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Nov. 21, 2024

The Philippines’ Security in the Face of China’s Rising Threats

Shang-Su Wu
©2024 Shang-Su Wu

ABSTRACT: This article contends that the United States has insufficiently acknowledged the extent of the Philippines’ vulnerability and its importance in preserving the balance of power. While many scholars have focused on Taiwan’s strategic importance, few have considered the state of the Philippines’ military capabilities in maintaining the region’s status quo. This article traces the modern history of the Philippines’ military and defense capabilities and examines the current state of the country’s defenses and the likely outcomes of different military scenarios. It concludes by providing practical recommendations on how the United States can help the Philippines within the constraints of its existing commitments.

Keywords: Philippines, United States, China, Taiwan, South China Sea

 

The People’s Republic of China seeks alternatives to an all-out war in the Indo-Pacific as competition for dominance continues to increase. The Philippines’ weak defenses and Washington’s relatively low attention to the country—in contrast to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—make it an attractive target. Beijing would prefer for Washington to abandon Manila, undercutting its credibility with other regional partners. Defeating the US Armed Forces in the archipelago would also bolster China’s military reputation. Add the strategic position of Luzon, the Philippines’ northernmost island on the edge of the Bashi Channel and a major entry point into the South China Sea for external navies like the US Navy, and the Philippines becomes an even more appealing target.1

If the United States wants to use the northern part of Luzon as a base for deployments, the current level of preparation, as evidenced in the annual Balikatan exercise, would be insufficient for either defending the Philippines or supporting US forces. In 2024, the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ (AFP) air defense capabilities include a single squadron of 12 FA-50 fighters, three Spyder surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, and a handful of Bofors 40mm anti-aircraft guns. None of these systems can likely provide comprehensive protection to major military facilities in northern Luzon, especially if they need to be redeployed further south to defend the capital of Manila against threats from China. Given that the Philippines has concentrated air defense units in a single location, it does not have the capacity to absorb potential attacks by China’s diverse capabilities—including loitering munitions, land attack cruise missiles, air strikes, and other kinds of standoff firepower. Even in less intensive situations, such as intercepting unidentified flying targets, the Philippine FA-50 fighters could only engage targets at a close distance due to the lack of beyond-vision-range capability.2

Although the American-Philippine joint exercises have covered coastal defense and standoff firepower, neither country has addressed air defense sufficiently. This deficit, evident in the lack of deployable assets and the absence of a multilayered network, consists of jammers, anti-aircraft guns, and short-range, mid-range, and long-range SAMs for diverse threats. Without enough air defense capacity deployed, even the existing aid from American standoff firepower could be suppressed or neutralized.

Despite America’s focus on security measures related to Taiwan, it has failed to demonstrate a full awareness of the Philippines’ vulnerability to China and its importance in preserving the balance of power in the South China Sea. The Philippines presents a vital site for deploying US forces in the case of a great-power conflict; failure to support the Philippines could drastically undercut the credibility of the United States with its partners and overall hegemonic standing. The United States should enhance US detachments to the Philippines and Manila’s defenses. This article examines the history and current state of the Philippines’ military and defense capabilities and considers the Sino-American security dynamic and possible scenarios that could arise if tensions escalate. Finally, it proposes practical steps the United States should take to bolster the Philippines’ defense capabilities.

The State of the Philippines’ Defense

The Philippines developed its modern military structure after World War II in close collaboration with the American military. In the years following the country’s independence, Manila’s defense and military spending did not keep pace with technology, and updates largely focused on counterinsurgency. While the United States has maintained relations with the Philippines since the Philippines gained independence, US support relative to other nations in the region does not indicate an awareness that the Philippines has become the weak link in the US defense of the South China Sea.

The Development of the Philippines Armed Forces

After the country gained independence in 1946, the Philippine Air Force (PAF) and the Philippine Navy (PN) were advanced forces in Southeast Asia in the 1950s and 1960s, operating jet fighters and major surface combatants supplied by the United States. By the late 1960s, though, the expanding Communist and Islamic insurgencies reshaped the security landscape of the archipelago. As the Communist rebellion of the New People’s Army pushed for violent revolution, the Islamic guerillas called for the independence of the Moro people on the island of Mindanao. Thus, in 1972, Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law and dramatically shifted the AFP’s focus from external defense to internal security. Although the Philippine Army (PA) served as the main proponent for counterinsurgency, the navy and air force also adjusted their modernization plans to support counterinsurgency.3

Consequently, the three AFP services have reduced or fully lost their capability for conventional warfare due to outdated technologies or the lack of assets. The navy did not follow the regional trend of naval modernization by introducing anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) or SAMs. Thus, it had no capacity for modern naval warfare until the commission of its Jose Rizal–class frigates in 2020. The air force obtained fighter jets in the 1970s, but its F-8Hs and F-5A/Bs were decommissioned in 1988 and 2005, respectively, leaving it in a zero-fighter status until 2015, when FA-50s entered service. During the intervening years, the air force’s only assets for air defense were a few modified S-211 jet trainers armed with air-to-air missiles, highly constraining its interception capability. Indeed, the army and Philippine Marine Corps’ lack of indirect and direct firepower during the battle of Marawi in 2017 demonstrated the Philippines’ failure to maintain conventional capabilities.4

