US Relations with Africa and the New Cold War

Hamid Lellou
©2024 Hamid Lellou

ABSTRACT: As a key battleground in the global struggle between democracy and authoritarianism, Africa offers US policymakers insights to navigate competing interests and power dynamics. For a comprehensive view of this competition, this article analyzes American, Chinese, French, and Russian geopolitical strategies; employs a geopolitical analysis of current events, diplomatic maneuvers, and historical lessons; and uses policy documents, expert opinions, and case studies of geopolitical engagements. It then provides actionable policy recommendations for fostering stable, long-term US relations in Africa and offers strategic perspectives on managing the global power competition applicable to broader national security and diplomatic contexts.

Keywords: US policy in Africa, global order and power dynamics, strategic insights for policymakers, Russia-China relations in Africa, proxy conflicts and diplomatic maneuvers

Commemorated in March 2024, the 51st anniversary of the end of the Vietnam War serves as a reminder of the enduring struggle between democracy and authoritarianism exemplified by the ongoing proxy wars across the globe. Discussions about the rise of authoritarianism and the proxy wars waged by world superpowers often overlook Africa despite a clear example like the conflict in Libya and Russia’s security involvement in multiple countries. Since the fall of Muammar al-Qaddafi in 2011, Libya has become a battleground for competing factions backed by foreign powers, including Russia, Türkiye, and the United Arab Emirates, each seeking to advance their strategic interests. While this proxy war has fueled violence, political instability, and a humanitarian crisis, it has received less attention than conflicts in other regions. Ignoring these critical situations perpetuates instability on the continent and undermines global efforts to address authoritarianism and conflict.

Russia’s security involvement, exemplified by its military support in countries like Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Libya, Mali, and Niger, combined with China’s investments in infrastructure, natural resources, and trade partnerships, poses a threat to US economic interests on the continent. Chinese financing, often provided with fewer conditions than Western alternatives, grants Beijing considerable leverage in shaping African economic policies and securing access to critical resources. Concurrently, Russia’s military engagements, such as providing mercenaries and military advisers, enhance its influence and stabilize regimes favorable to its interests. Both nations, through diplomatic engagements, development aid, and support for authoritarian governments, seek to expand their political foothold. This growing influence undermines US efforts to promote democratic governance, human rights, and transparent institutions and complicates America’s broader geopolitical objectives and commitment to fostering stable and open societies in the region.

Africa’s Disillusion: The Postwar Fight for Independence

During World War II, many African colonies supported Europe in the fight against Nazi Germany, hoping their contributions would be rewarded with independence. After Europe’s liberation in 1945, however, their demands for freedom were met with colonial repression. The resulting disappointment led to several African national liberation movements, which, for the first time since colonialism began, united under the common goal of self-determination and the vision of Africa for African people. The legacy of more than a century of European colonization, with arbitrary borders from the Berlin Conference on Africa, created challenges. Colonial divisions resulted in countries too small to sustain viable economies or too large and diverse for effective governance.¹

Ieuan Griffiths argues that the colonial borders are obsolete and do not reflect Africa’s realities. As Saadia Touval notes, rejecting these borders was central to anticolonial nationalism, but newly independent states accepted these borders to avoid conflicts. The 1964 validation of these borders by the African Union (then the Organization of African Unity) did not prevent disputes, which the United States and the USSR exploited for proxy wars during the Cold War. Thus, Africa found itself trapped between decolonization and superpower rivalry, unable to enjoy fully its hard-won independence. Empowering regional blocs could help unlock Africa’s economic potential, promote peace, and advance development goals.²

The Cold War Spills over to the African Continent

According to military and security experts, the major proxy wars of the Cold War took place in Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, and Afghanistan. These proxy wars were conventional conflicts between the USSR and the United States fought by allied governments to expand their spheres of influence and secure advanced military equipment. In Africa, the Cold War proxy wars had a profound and lasting impact. Notable examples include the Congo crisis (1960–65), the Ogaden war (1977–78, between Ethiopia and Somalia), the Angolan civil war (1975–2002), the South African border war (or the Namibian war of independence, 1966–90), and the Rhodesian Bush War (1964–79).

