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Aug. 29, 2024

Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander: A Reappraisal

Richard D. Hooker Jr.
©2024 Richard D. Hooker Jr.

ABSTRACT: This article argues that the historical assessment of Dwight D. Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force in World War II lacks objectivity and balance. It identifies several strategic errors and missteps attributable to Eisenhower, which resulted in severe casualties and prolonged the war in Europe. The conclusions can help US military practitioners and policymakers assess the background and qualities required for successful theater command during wartime and senior commanders’ performances.

Keywords: Dwight D. Eisenhower, World War II, strategy, command, Joint

 

Dwight D. Eisenhower rose from obscurity soon after the United States entered World War II in 1941 to achieve dizzying heights, first, as Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force in the victorious campaigns in Europe and, later, as the Chief of Staff of the Army, Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO, and president of the United States. His infectious grin, folksy persona, and consistently favorable press made him beloved at home and abroad. As a coalition commander with numerous fractious allies, Eisenhower possessed diplomatic skills that contributed to victory in World War II. History has endowed him with a wartime reputation unmatched by any other World War II commander, including Douglas MacArthur. A closer examination, however, stripped of the positive bias that often accompanies victorious commanders in wartime and after, suggests Eisenhower committed serious mistakes that may have lengthened the war and led to major and unnecessary loss of life. Eisenhower’s errors slowed the campaign and led to tens of thousands of deaths, which more skillful and decisive leadership could have prevented.

Eisenhower on the Rise

Like many of his United States Military Academy class of 1915, Eisenhower was relegated to training duties during World War I and did not see combat overseas. Although not an academic standout at the academy, he gained a reputation as a superb staff officer in the interwar period, serving successively under Generals Fox Conner, John J. Pershing, and MacArthur. After the German invasion of Poland in 1939, Eisenhower returned from the Philippines and served brief stints as a battalion commander, regimental executive officer, and corps and field army chief of staff. Following the Pearl Harbor attack, he was assigned to the War Plans Division in Washington, DC, where he was closely associated with Chief of Staff of the Army General George C. Marshall and formed a strong relationship that lasted throughout the war. Largely through Marshall’s patronage, Eisenhower was catapulted from lieutenant colonel to four stars in 23 months—without the combat or command experience required of most other senior commanders.1

Based on Eisenhower’s performance in the War Plans Division, Marshall nominated him to command all US and Allied forces in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy and, later, to command the Normandy Invasion in 1944. This rapid ascent meant Eisenhower never commanded at the brigade, division, corps, field army, or army group level. With no previous wartime service or experience in command of large formations, Eisenhower suffered setbacks in North Africa. His support of pro-Vichy French Admiral François Darlan caused a political firestorm, and the initial US defeat at the Kasserine Pass tarnished his reputation. Nevertheless, British success at the Battles of El-Alamein and the growing strength of US forces drove German troops out of North Africa in May 1943. With strong land, air, and sea superiority, Allied forces took Sicily in five weeks. Most German forces escaped to the mainland, however, and stymied the Allied offensive in Italy for months with their stubborn defense.2

In December 1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt named Eisenhower Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, a position he held until the war’s end. On June 6, 1944, the campaign commenced with the Normandy Invasion and ended with the surrender of all German forces on May 7, 1945. Throughout this period, Eisenhower commanded enormous forces: the British 21st Army Group (First Canadian Army and Second British Army), the US 12th Army Group (First, Third, Ninth, and, later, Fifteenth Armies), the 6th Army Group (Seventh Army and French First Army), the First Allied Airborne Army, the US 9th Air Force (tactical), and the British 2nd Tactical Air Force. Strategic bomber forces based in the United Kingdom and substantial Allied naval forces also came under Eisenhower’s command for the initial invasion phase. Ultimately, Eisenhower commanded 91 divisions (61 infantry, 25 armored, and 5 airborne). Unlike the Germans, who still relied heavily on horses for transport, all Allied artillery and supply trains were motorized or mechanized, and all US infantry divisions were typically supported by an independent tank battalion and tank destroyer battalion—making them, at this stage of the war, the equivalent of German panzer divisions.3

After the Normandy Invasion

In June 1944, Eisenhower faced 58 German divisions, including 33 low-quality static or reserve divisions with minimal transport, 9 panzer divisions, and 1 panzer grenadier division. Most German artillery was horse drawn. The Luftwaffe had been virtually destroyed, giving the Allies crushing air superiority. By 1944, the US industrial base functioned at near-maximum capacity, while German fuel and ammunition supplies ran short due to ceaseless Allied bombing and the demands of the far larger Eastern Front. While talented German commanders did exist in the European theater, five years of intense warfare had bled many German formations white, with huge numbers of junior and mid-level leaders dead or in captivity.4