Dependence on external aid and inconsistent leadership likely led to Manila neglecting its external defenses. During the Cold War, US military bases in the archipelago offset the gaps in the AFP’s capabilities. The 1992 closure of these bases left a strategic vacuum the armed forces could not fill. In 1994, China took the opportunity to expand its presence in the South China Sea by occupying Mischief Reef inside the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. President Fidel Ramos responded by passing a military modernization act in 1995 and the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with Washington in 1998. Together, these policies could have addressed the weakness identified by the Mischief Reef incident, but succeeding administrations failed to follow through. The financial crises during the Estrada and Arroyo administrations—aggravated by internal armed struggles—prevented further military modernization, leaving the Philippines behind and reliant on aging assets. The Visiting Forces Agreement enabled a continued, if limited, US military presence. It proved insufficient, however, in deterring China from seizing control of Scarborough Shoal in 2012.5

Following the incident, the second Aquino administration supported the most significant reforms of the AFP’s external defense capacity since the 1960s. The administration also signed the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the United States. The succeeding Duterte administration shifted modernization efforts back to counterinsurgency; still, Manila gained some basic capabilities for defending the archipelago. Nonetheless, Beijing has outpaced these modest achievements on a larger scale, expanding more than ever the gap between China and the Philippines’ bilateral defense. The Duterte administration nearly abandoned the EDCA due to the administration’s desire to distance itself from the United States, but the Marcos administration revived it in 2023.6

The Modern State of Defense

Currently, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the coast guard, and other paramilitary forces can provide force presence and confrontation. Nonetheless, only a narrow margin exists for escalation into kinetic combat. Despite relatively new naval and aerial assets that enable Manila to conduct patrols and surveillance, the Philippines lacks the assets to handle confrontations at multiple locations—especially in prolonged situations. Even if China attacked a single location, the Philippine forces on-site could be overwhelmed or insufficiently equipped for prolonged engagements.7

In a kinetic combat situation, the Philippine forces might inflict losses early on, but the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has vast numerical superiority in manpower and materiel and would outlast them. Manila relies on two Korean-built Jose Rizal–class frigates and three systems of Indian BrahMos land-based ASCMs, 12 Korean FA-50 fighters, and three Israeli Spyder SAMs for its external defense. In contrast, the PLA’s Southern Theater Command (STC) alone has 2 nuclear attack submarines, 15 diesel-electric submarines, 1 aircraft carrier, 4 cruisers, 14 destroyers, 36 frigates, and more than 10 brigades of combat aircraft, including fourth- and fifth-generation fighters, supported by aerial early-warning drones and other types of aircraft. Even a partially deployed PLA Southern Theater Command would likely maintain superiority. While the Philippines’ efforts at military modernization have improved its capability and capacity, it still significantly lags behind many regional partners and threats.8

The Philippines could rely on allies to help balance China under new bilateral defense guidelines and the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. Even so, such measures are restricted during war and peace. For instance, having law enforcement or armed forces from other countries (which are sovereign symbols) patrol the territorial waters of the Philippine archipelago might cause internal political disputes over sovereignty. Australia, Japan, and the United States have provided considerable training and assets to the coast guard, and Japan’s role will be enhanced with the recently signed Reciprocal Access Agreement—narrowing the gap in gray-zone capabilities with China. Nonetheless, China’s coast guard—with the support of the world’s largest fleet and a maritime militia—would still outstrip its Philippine counterpart. The decision to request US vessels for escort could prove provocative; even if China does not respond with armed conflict, it could test Washington’s commitment by deploying more and larger coast guard ships.9

Relying on the United States in wartime might also prove problematic, given the shifting balance of power. Beijing’s massive military buildup is closing the gap with its American counterpart, and at least quantitatively, the Chinese navy’s major surface combatants outnumber US Navy vessels. Furthermore, China has the benefit of concentrating its naval and other forces in only a few adjacent locations, while the United States must spread its forces around the globe due to its many commitments. If Washington moves slowly to aid Manila, Beijing might gain the upper hand in the Sino-American security dynamics within the archipelago. Australian and Japanese forces could supplement the Philippines’ security infrastructure in wartime, though the amount of support they could spare remains uncertain—especially for Japan, which is also facing direct strategic pressure. Moreover, without new legal and administrative agreements, the Australian and Japanese forces would be less capable of force integration than the United States.10

The Current Strategic Situation and Potential for Conflict

China presents the Philippines with security challenges on two fronts: the South China Sea and Taiwan. For Manila, its territory in the South China Sea faces gray-zone operations and conventional military invasion, while northern Luzon faces standoff strikes that can be related to Beijing’s offense against Taipei. Gray-zone threats include blockades, confrontation, intrusion, collision, and other operations by China’s paramilitary forces, and conventional invasion involves attack, isolation, or capture by the People’s Liberation Army. China frequently, if not regularly, employs gray-zone tactics (like ramming, employing water cannons, jamming, and blinding crews with lasers) and other nonlethal tactics against the Philippine coast guard. Even below the threshold of conventional attack, the Philippine coast guard lacks the assets to answer its Chinese counterpart’s gray-zone tactics. China’s coast guard can replace any assets the Philippine coast guard damages through ramming or other physical contact due to its huge shipbuilding capacity, and the PLA Navy could take over when it escalates into an armed conflict. The Philippine navy and air force, however, must reserve assets in case situations escalate into armed conflict. The two-front situation could lead to several scenarios that would compromise the Philippines and prevent the United States and other allies from rendering assistance.11