The continent became a battleground for superpower conflicts over the next 50 years and fostered the emergence and entrenchment of authoritarian regimes that remain in power, as highlighted in the study of regime cycles and political change in African autocracies. Several academic sources (including Lindsay A. Rourke’s Covert Regime Change: America’s Secret Cold War and Sarah Corke’s US Covert Operations and Cold War Strategy: Truman, Secret Warfare and the CIA, 1945–53) assert that during the Cold War, the US government’s strategic approach evolved.³

Initially, the approach focused on containment through military alliances and interventions. Over time, it shifted to covert operations and support for anti-communist regimes, often disregarding democratic principles. This incoherence and inconsistency enabled authoritarianism, as seen in US support for dictatorial regimes that aligned with anti-communist objectives. This strategy facilitated the rise of authoritarian regimes that remain in power today. For example, in Angola, the US-backed UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) rebels against the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola government, which the USSR and Cuba supported. The prolonged conflict devastated the country and left a legacy of instability. Similarly, the Ogaden war saw US and Soviet support for Somalia and Ethiopia, respectively, leading to the regional destabilization still seen today and confirming that US foreign policy then was marked by strategic missteps.⁴

Russia, inheriting the USSR’s influence, has reestablished ties with countries it supported during the Cold War, such as Angola, the Central African Republic, and Mozambique. These relationships are marked by military cooperation and economic investments. Meanwhile, China has made significant inroads into Africa, leveraging economic partnerships and infrastructure projects, notably, through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China’s foothold began to solidify during the latter stages of the Cold War in countries like Zambia and Tanzania, where it built railways and invested in mining.⁵

American strategy during the Cold War shifted from direct military engagement to more nuanced forms of influence, such as economic aid and covert operations. The lack of a coherent, long-term plan often led to short-term alliances with authoritarian regimes, which undermined efforts to promote democracy and stability. This inconsistency has had lasting repercussions, with American strategies enabling the rise of authoritarianism and allowing Russia and China to capitalize on the resulting instability to expand their regional influence in the region.⁶

Cold Peace or Transformed Cold War?

When the Berlin Wall crumbled in 1989, the world thought the end of the Cold War had come. Euphoria, jubilation, and festive celebrations dominated public lives in Europe. Michael Howard indicates that history has shown that each war, hot or cold, has been followed by cold peace. Africa was no exception. For 20 years following the fall of the wall, African nations felt the chill across the continent as they recovered from the trauma of post-independence proxy wars and tried to understand the new world order. The last years of President Mikhail Gorbachev’s rule saw the first signs of the Soviet Union weakening, which led to the improved American-Soviet relationship and the beginning of a unipolar world order led by the United States.⁷

Conflict transformation is subject to the transformation of relationships and social systems, elements affected by the evolution of the USSR and US relationships through détente and rapprochement. The new world order often came at the expense of the South, without the necessary cultural and educational transitions, leading to widening educational gaps, economic stagnation, increased inequality, and brain drain. Without considering or understanding traditional economic and cultural practices, the unipolar hegemonic Western domination imposed political system changes in Africa. Part of the West’s strategy for political reform was to make economic aid conditional upon the implementation of free market policies, respect for democracy, and human rights. Although these requirements were often accepted, the West did little to ensure and enforce these policies, allowing regimes like those of Denis Sassou-Nguesso of Congo (Brazzaville) and Paul Biya in Cameroon to gain power and continue the cycles of exploitation and corruption of the Cold War. Consequently, today, Africa does not influence important decisions in international bodies, including the United Nations, even when it comes to African affairs.⁸

Bogdan Denitch argued in 1996 that “capitalism does not strengthen democracy in the Third World South (including Africa).” To take the case of France’s involvement in African affairs, one can say the “France-Afrique” relationship has never been idyllic for, or advantageous to, the peoples of Africa. While Africans hold some responsibility for their situation, France, as a former colonizer and with its continued involvement in African affairs, shares a great part of the blame for the African failure, according to John A. McKesson. By tolerating corruption and mismanagement and agreeing to work with authoritarian regimes, France bears responsibility in the African abyss.⁹

Research has shown how authoritarian regimes in Africa manipulate democratic processes or institutions to consolidate power rather than democratize. The concept of competitive authoritarianism demonstrates how regimes maintain authoritarian control while holding competitive elections. This process gives the appearance of democracy while consolidating power through nondemocratic means. The regimes of Robert Mugabe and Emmerson Mnangagwa in Zimbabwe and of Yoweri Museveni in Uganda since 1986 are examples of where elections are systematically manipulated.¹⁰

