong bureaucratic battle only resolved when the United States and FRG defense ministers compromised on the use of both imperial and metric sizes. The compromise provided succor for both nations’ defense industries and meant German parts could not be built in American factories and vice versa. The crews bore the burden of resolving which parts could be serviced by which set of tools. By 1969, the MBT-70 project collapsed, as both sides concluded joint development would not produce joint agreement. All the large joint US-FRG development projects initiated by the Kennedy administration faltered in similar ways.12

Two independent visions emerged from the MBT-70 program—the American XM-803 and the German Keller tank designs. The programs intended to complete the work the MBT-70 project started, which, by that time, had produced a dozen prototype vehicles. The XM-803 could not escape the implosion of the joint development project, and by 1972, the design was abandoned. In Germany, however, the Keller received continuous development through the early 1970s. The project rapidly evolved past the bloated and compromised MBT-70 design, though many of the components preferred by the German contingent were retained and refined. The first prototype Leopard 2 tanks came out of this process—though by the late 1970s, that design was considerably different from the MBT-70 starting point. While the MBT-70 tank acquisition program collapsed, the technology-sharing agreements between the United States and West Germany remained intact. The product of these agreements gave the XM-1 program access to much of the Keller’s research data. The Heer played an active, though now supporting, role in the development of the M1 Abrams tank.13

Alongside tank development, the countries also built closer collaborative relationships on several important technologies. In the 1970s, the Heer and US Army reignited work on the Improved Hawk (I-Hawk) upgrade program, which began in the 1960s and was saved due to its relative success. By 1974, the I-Hawk had produced prototypes, and the first joint US-FRG training cadre arrived at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. The induction of this first cadre allowed officers and staffs to collaborate and develop a new work relationship. At Fort Sill, members of several Army commands—most importantly, William E. DePuy of the newly created United States Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and Chief of Staff of the Army Creighton Williams Abrams Jr.—met with their German counterparts led by Inspector of the German Army Horst Hildebrandt. DePuy had a stiff job—to develop a new technology-forward doctrine for an army still nursing a post-Vietnam hangover. Hildebrandt, likewise, hoped to innovate on German doctrine and technology. He needed American observations on the Yom Kippur War, which offered tantalizing hints at the Soviets’ technologies and intentions for central Europe.14

Under the guise of deepening technological connections, Germany and the United States struck a bargain. The Heer and TRADOC shared thinking, swapped documents, exchanged officers, passed along technology, and, most importantly, held biannual meetings that became forums for the open exchange of ideas regarding collective defense. This new relationship would be qualitatively different from earlier ones. Joint projects were smaller, targeted toward areas of consensus, and rarely produced a single solution. Instead, both sides brought ideas to what DePuy dubbed an intellectual perpetual soup. The German connection helped Americans refocus on the central European front, legitimizing DePuy’s new ideas by grounding them in the experience and practice of the World War II German army, from which both sides drew inspiration. Both sides benefited from the cost-sharing and data-exchange agreements that facilitated the completion of projects—from artillery-deployable mines to night vision to attack helicopter designs.15

Neither party coerced the other to bolster the other party’s industrial base or to standardize equipment or doctrine around one rigid concept. Instead, each country exchanged information on specific, individual pieces of equipment, taking only what they wanted and adapting the information to their national military contexts. Often, technology sharing led both sides to acquire weapons systems that, while distinct and manufactured domestically, had similar capabilities. In terms of doctrine, itself an outgrowth and a shaper of technology, the 1980 edition of HDv (Heeresdienstverordnung / ArmyService Regulation) 100/100 and the equivalent 1982 edition of Operations, Field Manual 100-5, contain a similar, compatible vision of war. Paradoxically, the United States and West Germany reached the greatest period of joint interoperability and standardization in the 1980s, a time when both sides had abandoned the goal in object and rhetoric and were producing superficially unique weapons.

