Weapons of Influence: Unpacking China’s Global Arms Strategy

Jake R. Rinaldi
©2024 Jake R. Rinaldi

ABSTRACT: This article explores the strategic motivations behind China’s arms sales and uses Chinese-language analyses from influential party and military institutions to identify five main interests driving Chinese arms exports: protecting economic investments, gaining influence in conflict zones, enhancing partner military capabilities, building diplomatic relationships, and offsetting research and development costs. The article integrates primary sources to reveal how arms sales advance Beijing’s geopolitical aims. The findings highlight how China’s arms trade shapes partner and adversary military capabilities and underscore the need for the United States and its allies to compete in the arms trade to mitigate China’s growing influence.

Keywords: China, arms exports, military assistance, geopolitical interests, strategic competition

The surge of necessary equipment to support Russia’s war effort in Ukraine by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) follows a global expansion in China’s arms trade, including China surpassing Russia and the United States as the primary supplier of major arms to sub-Saharan Africa. Since the Pentagon regards China as its “pacing challenge,” US civilian and military leadership must understand Beijing’s strategic interests in conducting its arms sales program. This article explores the strategic motivations behind China’s arms exports by examining influential Chinese scholarship from military and party institutions and recent external reports on PRC arms sales.¹

Driven by the five strategic interests outlined below (in descending order of importance), China’s arms sales aim to:

1. Protect PRC economic interests and ensure the security of local governments to prevent disruptions to Chinese investments and safeguard Chinese workers, especially those involved in Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects.
2. Gain a strategic foothold in conflict zones and exert influence over the progression of conflicts to serve Beijing’s broader geostrategic aims.
3. Improve military operations and capabilities of partner states, thereby stabilizing regions of interest by addressing local issues, such as disturbances near the PRC border.
4. Build relationships with senior political and military leaders in other countries, further expanding China’s diplomatic and strategic influence.
5. Subsidize the R&D and production costs of China’s weapons systems.

Table 1 highlights strategic interests served by the PRC’s arms sales, explains each factor, and highlights one example sale.

This article first examines how the People’s Republic of China utilizes arms sales to protect its economic interests in the Belt and Road Initiative. Next, it explores how Chinese arms sales enhance the PRC’s influence in strategically significant conflicts, with the Russia-Ukraine War as a recent example. Following this discussion, it delves into the strategic objective of using PRC arms sales to shape the military operations of importing countries, such as training Myanmar’s forces to quell ongoing violence.

The analysis then shifts to how China leverages arms sales to build relationships with influential military figures in other countries, particularly in Latin America—a region of concern for the United States. This section also explores profit considerations in PRC arms sales as a secondary strategic interest, primarily aimed at offsetting R&D and production costs through international sales to wealthy oil-exporting nations in the Middle East (for example, Saudi Arabia). Next, the article addresses the limited evidence that China aims to use arms sales to expand its overseas garrisons.

This research clearly indicates that US and allied policymakers must continue to monitor the efficacy of PRC arms sales in achieving Beijing’s global strategic aims and subsequent consequences for the United States. China has gained a foothold in regions of strategic significance, including around the Indian Ocean and Latin America, partly due to PRC arms sales. American military planners must account for increased PRC presence in these areas and the implications for US national security. One key policy recommendation the research poses is to develop more affordable weapons systems to compete directly with Chinese sellers who primarily deal with low-income developing countries. The article concludes with policy recommendations for US and allied officials on responding to and counterbalancing China’s strategic use of arms sales in its broader geopolitical agenda.

Table 1. Strategic interests in arms sales matrix (Source: Author research)

Chinese Strategic Interests in Arms Sales

Protect Economic Interests

The primary aim of China’s arms sales in recent years is to ensure the security of foreign partner governments and safeguard Chinese workers and projects, particularly those connected to the Belt and Road Initiative. Underlining this dynamic, “Beijing’s preferred countries for security engagement overlap with its top trading partners.” To this end, several notable transactions exemplify PRC arms sales.²