The Battle of the Atlantic tilted decisively in the Allies’ favor, and US convoys now crossed back and forth at will. Allied air forces in Europe included 13,000 aircraft, compared to fewer than 2,000 serviceable German planes (most of which remained in Germany to defend against the Allied strategic bombing campaign). By early 1945, the German Army in the west possessed the equivalent of 26 divisions, with more than 200 divisions facing the Soviets in the east. Britain’s Ultra project also conferred an enormous advantage by providing the Allies with high-level signal intelligence. Eisenhower possessed overwhelming superiority over his German opponents in combat power, logistics, materiel, intelligence, airpower, and sea power. Only in combat experience did the Germans enjoy some superiority.5

The campaign began with successful landings in Normandy in early June 1944, enabling the Allies to put strong forces ashore. For weeks, a stout German defense held up the Allies in the hedgerows, but by mid-August, the Allies had broken through in Operation Cobra. Here, they missed the first great opportunity to deal a fatal blow to the Wehrmacht in the west. By August 8, 1944, US forces from the south and British and Canadian forces from the north encircled German Army Group B (Fifth Panzer Army and Seventh Army) in the Falaise pocket. In the ensuing battle, up to 10,000 German soldiers were killed, and 50,000 were captured, but perhaps 200,000 escaped.

For decades, British and American commanders and historians have argued over who is to blame. No senior Allied commander pushed to exploit the opportunity and close the gap. Eisenhower, still in England, deferred to General Bernard Montgomery, commander of 21st Army Group and, at that stage, the overall ground commander, who moved cautiously, while General Omar Bradley, commander of 12th Army Group, worried about a “broken neck” at Falaise. German forces were weakened, especially in artillery and armored vehicles. Although they had lost most of their equipment, the German soldiers who escaped the pocket eventually manned new formations and confronted the Allies in fierce fighting for months.6

Eisenhower’s deference to Montgomery, far more senior and combat experienced, would play out for much of the campaign, with doleful consequences. Vainglorious and egoistical, like George Patton, Montgomery exhibited little of Patton’s daring and aggressiveness, preferring to conduct set-piece battles with overwhelming force. Tasked to open the port of Antwerp, vital to campaign logistics, Montgomery dithered, contributing to a supply crisis that nearly stopped Allied forces in their tracks in early fall 1944. When in full operation, Antwerp reduced the travel distance from the port to advanced depots (the channel ports were up to 400 miles away, Antwerp only 65) and increased logistical throughput; 54 divisions could be supplied, as opposed to only 21 from Cherbourg.7

Advanced British units captured the port in early September, its port facilities intact. Nevertheless, Antwerp lay approximately 55 miles up the Scheldt River estuary, and that terrain controlled access to the port from the North Sea. With the German forces in Normandy in full retreat, the capture of Antwerp and its approaches raised the possibility that the war in Europe could end in 1944. Logistical support for the campaign relied on access to the port, and the area was not defended by strong German forces. As he explained in his memoirs, Montgomery considered it more “worthwhile” to press on toward the Rhine River and the Ruhr. Eisenhower did not press the point. The Germans sped reinforcements through the hastily assembled First Parachute Army and Fifteenth Army (originally posted near the Pas-de-Calais, where Hitler expected the invasion to occur) to secure the Scheldt River’s northern and southern banks. A rapid advance by Montgomery’s lead elements across the Zuid-Beveland peninsula would have trapped the 86,000 soldiers of the Fifteenth Army, but the 21st Army Group would not clear the approaches until late November. By then, logistical shortages had crippled the advance, giving the Germans time to regroup.8

Figure 1. Northwest France 1944 breakout
(Map courtesy of the Department of History, United States Military Academy, New York)

The historical record clearly shows that Montgomery considered his drive on the Ruhr more important than securing the approaches to Antwerp, though any chance of finishing off the fleeing remnants of the German Army depended on it. So did Eisenhower, who later wrote,

. . . [M]y decision to concentrate our efforts in this attempt to thrust into the heart of Germany before the enemy could consolidate his defenses along the Rhine had resulted in a delay in opening Antwerp and in making the port available as our main supply base. I took full responsibility for this, and I believe that the possible and actual results warranted the calculated risk involved.9