Collateral Damage After the September 11 Attacks

The war on terrorism after the September 11 attacks was brutal and dramatic in Africa. Economic development and aid were no longer conditional on respect for democracy and human rights but rather on African nations’ dedication and contribution to the fight against global terrorism. According to Liz Sherwood-Randall:

The United States is doing three key things to tackle the [terrorism] threat. First, we are investing in governance, development, and diplomacy. Second, we are deepening our ties with our African partners and empowering them to take the lead on this challenge. And third, we are leveraging the collective strength of the international community, including the UN.¹¹

It has been more than two decades since the United States launched its war against terrorism on the African continent, including through training and security cooperation, yet the results are mixed and not beneficial for African people. American military personnel and Russian military experts have been involved in significant geopolitical maneuvering in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.¹²

Mali has experienced multiple coups in recent years, leading to the expulsion of French forces and the invitation of Russian military advisers. The Malian government has relied on the Wagner Group for security assistance, cementing its pivot away from Western allies. Like Niger and Mali, Burkina Faso severed military ties with the United States and France following a coup. The new junta has also sought assistance from Russian military experts to combat jihadist insurgencies in the region.

This pattern of inviting Russian military support while expelling Western forces underscores a strategic shift in the region. The affected countries appear to leverage security relationships to consolidate power domestically and reduce Western influence while potentially gaining greater autonomy in their security policies. This realignment has significant implications for regional stability and international security dynamics.

Additionally, China and Russia used the pretext of the global war on terrorism to abuse opponents domestically and support authoritarian regimes in Africa. Authoritarianism Goes Global: The Challenge to Democracy, a well-documented book by Larry Diamond, Mark F. Plattner, and Christopher Walker, explores how authoritarian regimes, including China and Russia, have exploited the global war on terrorism to justify repressive measures against their political opponents. The authors discuss how these countries used counterterrorism as a pretext to consolidate power domestically and extend their influence abroad, including in Africa.¹³

Current African leadership has shown its limits; the United States must reconsider its war on terrorism policy and hedge its bets. Africa is not better off today, which partly explains the repeated military coups and their seemingly popular support. According to a report developed by AJLabs (Al-Jazeera Network), 106 of the 242 successful military coups around the world since 1950 occurred in Africa.¹⁴

In 2023, Megan Duzor and Brian Williamson indicated that since the war on terrorism began, there were 53 coup attempts, including 25 successful ones. The last military coups in Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, and Niger, with which the United States had close military relationships, showed the fragility of America’s relationships with African nations. The failure of the war on terrorism, coupled with the support of corrupt African regimes from authoritarian powers like China and Russia, resulted in African countries experiencing increased repression, instability, and limited progress in development.¹⁵

Africa Today: A New Cold War

In recent decades, Africa has become a strategic focal point for major global powers, including China, France, Russia, and the United States, each vying for influence across the continent. These external players have impacted the political and security landscape in various African regions. In North Africa, instability following the Arab Spring drew attention from Western and Eastern powers. East Africa, with its strategic maritime routes and emerging markets, has seen increased engagement from China and the United States. West Africa, grappling with terrorism and economic challenges, has been a battleground for French and American counterterrorism efforts. The Sahel region faces severe security threats, exacerbated by military coups and the rise of jihadist groups. Central Africa’s rich resources attract Chinese investment, while southern Africa, relatively more stable, remains a competitive ground for economic and political influence. Despite these engagements, many African countries struggle to achieve substantial benefits, often finding themselves entangled in the geopolitical maneuvers of these powerful nations.

China’s Opportunistic and Calculating Strategies

China kept quiet and behaved as a silent pawn during the Cold War. During this time, it positioned itself globally and established deals that are proving its economic prowess and uncovering its long-term strategy. Today, China is the second-largest economic power, surpassing Japan and Europe and knocking at America’s door. While the United States was fighting proxy wars in Africa, China was building an empire on the continent.

