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Nov. 21, 2024

Korea: The Enduring Policy Blindspot

Justin Malzac and Rene A. Mahomed
©2024 Justin Malzac and Rene A. Mahomed

ABSTRACT: The threat posed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is a neglected and under-prioritized problem across the US government, requiring a dramatic change of approach. Most proposals for Goldwater-Nichols reform focus on geography, either increasing or decreasing the number of geographic commands. Based on our personal experience as Joint military planners at strategic-level headquarters, we argue that the change needs to go further, focusing on global national security problems instead of geography. This article’s analysis and conclusions will provoke conversation across the national security enterprise about how the United States competes with multiple global threats.

Keywords: North Korea, South Korea, Goldwater-Nichols reform, National Defense Strategy, force structure

 

The US commitment to one of its closest allies, the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea), has been shaky despite the alliance being one of the most successful in modern history. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) continues to threaten the ROK and has even developed the capability to attack the continental United States. Nevertheless, the 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS) subordinated North Korea to a subsidiary problem behind China and Russia, even though the dangers of DPRK escalation and miscalculation are higher than ever. While the United States has been distracted by arguably less existential threats—such as the wars in Ukraine and Gaza—North Korea continues to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles that pose a physical danger to Washington unabated.

As Kim Jong-Un’s regime clings to its nuclear ambitions, North Korea’s arsenal of nuclear warheads and delivery systems place the United States at risk. Moreover, Pyongyang flaunts gray-zone activity without any serious consequence from Washington. Failure to act has resulted in an erosion of redlines, the loss of US credibility, and the legitimization of coercion over international norms. Meanwhile, the United States has devoted excessive attention and resources to aiding Ukraine in the fight against an increasingly degraded Russia.

“For more than 30 years, 16 Congresses, and 6 presidential administrations,” North Korea has “advanced nuclear weapons and missile programs,” violating United Nations Security Council Resolutions and setting an example of noncompliance to a rules-based world order. This failure to reach compliance with international norms is the result of US decisionmakers’ complacency and inadequate attention to the Korean Peninsula. The resulting lack of credibility in US deterrence has led Seoul to seek the means to counterbalance Pyongyang’s nuclear threat, with or without US support, with many in the south now advocating for their own nuclear weapons capability. We are far from the only ones sounding alarm bells. Writing in Foreign Policy, senior Asia analyst Robert A. Manning recently declared, “I have worked on the Korea nuclear problem in and out of government over the past three decades, and the Korean Peninsula seems more dangerous and volatile than at any time since 1950.”1

The task of planning to compete with North Korea is assigned to United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM), which has neither the capacity nor the global reach to address the problem. Moreover, the commander of Combined Forces Command (currently also the US Forces Korea commander) is ultimately responsible for fighting any future war on the peninsula and, therefore, should also be responsible for the strategic risk. Indo-Pacific Command remains solely focused on America’s largest strategic concern—China. The command is likely under-resourced to deal with China, never mind North Korea, which is a challenge equivalent to or greater than the threat Russia now poses. Additionally, due to the geographic constraints of command structure, INDOPACOM does not have the reach to address a global problem. For example, the command has no authority in Vladivostok, Russia, where North Korean workers and illicit revenue activities thrive.2

Currently, North Korea’s actions affect the regional areas of at least five of the existing combatant commands, yet INDOPACOM seems reluctant to own the problem. The Joint Staff also appears unconcerned—unless North Korea is actively launching ballistic missiles. In today’s globally integrated world, the US military can no longer afford to define problem sets along geographical lines. We propose elevating US Forces Korea (USFK) to a combatant command and reorienting the command structure to enable Title 10 authority beyond a limited geographic scope. The current US approach has failed, leading to the emergence of North Korea as a global gray-zone actor and homeland threat, undercutting US credibility. Restructuring the combatant commands to focus on specific, global strategic problems will address the North Korean threat and improve the US military’s threat response for core national defense problems.

A Growing Threat and an Opportunity

The 2022 National Security Strategy reduced North Korea to a subsidiary problem behind China and Russia, though the dangers of DPRK escalation and miscalculation—paired with a nuclear arsenal and validated delivery capability—are higher than ever. The official Department of Defense (DoD) media announcement of the 2022 strategy did not even mention Korea once. After multiple doomed attempts to achieve rapprochement with the regime, the aggressive and provocative behavior of North Korea has only surged. While the United States has been distracted by Ukraine and Gaza, the Kim regime has continued to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles that pose a physical danger to the entire continental United States. Many see the North Korean regime as the most likely to employ nuclear weapons, despite Vladimir Putin’s persistent bluster.3

Moreover, North Korea engages in gray-zone activity with relative impunity, including overt uses of force (such as the 2010 sinking of the ROK ship Cheonan), hacking, cybercrime, and weapons proliferation to Russia and Hamas. Russia actively uses North Korean weapons in its illegal war to kill Ukrainians. North Korean hackers have stolen more than $3 billion in cryptocurrency since 2017, causing harm to the global economy. North Korea also routinely carries out cyberattacks against banking and industry worldwide and has conducted unlawful GPS jamming that endangers civilian aircraft. In 2023, North Korea launched a spy satellite into space, violating UN Security Council resolutions (particularly UNSCRs 1718 and 1874) and announced plans to launch three more in the coming years.4