On September 1, 1944, Eisenhower took command of all ground troops, in addition to his responsibilities as Supreme Commander, against Montgomery’s strong objections. Even as he struggled with Montgomery, he approved Operation Market Garden, the failed attempt to vault the Rhine River by seizing the bridges at Arnhem with the 1st Allied Airborne Army. Conducted from September 17 to 25, 1944 (and executed despite Bradley’s objections), Operation Market Garden fell short of its ambitious goals. The British 1st Airborne Division was destroyed, while the US 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions also took high losses, as the British XXX Corps fell far behind schedule in linking up with the airborne forces. The diversion of hundreds of C-47 transport aircraft for Operation Market Garden also hampered theater logistical support. The smaller and more lightly equipped US airborne divisions were left in the line as conventional infantry for many weeks, sapping their battle worthiness. Described by Pulitzer prize–winning author Rick Atkinson as “a poor plan with deficient intelligence, haphazard execution, and indifferent generalship,” Operation Market Garden proved inordinately wasteful in time, resources, and lives—for little gain. Another author describes the defeat as “absolute and terrible.” German forces would hold Arnhem until mid-April 1945.10

As Operation Market Garden foundered, more tragedy unfolded to the south, in the Hürtgen Forest, in the US First Army’s zone of attack. Located between Aachen and the Ruhr River, the densely wooded Hürtgenwald was ideal for defense, studded with pillboxes and heavily mined. It was the longest single battle the US Army ever fought, in terrain where American advantages in airpower, artillery, and armor could not be brought to bear. In mid-September, General Courtney Hodges, First Army’s commander, ordered the 9th Infantry Division to enter and clear the forest, ostensibly to prevent the German forces there from reinforcing the Aachen defenders to the north. One month later, the 28th Infantry Division replaced the 9th, which had suffered grievous losses. At this point, the 28th was the only division in the 12th Army Group engaged with the enemy, warranting a visit from Eisenhower and Bradley on November 8, 1944. In four weeks of bitter fighting, the 28th was effectively destroyed. The 1st, 4th, 8th, and 83d Infantry Divisions assumed its mission, all of which suffered cruelly. Ultimately, the US Army sustained more than 50,000 casualties in the battle. The Hürtgenwald was not cleared until mid-February 1945. The official Army historian describes the battle as “a misconceived and basically fruitless battle that should have been avoided.”11

Hodges was largely to blame for the headlong bludgeoning that marked the Hürtgen battle. Corps and division commanders conducted little reconnaissance, and First Army intelligence reports underestimated the strength of the German defense. The forces committed lacked the combat strength to achieve their objectives, but First Army reinforced failure with the piecemeal replacement of divisions one after another. Hodges rarely left his headquarters in Spa, a Belgian resort town. A famously toxic leader, he relieved 10 corps and division commanders during the campaign—far more than any other US Army commander. In Atkinson’s words, Hodges was “the wrong general to command First Army . . . peremptory and inarticulate.” Despite his catastrophic losses, Hodges survived the disaster and commanded the First Army through the end of the war.12

As these events unfolded, General Jacob L. Devers’s 6th Army Group rapidly moved up the Rhone River valley after it invaded southern France in mid-August 1944 in Operation Dragoon. With logistical support from the ports in Marseille and Toulon, 6th Army Group advanced 300 miles in 26 days, linking up with 12th Army Group on September 15, 1944, and coming under the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force’s (SHAEF) control. After tough fighting in the Vosges Mountains, the First French Army took Strasbourg on November 23, 1944. The next day, Lieutenant General Alexander M. Patch’s Seventh Army reached the Rhine River.13

In a face-to-face meeting with Eisenhower in Vittel on November 24, 1944, Devers pleaded for permission to cross the weakly defended Rhine River. The 6th Army Group boasted 350,000 troops and had trained for the river crossing. Seven crossing sites were prepared, and an intact bridge at Rastatt, 25 miles north of Strasbourg, led directly to Karlsruhe and a striking opportunity to trap the German 1st Army between Patton and Patch, drive to the Saar industrial basin, and rupture the Western Front. With support from the experienced Patch and Brigadier General Garrison H. Davidson, the Seventh Army engineer, Devers based his views on reconnaissance, assessment of the terrain, and weak enemy opposition. Patton also thought the operation propitious. Yet Eisenhower demurred.14