The South China Sea

In the South China Sea, a range of positions under Manila’s control face threats from Beijing because the latter’s nine-dash line covers all of them—sometimes called the 11-dash line by Taiwan, these cartographic marks indicate China’s territorial claims. Despite the Chinese coast guard’s ongoing use of gray-zone tactics, none have triggered the Philippines’ Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States, which raises questions about what escalatory actions would prompt the treaty to take effect. The Chinese coast guard’s seizure of a PCG vessel and injury of PN personnel during the Second Thomas Shoal incident could have been such a moment, but the United States did not consider it an attack because China only used cold weapons. The United States and other allies’ lack of response may encourage Beijing to test further. The summer 2024 Sabina Shoal incident revealed the Philippine coast guard’s limited capacity for lasting deployment when it had to withdraw its vessel on-site for resupply. If a gray-zone conflict becomes a conventional war, China’s naval superiority, particularly firepower and amphibious capacity, could create a fait accompli by defeating the Philippine navy and coast guard and perhaps occupying specific islands. According to China’s nine-dash line, Beijing could seize a wide range of targets within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone to use as bargaining chips to negotiate with Manila and which Washington would likely find too costly or complicated to restore.12

Despite its military superiority and ability to deter third-party intervention with its robust anti-access and area denial capabilities, China might constrain gray-zone operations in the South China Sea to avoid losing access to vital trade routes. China’s economy relies on the Lombok, Malacca, and Sunda straits for connections to resources, materials, and markets, which it cannot wholly replace with the Belt and Road Initiative or its other land transport projects. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore border these straits and typically remain neutral. If China becomes a clear threat to regional peace, however, these countries might support the Philippines and its allies. The military might of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore may not match China, but it would pose a significant obstacle to securing the straits. Geographically, China’s navy would have to project its forces across the South China Sea, a considerable distance from its home bases and usual operational environment, and incur additional logistical burdens. Furthermore, Australia and India maintain military deployments near the straits and would likely favor supporting the strait countries. China, therefore, must deal cautiously with all Southeast Asian claimants in the South China Sea, including the Philippines, to secure its vital sea-lanes. Even so, Beijing could still exert pressure on Manila through actions in the South China Sea. Due to their ongoing practice and less violent nature, gray-zone operations alone may be insufficient to trigger third-party involvement or reshape the strait states’ foreign policy.13

Third parties might consider China’s use of conventional military power in the South China Sea as an escalation, but they could also justify it as a reasonable counter against American intervention in the Taiwan Strait. For example, Beijing may capture one or more islands of the Palawan Province, with a threat of taking more to prevent Manila from allowing Washington’s deployment and use of military facilities in Luzon or to pin down Washington’s forces by activating the Mutual Defense Treaty. If a Sino-American confrontation or war led to a Sino-Philipppine armed conflict, the strait countries might remain neutral to avoid choosing a side. Without their cooperation, China’s concern regarding the Malacca Dilemma could be less salient.

The Taiwan Front

The multilateral relations at play make the Taiwan front more complicated. In addition to not having the military capabilities needed to deter China if it attacked Taiwan, the Philippines has no formalized security agreement with Taiwan that outlines a legal justification for interfering. If PLA assets do not violate the Philippines’ sovereignty, Manila could only stabilize the Taiwan situation by allowing the United States to deploy capabilities, such as combat aircraft, ASCMs, and other standoff weapons, in northern Luzon. These capabilities could prevent the Chinese air force from achieving air superiority, provide electronic warfare and surveillance for operational support to Taiwan, deny amphibious invasion, and perhaps allow airlift for supplying the isolated island. Beijing would prefer to prevent or remove US military presence in the Philippines, which could affect its operations against Taiwan. To achieve this goal, China has nonviolent and violent options.

Overseas Filipino workers provide a significant source of economic revenue for the Philippines, including those living in Taiwan whose presence could provide China with leverage. Filipino decisionmakers would make saving them from war a high priority, though evacuating roughly 151,000 workers from Taiwan would prove difficult. In 2003, the Arroyo administration withdrew Filipino forces from Iraq due to the terrorist threats made against workers, and the same response could apply to Taiwan. If China invades or blockades Taiwan, Beijing might offer Manila the opportunity to withdraw Filipino workers from the island in exchange for denying the United States the use of Philippine military bases.14

Such an offer would come with added pressure since it would likely benefit other strait countries, including Indonesia and Vietnam, which have more than half a million citizens working in Taiwan. While the Philippine presidency’s one-term limit frees a president from caring about the next election, saving human lives would carry enormous value but might compromise the alliance. Nevertheless, Filipino decisionmakers would not want to see additional PLA positions in Taiwan given the threat to the archipelago and the Philippine Sea. Washington would also press Manila to continue the alliance, including its military deployment, and the Philippines may not have enough credibility or capability to reject the on-site US forces. If the Philippines does not accept a deal or China cannot afford to pause its operations, Beijing could neutralize Philippine military facilities and assets related to Taiwan. Borrowing from Moscow’s terminology, Beijing might announce a “special military operation” intended to negate external intervention in its pursuit of China’s unification.15

If and how the Philippines enters into a war over Taiwan depends on a more extensive set of security dynamics in East Asia. The PLA’s operation against Taiwan would contain two flanks—Japan and the Philippines. Beijing would aim China’s main forces, both firepower and troops, at Taiwan; it would also reserve a sizeable force for the northern flank toward the many American and Japanese bases around Okinawa, with the rest designated for the southern flank toward Luzon. If China sets a primary strategy to blockade Taiwan, it would evenly allocate units to encircle the island. In contrast, if China invades, it would likely focus on Taipei to the north and send more troops toward Japan. Washington’s response to either strategy would also influence Beijing’s plans, leading them to concentrate on either Okinawa or Luzon.