Most importantly, the United States has failed to curtail Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons development. America’s strategic goal regarding North Korea has consistently been “complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization.” This status is the hardline starting point for the United States to enter any negotiations with North Korea, despite being unachievable almost since the policy’s adoption. The Kim regime has tested nuclear devices at least six times, may already have over 100 nuclear warheads—far more than could be neutralized by preemptive strike—and has successfully tested an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of reaching inside the continental United States. The nuclear genie is out of the bottle, and it is time for a new approach.5

To the Kim regime, nuclear weapons are “the ultimate guarantor of autocratic rule” with which North Korea can threaten US forces within the region and the homeland. In December 2023, North Korea launched a solid-fuel Hwasong-18 ICBM—capable of striking all mainland areas of the United States—the most advanced and accurate weapon it has employed to date. The regime claimed the launch was a “preview of a nuclear war” in opposition to recent port calls of the USS Carl Vinson and nuclear missile submarines. A RAND Corporation study revealed “there is a growing gap” between DPRK offensive missile capability and the “ability for ROK and US capabilities to defeat it.” In particular, North Korea has called for outfitting tactical munitions to complement its growing arsenal of ballistic missiles, significantly increasing the number of warheads able to fire at targets simultaneously and overwhelming missile defense systems.6

A Degraded Russian Threat

As the North Korean threat to the US homeland grows, Washington continues to pour resources into a problem that becomes less substantial each day. The 2022 National Security Strategy identified Russia as the number two national security priority—the “acute threat” in the shadow of the “pacing challenge” posed by China. In response to the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine War, the United States rightfully increased force deployments and resourcing in Europe. Nonetheless, US strategic focus on Russia has barely shifted, despite the degradation of Russian military capability caused by more than two years of large-scale combat operations.7

In less than two years, Russia has lost 87 percent of its prewar ground forces and two-thirds of its tanks in Ukraine. Some estimates put the loss at over 300,000 killed or wounded—including much of the Russian military’s pool of experienced soldiers—besides the loss of equipment and low-density critical assets like strategic bombers and command aircraft.8

A debate regarding the scope of Russian military losses continues. Some reports note that Russia is showing a surprising speed of recovery—at least its conventional forces. Russia continues to try to present itself as the same bear it once was (for example, by sending a flotilla within 90 miles of Florida). Nonetheless, a close look at the measures Russia is taking to restore its depleted military strength paints a bleak picture. Russia has been replacing lost armor by throwing together whatever resources are readily available, such as welding naval guns to old armored tractors or, more recently, to 50-to-60-year-old tanks. To close the manpower and supply gaps, Russia has resorted to recruiting foreign fighters from countries such as Cuba and purchasing poor-quality ammunition from North Korea. One report suggests some of this ammunition was manufactured in the 1970s. A recent Russian domestic recruitment ad shows Russia is targeting 30-to 40-year-olds from low-wage, low-skilled jobs, such as taxi drivers—not the ideal source for an effective, professional army.9

Moreover, the current vitality of the Russian economy hides several festering problems. First, Russia has been forced to shift much, if not most, of its economy to war production married to an increase in government economic control, leeching labor from key industries such as oil and gas production. None of these trends bode well for the coming years. Worse, sanctions have forced Russia to kowtow to China to secure both immediate relief and critical components for its war, including “over 70% of its imports of machine tools used for ballistic missile production” and “90% of Russia’s microelectronics imports.” Most recently, Chinese banks have stopped Russian transactions “en masse,” and “billions of yuan worth of payments” have been stalled.10

In the end, Russia has been militarily and economically degraded by its quagmire in Ukraine, which has only catalyzed European and NATO concerns for their own defense. While it will take time before Europe is fully able to defend itself—some estimates suggest a decade or longer—the balance between Russia and the West has shifted in America’s favor over the past two years. Debate continues about how much the balance of power has changed in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine War. Despite being a nuclear power, we would argue that Russia no longer poses an acute threat requiring the primary focus of DoD planners. Washington can safely shift some of that focus to Korea.11

A Failure of Deterrence

At the most basic level, deterrence can be defined as actions taken with the goal of “discouraging states from taking unwanted actions, especially military aggression,” as opposed to strategic deterrence, which is a term of art referring to deterrence through the threat of nuclear weapons. General deterrence is employed against a range of adversary actions, not just aggression. Deterrence against North Korea has failed because of inadequate resources and a stubborn strategic focus on an unachievable end state—denuclearization.12

In Foreign Policy, Stephen M. Walt refers to this concept as one of the many “neurotic fixations” in US policy and strategy. Walt observes, “It is hard to think of a combination of carrots and sticks that would convince” the Kim regime to surrender the one thing guaranteeing its survival. As the Lowy Institute’s Daniel R. DePetris notes, “Denuclearization may have been possible in the 1990s, when the Kim dynasty was still mastering the plutonium fuel cycle and had yet to acquire a single operational nuclear device,” but such a policy has long since become “an archaic concept.” As US and ROK policy professionals and strategists come to this realization, the refusal of US policy leaders to change course breeds confusion in the ranks.13