In 2023, James McBride, Noah Berman, and Andrew Chatzky affirmed that one of China’s biggest maneuvers had been building the Belt and Road Initiative, or the New Silk Road, noting that the ambitious infrastructure project allowed China to expand its influence globally and strengthen its worldwide economic grip. The initiative develops strategic transportation, energy, and water infrastructure, including, but not limited to, the port of Djibouti, the Ethiopia–Kenya railway, the Ethiopia–Djibouti railway, the Ethiopia–Djibouti water pipeline, and the East–West highway in Algeria. China’s advantage in Africa is threefold.¹⁶

• It does not defend universal human rights or try to leverage these principles when dealing with authoritarian regimes.
• It has an educated, skilled, low-cost workforce that is easily deployable for African infrastructure projects.
• It does not impose its cultural, political, or economic values on African nations.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China mentioned that: “China will continue its support for African countries’ efforts to resolve their continent’s issues in their way and make a greater contribution to peace and security in Africa. China will continue its firm support for African countries’ efforts to explore development paths suited to their national conditions.”¹⁷

One can argue that this support is a great competitive advantage, however, countries in Africa recognize the hidden side of this transaction— the Chinese debt-trap policy. Many African countries realize that their debts are insurmountable, and the only way out is to lose control of some of their infrastructure to China’s benefit, which results in a loss of sovereignty. Local Kenyan newspapers have reported that recent protests in Kenya have been driven by mounting public frustration over the country’s substantial debt to China, which has exacerbated economic hardships. The debt, largely accumulated through infrastructure projects like the Standard Gauge Railway, has led to financial strain. In the first quarter of 2024, Kenya paid a record $471 million in interest on Chinese loans, marking a 106.41 percent increase from the previous year. This surge in debt repayments has sparked discontent among Kenyans, culminating in riots and demonstrations against the government’s borrowing practices and economic management.¹⁸

Xue Gong, a researcher and scholar on Southeast Asia’s political and economic affairs, alluded to a report by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development stipulating that global Chinese investments are troubling. China is associated with global projects worth more than $369.5 billion, including the Belt and Road Initiative’s $101.8 billion toxic assets (toxic from the African perspective). The official African narrative that China is investing in Africa is misinterpreted and misinformed. There is a difference between Chinese direct investment and lending money, and China is doing the latter.¹⁹

Boston University’s Global Development Policy Center reported in a recent publication that according to its Chinese Loans to Africa Database, between 2000 and 2022, China loaned approximately $170.08 billion to African countries. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund offer African countries loans at much higher rates than those given to other countries because of their low income, making Chinese loans more appealing.²⁰

Although there is a free-trade agreement between African nations, the reality on the ground is different. Authoritarian regimes that undermine national interests at the expense of the people dominate African nations. Caroline Freund, a global economy expert speaking for the World Bank, said that “[t]he implementation of [the African Continental Free Trade Area] AfCFTA would be a huge step forward for Africa, demonstrating to the world that it is emerging as a leader on the global trade agenda.” By owning infrastructure in many African countries, China can influence AfCFTA members, control trade, and displace national sovereignty.²¹

The second big Chinese initiative is in BRICS, a nascent economic group consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa that recently invited six more countries to join. China sees BRICS as an alternative to the hegemonic Group of Seven (comprised of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States). This conglomerate already suffers from its contradictions and cleavages.

Leslie E. Armijo introduces the newly formed group as one of “the United States’ main foils in upcoming decades.” She insists:

[F]rom a liberal institutionalist model, the BRICS are a compelling set, yet [unlike the European Union] one with a deep cleavage between two subgroups: large emerging powers likely to remain authoritarian or revert to that state [including the authoritarian regimes of China and Russia] and states that are securely democratic like Brazil, India, and to a certain extent South Africa.

China prioritizes the Belt and Road Initiative as a strategy in its engagement with Africa, fostering relationships that position African countries in debt rather than as equal economic partners, reflecting a lack of confidence in their reliability.²²

China’s implementation of its Belt and Road Initiative in Africa does not entail direct investment. Instead, China frequently extends credits to countries, many of which struggle to fulfill their debt obligations. Beyongo Mukete Dynamic asserts that “[b]etween 2000 and 2018, Chinese financial institutions provided more than US $152 billion in credit, loans, and grants to Africa.” He adds, “Beijing decided to walk a fine line between selectively canceling some debts and postponing others, while resisting calls for blanket debt forgiveness.”²³