Regardless of the location of the center of gravity in a fight over Taiwan, the United States would need adequate support capabilities, particularly air defenses. Knowing the weakness of the Philippines compared to its Japanese counterparts, the United States should extend more aid to the Philippines since it presents the more vulnerable target. China, a leader in military drones, can launch swarms of loitering munitions with other standoff firepower. Philippine defense capabilities, however, are limited to two batteries of Spyder SAMs and one squadron of FA-50 fighters. If China attacked Luzon, these defenses could protect one or two locations, at most, unless the United States had established preexisting support facilities on the island. Thus, to deter China and defend in the case of attack, potential US forces would need SAMs, fighter squadrons, and other types of air defense systems deployed on Luzon.16

Unlike Taiwan, Luzon is relatively far from China’s territory, both the mainland and Hainan Island, and thus, Chinese land-based short-range ballistic missiles and guided rockets would be less effective. Chinese vessels, aircraft, and artificial islands could serve as platforms for land-attack missiles, loitering munitions, and other projectiles that could completely cover Luzon. While the PLA’s standoff firepower could not likely destroy an entire US military detachment, it could severely disrupt America’s ability to assist Taiwan.

As the US military detachment to the Philippines could likely comprise several services, integrating their respective air defense systems and networks to resist China’s standoff firepower could present a fundamental challenge. Given the length of deployment confirmed by the Pentagon, transporting all assets and personnel to the archipelago in a limited time could prove challenging. A late deployment could become vulnerable to the PLA’s firepower, especially after combat has begun. One solution—forward deployment in a semipermanent base—could work. Whether Washington could spare enough assets and personnel in the context of current global instability remains unclear. Another solution practiced by the United States—on-site equipment storage—could also work, but it would require further political and legal coordination with the Philippines.

Preparing for the Future

To counter China’s strategic pressure, the Philippines must approach the problem through internal efforts and external support. Over the last decade, Manila has spurred internal development primarily by investing in the coast guard’s expanded organization, fleet, and human resources to defend archipelagic waters. Despite the quantitative and qualitative gap between the Philippine and Chinese forces, the Philippine government continues to invest in its coast guard and other paramilitary and law enforcement forces to face the possibility of heavy engagement in the future. Additionally, the Philippines must focus on improving its technological capabilities for anticipating how China might employ novel gray-zone tactics—like the use of cold weapons, including axes—and be prepared to counter them. Building its armed forces’ capacity and capability is not something Manila can achieve alone, though; it must also look to external support to deter China from trying to accomplish a fait accompli in the near future.17

Internal Action

The Philippines needs to bolster its conventional defense on two fronts with different approaches. Overall, Manila passed the Revised Armed Forces of the Philippines Modernization Program after the 2012 Scarborough incident to address the armed forces’ capacity and capability needs. Recently, the program progressed into the third phase, “Horizon 3,” which addresses the need for greater capacity, but not to the degree needed to deter Chinese aggression.18

Manila’s sea denial is essential to protect the positions and islands in the South China Sea, and its denial measures for these positions hinge on active and passive defense. Aside from anti-ship cruise missiles, additional means of active sea denial include loitering munitions, first-person-view and other kinds of drones, multi-rocket launchers, and anti-tank missiles. Passive sea denial could include mines and obstacles. Sea mines and land mines, together with anti-landing obstacles, can significantly slow or pause amphibious invasions, while inflicting losses and casualties on the intruders.19

The Philippines has a few relatively low-cost options that would help deter a Chinese air attack or airborne landing. The Philippine islands could be equipped with field air defense systems, such as anti-aircraft guns and portable anti-aircraft missiles, to counter airborne operations. Relatively low-cost field air defense systems could also engage Chinese drones. Obstacles on open terrain, like Rommel’s asparagus, could also deny or disrupt parachute and helicopter landings. More sophisticated SAMs might prove unsuitable for frontline positions due to the lack of supportive infrastructure and exposure to PLA firepower.20

In contrast, the PLA is less likely to invade Luzon island in parallel with its operations against Taiwan, and thus, the AFP’s main goal would be to cope with the threat of standoff firepower and air strikes. The AFP should establish layers of passive and active defense on Luzon to counter the PLA’s standoff threats. The Philippines should prioritize expanding its air defense capabilities to absorb the first wave of strikes and cover all its air bases and critical military facilities in northern and central Luzon, including Manila. Based on recent cases, expensive SAMs alone could be insufficient, and integration with anti-drone capabilities, such as jammers and anti-aircraft guns, would be necessary. To optimize the air defense networks and the AFP’s current land-based radars, defense planners should employ airborne surveillance—such as aerial early-warning aircraft and radar-equipped airships—to minimize the blind zones.21

The Philippines should also expand and improve its area-denial capabilities to neutralize or threaten the Chinese aerial and maritime platforms that could launch projectiles. To combat aerial platforms, Manila should expand the AFP’s current fighter wing with beyond-vision-range capabilities to engage aerial platforms at midrange or long range. The Philippines’ deal to purchase Swedish JAS-39 fighters and Saab-340 early-warning aircraft will meet this need. Similarly, the navy should enhance sea denial capabilities against Chinese maritime platforms to keep them at a certain distance, such as 100 kilometers or more, which would provide time for surveillance and response. The deal with India for BrahMos supersonic ASCMs provides a great start of standoff firepower to engage Chinese vessels, and Manila should plan for the subsequent crucial expansion of quantity to maintain continuous firepower and bear losses.22

External Help

Manila must supplement its efforts with external support to deter Beijing and maintain the regional status quo. The Philippines faces defense needs similar to those of other Southeast Asian states with claims in the South China Sea. The situation with Taiwan, however, has amplified the threat to northern Luzon and Filipino overseas laborers and requires significant external support to stabilize the geostrategic landscape. Given Washington’s vested interest in regional security, the United States should consider expanding its short-term and long-term support.