The few measures the United States has taken, beyond waiting at the diplomatic table, have proven ineffective. While the Department of the Treasury has targeted DPRK officials and businesses with sanctions for years, domestic and “U.S.-led international sanctions have failed to halt North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programs.” Additionally, North Korea’s illicit procurement and revenue generation networks barely skipped a beat when the Department of Justice seized 17 web domains used by previously sanctioned North Korean IT workers.14

Consequences of Strategic Failure

Failed deterrence against North Korea poses the obvious, but often ignored, risk of a nuclear attack. Immediate and significant action is required to address the fact that North Korean nukes can now reach anywhere in the United States. The Kim regime also likely has more ICBMs than the United States can shoot down. As reported by Politico, “The U.S. only has 44 ground-based interceptors to launch from Alaska and California to destroy an oncoming ICBM in flight. Assuming North Korea’s weapons can fit four warheads atop them, it’s possible Pyongyang can fire more warheads at the U.S. than America has interceptors”—even in the unlikely situation where each interceptor successfully defeats a target. Meanwhile, Kim Jong-Un promises to increase his arsenal of weapons “exponentially.”15

Beyond the extreme consequences of a nuclear exchange, however, lies another legitimate threat to the Korean Peninsula. A late 2023 Atlantic Council report suggested “ongoing changes in North Korean and PRC [People’s Rebuplic of China] capabilities and intentions are very likely to drive a dramatically increased risk of strategic deterrence [sic] failure on or around the Korean Peninsula in the next five to ten years.” Few argue that Kim would launch an invasion of the south since it would almost certainly spell the end of his regime. The threat of conventional war hides in the shadows of tit-for-tat provocations from both sides that could spiral out of control.16

The United States has found itself close to this brink many times. In response to the 2010 shelling of Yeonpyeong Island by North Korea, which resulted in the deaths of two ROK marines and multiple civilians, the South Korean government planned to send fighter aircraft across the border to strike the firing location. The South Korean president was luckily dissuaded at the last moment by his US counterpart. Such instances of aggression have been increasing quickly as of late, with each side driven by a political need to look tough for domestic audiences. Some have argued that “a conflict on the Korean Peninsula can also spiral out of control faster” than in other regions due to South Korea’s aggressive operational stance. War will occur when Kim views his only options as escalation or facing a coup.17

Another Atlantic Council report cautioned that a conflict in Korea will likely expand, arguing, “If a conflict with either the PRC or North Korea does not conclude quickly—we should anticipate that simultaneous conflicts with both could result.” The report also argued that China will soon be better prepared than the United States for a two-front conflict in Asia, based on an “apparent lack of preparedness of the United States and its allies to fight simultaneous conflicts with the PRC and North Korea.” Neglecting Korea in strategic planning generates strategic risk with regard to the largest problem the United States faces today—China. American policymakers should recognize that Korea is central to competition or conflict with China and should be nurturing the planning against North Korea required for a potential two-crisis scenario.18

The lack of credibility in US deterrence vis-à-vis North Korea has had larger ramifications in recent years. Naturally, Seoul seeks to counterbalance Pyongynag’s nuclear threat, with or without US support. Notably, “South Koreans have advocated that the United States redeploy tactical nuclear weapons,” and “polls suggest a strong majority” also concurs with “developing a domestic nuclear weapons capability.” A poll conducted by Adam Lowther showed a 71 percent public approval. South Korean sentiment shows a loss of confidence in the hardline US policy of a nuclear-free peninsula. This sentiment has remained consistent despite the assurances of the “Washington Declaration” and increased strategic deployments to Korea. More recent polling in June 2024 showed consistent support hovering approximately around 70 percent for a domestic nuclear program. Worse, this poll marked “the first time support for nuclear armament outran support for the US troops.” The US failure to deliver on redlines and deter the DRPK is driving America’s partners to take matters into their own hands.19

Beyond Geography

The problem is twofold.

  1. The United States gives insufficient strategic attention to the North Korean threat. The problem belongs to Indo-Pacific Command, which is preoccupied and overtaxed with leading competition with China, and the national security enterprise is fixated on Russia.
  2. The current DoD command structure is defined by geographical regions, and one commander does not have the authority to operate in a global manner.

To address this problem, we recommend elevating US Forces Korea to combatant command status as part of a new command structure that deemphasizes geography over mission. As Thomas G. Mahnken notes, “the threats the United States faces today do not conform to carefully drawn geographic boundaries, nor do the strategies needed to counter them.” For example, North Korea has found willing economic partners in Africa, exchanged missile technology with Iran, long-supported Hamas and other terrorist groups, and sent Russia ballistic missiles to employ in Ukraine. North Korea is a global actor, and its weapons have global reach, directly and indirectly.20

To use a legal term, US Forces Korea already shows several indicia of a combatant command. It is the only sub-unified command led by a four-star commander, the only sub-unfied commander who gives an annual posture statement to Congress, alongside the other combatant commanders. In the 2024 USFK posture statement, USFK Commander General Paul J. LaCamera frames his mission as regional, noting, “Northeast Asia, which includes the Korean Peninsula, is vital to global peace and stability.” LaCamera, through his various command roles, also directly communicates with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense, a right typically reserved for combatant commanders. Moreover, US Forces Korea was one of the first Joint commands to gain a Space Force component, along with Indo-Pacific Command, European Command, and Central Command. Likewise, US Forces Korea is the only noncombatant command entity outside the regional combatant commands that has an assigned Theater Special Operations Command and a “cyber operations-integrated planning element,” or CO-IPE. Indeed, US Forces Korea is halfway to being a combatant command, though without the same Title 10 authorities.21