Pakistan, a major BRI participant, has experienced terrorist attacks targeting Chinese citizens and workers on BRI projects. To bolster Pakistan’s security, Beijing sold Chengdu J-10 Vigorous Dragon fighters and 149 JF-17 Thunder aircraft and plans to sell it J-31 stealth fighters. Similarly, in Africa, China’s BRI partners have received significant military support to quell violent extremism. In December 2023, Ghana received PHL-11 multiple-rocket launchers from China. That same month, China sold Zimbabwe PTL-02 6x6 anti-tank guns. The Nigerian Army received Ziyan Blowfish unmanned aerial vehicles for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions, addressing Nigeria’s high levels of terrorism and separatist violence. While some of these examples represent high-end conventional arms to combat low-end insurgent and civil threats, China’s sale of larger systems can be viewed as attempts to bolster the deterrence of partner governments and present a show of force to protect economic interests in strategic regions.³

Chinese arms sales can also evolve into more direct forms of security cooperation. For example, China deploys armed private security personnel to protect its economic interests overseas, all under strict state control. The September 2009 “Regulation on the Administration of Security and Guarding Services” (保安服务管理条例) legalized private security companies and established a regulatory framework under the Ministry of Public Security. It underscores that Chinese private security companies operate entirely under state supervision, blurring the line between China’s public and private security services while showing how economic interests act as a gateway to Chinese arms sales and deepen security cooperation.⁴

Establish a Presence in Conflict Zones

Chinese scholars also characterize arms sales as a means to strengthen PRC influence in strategically important conflicts. Han Jie, a representative from the Chinese weapons manufacturer China North Industries Group Corporation, notes, “Arms exports are given to one side in a conflict not only to provide diplomatic support but also to clarify the exporting country’s sense of presence and influence the conflict resolution process.” Ren Haiping et al. from China’s National Development and Reform Commission observed that arms sales and other military support help secure “strategic space and room to maneuver” in major conflict zones. Similarly, China uses arms transfers to gain presence and influence in strategic regions and conflicts. For example, Chinese equipment exports to Russia have surged since the invasion of Ukraine. In July 2023, China exported $68 million worth of computer numerical control tools to Russia, a significant increase from $6.5 million in February 2022. Rob Lee notes that nearly 80 percent of the components Russia receives, especially for military electronics, come from China.⁵

Further examples of PRC involvement in the Russia-Ukraine War demonstrate China’s strategic aim of gaining a presence in global hot spots. Chinese munitions, which have arrived from China or through third-party countries, have been documented in the Russian army since at least September 2022. The Russian military, which does not have indigenous 60mm mortars in service, has been using Chinese 60mm mortar ammunition. Additionally, China has shipped more than 2,000 all-terrain vehicles to support Russian military capabilities further. Russia has also used Chinese drones in conflict. According to another investigation, from December 2022 to April 2023, a Russian company imported at least 37 Chinese drones valued at $103,000, explicitly stating that they would be used for “special military operations” in Ukraine. Despite Beijing’s denials, customs records indicate the intended military use of these drones. Moreover, Russia has imported other military-related technologies from China, including monitoring and jamming equipment for drones and portable personal computers designed for warfare. These transactions demonstrate how the People’s Republic of China uses arms sales to establish a presence in the conflicts Beijing deems important.⁶

Enhance Partner Military Operations

Chinese scholars emphasize the strategic objective of using arms sales to influence the military operations of importing countries. Han notes that as far as weapon systems determine “manpower requirements, training models, combat concepts, and military culture,” they represent a critical and indirect means to influence other states’ military operations. He highlights how Soviet military assistance to China had a “tremendous impact” on China’s battlefield philosophy and training models, noting that “it is still difficult for the Chinese military to completely overcome the influence of Soviet military concepts.” Hence, Beijing believes in the long-lasting military influence exerted through arms transfers.⁷

China’s arms sales in Myanmar illustrate this strategy. Myanmar’s inability to control border issues and maintain internal stability raises significant concern for China. To manage the situation and influence the outcome, China arms various factions within the conflict. The United Wa State Army receives most of the Chinese weapon exports and subsequently transfers the arms to other groups involved in the conflict. This approach ensures China’s presence and influence and shapes regional military dynamics.⁸