China’s investments in African infrastructure, natural resources, and trade partnerships can undermine US economic interests on the continent. Chinese financing often comes with fewer strings attached than Western counterparts, giving Beijing leverage in shaping economic policies and gaining access to critical resources. China, therefore, is expanding its political influence in Africa through diplomatic engagements, development aid, and support for authoritarian regimes. This influence undercuts US efforts in the region to promote democratic governance, human rights, and transparent institutions.²⁴

Russia’s Opportunistic and Calculating Strategies

Following the USSR’s collapse, Russia lost interest in Africa. Today, however, the Kremlin seizes new opportunities to provide security services, a vacuum created by Westerners’ quid pro quo policies. Sandun Munasinghe proposed that “Russia is reviving Soviet-era ties with African states to extract resources from the region, and in exchange, become a security provider.” Proof of these alliances is seen in the fact that 17 African countries abstained and one voted against the March 2, 2024, UN resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.²⁵

The Wagner Group is the most well-known Russian private military contractor. Munasinghe notes that “Russian [private military contractors] PMCs have deployed to at least 19 African nations,” including Northern Mali (countering the French Barkhane mission), Sudan (supporting then-President Omar al-Bashir), and Libya (providing military support to surrogate General Khalifa Haftar). The Wagner Group’s involvement in the killing of Chad’s President Idriss Deby is also evident, as it supported the rebels that facilitated the tragic event on the battlefield. Consequently, Russia was awarded gold-mining licenses and access to other minerals in these countries.²⁶

While awaiting opportunities in Africa, Russia has developed a strategy. Francesco Generoso notes that following Russia’s invasion of Crimea, Russia developed a new “global strategy to establish itself as a superpower, which led to its increased presence in Africa.” Russia may not possess the resources the Soviet Union had, but its ambitions are growing.²⁷

Agnieszka Paczyńska, a conflict analyst and professor at George Mason University, mentions that “Russian involvement in Africa has grown significantly.” Russia is not a superpower, and its involvement in Africa is less important than many other countries. Nevertheless, it sees itself as an alternative to Chinese and American dominance. Paczyńska suggests that “Russia’s strategy . . . [involves] a mix of arms sales, political support to authoritarian leaders and security collaboration.”²⁸

France: Losing Ground

France has long and lingering relationships with several African nations, and this history is not as rosy as many French people may describe it. As a former colonial force, France continues to influence and manipulate the Communauté Financière d’Afrique bloc. The Communauté Financière d’Afrique franc, previously tied to the French currency and now to the euro, has been criticized for its perceived constraints on monetary policy autonomy and economic sovereignty. Critics within Africa argue that the fixed exchange rate regime and the requirement to deposit a portion of foreign reserves with the French Treasury limit the ability of member countries to pursue independent monetary policies tailored to their economic needs.²⁹

Philippe Vasset notes that “[s]ince decolonization, France has maintained military accords with eight African countries and programs of military cooperation with 23 others.” These agreements were meant to help French allies, protect local people, and keep the peace. Relationships between states should be gain-driven. In the France-Afrique partnership, however, the outcome is win-lose. These accords have not prevented repeated military coups and destabilization but have increased poverty and disparities, social injustice, and sustained authoritarian, but friendly, regimes. Today, the West criticizes Vladimir Putin for using Wagner mercenaries, but in the recent past, France supported mercenaries, such as Robert Denard.³⁰

Examples of misused French military cooperation and mismanagement abound: from Rwanda to the Central African Republic, passing by the Congo and Côte d’Ivoire. Vasset insists French military involvement failed and that only international pressure and reform can redirect this cooperation. How can the West speak about African sovereignty when it has a foreign military on African soil?

France is not satisfied with military operations only; it has established permanent military bases, as Vasset reiterates, in Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Gabon, Senegal, and other locations. Recent events, including the end of the Barkhane mission in Mali and military coups in Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Niger, show that France is losing ground. Russia and China are rising to fill this vacuum.³¹

American-African Partnership: Where Is the Strategy?