Initially, the United States should shoulder more responsibility than the Philippines for strengthening the archipelago’s security, while Manila reduces its existing vulnerabilities—increasing military assets and reducing laborers in Taiwan. The Philippines should accelerate military procurements to improve the AFP’s capability and capacity qualitatively and quantitatively and perhaps use arms deals with external suppliers to develop its defense industry through offset and other arrangements. Hopefully the bilateral alliance would be more balanced, like the American-Korean or the American-Japan alliances.

Although Balikatan, the flagship joint exercise, continues to grow, Manila should request the level of continuous US military deployment needed to support the Armed Forces of the Philippines effectively and maintain deterrence, including an on-site presence or a rapid deployment force to supplement the Philippine coast guard and other defensive capabilities against the PLA’s standoff strikes and provide denial capabilities to neutralize Chinese platforms. Due to China’s strategic significance, Washington should prioritize the deployment of American forces and supplies to the Philippines—despite the constraints the United States may face due to other commitments. This action would reduce the security vulnerability of the archipelago and complicate Beijing’s gambit over Taiwan, a pillar of deterrence and regional stability.

Despite highly distinct conditions, such as technology and tactics, the US Army and Navy failures in 1941 still raise alarms. Indeed, American military planners deployed considerable capabilities, such as submarines and airpower, to defend the archipelago, but certain factors, including training and reliability, undermined efforts to repulse Japan’s invasion. Furthermore, delayed deployments at the time caused a narrow margin for bearing loss. The past demonstrates how an insufficient deployment vis-à-vis China’s new capabilities and capacity may lead to another military catastrophe.

Despite a growing economy, Manila possesses limited financial capacity and cannot afford all the projects needed to address immediate security threats. Thus, external support remains indispensable. In contrast to gray-zone threats, more direct confrontation against the PLA would demand greater maritime and air defense, but the Philippines’ allies may face restrictions in military supply.

The simultaneous conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have exposed the limited capacity of US defense industries, and the high demands from these hot spots would naturally limit supplies for the Philippines. Washington’s recent offers of loitering munitions to Taipei, however, suggest some capacity to supply Manila. Even so, Washington’s arsenal may fall technologically behind Beijing’s weaponry, including assets like supersonic ASCMs and hypersonic missiles. With limited capacity, Canberra and Tokyo may not provide a sufficient supply. New Delhi may not open its defense industries either to deliver significant supplies to Manila or other countries. Looking outside the members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue presents different problems. South Korea and Türkiye, with their existing sales to the Philippines, could play greater roles as arms suppliers. Rather than military aid, they would prefer commercial deals. The Philippines’ considerable shipbuilding industry signifies defense potential for capacity buildup, but it requires external technologies and other assistance.23

Funding remains an essential but fundamental obstacle for the Philippines’ defense. Although Washington maintains military aid worldwide, it has not placed Manila in a prominent position on the list. America’s ability to allocate additional resources to the Philippines, given its economic concerns and existing obligations, remains unclear. Whether other member states of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue would invest more in Manila’s defense also remains uncertain. Japan, a top donor of official development aid to the Philippines, provides exclusively nonmilitary support.24

Diverting laborers away from Taiwan would reduce the humanitarian vulnerability of the Philippines, but it would require a multilateral effort. The United States could accommodate 150,000 workers in its job market, and allies, such as Australia and Japan, might accommodate additional foreign labor. Nonetheless, Manila would find it difficult, or even impossible, to remove most workers from Taiwan immediately. The critical point is replacement; Taipei’s recent introduction of Indian laborers may pave the way toward replacement, but current policy does not support the replacement of workers. If a plan of replacement occurred, it would unfold over years.25

Beijing’s increasing military power and the complexity of the steps Washington and Manila must take do not leave time for leisure. The measures discussed here would not fully solve the Philippines’ security challenges. They would, however, adjust its balance of force with China from highly unfavorable to more manageable, buying time for Manila to develop and for Washington to reshape its dynamics with Beijing in East and Southeast Asia.

Conclusion

The United States can use its alliance with the Philippines and the country’s location as leverage to maintain US deterrence in East and Southeast Asia, given the recent rise of China’s military power. An American military presence in Luzon can affect the gravity of the PLA’s operations against Taiwan and compensate for the operational disadvantages caused by the latter’s anti-access and area denial capabilities. Nonetheless, Beijing can exploit Manila’s military and humanitarian weaknesses and US constraints. Despite improvement efforts, the archipelagic country’s vulnerabilities, reflected by its geostrategic and economic context for the past several decades, will remain in full or in part, underlining the need for external support. Washington should, therefore, recognize Manila’s vulnerabilities and support its security reforms to honor the alliance and long-standing friendship between the two countries and stabilize the geostrategic landscape.

Current US efforts to support the Philippines’ security through arms transfers or military deployment may prove insufficient, particularly with PRC forces showcasing a wide range of capabilities and a high level of proficiency. The United States, therefore, should view the Philippines as a priority equivalent to other hot spots in the Indo-Pacific region and allocate more resources to the country to prevent a major breach from occurring on the first island chain. The military catastrophe experienced in the initial stage of the Pacific War in World War II remains relevant to the current situation with a major difference—massive production capacity has shifted across the Pacific Ocean, leaving Washington a narrower margin for a strategic mistake in the Philippines today than in the early 1940s.