The current command structure resulted from the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, which considered the “creation of a unified combatant command for missions relating to defense of Northeast Asia” at a time when most military problems were, indeed, regionally fixed—Cuba, Vietnam, Iran, Korea, and Grenada were localized issues. Even global cold war with the Soviets was largely manifested by localized competition. The resulting statutes did not define the combatant commands at all by area. The geographic focus is the result of the Unified Command Plan, which currently establishes 11 combatant commands, 6 with defined geographic areas of responsibility. The other 5 are referred to as “functional” combatant commands, further showing no legal requirement exists to define combatant commands geographically.22

There have been calls for years to reexamine the current combatant command structure as part of a broader Goldwater-Nichols reform. Most proposals have focused on geography, and some have called for more geographic regions. Other proposals separate peacetime and wartime functions or place war-fighting responsibilities on a set of new commands. No proposals have suggested aligning the command structure specifically to NSS-named threats.23

This article is not the first time the idea of a new combatant command centered on Korea has been offered. According to the Joint Staff’s History of the Unified Command Plan, in 1974, the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force “proposed disestablishing PACOM, making the Pacific Fleet a specified command, and creating four new unified commands: western Pacific, eastern Asia, northeast Asia, and southwest Pacific.” The so-called “Northeast Asia Command” would have been responsible for Japan, Korea, and Okinawa. Part of the reasoning behind the rejection of a Northeast Asia Command at the time was the Joint Chiefs’ belief that “long-standing animosity between Japan and Korea would keep the CINC of such a command constantly walking a tightrope.”24 The increasing military cooperation between Japan and Korea today makes this concern an invalid point of opposition.

The debate was revived in 1997 when the USFK staff provided the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs a proposal for “the establishment a Title 10 Unified Command with an area of responsibility that encompasses Northeast Asia.” The argument for the new command was the political explosiveness of the region—along with the overtaxing of then Pacific Command that, at the time, was also responsible for “Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, Oceania, and South Asia.” The brief presciently identified how the US presence in Korea and Japan served as a key stabilizing factor in the region. It also highlighted, almost 20 years ago, Pacific Command’s inability to handle all its missions fully, which have since compounded.25

The recent Commission on the National Defense Strategy report also acknowledges the current command structure’s dysfunctionality, stating, “2022 NDS force construct does not sufficiently account for global competition or the very real threat of simultaneous conflict in more than one theater.” The report notes that the current structural focus on geographic commands “may not take into account competing demands” across theaters and argues that the “practice to assign warfighting responsibilities to joint task forces during modern conflicts illustrates the disconnect within DoD’s structure.” Combatant commands are no longer war-fighting headquarters—that responsibility is assigned to other Joint headquarters. The report proposes a “Multiple Theater Force Construct” to solve these issues but provides no details on what this structure might look like. Here, we present one possible approach to address these concerns.26

While no legal requirement exists for combatant commands to be defined geographically, the Unified Command Plan has repeatedly enshrined this practice into DoD policy. Current doctrine, however, already provides an alternative—functional combatant commands. The Joint Force (Joint Publication 1, Volume 2) notes, “Sometimes a joint force based solely on military functions without respect to a specific geographic region is more suitable to fix responsibility for certain types of continuing operations.” A functional command focuses on specific missions, objectives, or services provided. The Joint Force also notes how a functional command can fit within another combatant command’s area of operations, stating, “The missions or tasks assigned to the commander of a functional command may require that certain installations and activities of that commander be exempt, partially or wholly, from the command authority of a CCDR in whose AOR they are located or within which they operate.” Nothing in the current policy prevents the creation of a new functional combatant command, even one with a narrow global mission.27

A Threat-Oriented Approach

While there are many possible ways to restructure the disposition of the Title 10 combatant commands, prioritizing threats over geography provides the most flexible and efficient option in this global era.

Generally, this structure creates three types of combatant commands:

  1. Geographic commands.
  2. Capabilities-based supporting commands.
  3. Threat-aligned operational commands.

The two geographic commands, Pacific and Atlantic, would coordinate movement through their areas of operations, along with the general maintenance of relationships with allies and partners. The six threat-oriented functional combatant commands would serve as the headquarters with the responsibility and authority to conduct operations. United States Strategic Command has already proven itself as a global coordinator and could step in where problem sets overlap, such as North Korean missiles finding their way to Ukraine. Operations of the threat-oriented commands would be supported by the functional CCMDs responsible for the management of exquisite capabilities. These include transportation, special operations forces, and the nuclear arsenal. It might be worth a debate on whether space and cyber capabilities and authorities should remain under separate combatant commands or be directly assigned to the problem-oriented commands. Consolidating operations in one Joint headquarters reduced duplication of effort, operational fratricide, and allows for timely planning and execution.28