As a nation of former insurgents against British occupation, the American people could not accept European colonization of Africa and the Middle East. Philip E. Muehlenbeck asserts that President John F. Kennedy had an Africanist view of Africa, meaning Kennedy believed the United States could leverage African nationalism strategically to help build strong and fair relationships. Compared to other major powers, the United States had a positive image on the continent. According to Richard Wike, in 2015, “the U.S. [received] higher favorable ratings in Africa than in any other region” (79 percent). Jordan Link notes that while the United States and China enjoy favorable views on the continent, the latter is deploying a much more aggressive economic diplomacy, including building infrastructure, which will later allow China to dominate most sectoral domains, job creation, training, education, and trade. American strategy for economic development and security is unclear. The United States should not build its relationships with Africa just to counter China’s African policy. America’s competitive advantages in soft power— including advanced technology, higher education, a free market, and democratic values—are abundant in Africa.³²

America’s waning influence in Africa stems from its continued emphasis on security policy, often at the cost of fostering economic growth and sustainable development. A recent Gallup poll underscores this trend, revealing how China’s prominence in the region overshadows that of the United States. It appears US policy in Africa has been reactionary. Washington will find it difficult to counter Russia’s plan and China’s decades-long strategy with defensive actions.³³

The American response to the September 11 attacks generated mixed global reactions. While the world understands the reaction and America’s right to self-defense, many people regret the collateral damages the US war on terrorism caused. The United States Africa Command mission statement stipulates that “U.S. Africa Command, with partners, counters transnational threats and malign actors, strengthens security forces and responds to crises to advance U.S. national interests and promote regional security, stability and prosperity. As history has shown when working in foreign theaters and cultural contexts, good intentions are insufficient, and US leadership should pay close attention to the second- and third-order effects. Integrating defense with diplomacy and development cannot succeed without the inclusion of civil society. The US Department of State, through its embassy in Algiers, expressed that “[the United States] pursues three broad mission goals in its relations with Algeria: Enhance domestic security capacity and promote regional cooperation to combat instability and challenge Russia and China’s destabilizing influence.”³⁴ This statement poses two main issues:

1. building the military and security capacity of illegitimate regimes that will use them to counter popular demands for regime change; and
2. using Africa as a battlespace or buffer to counter one’s enemies is a chimera.

The United States has been criticized for turning a blind eye to, or maintaining relationships with, authoritarian regimes in Africa for strategic and geopolitical reasons. For example, it has maintained a close relationship with Egypt despite concerns over human rights abuses and authoritarian practices under leaders like Hosni Mubarak and now Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. The United States justifies this relationship, however, by Egypt’s role in regional stability and its peace treaty with Israel.³⁵

Following the Rwanda genocide of 1994, the Clinton administration faced criticism for not intervening to prevent or stop the genocide and for maintaining relations with the Rwandan Patriotic Front, which has been accused of authoritarian practices and human rights violations. The United States has a long-standing relationship with Uganda, particularly under President Museveni, despite concerns over his increasingly authoritarian rule, crackdowns on political opposition, and human rights abuses.³⁶

America’s recent wait-and-see attitude to what is unfolding in the Sahel (including successful military coups in Burkina Faso, Mali, and, most recently, Niger) denotes the immaturity of US policy in Africa or a lack of political courage facing China’s and Russia’s omnipresence. The American approach to Africa lacks a coherent strategy, raising concerns about its effectiveness in the region. The current US policy appears reactionary and lacks a proactive agenda for economic development and security. Unlike China or Russia, which are aggressively pursuing economic diplomacy and infrastructure development in Africa, the United States seems adrift in its approach.

Rather than countering China’s and Russia’s influence, the United States should capitalize on its strengths, such as advanced technology and democratic values, to foster mutually sustained beneficial relationships. America’s hesitant stance in response to developments in the Sahel region, however, including military coups, suggests a lack of political resolve or a coherent long-term strategy. Without a clear and proactive approach, the United States risks ceding influence on competitors like China and Russia in Africa.

Policy Recommendations

The US policy in Africa has been criticized as incoherent and inconsistent, resulting in fragmented and reactive approaches rather than a unified strategy, hampering the effectiveness of addressing key challenges, such as political instability, good governance, terrorism, and economic development. The US military and defense complex can play a pivotal role in remedying this situation by leveraging expertise in strategic planning and operational execution. By fostering strong partnerships with African nations; providing education on civil-military relations and leadership, training and capacity-building initiatives, and emergency relief missions; and supporting peacekeeping, the American military can contribute to stabilizing regions and promoting security. Additionally, the defense complex can help develop sustainable defense infrastructure and enhance intelligence capabilities, ensuring that African countries are better equipped to handle internal and external threats. A coherent and integrated approach focused on the military and defense sectors is essential for advancing mutual American and African interests and fostering long-term stability and prosperity. The United States is uniquely positioned to foster this partnership with the following recommendations.