 
 

Shang Su-Wu
Dr. Shang Su-Wu is an assistant professor and research coordinator in the Homeland Security Program at Rabdan Academy in Abu Dhabi. His areas of specialty are defense issues in Southeast and East Asia and railways of international relations. He holds a PhD in politics and international relations from the University of New South Wales in Sydney and a master’s degree in political science from the National Taiwan University in Taipei. His latest book, Military Modernisation in Southeast Asia after the Cold War: Acquisition, Retention, and Geostrategic Impacts, was published by Routledge in April 2024.

 
 

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Endnotes

  1. Lawrence Chung, “Operation Bashi Channel: The Next Flashpoint in the China-US Military Rivalry,” South China Morning Times (website), July 5, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3091879/operation-bashi-channel-next-flashpoint-china-us-military. Return to text.
  2. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Military Balance 2024 (Routledge, 2024), 307–8; and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Transfers Database, “search terms: Philippines, all countries, from 1946 to 2024,” n.d., accessed March 11, 2024, https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers. Return to text.
  3. Renato Cruz De Castro, “Adjusting to the Post-U.S. Bases Era: The Ordeal of the Philippine Military’s Modernization Program,” Armed Forces & Society 26, no. 1 (1999): 119–20, https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X9902600107; SIPRI Arms Transfers Database; Renato Cruz De Castro, “The Twenty-First Century Armed Forces of the Philippines: Orphan of Counter-Insurgency or Military Geared for the Long War of the Century?,” Contemporary Politics 16, no. 2 (2016): 162; “Calming the Long War in the Philippine Countryside,” International Crisis Group (website), April 19,2024, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/philippines/338-calming-long-war-philippine-countryside; and Georgi Engelbrecht, “The Logics of Insurgency in the Bangsamoro,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 32, no. 6 (2021): 888–900. Return to text.
  4. SIPRI Arms Transfers Database; Martin Manaranche, “Philippine Navy Commissions Its First Ever Missile Frigate BRP Jose Rizal,” Naval News (website), July 10, 2020, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2020/07/philippine-navy-commissions-its-first-ever-missile-frigate-brp-jose-rizal/; Jeffrey P. Joyce, review of Vought F-8 Crusader: Development of the Navy’s First Supersonic Jet Fighter, by William D. Spidle, Air Power History Preview 65, no. 2 (2018): 56; “2 FA-50 Fighter Trainer Jets to Arrive in PH by Yearend – PAF,” INQUIRER.net (website), November 9, 2015, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/738181/2-fa-50-fighter-trainer-jets-to-arrive-in-ph-by-yearend-paf; “Philippine Air Force’s Remaining S-211 Jet Trainers Used for Training and Support Missions,” Military Leak (website), July 21, 2022, https://militaryleak.com/2022/07/21/philippine-air-forces-marchetti-jet-trainers-used-for-training-and-support-missions/; Priam Nepomuceno, “PAF’s Remaining S-211 Jets Used for Training, Support Missions,” Philippine News Agency (website), July 21, 2022, https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1179417; and John Spencer et al., “Urban Warfare Project Case Study Series: Case Studies #8 – Marawi,” Modern Warfare Institute (website), May 23, 2024, https://mwi.westpoint.edu/urban-warfare-case-study-8-battle-of-marawi/. Return to text.
  5. Shawn D. Harding, “There and Back and There Again: U.S. Military Bases in the Philippines,” Proceedings 150, no. 5 (2024), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/may/there-and-back-and-there-again-us-military-bases-philippines; Julio S. Amador III et al., “Modernizing or Equalizing? Defence Budget and Military Modernization in the Philippines, 2010–2020,” Defense Studies 22, no. 3 (2022): 300; IISS, Military Balance 2024, 307; Ruth Abbey Gita-Carlos, “VFA Fate Depends on US Explanation on Role in 2012 Standoff,” Philippine News Agency (website), June 9, 2021, https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1143063; and “Scarborough Shoal Standoff: A Timeline,” INQUIRER.net (website), May 9, 2012, https://globalnation.inquirer.net/36003/scarborough-shoal-standoff-a-historicaltimeline. Return to text.
  6. Jairo Bolledo, “LIST: 5 Ways Noynoy Aquino Strengthened the Police and Military,” Rappler (website), June 30, 2021, https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/list-ways-noynoy-aquino-strengthened-police-military-philippines/; Eleanor Albert, “The U.S.-Philippines Defense Alliance,” Council on Foreign Relations (website), October 21, 2016, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-philippines-defense-alliance; Shang-Su Wu, “Aquino’s Military Modernization: Unprecedented But Insufficient,” The Diplomat (website), March 23, 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/03/aquinos-military-modernization-unprecedented-but-insufficient/; and Amador III et al., “Modernizing or Equalizing?,” 301–3; Felix K. Chang, “US-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement Revived,” Foreign Policy Research Institute (website), June 14, 2023, https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/06/us-philippines-enhanced-defense-cooperation-agreement-revived/. Return to text.
  7. Samir Puri and Greg Austin, “What the Whitsun Reef Incident Tells Us About China’s Future Operations at Sea,” IISS (website), April 9, 2021, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2021/04/whitsun-reef-incident-china/; and Micah McCartney, “US Ally Mounts Fresh Challenge to China at Disputed Territory,” Newsweek (website), September 23, 2024, https://www.newsweek.com/philippines-fresh-challenge-china-news-disputed-territory-1957630. Return to text.