Figure 2. 6th Army Group front
(Source: Map 30 from Jeffery J. Clarke and Robert Ross Smith, Rivera to the Rhine [Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1993])

Inherent caution and a desire to proceed methodically along the line may explain Eisenhower’s views, but a well-documented personal antipathy undoubtedly played a role. Devers was another of Marshall’s protégés, and he and Eisenhower were rivals. Like many others, Devers was senior to Eisenhower at the outbreak of the war and achieved general’s rank before him. Affable and competent, Devers commanded the European theater of operations in England in 1943 and, in that capacity, denied Eisenhower’s request to send four bomber groups to Italy, a decision Marshall and the Combined Chiefs of Staff seconded. A petty animus developed; in a confidential ranking of general officers Eisenhower submitted to Marshall late in the war, Devers appeared near the bottom. Eisenhower’s decision to halt Devers and forego a Rhine River crossing in November 1944 prevented a viable chance to end the war in early 1945.15

Less than one month later, 30 German divisions burst from the Ardennes to split the Allies and drive for the logistics hub at Antwerp. Although SHAEF believed the Germans incapable of major offensive operations, the logistical challenges that stalled the campaign and the tens of thousands of German veterans who escaped the battle for Normandy provided time and manpower for one last German push. The heavily forested Ardennes was left weakly defended, a rest and training area for green or exhausted divisions, though the Germans had used it as an invasion route in the 1940 Battle of France. The Ardennes counteroffensive (the Battle of the Bulge), in scope and scale, would later be seen as the greatest intelligence failure of the war in Europe.16

The irruption of German forces from the Ardennes on December 16, 1944, came as a stunning surprise. Undetected by Allied intelligence, the Germans amassed more than 1,200 tanks and assault guns and more than 4,200 artillery and anti-tank guns in assembly areas east of the Rhine River. The German Fifth Panzer and Sixth Panzer Armies spearheaded the assault, supported by the Fifteenth Army on the northern flank and the Seventh Army on the southern flank. Within days, a 60-mile “bulge” in the Allied lines opened. Poor flying weather grounded Allied air forces, which helped the Germans press toward the Meuse River crossings. The US 99th Infantry Division at the Elsenborn Ridge and the US 7th Armored and 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions at Bastogne and St. Vith slowed the German advance with heroic resistance, aided by low German fuel reserves and improved flying weather. By December 23, 1944, it was clear the attempt to cross the Meuse River would fail.17

At the height of the Battle of the Bulge, Eisenhower ordered Devers to give up forces to Bradley, attack north with Patch’s Seventh Army, and attack south to clear out the Colmar pocket with Jean de Lattre de Tassigny’s First French Army. This dissipation ensured neither operation went well. More was to follow. On December 26, 1944, SHAEF ordered Devers to withdraw 40 miles west, give up Strasbourg, and “hang on” until the fight in the Bulge stabilized. A furious Charles de Gaulle, now the political head of France, ordered French forces to disregard all such orders and to make Strasbourg “another Stalingrad.” Lieutenant General Walter Bedell “Beetle” Smith, Eisenhower’s famously acerbic chief of staff, dismissed Devers’s protests as evidence of “disloyalty.” The political crisis escalated and threatened to engulf the Allies until Winston Churchill brokered a meeting with de Gaulle and Eisenhower, after which the Supreme Commander rescinded the order.18

Meanwhile, a large salient remained in 12th Army Group’s defensive sector. In a controversial decision, Eisenhower detached the US Ninth and First Armies and placed them under Montgomery’s control on the northern shoulder, leaving Bradley with only the Third Army. Protesting that his communications remained reliable, Bradley threatened resignation, further stoking coalition frictions. By late December, an opportunity existed to pinch off the northern and southern shoulders of the Bulge—now approximately 40 by 60 miles—and kill or capture the 400,000 German soldiers inside the pocket.19

As at Falaise, this attempt was stillborn. Although pushed aggressively by Patton, Eisenhower could not move Montgomery to attack. German forces were pushed out of the Bulge from west to east, instead of being trapped in converging attacks from north to south, as US doctrine called for at the time. While German losses were heavy, two German field armies escaped, lengthening the war by months. From December 16, 1944, to January 25, 1945, US casualties totaled almost 90,000, including more than 19,000 dead and 23,000 taken prisoner. The Battle of the Bulge accounted for 10 percent of all US casualties in World War II.20