One specific example of China’s influence through arms sales is the Myanmar Air Force’s use of Chinese-built turboprop transport aircraft as improvised bombers for close air support (CAS) missions. Ironically, the proliferation of Type 77 12.7mm machine guns facilitated by the United Wa State Army has led to the destruction of several Myanmar Air Force, Chinese-built Hongdu JL-8 light attack aircraft by insurgents. Nonetheless, these transactions underscore China’s strategic intent to influence military operations in Myanmar through the distribution of arms. Other instances of Chinese investments in other states’ operational capabilities include a 2018 PRC-constructed military training center at the Mwalimu Nyerere Memorial Academy in Tanzania “to provide leadership training to emerging leaders from countries governed by the Former Liberation Movements of Southern Africa.” This base is another example of Chinese military assistance and arms exports being used to improve partner capacity.⁹

Build Relationships with Civilian and Military Leaders

Chinese leaders strategically deploy arms sales to cultivate relationships with influential figures in regions where the military wields significant political power. Han writes that in some of China’s target markets, “the military can even determine the direction of domestic and foreign policy.” Once Chinese training or special forces are in the country, personnel in the importing country will be “imperceptibly influenced” by China’s military culture and “form a pro-China bloc, thus impacting the policies of their respective country.” Other authors are less explicit about this lasting influence and argue that in many cases, arms exports allow the exporting state to “intervene and control another country’s politics,” as Ren Haiping notes. This gradual integration often results in the formation of personal alliances and interest groups that can sway policies in favor of Chinese interests.¹⁰

Chinese relationship-building is particularly evident in West Africa, where Beijing has strategically expanded its arms market foothold amid diminishing French influence. The North Industries Group Corporation, China’s largest weapons producer, has established a robust presence in Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, and Senegal through the supply of arms and essential maintenance and support services. Chinese sales to Zimbabwe, including exporting dozens of armored vehicles, also show strategic intent to deepen military-to-military ties with the Zimbabwe Defence Forces. Shortly after the sale, Central Military Commission Vice Chairman General Zhang Youxia met with Zimbabwe Defence Minister Oppah Charm Zvipange Muchinguri, declaring that the “all-weather friendship between China and Zimbabwe is as strong as rock” and thanking the official for “Zimbabwe’s unwavering commitment to the one-China principle.” Other equipment sales and donations for relationship-building objectives include a 2016 sale of a patrol ship to Togo, a 2018 donation of a “Community Policing Kit” to Lesotho’s Ministry of Police and Public Safety, and a 2019 sale of patrol vessels to Malawi’s chief of defense.¹¹

Given its strategic inroads in Africa, China’s activities in Latin America are also concerning. According to Evan Ellis, between 2006 and 2022, Beijing exported approximately $629 million worth of arms to Venezuela, with further sales of military aircraft, ground vehicles, air defense radars, and assault rifles to Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. Additionally, China has funded all-expenses-paid trips for Latin American military officers to live and study in China as part of a broader effort to cultivate relationships with key military elites. These efforts have yielded significant dividends for Beijing, securing access to vital natural resources and expanding its export markets. Thus, forging these relationships with military and political leaders enhances China’s regional influence and represents a direct challenge to US national security interests in the Western Hemisphere.¹²

Profit Considerations to Subsidize Research and Development and Production Costs

According to PRC scholars, profit considerations present a secondary strategic interest in China’s arms trade, aimed at offsetting research, development, and production costs through international sales. Han observes, “China has large economic and technical gaps with the United States. If we only rely on the domestic leg [market] to operate, we will face difficulties bearing the costs.” Therefore, he asserts, China must “use the international market to reduce research and development costs.” An article written under the auspices of the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation states, “in the Post–Cold War world, while the military and political effects of arms trade is still key, its economic effects are most central.”¹³

This strategy reduces the financial burdens of domestic defense producers and fosters technological advancement through collaborations with strategic partners. For example, in the Middle East, China has strategically positioned itself to enhance military-security partnerships with wealthy energy-supplying countries like Saudi Arabia. Recent joint ventures focus on manufacturing UAV systems and other defense technologies locally. There are also reports that plans are under advisement to manufacture the JF-17 in Saudi Arabia. The PAC/Chengdu JF-17 Block III Thunder, developed jointly with Pakistan, further showcases China’s collaboration with foreign countries to expand market presence. While economic incentives play a role in PRC arms sales, the PRC scholarship analyzed in this article evinces an emphasis on other strategic objectives over purely economic benefits.¹⁴

People’s Liberation Army Overseas Garrisons

According to recent reporting, China has long-term ambitions to establish overseas garrisons in Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Mozambique, Tanzania, and the United Arab Emirates, which could be facilitated by defense influence through arms sales. While deploying permanent overseas garrisons represents a long-term Chinese strategic interest, practical considerations suggest this ambition, along with economic considerations, is secondary.