A renewal of the joint relationship appeared imminent in the late 1980s as the forces exchanged notes on two new doctrinal concepts, AirLand Battle 2000 and Gefechtsfeld 90, both predicated on developing new unmanned systems and battlefield observation devices that might be feasible by 2000. The end of the Cold War halted planning on new doctrine, and the joint relationship faded. The United States focused on expeditionary capabilities versus a heavy, static deployment in Europe. Without serious peer competition from Russia or China, America lacked a driving interest to invest heavily in risky technological development programs.16

The Global War on Terror doubled these tendencies, as these conflicts required lighter, more deployable, more responsive forces. The financial cost of combat operations also came partially at the cost of research and development (for example, short-range air defense was unnecessary in counterinsurgency operations). The newly reunified Germany experienced similar problems, though differently expressed. Established borders and neighbors, with whom war would be unthinkable, replaced unstable borders and threatening neighbors practically overnight. There would be no third attempt to invade France or capture Warsaw. The 1990s inaugurated a new Pax Germanica, marred only by limited commitments to nonexistential conflicts—a humanitarian intervention in the Balkans, a commitment to a NATO mission in Afghanistan, and the more general threat presented to Europe by the global strategic situation after the September 11 attacks. For the German public, these experiences have been more painful than challenging and have reinforced the unpalatability of any war.

Parallel Developments in South Korea

During the late Cold War, comparisons between the South Korean and German armies began to break down. After the Vietnam War, the US Army began considering the issue of fighting in central Europe and incorporated German thought and practice into its broad-based reforms. In 1979, Kim Jae Kyu, head of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, assassinated Park. A second dictatorship replaced Park’s, again arising from within the army, led by Chun. Chun’s regime began with the massacre of democratic activists in Gwangju, and as a result, unlike Park, he remained a contentious, often unpopular leader. From the beginning, Chun relied on US recognition and support to secure his position and developed closer ties with the Reagan administration. Chun maintained the military reforms initiated under the previous regime. In 1978, Park had launched the Korean army into an ambitious tank development program. By the early 1980s, it had produced the K1 tank. In 1981, the Korean army also created its equivalent Training and Doctrine Command. Despite this reform momentum, Chun’s regime and the Reagan administration were inseparable. Purchasing American equipment and coordinating with American doctrine entrenched Chun, where it had previously weakened Park.17

After Chun’s ousting in 1988, the Korean army reconsidered the applicability of American doctrine developed jointly with the German Heer for the central European context. Under the post-Chun democracy, the Korean army underwent depoliticizing and strengthening reforms. Under Plan 818, the Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff received more operational responsibility, further separating the office of the president from military decision making, and long-term force planning further became a responsibility for individual staffs. These reforms and South Korea’s broader democratic turn altered the accountability structure for the Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff and military. Instead of relying on generals-turned-dictators to chart the development of the force, Korean officers had to justify to the people why the services deserved a share of national resources. While the American- Korean alliance remains strong and influential, this domestic democratic turn incentivizes a focus on domestic needs, domestic industries, and the unique strategic situation in Northeast Asia.18

For the United States, German reunification and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact signaled the end of the Cold War in central Europe. On the Korean Peninsula, the Cold War never ended—the status quo of 1953 persists today. During the 1990s, the relationship between South Korea and the US Army remained strong, Korea was a central focus for the Clinton administration, and AirLand Battle dominated doctrinally. Following the September 11 attacks, American and South Korean interests diverged more sharply than at any other time in their history. As with Germany, the Korean army had little interest in following the US Army down the road of counterinsurgency and light infantry. The defense requirements in Korea require a much heavier, armored fighting force. Consequently, the Korean army must consider its needs and requirements in greater isolation than previous eras. Utilizing domestic defense institutions, the national university system, and the close cooperation between the government and South Korea’s potent industrial sector, this challenge has been met and has produced a flourishing Korean military-industrial complex. South Korea’s armed forces have several capabilities equal to, or exceeding, those of their allies.

Conclusion

The calculus for the United States has shifted again. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the possibility of war over Taiwan have refocused Americans on the high end of the combat operations spectrum. Ukraine has exposed the shallow pool of Western largesse, whether it be 155mm ammunition, modern tanks and fighting vehicles, or air defense systems. The United States and its allies are struggling to fill the gap between existing stocks, production capacity, and Ukraine’s voracious needs. Despite the largest investment in Western weapons production in the twenty-first century, considerable shortfalls exist in many critical systems. The disparity between need and capacity is most evident in Germany, where decades of cost cutting have left the Bundeswehr systemically unable to provide the type or quantity of weapons Ukraine needs.