To counter North Korea, we recommend utilizing the Joint headquarters already leading that effort—US Forces Korea. Retitled “Northeast Asia Command,” it would likely include Japan. Although the idea of putting an operations-focused Joint headquarters in Japan to counter China has been suggested, we believe Japan’s most existential threat is a nuclear-armed North Korea. In conversations discussing increased South Korean–Japanese cooperation, the shadow of the North Korean threat is lost, which highlights the necessity of separate commands for these two problems—it has proven impossible for one headquarters (INDOPACOM) to take a balanced approach to both challenges. Moreover, the focal point of alliances often depends on the geography of the parties, which informs their relative strategic interests. Scholars such as Robert D. Kaplan have long argued that the “cauldron” of potential crisis with China is the South China Sea, not East Asia. It makes sense, therefore, to headquarter the command aligned against the PRC threat in the Philippines or another ally in that region, not Japan.29

Combatant command structure focused on strategic threats

Figure 1. Combatant command structure focused on strategic threats (Source: Created by author)

The lack of two separate headquarters viewing these problems in isolation has made it difficult to see (or perhaps accept) how they are interrelated. This blind spot includes the previously described risk of sympathetic conflicts breaking out with North Korea and the PRC, one triggering the other. The Commission on the National Defense Strategy has called out the US military’s lack of readiness to handle simultaneous conflicts. It is easy to see as a root of this vulnerability the current focus on one of these threats to the neglect of the other. A single headquarters simply cannot focus attention on both problems, certainly not while also dealing with the myriad issues INDOPACOM is currently responsible for. Creating a new combatant command to oversee operations aligned against North Korea would fill the blind spots and allow the United States to generate effects to disrupt the global DPRK threat network and check the Kim regime’s malign behavior.30

Benefits of Change

A primary benefit of turning US Forces Korea into a combatant command would be streamlined funding and authorities. The organization requires the full suite of combatant command authorities and resources to handle the strategic global DPRK problem. As a subordinate sub-unified command, the majority of US Forces Korea funding and authority is routed through INDOPACOM. Combatant commands often reprioritize subordinate components’ requests on the way up the chain of command or redirect them on the way down. For example, the Pentagon provides the combatant commands funding for military information support operations, which the commands then have free rein to distribute. The result is the subordination of perceived niche requirements (North Korea) to other priorities (China). While the execution of these new threat-oriented commands might play out like previous regional Joint Task Forces, having the global Title 10 authorities assigned the new threat-oriented commands will make a fundamental difference, streamlining decision making and execution in a world where strategic OODA loops take minutes to resolve rather than days or months.31

These authorities would allow US Forces Korea to do more to deter North Korea’s regime not only from nuclear use but also from conventional aggression and malign gray-zone activity. The Department of Defense, alongside the greater national security enterprise, certainly possesses the means to check North Korea’s malign behavior. Denial measures include disrupting the regime’s global proliferation networks, locating and arresting DPRK hackers, enforcing sanctions and UN Security Council Resolutions via maritime interdictions, and employing information operations to drive wedges between North Korea and its supporters. Punishment measures include new sanctions, freezing assets, and further isolation from international mechanisms. The Department of Defense should pair these measures with efforts to persuade allies and partners to increase their cooperation with South Korea and communicate concern for the Korean problem to encourage restraint in America’s ROK partners. Effective disruption operations generate credible deterrence. To be effective, they must be timely, synchronized, sufficiently resourced, and approved by a single commander.

Creating threat-oriented combatant commands would provide an even playing field for US Forces Korea to compete for resources against other missions. Resources, in this sense, mean more than just manpower and money. At the operational and tactical levels, the military capabilities required vary widely based on the terrain and the threat. The forces that would be effective in a primarily land-based war in North Korea are not the same forces that would be needed in a maritime-heavy fight around Taiwan. A prime example of this divergence is the divestment of the A-10 ground strike aircraft. The Air Force is seeking to eliminate the A-10 by 2029 because it cannot survive the cutting-edge air defenses of China or similar peer adversaries. As the only purpose-built platform for close-air support and anti-armor, the A-10 plays an essential role in the defense against a deliberate North Korean ground invasion, which cannot simply be replaced by the F-35. The possession of such capabilities is critical to the US deterrence posture in Korea. Nonetheless, the China problem is driving resourcing decisions across the entire enterprise. Threat-oriented combatant commands that report directly to Congress would mitigate this unitary thinking.32

Conclusion

A devastating nuclear strike against the US homeland or a bloody conflict that subsumes East Asia present the ultimate—and unacceptable—risk of deterrence failure vis-à-vis North Korea. Past deterrence failures on the peninsula stemmed from Washington’s lack of focus. This neglect led to the deterioration of deterrence, as the regime in Pyongyang saw the United States as unwilling to spend resources to curtail its behavior. The report of the Commission on the National Defense Strategy provides four priorities, none of which mention Korea. One priority mentions deterring the malign activities of Iran but not the nation that has nuclear weapons aimed at Washington, DC. It would be laughable if it were not so serious.33

There are certainly ways the DoD and interagency can deter DPRK malign behavior, but this effort will require more national resources, and, more importantly, national attention. It is unlikely that resources would be pulled from China activities—and rightfully so—but there is certainly plenty across the Department of Defense that can be safely shifted to USFK. For these resources to be meaningful, however, there needs to be a Joint Force commander who is fully empowered to use them. It will require significant policy updates, but there is no legal impediment to creating a new functional combatant command to take on the North Korea threat globally. This change would surely boost deterrence against North Korea, when the Kim regime sees the United States taking their threats seriously and acting with unified effort across the interagency, and with allies and partners, to deny and punish their malign behavior.