Unlike the United States, which maintains substantial and strategically vital bases around the world, China faces financial constraints that limit its ability to sustain similar extensive overseas deployments. This limitation can be observed in Djibouti, where American military presence significantly outstrips that of China in size and operational capacity. According to William Hartung at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, the Chinese military operates under budgetary constraints, with annual expenditures likely already exceeding planned allocations by a significant margin. This fiscal reality necessitates prioritizing resources toward immediate security needs, such as territorial defense, rather than expansive overseas garrison deployments, which would also be the first installations destroyed in a global conflict. While establishing permanent bases abroad remains on China’s strategic radar, the current economic realities and comparative capabilities vis-à-vis the United States suggest such ambitions are lower priorities in the overall framework.¹⁵

Conclusion

Based on the analysis of PRC arms sales detailed in this article, it becomes evident that PRC arms sales are intricately linked to broader geopolitical dynamics, including Chinese economic investment projects like the Belt and Road Initiative. Arms sales are not standalone efforts but tools for China to pursue its geostrategic interests. Future research must evaluate China’s effectiveness in achieving its strategic aims through arms sales and determine direct consequences for the United States.

Regarding potential strategic consequences, China’s provision of arms to Russia signals willingness to support partners in conflict zones that serve its geostrategic interests. This propensity could lead to a more assertive China in other global hot spots where it might provide other state actors materiel support to the detriment of US national interests. For example, China might supply North Korea with ammunition and spare parts in a conflict on the Korean Peninsula. American planners would need to account for the potential increase in North Korean operational endurance resulting from PRC support.

Strengthening PRC bilateral military relationships through arms sales could also allow China to deploy naval and air assets in key locations to secure China’s trade routes and critical resources—like oil in a future war. The 2020 edition of Science of Military Strategy notes China’s intent to “vigorously strengthen the construction of comprehensive long-sea support capabilities” and “improve the construction of naval bases” to safeguard its maritime trade. For example, by extending its influence from the northwestern Arabian Sea to the western Indian Ocean, China could force the United States and its allies to divert naval forces from critical areas, undermining US strategic objectives in a future conflict.¹⁶

The United States should prioritize selling more affordable defense systems to counter the malign impact of PRC arms sales. China’s successes in the global arms market are based on selling advanced weapons systems at competitive prices to developing countries. For example, while China’s J-10 fighter costs around $40 million, the US F-16 Fighting Falcon costs around $63 million. Yao Pengfei of Shanghai Maritime University highlights that Chinese arms exports excel by tailoring products to accommodate clients with “differing economic levels, geographic environments, and international status.” According to Yao, this approach has enabled Chinese defense enterprises to make significant strides in selling military products. Nevertheless, the United States possesses a distinct advantage in this arena, given China’s reputation for offering lower quality products and poor after-sales assistance. By capitalizing on its reputation for reliability in defense technology, America can provide compelling alternatives in the global arms trade market.¹⁷

To counter the strategic challenges posed by China’s arms sales, the United States must leverage its competitive strengths in defense technology and enhance its global arms market strategy, ensuring that US defense offerings surpass the appeal of Chinese alternatives in quality and price. China’s arms sales are not simply a matter of economic competition but serve PRC strategic interests around the globe.

Jake R. Rinaldi
Dr. Jake R. Rinaldi is a defense analyst in the China Landpower Studies Center within the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College. He holds a PhD and MPhil from the University of Cambridge, where his doctoral dissertation examined China–North Korea military relations, and his master’s degree focused on China’s nuclear forces.