Political concerns have long dominated and played a major role in the faltering of a military that was once the cornerstone of Western defense. In the aftermath of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Olaf Scholz’s chancellorship declared the beginning of a new era, the Zeitenwende, repositioning Germany as an international defense leader. In practice, however, the Zeitenwende has not delivered on the bold leadership initially suggested. Germany has lagged behind other nations in weapons deliveries. Systems such as the Gepard antiaircraft gun, the Marder infantry fighting vehicle, and the Leopard 1 tank have been trapped by legal agreements regarding the secondary export of weapons. Additionally, controversy exists in German politics over the delivery of long-range Taurus KEPD-350 cruise missiles to Kyiv.

Seoul, on the other hand, has had a longer and deeper military relationship with the United States than the Bundeswehr can claim. Both sides have collaborated over the defense of the Korean Peninsula. During the Cold War, a second Korean War remained an important, but secondary, concern to central Europe. That thinking changed in the 1990s. A war with the North became one of America’s two main strategic concerns under the two medium regional contingencies framework. This framework envisioned an American military designed to fight two simultaneous regional wars on the scale of Operation Desert Storm, or a second North Korean invasion of the South. As a result, a divided Korean Peninsula remained an important strategic concern following the end of the Cold War. Even today, US Forces Korea is the second-largest overseas deployment of American forces, and the inter-Korean border remains restless.

The legacy of this strategic reorientation can be seen in the Republic of Korea Army’s arms, which blend American concepts, technology, and domestic innovation. The North’s constant and continued threat provides a stimulus for change and innovation. Nonetheless, South Korea’s armed forces have stepped out of the American shadow since the end of the Cold War to develop answers to the questions of defense on the peninsula. The K1 tank may share its DNA with the American M1, but the newer K2 is a more distant relation. The Korean air force flies the F-15, as does the US Air Force, but the F-15K has several unique capabilities. While the United States has struggled to field mobile air defenses comparable to the Russian SA-11 Buk—which can bridge the gap between the man-portable FIM-92 Stinger air defense system and the long-range MIM-104 Patriot surface-to-air missile system—the Korean army has introduced the KM-SAM Cheolmae, an intermediate-range and truck-mobile platform that fills this gap. The Korean Cheolmae provides a possible point of collaboration with the United States since it exists in an air defense niche currently unfilled in the American arsenal. The US Army could embark on a long, risky, and expensive independent development project to fill this niche—or it could partner with the Korean army and use the system as a springboard to reduce development time, cut costs, lower risks, and produce a product better than the result of two independent procurement projects.

The Russia-Ukraine War has pushed the strategic situation in East Asia into flux. Russian military weakness has fundamentally altered the Russian–North Korean relationship. North Korea recently demonstrated suicide drones similar to those being used in Ukraine today, likely the first fruits of a deeper Russian-Korean partnership. China, likewise, cannot ignore the Russia-Ukraine War and its impact on the South China Sea area. Much as Belarus has conditioned the periphery of the war in Ukraine, North Korea will play an unavoidable role in American and Korean defense planning, and China would do well to challenge Russian influence with support of its erstwhile ally. Regardless of ideological sentiment, both leading parties in the South Korean National Assembly will struggle to reengage North Korea in a détente, while rising tensions in the region create conditions for further collaboration. Threatened as they are by the North, many Korean citizens will unlikely favor a détente when their largest strategic threat is rearming and retrenching into an anti-Western, anti-South coalition.19

Looking to the future, the United States has been lucky. The Russia-Ukraine War has exposed vulnerabilities in the Western arsenal and provided a long lead time to fix them. The United States is wealthy enough and the Department of Defense well funded enough that the military could acquire a new generation of weapons without needing collaborative development. A larger question ought to be why start fresh when allied nations already address many of these vulnerabilities? The Department of Defense should share in, and follow up on, others’ success. History provides a framework to do this work. Our European relationships were important when the primary threat was in that region. Today, we face more global challenges and should turn to global partners.

South Korea is poised to be one such global partner, with an industry capable of supporting shared interests in Northeast Asia, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere. As this process unfolds, we must assess our history of collaborative development and procurement, particularly the US-FRG relationship, to see where possible successes and failures are likely to occur. In reality, South Korea will not once again become a major consumer of US arms. Nevertheless, the Korean military-industrial complex as a partner can help develop the American one. When the Russia-Ukraine War concludes, the United States and Europe will question their strategic directions. Europe should evaluate its commitment to Scholz’s Zeitenwende in a hypothetical scenario in which the Russian threat is diminished. Meanwhile, the United States should continue to focus on Taiwan and the Pacific. If American and European strategic concerns deviate significantly, their partnerships will unlikely produce the success they achieved in the 1980s or today.