Through February and March 1945, Eisenhower’s three army groups approached the Rhine River and began preparations to cross. By late March, Allied forces were established on the east bank of the Rhine River and moving forward. The end was in sight. As Soviet forces approached Berlin from the east, German forces in the west began to disintegrate, though small enclaves of fierce resistance remained. The Ruhr pocket collapsed on April 18, 1945, with a staggering 325,000 prisoners taken. Hitler committed suicide in the Führerbunker on April 30, 1945, and hostilities ceased on May 8, 1945. The victory was Eisenhower’s. But at what cost?21

Hindsight

The campaign in Northwest Europe from June 1944 to May 1945 resulted in 780,860 Allied casualties, including 165,590 killed in action. Of that total, the United States suffered 523,110 casualties, with 109,820 killed or missing in action, 356,660 wounded, and 56,630 US soldiers taken prisoner. Ninety days into the campaign, the infantry regiments in US divisions had suffered heavy casualties, precipitating a severe manpower crisis in early fall 1944. In December that year, SHAEF was forced to break up the infantry regiments in the 42nd, 63rd, 69th, and 70th Infantry Divisions from 6th Army Group for use as infantry replacements in other divisions. By the war’s end, 13 US divisions had suffered 100 percent casualties, with 5 more divisions suffering 200 percent casualties. American forces lost 11,000 tanks—the equivalent of almost the entire armored force in the European theater of operations. In 10 months of campaigning, the combat echelon of Eisenhower’s forces was destroyed and reconstituted.22

Throughout the campaign, Eisenhower insisted on an orderly advance across Northwest Europe as his armies closed on the Rhine River—the much debated “Broad Front” strategy. Given SHAEF’s logistical difficulties, supplying all three army groups in a general advance from Normandy to the Ruhr and beyond was more challenging than the alternative—a single main effort, with supporting attacks on the flanks.23

Montgomery opposed Eisenhower’s decision against this course of action and pressed for primacy for 21st Army Group in the north with priority for logistics and additional US forces. Bradley and Patton, 12th Army Group’s spearhead, and Devers—who was denied an early opportunity to leap the Rhine River—also opposed the decision. Phase line by phase line, the armies advanced in tandem, foregoing opportunities to break open the front or exploit opportunities in a more fluid war of movement. Worried about exposed flanks, sensitive to national considerations, and lacking Montgomery’s confidence and Patton’s boldness, Eisenhower proceeded cautiously. This safer but slower approach gave a resilient German Army opportunities to rally and reconstitute. Admittedly a British partisan, Chester Wilmot was probably correct when he observed:

In the role of Supreme Commander [Eisenhower] had shown himself to be the military statesman rather than the generalissimo . . . [H]e was conscious of his lack of experience in the tactical handling of armies, and this gave him a sense of professional inferiority in dealing with men like Montgomery and Patton who had been through the mill of command at every level.24

Given these shortcomings, why was Eisenhower retained in command? The answer must be speculative, but Marshall’s firm support was likely overriding. Roosevelt relied on Marshall’s judgment throughout the war and never intervened unilaterally to remove senior military leaders. The negative impact of replacing the Supreme Commander mid-campaign also must have weighed heavily. The administration and the War Department had invested in Eisenhower as the American face of the war in Europe. His relief would have reenergized British calls for Montgomery to assume overall control—an unacceptable option. A different selection in late 1943 or early 1944 would have been politically and militarily feasible, but after D-Day, only an outright military disaster could have justified Eisenhower’s relief.

Conclusion

We cannot know if other generals would have outperformed Eisenhower. Montgomery’s battle experience and seniority did not produce striking results in 1944–45. The results of the campaign in northwest Europe in 1944–45 suggest, however, a more senior and experienced American would have enjoyed more prestige and credibility with the British and perhaps provided more forceful and aggressive leadership. Several leaders were available, all senior to Eisenhower at the outbreak of war and with superior professional résumés.

These leaders included:

  • Devers, commissioned in 1909, with command experience at the division level and of the Armored Force and the European theater of operations by 1943;
  • Patch, commissioned in 1913, with World War I combat experience and regimental-, division-, and corps-level command experience by 1943;
  • Robert L. Eichelberger, commissioned in 1909, with combat experience in Siberia in 1920 (where he was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross) and regimental-, division-, and corps-level command experience by 1943;
  • and Walter Krueger, commissioned in 1909, with World War I combat experience and command experience at the regimental, brigade, division, corps and field-army level by 1941. (At one point, Krueger wore three stars with then-Colonel Eisenhower as his chief of staff. Krueger also spoke French and German fluently.)