A Regional Approach

Rather than dealing with individual nations, the United States should work with regional blocs to improve its chances of gaining stable relationships. The arbitrary borders that evolved over the colonial period prevented local people from moving freely and enjoying natural resources, contributing to the instability that makes the West wary of interacting with African nations. The United States may find that African states will practice greater self-enforcement when approached as regional blocs (which offer more economic opportunities) instead of individual states because failure to uphold democracy by one state would have consequences for all nations in a bloc. These blocs can offer several strategic concessions to Western partners to preserve democracy and transparency, drawing lessons from the successes and failures of post–Cold War policies.

One significant concession—increased cooperation in security efforts—could allow Western nations to establish or expand military partnerships or alliances and intelligence-sharing agreements in strategically important regions, enhance intraregional and interregional security, and provide Western partners with greater influence and operational reach in areas prone to instability and extremist threats. Additionally, these blocs can commit to rigorous anti-corruption measures and governance reforms and ensure that states handle Western aid and investment effectively and transparently.

In return, Western governments can expect a more stable and secure environment conducive to trade and investment that benefits their economic and strategic interests. Past experiences show that economic aid and development programs have had mixed results, even when coupled with security assistance. Past experiences coupled with governance reforms, however, will yield more sustainable outcomes. Economic concessions, therefore, could come with accommodations for the West, NATO, or the UN to play a greater role in creating a mutually beneficial arrangement where improved regional stability and governance directly align with Western partners’ defense and security gains.

Encouraging Good Governance

Encouraging good governance is crucial, as prioritizing security needs at the expense of local governance will trigger second- and third-order effects in the long term (such as public mistrust, anger, and, ultimately, rejection of American influence or aid), as the current French situation in the region demonstrates. To mitigate these risks and promote sustainable development, US leadership should consider several key recommendations.

Foster New, Young, and Competent Leadership

The United States should support the emergence of innovative and capable African leaders rather than deferring to former colonial powers that may still be perceived as dominant influences. This approach will empower local governance structures and promote political renewal, reducing the risk of stagnation and dependency.

Leverage African Diasporas

Immigrant communities in Western nations can play transformative roles by serving as bridges for cultural, economic, and political engagement. For example, the large African communities around Washington, DC, can influence US policy on African affairs by providing unique insights and facilitating connections that enhance mutual understanding and cooperation. These communities can contribute to the development and prosperity of their countries of origin through remittances, investment, skills transfer, and advocacy. Their involvement would ensure that policymakers develop recommendations grounded in a nuanced understanding of local contexts and needs, avoid the pitfalls of external imposition, and foster a partnership that respects and empowers African sovereignty.

This approach can mitigate concerns about undue influence from former colonial powers and promote more equitable and collaborative relationships. Evidently, France and Great Britain have lost credibility in Africa. By outsourcing relations to former colonizers, the United States may seem to display arrogance toward Africans—at best, by showing a lack of interest in the continent and its people or, at worst, by demonstrating a misguided strategy that props up two fading powers under the guise of the Northern Alliance strategic approach.

Conclusion

The 51st anniversary of the Vietnam War’s end in March 2024 highlighted the ongoing global struggle between democracy and authoritarianism reflected in contemporary proxy wars. Africa is often neglected in discussions about authoritarianism and proxy conflicts, despite the clear examples discussed in this article. This oversight perpetuates instability and weakens global efforts to combat authoritarianism. Russia’s military support and China’s investments in Africa pose significant threats to US interests and undermine efforts to promote democracy and stability. Since the United States lacks a coherent African strategy, its outreach on the continent appears reactionary and ineffective compared to China’s proactive economic diplomacy. To counteract this perception, the United States must leverage its strengths to foster beneficial relationships and maintain influence.

Future areas of study related to the development of US policy in African affairs should enhance understanding and effectiveness. Researchers should examine the long-term impacts of US aid and development programs in comparison to those of China and Russia, assessing which strategies best promote sustainable development and political stability.

1. Studies should explore the role of soft power, particularly how cultural, educational, and technological exchanges can strengthen relations between the United States and African nations.
2. Another critical area is the evaluation of US military involvement and its implications for regional security, considering direct interventions and support for local forces.
3. Furthermore, an analysis of the effectiveness of US diplomatic efforts in fostering democratic governance and human rights protections across different African nations is essential.
4. Finally, comparative studies on the economic policies and trade agreements proposed by the United States versus those proposed by China and Russia can provide insights into their respective impacts on African economies.