South Korea’s strategic interests should remain laser focused on its unquiet frontier. The barbed-wire fencing lining the Han River estuary serves as a reminder of the region’s strategic realities and that Seoul should prioritize defense. American defeat in the region would gravely affect Korea’s long-term position. Seoul, therefore, should invest in its defense and strive to become the cornerstone in a new twenty-first-century defense framework. Washington should learn from the 1970s and embrace Korea as a partner and close ally for weapons development and procurement.

 
 

Michael Fitzpatrick
Dr. Michael Fitzpatrick is the Defense POW / MIA Accounting Agency (DPAA) post-doctoral fellow at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He is not an employee of DPAA, but he supports the agency through a partnership. Fitzpatrick is currently working on a book manuscript, titled The Perpetual Soup, about American and German doctrinal development during the late Cold War.

 
 

DPAA disclaimer: Dr. Michael Fitzpatrick is not an employee of DPAA, he supports DPAA through a partnership. The views presented are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of DPAA, DoD or its Components.

Disclaimer: Articles, reviews and replies, review essays, and book reviews published in Parameters are unofficial expressions of opinion. The views and opinions expressed in Parameters are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. The appearance of external hyperlinks does not constitute endorsement by the Department of Defense of the linked websites or the information, products, or services contained therein. The Department of Defense does not exercise any editorial, security, or other control over the information you may find at these locations.

 
 