  8. Two additional corvettes built by Korea will be commissioned in the near future. IISS, Military Balance 2024 (Routledge, 2024), 261–62, 307–8; SIPRI Arms Transfers Database; and Martin Sadongdong, “Philippine Navy’s Brand-New Corvette Launched in South Korea,” Manila Bulletin (website), June 22, 2024, https://mb.com.ph/2024/6/22/philippine-navy-s-brand-new-corvette-launched-in-south-korea. Return to text.
  9. “FACT SHEET: U.S.-Philippines Bilateral Defense Guidelines,” U.S. Department of Defense (website), May 3, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3383607/fact-sheet-us-philippines-bilateral-defense-guidelines/; “Signing of the Japan-Philippines Reciprocal Access Agreement,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (website), July 8, 2024, https://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sea2/ph/pageite_000001_00432.html; Alex Wilson, “China Adds 22 Ships to World’s Largest Coast Guard Fleet, Japanese News Agency Says,” Stars and Stripes (website), February 2, 2023, https://www.stripes.com/theaters/asia_pacific/2023-02-02/china-coast-guard-rapid-expansion-9015285.html; and Aaron-Matthew Lariosa, “U.S. Will ‘Do What Is Necessary’ to Aid Philippines in South China Sea, Official Says,” USNI News (website), September 12, 2024, https://news.usni.org/2024/09/12/u-s-will-do-what-is-necessary-to-aid-philippines-in-south-china-sea-official-says. Return to text.
  10. “Report to Congress on Chinese Naval Modernization,” USNI News (website), February 1, 2024, https://news.usni.org/2024/02/01/report-to-congress-on-chinese-naval-modernization-20; and Jesse Johnson, “Tokyo Protests After Chinese Navy Ship Enters Japanese Territorial Waters,” The Japan Times (website), August 31, 2024, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2024/08/31/japan/china-warship-japan-territorial-waters/. Return to text.
  11. Eric Cooper, “Persistent Gray Zone Aggression in the South China Sea Calls for Increased Coordination in Rule of Law,” RAND (website), April 16, 2024, https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2024/04/persistent-gray-zone-aggression-in-the-south-china.html; Josiah Gottfried, “The Philippine Coast Guard’s Modernization: An International Joint Effort,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (website), March 5, 2024, https://www.csis.org/blogs/new-perspectives-asia/philippine-coast-guards-modernization-international-joint-effort; “China Jamming Tracking Signal of Philippine Ships: Coast Guard,” The Star (website), February 26, 2024, https://www.thestar.com.my/aseanplus/aseanplus-news/2024/02/26/china-jamming-tracking-signal-of-philippine-ships-coast-guard; Brad Lendon, “Philippine Coast Guard Says Chinese Ship Aimed Laser at One of Its Vessels,” CNN (website), February 13, 2023, https://edition.cnn.com/2023/02/13/asia/philippines-china-coast-guard-laser-intl-hnk-ml/index.html; and Aaron-Matthew Lariosa, “VIDEO: China Coast Guard Blasts Philippine Fisheries Vessel at Scarborough Shoal,” USNI News (website), October 8, 2024, https://news.usni.org/2024/10/08/video-china-coast-guard-blasts-philippine-fisheries-vessel-at-scarborough-shoal. Return to text.
  12. Agence France Presse, “Chinese Sailors Wield Sticks, Axe in Disputed Sea Clash with Philippines,” Manila Standard (website), June 20, 2024, https://manilastandard.net/news/top-stories/314461818/chinese-sailors-wield-sticks-axe-in-disputed-sea-clash-with-philippines.html; Jim Gomez, “Philippines Won’t Invoke Mutual Defense Treaty with US After Chinese Confrontation at Disputed Shoal” APNews (website), June 21, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/south-china-sea-territorial-dispute-philippines-us-c7f22418e276d689c2dcacfed4d0a494; and Camille Elemia, “2024 Sabina Shoal Standoff: A Timeline,” Benar News (website), September 19, 2024, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/philippine/sabina-shoal-timeline-09192024124325.html. Return to text.
  13. Cheng-Chwee Kuik, “Active Neutrality: Malaysia in the Middle of U.S.-China Competition,” United States Institute of Peace (website), October 11, 2023, https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/10/active-neutrality-malaysia-middle-us-china-competition; Mercedes Ruehl, “Singapore Deepens US Defence Ties Despite Chinese Financial Inflows,” Financial Times (website), April 30, 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/0c20823d-2d5f-435e-aec4-269dbe5dafb4; Christopher S. Chivvis et al., “Indonesia in the Emerging World Order,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (website), November 9, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/11/indonesia-in-the-emerging-world-order?lang=en; Shishir Gupta, “Why Are Andaman and Nicobar Islands a Key Indian Military Asset?,” The Hindustan Times (website), January 24, 2023, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/why-are-andaman-and-nicobar-islands-a-key-indian-military-asset-101674528554860.html; and National Defence: Defence Strategic Review (Australia Government Defence, 2023), 7, 55, 65, 76. Return to text.
  14. Laurinne Jamie Eugenio, “Overseas Filipino Workers: The Modern-Day Heroes of the Philippines,” Harvard International Review (website), August 11, 2023, https://hir.harvard.edu/overseas-filipino-workers-the-modern-day-heroes-of-the-philippines/; Bea Cupin, “Hundreds of Thousands of Filipino Workers in Taiwan, Hong Kong Getting Wage Hikes,” Rappler (website), December 27, 2023, https://www.rappler.com/philippines/ofw-salary-increase-taiwan-hong-kong/; and Richard C. Paddock, “Philippines Completes Iraq Pullout,” Los Angeles Times (website), July 20, 2004, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2004-jul-20-fg-pullout20-story.html. Return to text.