All were noted as aggressive and successful senior commanders who worked well in coalition settings, served with great distinction in World War II at the army- or army-group level, and achieved four-star rank.25

Given his relative youth, inexperience, and meteoric rise, Eisenhower faced immense challenges, and leading the Allies to victory was no small achievement in the greatest war in history. The cost was high, however, and Eisenhower’s learning curve was steep. Given his advantages—overwhelming force, crushing air dominance, superior intelligence, secure sea lanes of communication, near-limitless industrial capacity, and the diversion of German resources to the far larger Eastern Front—an Allied victory by summer 1945 seemed inevitable. Most scholarship on Eisenhower’s generalship is laudatory and deferential. The few, often indirect critics of his leadership as Supreme Commander pass blame or responsibility for strategic missteps onto the War Department, Eisenhower’s staff, or subordinate commanders—but Eisenhower’s responsibility as Supreme Commander cannot be fairly deflected onto others. As he admitted, “No major effort takes place in this Theater by ground, sea or air except with my approval and no one in the Allied Command presumes to question my supreme authority and responsibility for the whole campaign.” Eight decades later, a more balanced assessment is in order.26

 

Richard D. Hooker Jr.
Richard D. Hooker Jr. is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council and senior associate at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center. He is the former National Security Council senior director for Europe and Russia. He authored The High Ground: Leading in Peace and War (Casemate, 2023).

 