Endnotes

  1. Hyung-Jin Kim et al., “North Korean Rocket Carrying Its 2nd Spy Satellite Explodes Shortly After Launch,” The Associated Press (website), May 28, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/north-korea-missile-japan-28efd0f15318594fdcf5ec8f416c196b; Michelle Ye Hee Lee and Robyn Dixon, “Russia’s Putin to Visit North Korea, amid Growing Military Cooperation,” The Washington Post (website), June 17, 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/06/17/russia-putin-north-korea-visit-kim/; Kim Na-young, “S. Korea Pushes for Reusable Space Rocket Development, L4 Exploration: KASA,” Yonhap News Agency (website), May 30, 2024, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240530006100320; Chae Yun-hwan, “S. Korea Launches Research Center in Defense Artificial Intelligence,” Yonhap News Agency, (website), April 1, 2024, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240401001900315; and Leilani Chavez, “South Korea to Start Mass Production of KF-21 Fighter Jets,” Defense News (website), February 2, 2024, https://www.defensenews.com/air/2024/02/02/south-korea-to-start-mass-production-of-kf-21-fighter-jets/. Return to text.
  2. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (W. W. Norton, 1969), 418, 436. See also William Stueck, The Korean War: An International History (Princeton University Press, 1997). For a history of the Korean Military Assistance Group, see Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War (Center of Military History, 1962). See also Allan R. Millett, The War for Korea, 1945–1950: A House Burning (University Press of Kansas, 2005). Return to text.
  3. See Allan R. Millett, The War for Korea, 1950–1951: They Came from the North (University Press of Kansas, 2010), 85–144. Return to text.
  4. See Robert McGeehan, The German Rearmament Question: American Diplomacy and Western Defense After World War II (University of Illinois Press, 1971). See also Frédéric Bozo and Christian Wenkel, eds., France and the German Question, 1945–1990 (Berghahn Books, 2019); Sheldon A. Goldberg, From Disarmament to Rearmament: The Reversal of US Policy Toward West Germany, 1946–1955 (Ohio University Press, 2017); and Michael Creswell and Marc Trachtenberg, “France and the German Question, 1945–1955,” Journal of Cold War Studies 5, no. 3 (Summer 2003): 5–28. Return to text.
  5. See Donald Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed Forces (Princeton University Press, 1988), 136–48; Andrew Birtle, “Rearming the Phoenix: American Military Assistance to the Federal Republic of Germany 1950–1960” (PhD diss., Ohio State University, 1985); and Helmut R. Hammerich et al., Das Heer, 1950 bis 1970: Konzeption, Organisation und Aufstellung (R. Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2006), https://doi.org/10.1524/9783486711875. Return to text.
  6. Hammerich et al., Das Heer, 417, 436–38, 453. See also Ingo Trauschweizer, The Cold War U.S. Army: Building Deterrence for Limited War (University Press of Kansas, 2008). Return to text.
  7. See Birtle, “Rearming the Phoenix,” 347–50. Return to text.
  8. Kwonyoung Park, Restoring the Nexus of History-Theory-Doctrine in Military Thought: Implications for the Republic of Korea Army (School of Advanced Military Studies, January 2013), 19, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA589528.pdf. Return to text.
  9. The Nixon Doctrine, designed primarily for Vietnam, further upset the American-Korean relationship. At a time when Park felt his regime was under siege, the Nixon administration pushed to withdraw major American formations from South Korea. The American policy of “Koreanization” opened the way for Yushin as much as events in Seoul. Return to text.
  10. See Peter Banseok Kwon, Cornerstone of the Nation: The Defense Industry and the Building of the Modern Korea Under Park Chung Hee (Harvard University Asian Center, 2024). Return to text.
  11. See Thomas L. McNaugher, “Problems of Collaborative Weapons Development: The MBT-70,” Armed Forces & Society 10, no. 1 (Fall 1983): 123–45, https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X8301000106; and Michael Fitzpatrick, “In Pursuit of Supremacy: Cold War Weapons Acquisition, a Case Study, 1963–1970” (master’s thesis, Millersville University, 2015). Return to text.
  12. Welborn G. Dolvin, Lessons Learned: Joint International Program Management for the U.S./FRG Main Battle Tank (United States Army Management Engineering Training Agency, September 1966), 59. Return to text.
  13. R. P. Hunnicutt, Abrams: A History of the American Main Battle Tank, vol. 2 (Presidio Press, 1990), 117. Return to text.
  14. C. J. LeVan to William E. DePuy, June 10, 1974, folder 8, box 31A Backchannel, William DePuy Papers, US Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA; and “Deutsch-amerikanische Regierungsvereinbarung vom 12.7.74,” Bestand BW/1, Standort 22, Magazin H 3 OG, Reihe 401, Regal 1, Gefach 1, BA-MA. See also Paul H. Herbert, Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 edition of Operations, FM 100-5, Leavenworth Papers, no. 16 (Combat Studies Institute, 1988), 17–18; Michael Fitzpatrick, “Planning World War Three: How the German Army Shaped American Doctrine After the Vietnam War” (PhD diss., Ohio University, 2023); and William E. DePuy, “Implications of the Middle East War on U.S. Army Tactics, Doctrine, and Systems,” in Selected Papers of General William E. DePuy: First Commander US Army Training and Doctrine Command, comp. Richard M. Swain, ed. Donald L. Gilmore and Carolyn D. Conway (Combat Studies Institute, 1995), 75–111. Return to text.
  15. See DePuy, “Letter to Major General E. Ott et al. from General DePuy, 23 July 1974, with draft concept paper, Concept Operations [‘Pot of Soup Letter’],” Selected Papers, 121. “Smoke Operations-Briefing,” Bestand BH 1, Standort 22, Magazin H 2 OG, Reihe 180, Regal 9, Gefach 1, BA-MA. Return to text.
  16. “Zusammenfassender Bericht über die GE/US-Steuergruppensitszung vom 29. 04.- 03. 05. 1985,” Bestand BH 1, Standort 22, Magazin H 2 OG, Reihe 180, Regal 2, Gefach 1. See also AirLand Battle 2000 (Training and Doctrine Command, 1982). Return to text.
  17. The Carter administration, concerned about threats from the north, played an important role in supporting the fledgling Chun dictatorship through the most difficult early months. See William H. Gleysteen Jr., Massive Entanglement, Marginal Influence: Carter and Korea in Crisis (Brookings Institution Press, 1999). See Philip Lett, “Korea’s Type 88 Comes of Age,” International Defense Review (January 1988): 41–42. Unlike the MBT-70 project, which involved close government collaboration, the K1 tank project seems to have focused on joint development between Chrysler Corporation and the Korean army, highlighting a unique private-international partnership. Park, Restoring the Nexus, 22; Roh Yang Kyu, “Study on the Changes in the U.S. Forces’ Operational Art and the Application to the ROK Forces” (PhD diss., Chungnam National University, 2010), 10. Return to text.
  18. In-Bum Chun, “Korean Defense Reform: History and Challenges,” The Brookings Institution (website), October 31, 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/korean-defense-reform-history-and-challenges/. Return to text.
  19. Oliver Slow, “North Korea’s Kim Jong Un Abandons Unification Goal with South,” BBC (website), January 16, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-67990948. Return to text.