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Endnotes

1. Aamer Madhani, “US Intelligence Finding Shows China Surging Equipment Sales to Russia to Help War Effort in Ukraine,” The Associated Press (website), April 19, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/united-states-china-russia-ukraine-war-265df843be030b7183c95b6f3afca8ec; and “European Arms Imports Nearly Double, US and French Exports Rise, and Russian Exports Fall Sharply,” press release, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (website), March 11, 2024, https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2024/european-arms-imports-nearly-double-us-and-french-exports-rise-and-russian-exports-fall-sharply. Return to text.
2. Jake Rinaldi, “PRC Strategic Adaptation in Africa,” China Landpower Studies Center, (website), October 9, 2024, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Recent-Publications/Article/3930263/prc-strategic-adaptation-in-africa/; and Judd Devermont et al., “Personal Ties: Measuring Chinese and U.S. Engagement with African Security Chiefs,” (Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS], August 4, 2021,) https://www.csis.org/analysis/personal-ties-measuring-chinese-and-us-engagement-african-security-chiefs. Return to text.
3. Judd Devermont et al., “CSIS Brief – Personal Ties: Measuring Chinese and U.S. Engagement with African Security Chiefs,” CSIS (website), August 4, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/personal-ties-measuring-chinese-and-us-engagement-african-security-chiefs; Nikolov, “China’s J-31 Stealth Fighter”; “China Delivers PLH-11 Multiple Rocket Launchers to Ghana,” Global Defense News Army Recognition Group (website), January 3, 2024, https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/2024/china-delivers-plh-11-multiple-rocket-launchers-to-ghana; “Zimbabwe Receives Chinese PTL-02”; and Lionel,“Ziyan UAS Blowfish.” Return to text.
4. Kate Bartlett, “How Chinese Private Security Companies in Africa Differ from Russia’s.” Voice of America (website), March 31, 2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/how-chinese-private-security-companies-in-africa-differ-from-russia-s-/7030946.html. Return to text.
5. Han Jie, “Using the Zhuhai Air Show to Discuss the Non-Economic Impact of Chinese Military Exports,” Tanks and Armored Vehicles, no. 12 (2018): 28–33; Ren Haiping et al., “Present Situation and Prospect of the International Arms Trade,” Globalization, no. 10 (2016): 77–87; Joe Leahy et al., “China’s Advanced Machine Tool Exports to Russia Soar After Ukraine Invasion,” Financial Times (website), January 2, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/d16c688d-9579-4f1d-a84f-ca29ca2f0bc0; and Rob Lee (@RALee85), “He says almost 80% of the components Russia receives, especially for electronics, comes from China,” X (website), January 15, 2024, https://x.com/ralee85/status/1746870656405262784. Return to text.
6. Maria Tril, “Ukrainian Military Discover Chinese Mortar Shells in Russian Positions,” Euromaidan Press (website) November 27, 2023, https://euromaidanpress.com/2023/11/27/ukrainian-military-discover-chinese-mines-in-russian-positions/; and “Why Buy Chinese Drones? Nikkei: Russian Customs Declaration States ‘Special Military Operation’ ” [購中國無人機幹嘛？日經：俄方報關直說 ‘特別軍事行動’], Liberty Times Net (website) [自由时报], July 2, 2023, https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/world/breakingnews/4351025. Return to text.
7. Han, “Zhuhai Air Show.” Return to text.
8. Nectar Gan, “How Online Scam Warlords Have Made China Start to Lose Patience with Myanmar’s Junta,” CNN (website), December 19, 2023, https://www.cnn.com/2023/12/19/china/myanmar-conflict-china-scam-centers-analysis-intl-hnk/index.html; and Lucas Myers, “Mismanaging of the Unmanageable: China Tries to Play All Sides in Myanmar’s Metastasizing Civil War,” War on the Rocks (website), March 27, 2024, https://warontherocks.com/2024/03/mismanaging-of-the-unmanageable-china-tries-to-play-all-sides-in-myanmars-metastasizing-civil-war/. Return to text.
9. “Myanmar Air Force”; Zachary Abuza, “The Myanmar Military’s Air Superiority Is Slipping Away amid Sanctions and Opposition Attacks,” Radio Free Asia (website), January 20, 2024, https://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/myanmar-air-power-01202024101801.html; and Paul Nantulya, “Grand Strategy and China’s Soft Power Push in Africa,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, August 30, 2018, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/grand-strategy-and-chinas-soft-power-push-in-africa/. Return to text.