Endnotes

  1. Marshall presumably elevated Eisenhower over others with stronger qualifications because of his perceived excellence as a planner and staff officer, his loyalty and sense of obligation to Marshall, and his similar career arc; like Eisenhower, Marshall was principally a staff officer without credentials as a senior commander. See Merle Miller, Ike the Soldier: As They Knew Him (New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1987). Return to text.
  2. Of the five officers who commanded field armies in Europe (Courtney Hicks Hodges, George S. Patton, Alexander M. Patch, William Hood Simpson, and Leonard T. Gerow), all saw combat during World War I; 16 of 34 US corps commanders were World War I combat veterans. Robert H. Berlin, U.S. Army World War II Corps Commanders: A Composite Biography (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College [CGSC], Combat Studies Institute, 1989), 7. Eisenhower’s performance in North Africa and Sicily is described in Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower, vol. 1, Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect, 1890–1952 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 210–21. See also Don Cook, “Eisenhower,” in The War Lords: Military Commanders of the Twentieth Century, ed. Michael Carver (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976), 515–22. Return to text.
  3. The 6th Army Group came under the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) on September 15, 1944, after the successful invasion of southern France. The German Panzer Division was authorized two tank battalions in late 1944, but most operated well below establishment due to battle losses and the difficulty of replacement. Assault guns were often substituted for main battle tanks. Matthew Cooper, The German Army 1933–1945: Its Political and Military Failure (New York: Stein and Day, 1978), 488. See also Army Ground Forces Historical Section, History of the Armored Force, Command and Center, Army Ground Force Study no. 27 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CGSC, 1951), 4, 47, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA955008; and Christopher R. Gabel, Seek, Strike and Destroy: U.S. Army Tank Destroyer Doctrine in World War II, Leavenworth Papers no. 12 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CGSC Combat Studies Institute, September 1985), 56, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA532138.pdf. Return to text.
  4. Richard P. Hallion, D-Day 1944: Airpower over the Normandy Beaches and Beyond (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1994), 2. Return to text.
  5. These disparities included 425 German fighters in Western Europe in June 1944, compared to more than 13,000 Allied aircraft supporting SHAEF. German Air Ministry, The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force (1933 to 1945) (London: Air Ministry, 1948), 333. See also Gordon A. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, Center of Military History (CMH) Publication (Pub) 7-4, United States Army in World War II: The European Theater of Operations, ed. Kent Roberts Greenfield (1951; repr., Washington, DC: US Army CMH, 2002), 242, https://history.army.mil/books/wwii/7-4/7-4_contents.htm. The figure of 200,000 escaped German soldiers is from Martin Blumenson, as cited in William Weidner, “The Falaise Gap: Ike vs. Monty and a Failure of Command,” WWII Quarterly 3, no. 3 (Spring 2012): 66–79, https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/the-falaise-gap-ike-vs-monty-and-a-failure-of-command/; “Kriegsmarine in Normandy: Battle of Normandy,” D-Day Overlord (website), n.d., accessed July 22, 2024, https://www.dday-overlord.com/en/d-day/german-forces/kriegsmarine. Return to text.
  6. “The supreme commander had proven an indifferent field marshal in Tunisia, on Sicily, and during the planning for Anzio; now, at Falaise, he continued that deficiency, watching passively for more than a week without recognizing or rectifying the command shortcomings of his two chief lieutenants.” Rick Atkinson, The Guns at Last Light: The War in Western Europe 1944–1945 (New York: Henry Holt, 2013), 163. “General Bradley, to avoid colliding with the British forces coming from the north, firmly ordered Patton to halt at Argentan.” Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command, CMH Pub 7-1, US Army in World War II: European Theater of Operations, ed. Kent Roberts Greenfield (1954; repr., Washington, DC: CMH, 1989), 214, https://history.army.mil/html/books/007/7-1/CMH_Pub_7-1.pdf. See also Omar Nelson Bradley, A Soldier’s Story (New York: Henry Holt, 1951), 377; and David Eisenhower, Eisenhower at War 1943–1945 (New York: Random House, 1986), 410. Return to text.
  7. Commissioned in 1908, Montgomery served throughout World War I and was severely wounded. He commanded a division in the battle for France, a corps in England, and, later, the British 8th Army in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy. Operation Market Garden, daring to the extreme, appeared to be an exception to Montgomery’s customary caution. The airborne forces employed, however, were SHAEF’s strategic reserve and not part of 21st Army Group. The importance of Antwerp is discussed in Raymond E. Bell Jr., “The Allies’ Biggest Blunder?,” WWII Quarterly 8, no. 2 (Winter 2017): 16–27, https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/the-allies-biggest-blunder/. Return to text.
  8. “In retrospect it can be seen that the failure to clear the [Scheldt River] estuary . . . was the most calamitous flaw in the post-Normandy campaign.” John Keegan, The Second World War (Norwalk, CT: Easton Press, 1989), 437. Consistent with his generalship throughout the campaign, Montgomery aggressively refused to tie down more than a bare minimum of his troops to deal with the defenders of the Scheldt River estuary. Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), 293, 351. See also Bernard L. Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery (Cleveland, OH: World Publishing Company, 1958), 250. Return to text.
  9. “Until the middle of October, the enemy could have broken through at any point he liked, with ease, and would then be able to cross the Rhine and thrust deep into Germany almost unhindered.” Siegfried Westphal, The German Army in the West (London: Cassell, 1951), 173–74. See also Dwight D. Eisenhower, Eisenhower’s Own Story of the War: The Complete Report by the Supreme Commander on the War in Europe from the Day of Invasion to the Day of Victory (New York: Arco Publishing Company, 1946), 68. Return to text.