This article cannot address all the issues requiring resolution. How would the transition from competition to conflict look? Perhaps not too different from the current posture of the USFK commander already serving as the war-fighting commander for a Korean conflict through his Combined Forces Command role. Similarly, calls for a China-focused Joint Force headquarters in the Pacific have called for a standing Joint Task Force—and for the same command and control to carry over into a crisis or conflict. We expect the threat-oriented commands to operate similarly to past JTFs, but with Title 10 combatant command authorities in place prior to the outbreak of hostilities. The Department of Defense must establish a policy boundary in a contingency to mark which activities it would consider inside or outside hostilities. For Korea, this boundary exists as the defined theater for Combined Forces Command, so planners would not find it new.

Concerns about the balance of assigned forces between the Korea-oriented command and the China-oriented one will also arise. These forces might play roles in both possible conflicts. Aligning them to a specific threat-aligned command will delineate their primary roles if two contingencies occur simultaneously. We see more benefits than risk presented by this clear delineation. More difficult topics to address include how these changes might affect geopolitics and key relationships with the United States and how partners with equities or responsibilities related to more than one NSS threat (Japan or Türkiye, for example) will integrate with multiple US operational commands.

Coordination between commands, the Department of Defense and the interagency, and between the United States and its partners has always proven difficult. This article seeks to spark a discussion about doing something different—not suggest that command structure changes will solve these problems. First and foremost, the United States must shift resources to address a growing and immediate DPRK threat.

 
 

Justin Malzac
Justin Malzac is a senior information planner and policy advisor for the Department of Defense in Korea. He holds a master of arts degree in history with a focus on East Asia. His academic work has been published by the Harvard National Security Journal, among others, and he is pending publication with the Naval War College Review.

 

Rene A. Mahomed
Rene A. Mahomed is a lieutenant colonel in the US Army assigned as an information operations officer in US Forces Korea (J39) with experience in psychological operations, military intelligence, and irregular warfare. He holds a master of business administration degree and a master of science in accountancy degree and is attending the US Army War College.

 
 