These research efforts will provide decisionmakers with a comprehensive understanding of how the United States can refine its African policy approach to support stability, development, and democratic governance.

Hamid Lellou
Hamid Lellou is an independent analyst specializing in conflict resolution and regional dynamics in the Middle East and Africa. With more than 20 years of experience, he has led nonprofit initiatives, managed refugee camps, and engaged with foreign government officials. Lellou holds a master’s degree in conflict analysis and resolution with a concentration in inclusive conflict engagement from the Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter School for Peace and Conflict Resolution at George Mason University and is a certified mediator. He regularly contributes to specialized publications and appears on political TV shows.

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Endnotes

1. Ieuan Griffiths, “The Scramble for Africa: Inherited Political Boundaries,” The Geographical Journal 152, no. 2 ( July 1986): 204–16, https://doi.org/10.2307/634762. Return to text.
2. Griffiths, “Scramble for Africa”; Saadia Touval, “The Organization of African Unity and African Borders,” International Organization 21, no. 1 (Winter 1967): 102–27, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2705705; and Paul Thomas Chamberlin, “Rethinking the Middle East and North Africa in the Cold War,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 43, no. 2 (May 2011): 317–19, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23017401. Return to text.
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18. Martin Mwita, “China Remains Boss as Kenya’s Debt Hits a Record Sh8 Trillion,” The Star (website), January 31, 2022, https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2022-01-31-china-remains-boss-as-kenyas-debt-hits-a-record-sh8-trillion; and Staff Writer, The East African, “Kenya Spends $471mln on China Debt in First Quarter,” Zawya (website), November 24, 2023, https://www.zawya.com/en/economy/africa/kenya-spends-record-471mln-on-china-debt-in-first-quarter-qrix0uy7. Return to text.
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24. Dynamic, “Chinese Loans to Africa.” Return to text.
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30. Philippe Vasset, “The Myth of Military Aid: The Case of French Military Cooperation in Africa,” SAIS Review (1989–2003) 17, no. 2 (Summer-Fall 1997): 165–80, http://www.jstor.org/stable/45345747. Return to text.
31. Vasset, “Myth of Military Aid.” Return to text.
32. Philip E. Muehlenbeck, Betting on the Africans: John F. Kennedy’s Courting of African Nationalist Leaders (Oxford University Press, 2012), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195396096.001.0001; and Richard Wike, “5 Charts on America’s (Very Positive) Image in Africa,” Pew Research Center (website), July 23, 2015, https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2015/07/23/5-charts-on-americas-very-positive-image-in-africa/; and Jordan Link, 5 Things U.S. Policymakers Must Understand About China-Africa Relations (Center for American Progress, October 2021), https://www.americanprogress.org/article/5-things-u-s-policymakers-must-understand-china-africa-relations/. Return to text.
33. Benedict Vigers, “U.S. Loses Soft Power Edge in Africa: China’s Popularity Grows, While United States’ Wanes,” Gallup (website), April 26, 2024, https://news.gallup.com/poll/644222/loses-soft-power-edge-africa.aspx. Return to text.
34. “What We Do,” United States Africa Command (website), n.d., accessed October 21, 2024, https://www.africom.mil/what-we-do; US Department of State (DOS), “Integrated Country Strategy – Algeria,” DOS (website), January 2021, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/ICS_NEA_Algeria_Public-Release.pdf. Return to text.
35. Gregory L. Aftandilian, “Hope Versus Reality: The Efficacy of Using US Military Aid to Improve Human Rights in Egypt,” Parameters 51, no. 3 (Autumn 2021): 79–90, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss3/8/. Return to text.
36. Matthew Levinger, “Why the U.S. Government Failed to Anticipate the Rwandan Genocide of 1994: Lessons for Early Warning and Prevention,” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 9, no. 3 (February 2016): 33–58, http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.9.3.1362; and Sadie Statman, “US Should Prioritize Rights in Its Relationship with Uganda: Biden Administration Should Take Steps to Encourage Accountability,” Human Rights Watch (website), October 13, 2022, https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/10/13/us-should-prioritize-rights-its-relationship-uganda. Return to text.