10. Han, “Zhuhai Air Show”; and Ren et al., “International Arms Trade.” Return to text.
11. Sébastian Seibt, “Friends at Any Price: China Seeks Allies, Arms Markets in West Africa as French Influence Wanes,” France 24 (website), August 26, 2023, https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230826-china-seeks-new-allies-and-arms-markets-in-west-africa-as-french-influence-wanes; Sakshi Tiwari, “China Pledges Military Support to ‘Troubled’ Zimbabwe; Looks to Further Boost Its Presence in Africa,” The EurAsian Times (website), July 31, 2023, https://www.eurasiantimes.com/edited-chinas-march-in-africa-continues-beijing-pledges/; “CMC Vice Chairman General Zhang Youxia Meets with Guests Attending 10th Beijing Xiangshan Forum,” China Military Online (website), November 1, 2023, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/News_213114/TopStories/16263732.html; and Devermont et al., “Personal Ties.” Return to text.
12. Ellis, Chinese Security Engagement; Caroline Houck, “Beijing Has Started Giving Latin American Generals ‘Lavish,’ All-Expenses-Paid Trips to China,” Defense One (website), February 15, 2018, http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2018/02/beijing-has-started-giving-latin-american-generals-lavish-all-expense-trips-china/146040/; and Karin Küblböck et al., “Going Global: Chinese Natural Resource Policies and Their Impacts on Latin America,” ÖFSE Briefing Paper no. 24 (Vienna, Austrian Foundation for Development Research, 2019), https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/205129/1/1679092863.pdf. Return to text.
13. Han, “Zhuhai Air Show”; and Zhao Xia et al., “The Spatial-Temporal Pattern and Evolution of the Global Arms Trade Market,” Aerodynamic Missile Journal, no. 1 (2019). Return to text.
14. Helou, “Chinese and Saudi Firms”; David Donald, “Block III Thunder Makes International Debut,” Aviation International News (website), November 13, 2023, https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/defense/2023-11-13/block-iii-thunder-makes-international-debut. Return to text.
15. Devvrat Pandey, “Leaked Pentagon Documents Give Insight into China’s Secret ‘Project 141,’ ” India Today (website), April 28, 2023, https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/leaked-pentagon- documents-give-insight-into-chinas-secret-project-141-2366074-2023-04-28; Abu Mubarik, “Why Tiny Djibouti Hosts Both China and U.S. Military Bases—Only a Few Kilometers Apart,” Face2Face Africa (website), September 29, 2020, https://face2faceafrica.com/article/why-tiny-djibouti-hosts-both-china-and-u-s-military-bases-only-a-few-kilometers-apart; and William D. Hartung, Reality Check: Chinese Military Spending in Context, Costs of War project (Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, December 2023), https://home.watson.brown.edu/sites/default/files/Research/Research%20Briefs/2023/Hartung-%20Chinese%20Military%20Spending%20in%20Context.docx_.pdf. Return to text.
16. In Their Own Words: 2020 Science of Military Strategy (China Aerospace Studies Institute, January 2022), https://airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Translations/2022-01-26%202020%20Science%20of%20Military%20Strategy.pdf; and Connor Donahue and Travis Dolney, “East Africa’s Role in the People’s Republic of China’s Naval Strategy: Contesting Sea Control in the Indian Ocean,” in Decisive Decade: PRC Global Strategy and the PLA as a Pacing Challenge – 2023 PLA Conference – Updated and Expanded, ed. George R. Shatzer and Joshua M. Arostegui (US Army War College Press, 2024), 37–46, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/966/. Return to text.
17. Nathan Rennolds, “Take a Look at the $63 Million F-16 Fighter Jet the West Has Pledged to Help Ukraine Win the War with Russia,” Business Insider (website), August 26, 2023, https://www.businessinsider.com/f-16-fighter-jets-russia-ukraine-war-2023-8; Yao Pengfei, “International Military Industry Market Structure and China’s Response,” Aerodynamic Missile Journal, no. 1 (2019): 1–9; and Cindy Zheng, “Countries Buy Defective Chinese Military Equipment. Why?,” RealClearDefense (website), June 8, 2023, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/06/08/countries_buy_defective_chinese_military_equipment_why_939443.html. Return to text.