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Endnotes

  1. Mark E. Manyin, North Korea: September 2022 Update, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report R47242 (CRS, September 2022), 1, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47242/3; and Robert A. Manning, “The Risk of Another Korean War Is Higher Than Ever,” Foreign Policy (website), October 7, 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/10/07/northkorea-war-nuclear-russia-china/. Return to text.
  2. Kim Min-seo and Yeom Hyun-a, “N. Korea Sends 300 Workers to Russia, Violating UN Sanctions,” The Chosun Daily (website), February 14, 2024, https://www.chosun.com/english/north-korea-en/2024/02/14/7UDTOTEJHNDJ3GJCHAPIY742IY/. Return to text.
  3. Ken Moriyasu, “North Korea Most Likely Player to Use Nuclear Arms: Ex-U.S. Spy,” Nikkei Asia (website), August 26, 2023, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/N-Korea-at-crossroads/North-Korea-most-likely-player-to-use-nuclear-arms-ex-U.S.-spy. Return to text.
  4. Michael J. Mazarr, Understanding Deterrence (RAND Corporation, 2018), 1–2, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE295/RAND_PE295.pdf; Jean Mackenzie, “North Korean Weapons Are Killing Ukrainians. The Implications Are Far Bigger,” BBC (website), May 4, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-68933778; Shreyas Reddy, “North Korea Relies on Crypto Theft for up to Half of Foreign Income: UN Report,” NK News (website), March 21, 2024, https://www.nknews.org/2024/03/north-korea-relies-on-crypto-theft-for-up-to-half-of-foreign-income-un-report; and “North Korea Says It Will Launch Three New Spy Satellites in 2024” BBC (website), July 21, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-67851529. Return to text.
  5. David Welna, “ ‘Complete, Verifiable, Irreversible’ a Tough Goal for North Korea Summit,” NPR (website), June 6, 2018, https://www.npr.org/2018/06/06/617619192/complete-verifiable-irreversible-a-tough-goal-for-north-korea-summit; and David Albright, North Korean Nuclear Weapons Arsenal: New Estimates of Its Size and Configuration (Institute for Science and International Security, April 2023), https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/2023-north-korean-nuclear-weapons-arsenal-new-estimates/. Return to text.
  6. Mary Beth D. Nikitin, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs, CRS Report IF10472 (CRS, updated December 19, 2023), 1, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10472; Soo-Hyang Choi and Kantaro Komiya, “North Korea Fires ICBM After Condemning US War,” Reuters (website), December 18, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-korea-fires-ballistic-missile-south-korea-says-2023-12-17/; and Bruce W. Bennett et al., Countering the Risks of North Korean Nuclear Weapons (RAND Corporation, April 2021), ix, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA1015-1.html. Return to text.
  7. “Fact Sheet – U.S. Defense Contributions to Europe,” U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) (website), June 29, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3078056/fact-sheet-us-defense-contributions-to-europe/. Return to text.
  8. Katie Bo Lillis, “Russia Has Lost 87% of Troops It Had Prior to Start of Ukraine War, According to US Intelligence Assessment,” CNN (website), December 12, 2023, https://amp-cnn-com.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/amp.cnn.com/cnn/2023/12/12/politics/russia-troop-losses-us-intelligence-assessment/index.html; and Mary Glantz, “Ukraine War Takes a Toll on Russia,” United States Institute of Peace (USIP) (website), March 11, 2024, https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/03/ukraine-war-takes-toll-russia. Return to text.
  9. Murray Brewster, “Ravaged by War, Russia’s Army Is Rebuilding with Surprising Speed,” CBC News (website), February 23, 2024, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/russia-army-ukraine-war-1.7122808; Jesus Mesa, “Map Shows Russian Warships Passing Close to US,” Newsweek (website), June 12, 2024, https://www.newsweek.com/map-show-russian-warships-passing-close-us-1911774; David Axe, “Yes, Russia Really Is Sending 65-Year-Old Tanks to Assault Ukrainian Positions,” Forbes (website), February 9, 2024, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/02/09/yes-russia-really-is-sending-65-year-old-tanks-to-assault-ukrainian-positions/; and Micah McCartney, “North Korea Suspected of Sending 1970s Weapons to Russia,” Newsweek (website), May 13, 2024, https://www.newsweek.com/north-korea-suspected-sending-1970s-weapons-russia-1899829. Return to text.
  10. McCartney, “Sending 1970s Weapons to Russia”; “Russia’s War Mobilization Starves Crucial Oil Industry of Manpower,” Bloomberg (website), May 6, 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-05-06/russia-s-war-mobilization-starves-its-crucial-oil-and-gas-industry-of-manpower; Sylvie Kauffman, “The War in Ukraine Has, in Practice, Thrown Russia into China’s Arms,” Le Monde (website), April 17, 2024, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/opinion/article/2024/04/17/the-war-in-ukraine-has-in-practice-thrown-russia-into-china-s-arms_6668676_23.html; and “Exclusive: Russia Payment Hurdles with China Partners Intensified in August,” Reuters (website), August 30, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/russia-payment-hurdles-with-china-partners-intensified-august-sources-say-2024-08-30/. Return to text.
  11. Natalia Drozdiak et al., “Europe’s Race Against Time to Rebuild Militaries in Uncertain World,” The Japan Times (website), February 15, 2024, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2024/02/15/world/politics/can-europe-defend-itself-three-years/. Return to text.
  12. Michael Mazarr, Understanding Deterrence (RAND Corporation, 2018), 1, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE295/RAND_PE295.pdf. Return to text.
  13. Stephen M. Walt, “The Neurotic Fixations of U.S. Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy (website), February 12, 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/02/12/us-foreign-policy-bombing-deterrence-north-korea-nuclear-sanctions/; and Daniel R. Depetris, “Solutions to the North Korea Issue No Longer Include Denuclearisation,” The Interpreter (website), September 20, 2024, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/solutions-north-korea-issue-no-longer-include-denuclearisation. Return to text.
  14. “New US Sanctions Target North Korean Military Finances,” Reuters (website), March 27, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/us-north-korea-sanctions-target-individuals-russia-china-uae-based-firms-2024-03-27/; and U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of Public Affairs, “Justice Department Announces Court-Authorized Action to Disrupt Illicit Revenue Generation Efforts of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Information Technology Workers,” DOJ (website), October 18, 2023, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-court-authorized-action-disrupt-illicit-revenue-generation. Return to text.