  15. Ralph Jennings, “Vietnamese Workers Growing in Numbers, Contributing to Taiwan’s Economy, as Island Seeks Labour,” South China Morning Post (website), August 19, 2023, https://www.scmp.com/economy/global-economy/article/3231544/vietnamese-workers-growing-numbers-contributing-taiwans-economy-island-seeks-labour; M. Syaprin Zahidi, “Indonesia Can Talk to PRC about Taiwan,” Taipei Times (website), May 29, 2024, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2024/0/29/2003818543; Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Caitlin Talmadge, “Then What? Assessing the Military Implications of Chinese Control of Taiwan,” International Security 47, no. 1 (2022): 21–25, https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/47/1/7/112577/Then-What-Assessing-the-Military-Implications-of; and Ruslan N. Pukhov, “From ‘Special’ to ‘Military’ Lessons from Two Years of the Operation in Ukraine,” Russia in Global Affairs 22, no. 2 (2024): 112–14. Return to text.
  16. Vitaly Shevchenko, “Ukraine Fears Drone Shortages Due to China Restrictions,” BBC (website), October 22, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67078089. Return to text.
  17. Gottfried, “Philippine Coast Guard’s Modernization.” Return to text.
  18. Priam Nepomuceno, “AFP Modernization’s Horizon 3 to Focus on Archipelagic Defense,” Philippine News Agency (website), January 15, 2024, https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1216955; and National Defense Strategy 2018–2022 (Department of National Defense, 2019), 65. Return to text.
  19. Joint Chiefs of Staff ( JCS), Amphibious Operation, Joint Publication 3-02 ( JCS, 2021), VIII-1. Return to text.
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  21. Wes Rumbaugh, “Cost and Value in Air and Missile Defense Intercepts,” CSIS (website), February 13, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/cost-and-value-air-and-missile-defense-intercepts; Gordon Arthur, “Philippines Receives Final Israeli Air Surveillance Radars,” Shephard (website), March 18, 2019, https://www.shephardmedia.com/news/digital-battlespace/philippines-receives-final-israeli-air-surveillanc/; and “The Transfer of the Air Surveillance Radar Systems to the Philippines,” press release, Japan Ministry of Defense (website), November 2, 2023, https://www.mod.go.jp/en/article/2023/11/e005fad85ab5c48087162d939209232fb4cee216.html. Return to text.
  22. Frances Mangosing, “PH, Sweden Sign Pact on Fighter Purchases,” INQUIRER.net (website), May 27, 2024, https://globalnation.inquirer.net/237572/ph-sweden-sign-pact-on-fighter-purchases. Return to text.
  23. Stacie Pettyjohn and Hannah Dennis, “The Pentagon Isn’t Buying Enough Ammo,” Foreign Policy (website), May 21, 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/05/21/united-states-defense-pentagon-military-industrial-base-ammunition/; “Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States – ALTIUS 600M-V Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” press release, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (website), June 18, 2024, https://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/mas/Press%20Release%20-%20TECRO%2024-56%20CN.pdf; US Department of Defense (DoD), Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2023: Annual Report to Congress (DoD, 2023), 57–58, 90; Joe Saballa, “Leidos Announces Key Milestone for America’s ‘Mayhem’ Hypersonic Missile,” The Defense Post (website), June 5, 2024, https://thedefensepost.com/2024/06/05/leidos-milestone-mayhem-missile/; Rojoef Manuel, “Raytheon Completes Technical Review of US Navy’s HALO Hypersonic Missile Prototype,” The Defense Post (website), January 10, 2024, https://www.thedefensepost.com/2024/01/10/us-halo-hypersonic-missile-prototype/; Gregg Rubinstein, “Japan’s New Defense Buildup Plan and Its Defense Industrial Base,” CSIS (website), January 26, 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/japans-new-defense-buildup-plan-and-its-defense-industrial-base; “Sovereign Defence Industrial Priorities,” Australian Government Defence (website), accessed October 23, 2024, https://www.defence.gov.au/business-industry/industry-capability-programs/sovereign-defence-industrial-priorities; and “Restoring ‘Glory Days’ of Shipbuilding,” INQUIRER.net (website), May 20, 2024, https://opinion.inquirer.net/173817/restoring-glory-days-of-shipbuilding. Return to text.
  24. Jonathan Masters and Will Merrow, “How Much U.S. Aid Is Going to Ukraine?,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 9, 2024, https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-us-aid-going-ukraine; and “U.S. Foreign Assistance by Country,” Foreign Assistance (website), May 31, 2024, https://www.foreignassistance.gov/cd/philippines/; “ODA: Official Development Assistance,” Embassy of Japan in the Philippines (website), September 29, 2023, https://www.ph.emb-japan.go.jp/itpr_en/00_000032.html; and Ian Nicolas P. Cigaral, “ADB Overtakes Japan as Top ODA Source,” INQUIRER.net (website), October 4, 2023, https://business.inquirer.net/424663/adb-overtakes-japan-as-top-oda-source. Return to text.
  25. Rezaul H. Laskar, “India, Taiwan Sign MoU to Bring Indian Workers to Tide over Labour Shortage,” The Hindustan Times (website), February 17, 2024, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-taiwan-sign-mou-to-bring-indian-workers-to-tide-over-labour-shortage-101708101494842.html. Return to text.