  10. Norman F. Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence (London: Pimlico, 1994), 148. See also Pogue, Supreme Command, 287; and Atkinson, Guns at Last Light, 286, 288. In another major blow to theater logistics, 261 C-47s were lost. Return to text.
  11. See Thomas G. Bradbeer, “General Cota and the Battle of the Hürtgen Forest: A Failure of Battle Command?,” Army History no. 75 (Spring 2010): 35–36, https://history.army.mil/armyhistory/AH75(W)_replacement.pdf. See also Charles B. MacDonald, The Battle of the Huertgen Forest (New York: J. B. Lippencott, 1963), 205. Return to text.
  12. Atkinson, Guns at Last Light, 311. Return to text.
  13. The 6th Army Group’s operations in November 1944 are discussed in detail in Jeffrey J. Clarke and Robert Ross Smith, Riviera to the Rhine, CMH Pub 7-10, United States Army in World War II: European Theater of Operations, ed. Stetson Conn (Washington, DC: CMH, 1993), 363–445, https://history.army.mil/html/books/007/7-10-1/CMH_Pub_7-10-1.pdf. Return to text.
  14. Clarke and Ross, Riviera to the Rhine, 445. After the war, opposing German commanders agreed that the Allies missed a major opportunity to shorten the war due to Eisenhower’s decision. David P. Colley, The Folly of Generals: How Eisenhower’s Broad Front Strategy Lengthened World War II (Philadelphia: Casemate, 2021), 142. See also Atkinson, Guns at Last Light, 373–76; and Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers, 1885–1940 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974), 583. Return to text.
  15. Rick Atkinson, “Eisenhower Rising: The Ascent of an Uncommon Man” (Harmon Memorial Lecture 55, United States Air Force Academy, El Paso County, CO, March 5, 2013), https://www.usafa.edu/app/uploads/Harmon55.pdf; and James Scott Wheeler, Jacob L. Devers: A General’s Life (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2015), 227. See also Colley, Folly of Generals, 145; and Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, A General’s Life: An Autobiography (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 390. Return to text.
  16. Carlo D’Este, Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life (New York: Henry Holt, 2002), 640. Return to text.
  17. Hugh M. Cole, The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge, CMH Pub 7-8-1, US Army in World War II: European Theater of Operations, ed. Stetson Conn (1965; repr., Washington, DC: CMH, 1993), https://history.army.mil/html/books/007/7-8-1/CMH_Pub_7-8-1.pdf. Return to text.
  18. Atkinson, Guns at Last Light, 476–81. “Eisenhower’s relations with Devers had none of the warmth or patience of the Supreme Commander’s dealings with his friends in the 12th Army Group. Instead, there was a too-ready willingness to adopt an accusatory tone at the least hint of anything going wrong.” Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants, 551. See also Wheeler, Jacob L. Devers, 372. Return to text.
  19. In his memoirs, Eisenhower writes, “the command plan worked and there was generally universal acceptance of its necessity at the time.” Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York: Doubleday, 1948), 395. In contrast, Bradley reported his reactions as “dumbfounded . . . shocked . . . [and] a slap in the face.” Bradley and Blair, A General’s Life, 363. Return to text.
  20. Keith Huxon, “The Battle of the Bulge,” National WWII Museum (website), December 18, 2019, https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/battle-of-the-bulge. See also Gary W. Whitehead, “Missed Opportunity: Reducing the Bulge” (Strategic Research Project, US Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 2001), 12, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA390604.pdf. The 21st Army Group recorded 1,400 casualties with 200 killed in action in the Bulge. Donna Miles, American Forces Press Service, “Battle of the Bulge Remembered 60 Years Later,” CMH (website), December 14, 2004, https://history.army.mil/html/reference/bulge/DoD-BotB-60-years-later.html. Return to text.
  21. Edward N. Bedessemn, Central Europe, CMH Publication 72-36, U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II (Washington, DC: CMH), 23, https://history.army.mil/html/books/072/72-36/CMH_Pub_72-36.pdf. Return to text.
  22. John Ellis, The World War II Databook: The Essential Facts and Figures for All the Combatants (London: Aurum Press, 1993), 256; and Roland G. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, vol. 2, September 1944–May 1945, CMH Pub 7-3-1, United States Army in World War II: The European Theater of Operations, ed. Kent Roberts Greenfield (1959; repr., Washington, DC: CMH, 1995), 322, https://history.army.mil/html/books/007/7-3-1/CMH_Pub_7-3-1.pdf. See also Atkinson, Guns at Last Light, 633. Tank losses are found in Steven Zaloga, Armored Champion: The Top Tanks of World War II (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2015), 239, 276–77. Return to text.
  23. “[T]he virtues of concentration did not rank high in Eisenhower’s methods of generalship.” Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants, 580. See also Pogue, Supreme Command, 249. Return to text.
  24. Ladislas Farago, Patton: Ordeal and Triumph (New York: I. Obolensky, 1963), 628. Return to text.
  25. During Devers’s tenure with the Armored Force, it grew from 2 armored divisions to 16, with 63 independent tank battalions. Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley, The Organization of Ground Combat Troops, CMH Pub 2-1, United States Army in World War II: The Army Ground Forces (1947; repr., Washington, DC: CMH, 1987), 333–35, https://history.army.mil/html/books/002/2-1/CMH_Pub_2-1.pdf; Paul Chwialkowski, In Caesar’s Shadow: The Life of General Robert Eichelberger (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993); William K. Wyant, Sandy Patch: A Biography of Lt. Gen. Alexander M. Patch (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1991); and Kevin C. Holzimmer, General Walter Krueger: Unsung Hero of the Pacific War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2022). See also Wheeler, Jacob L. Devers. Eichelberger and Krueger served in the Pacific but could have been made available; for example, Patch was moved from the Pacific to Europe in early 1944 after commanding a corps on Guadalcanal. Return to text.
  26. Dwight D. Eisenhower to George C. Marshall, memorandum, August 19, 1944, as cited in Pogue, Supreme Command, 264. Return to text.
 

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