  15. Reuters, “North Korean Displays Enough ICBMs to Overwhelm U.S. Defense System Against Them,” Deccan Herald (website), last updated December 17, 2023, https://www.deccanherald.com/world/north-korea-missile-has-15000-km-plus-range-can-reach-any where-in-us-japan-says-2815195; Phelim Kine, “North Korea’s Missile Capability: ICBMs and Beyond,” Politico (website), February 8, 2023, https://www.politico.com/news/2023/02/08/north-korea-missile-capability-icbms-00081993; and Reuters, “North Korea’s Kim Jong Un Vows to ‘Exponentially’ Boost Nuclear Arsenal,” NBC News (website), January 1, 2023, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/north-koreas-kim-jong-un-vows-exponentially-boost-nuclear-arsenal-rcna170354. Return to text.
  16. Markus Garlauskas and Lauren D. Gilbert, Deterrence Is Crumbling in Korea: How We Can Fix It (Atlantic Council, November 2023), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/deterrence-is-crumbling-in-korea-how-we-can-fix-it/. Return to text.
  17. Markus Garlauskas and Bruce W. Bennett, “Deterrence Is Crumbling”; Kwon Hyuk-chul, “Yoon’s Talk of ‘Point-of-Origin’ Strike Against N. Korea Has No Basis in Reality,” Hankyoreh (website), June 19, 2022, https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/1047525.html; and Sungmin Cho, “The Crisis in East Asia: Korea or Taiwan?,” War on the Rocks (website), April 4, 2024, https://warontherocks.com/2024/04/the-crisis-in-east-asia-korea-or-taiwan/. Return to text.
  18. Markus Garlauskas, The United States and Its Allies Must Be Ready to Deter a Two-Front War and Nuclear Attacks in East Asia (Atlantic Council, August 2023), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/the-united-states-and-its-allies-must-be-ready-to-deter-a-two-front-war-and-nuclear-attacks-in-east-asia/. Return to text.
  19. Caitlin Campbell and Christina L. Arabia, U.S.-South Korea Alliance: Issues for Congress, CRS Report IF11388 (CRS, September 2023), 1, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11388; Adam B. Lowther, “Kim’s Nukes, Yoon’s Qualms: Strengthening the US Nuclear Umbrella over South Korea,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs (November-December 2023), https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3588559/kims-nukes-yoons-qualms-strengthening-the-us-nuclear-umbrella-over-south-korea/; and Kim Seung-yeon, “66 Pct of S. Koreans Support Developing Own Nuclear Weapons: Poll,” Yonhap News Agency (website), June 27, 2024, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240627011200315. Return to text.
  20. Thomas G. Mahnken, “The National Security Strategy: Preparing for a Challenging World,” in Expert Commentary on the 2022 National Security Strategy, ed. Michaela Dodge and Matthew R. Costlow (National Institute Press, 2023), 101, https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/OP-Vol-3-No.-2.pdf. Return to text.
  21. Posture of United States Indo-Pacific Command and United States Forces Korea, Fiscal Year 2025, 118th Cong. (2024) (statement of General Paul J. LaCamera, Commander, United Nations Command; Commander, United States-Republic Of Korea Combined Forces Command; Commander, United States Forces Korea), https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/lacamera_statement_3212024.pdf. Return to text.
  22. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-433, 100 Stat. 2 (1986), https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/dod_reforms/Goldwater-NicholsDoDReordAct1986.pdf. Return to text.
  23. Clark A. Murdock and Mark F. Cancian, “Goldwater-Nichols 2.0,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (website), March 4, 2016, https://www.csis.org/analysis/goldwater-nichols-20. In his Naval War College paper, Captain Jerome E. Levy envisions a new Arctic Command and suggests “having unity of effort and purpose of high North initiatives from NORTHCOM, INDOPACOM and EUCOM under one command allows for seamless execution of many operations in theater at once.” Jerome E. Levy, “Establishing the Permanent Presence of the United States in the Arctic” (Naval War College, 2023), 6, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/trecms/pdf/AD1207535.pdf. See also Edward Marks, “Rethinking the Geographic Combatant Commands,” InterAgency Journal 1, no. 1 (Fall 2010): 19–23, https://thesimonscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/IAJ-1-1-pg19-23.pdf. Return to text.
  24. Edward J. Drea et al., History of the Unified Command Plan 1946–2012 ( Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013), 2, 62, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/History/Institutional/Command_Plan.pdf. Return to text.
  25. USFK briefing on Northeast Asia Command, 1997, cleared of FOUO controls in 2022. Return to text.
  26. National Defense Strategy Commission, Providing for the Common Defense: The Assessment and Recommendations of the National Defense Strategy Commission (USIP, 2018), https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-11/providing-for-the-common-defense.pdf. Return to text.
  27. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), The Joint Force, Joint Publication (JP) 1-2 ( JCS, June 2020), IV-3. Return to text.
  28. This concept is borrowed from Marine Captain John T. Quinn II, who proposed two large geographic commands, Atlantic and Pacific, with several other mission-focused commands inside or adjacent to these broad areas of responsibility. John T. Quinn II, “Toward a New Strategic Framework: A Unified Command Plan for the New World Order” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1993), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA277042.pdf; and Theresa Hitchens, “Exclusive: STRATCOM Creates Global Ops Center for All Domain,” Breaking Defense (website), September 2, 2020, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/09/exclusive-stratcom-creates-global-ops-center-for-all-domain/. Return to text.
  29. Tim Kelly et al., “US Eyes Change to Military Command in Japan as China Threat Looms, Sources Say,” Reuters (website), March 25, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/us-japan-plan-biggest-upgrade-security-pact-more-than-60-years-ft-reports-2024-03-24/; Kelly A. Grieco and Jennifer Kavanaugh, “Geography Is a Dealbreaker for Coalition Building in Asia,” Lawfare (website), July 14, 2024, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/geography-is-a-dealbreaker-for-coalition-building-in-asia; and Robert D. Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific (Random House, 2014), xx. Return to text.
  30. Markus Garlauskas, The United States and Its Allies Must Be Ready to Deter a Two-Front War and Nuclear Attacks in East Asia (Atlantic Council, August 2023), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/the-united-states-and-its-allies-must-be-ready-to-deter-a-two-front-war-and-nuclear-attacks-in-east-asia/. Return to text.
  31. For an explanation of “the OODA loop,” see Alastair Luft, “The OODA Loop and the Half-Beat,” The Strategy Bridge (website), March 17, 2020, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2020/3/17/the-ooda-loop-and-the-half-beat. Return to text.
  32. Stephen Losey, “US Air Force Wants to Retire All A-10s by 2029,” Defense News (website), March 9, 2023, https://www.defensenews.com/air/2023/03/09/us-air-force-wants-to-retire-all-a-10s-by-2029/. Return to text.
  33. Jane Harman et al., Providing for the Common Defense: The Assessment and Recommendations of the National Defense Strategy Commission (Commission on the National Defense Strategy, July 2024), https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-11/providing-for-the-common-defense.pdf. Return to text.